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This thesis is primarily concerned with the question of personality in international law. 
In order to assess personality the vehicles of the Palestinian situation and representation 
of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip are used. Therefore at points in the 
study each dominates in order to further the overall thesis. 
The study looks beyond the jaded constitutive/declaratory debate regarding recognition 
and personality and examines recent state practice, which sheds further light on the 
issue. A flexible approach to personality is taken and it is asserted that the best 
description of the process of recognition and achievement of status for both emerging 
states and representative groups is that an entity's status can be variable: variable in an 
evolutionary sense, in relation to the range of responses which the international 
community may have and also in relation to status on the international stage. Thus an 
entity may operate with different degrees of status at any one point in time depending 
on with whom and what circumstances are in question. 
This theory is then examined in relation to the Palestinian situation. The progression of 
the Palestinian Liberation Organisation and the Palestinian Authority on the world stage 
is investigated through, inter alia, their relationships with other states and international 
organisations. The variability theory asserted above appears to be borne out in the 
Palestinian context which leads on to questions of what broader implications this may 
have for other areas of international law. 
Two subject areas are then discussed in relation to the implications of the theory of 
variable personality. First, the concept of responsibility which has traditionally been 
adopted in relation to states rather than other entities on the international stage. Second, 
the protection of the rights of those placed under the jurisdiction of an entity with 
variable levels of personality, noting that this is also an issue which is generally dealt 
with at a state level. In each examination the Palestinian situation is drawn upon to 
provide concrete examples of the possible problems which may arise for other areas of 
international law due to the theory of variable personality. Examples of ways in which 
those issues could be reconciled are also considered. Lastly, both subject areas provide 
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INTRODUCTION 
International legal personality and the norms which govern its attainment are perhaps 
the most important issues with which international lawyers must grapple. The status 
which an entity is considered to have can affect its relationships with other actors on the 
international stage and the extent to which it is able to operate within the international 
community. Therefore, some degree of international legal personality is vital if an 
entity intends to function at an international level. How this personality is achieved 
however has been the subject of much legal debate. ' 
The aim of this study is to further this debate and bring new evidence to light regarding 
the way in which the international community treats entities which seek to act on the 
international stage. This involves a reappraisal of the question of personality in 
international law in the light of recent state practice in the area. This is achieved by 
using the vehicle of a case study - that of the Palestinian situation. The richness of the 
practice in the Palestinian context enables the theory behind personality to be placed 
under the microscope and questioned. If the current theories regarding international law 
and personality are found to be wanting, this could have important consequences for 
other areas of international law. 
In order to address these issues this thesis is split into two parts. Part I looks at 
personality in both international law in general and also in the Palestinian context and 
Part II considers the consequences of those findings, again using the Palestinian 
situation as a case study. It is hoped that these assessments will have three main uses in 
terms of international law. 
First, it will assimilate recent and important state practice in terms of personality and 
recognition and will enable a reassessment of international law in that area to take place. 
' See Chapter One which deals with current and past legal thinking regarding the attainment of 
international legal personality. 
I 
Second and as a corollary of the study on personality, it will provide a useful study as to 
the status of Palestine and the representatives of the Palestinian people in the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip. 
Third, in the light of the two previous points it will be possible to consider the 
implications of the reappraisal on personality for other areas of international law. This 
may shed light on some of the main challenges for international law in general and also 
in the Palestinian situation. 
Due to these two different areas of concern, international legal personality and the 
Palestinian situation, there are occasions when each becomes prevalent in the 
discussion. The thesis is primarily about personality, but given that a case study of 
Palestine is used to present some of the ideas contained within this work, it forms a 
major part of the debate and at times conclusions may emerge regarding the Palestinian 
situation, as a by product of the questions raised in relation to personality. 
There are a few terms which are used which should be clarified at the outset. The term 
"Palestinian" people is generally used to describe only those Palestinians living within 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Often, however, the phrase, "Palestinians in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip" is used simply to reinforce the definition. The main exception to 
this is that in Chapter Two, where the history of Palestine is considered, the term 
"Palestinian" is sometimes used to describe all Palestinians - those in the Diaspora, 
those living in Israel and those in the West Bank and Gaza Strip since until after the 
1967 Israel/Arab war the West Bank and Gaza Strip were not occupied by Israel. 
The designation PLO is used to refer to the Palestinian Liberation Organisation which 
represents all Palestinians (in its widest sense). 2 The designation PA is used to refer to 
the Palestinian Authority which is the domestic body and form of interim government 
for Palestinians living within the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 3 On some occasions it is 
necessary to refer to the overall representation of all Palestinians at both an international 
and domestic level in which case the term "Palestinian Representation" is used and 
should be taken to include both the PLO and the PA. 
2 See Appendix I for PLO organisation chart. 
See Appendix I for PA organisation chart. 
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INTRODUCTION TO PART I 
The first part of this thesis aims to examine the nature of personality in international 
law. Part I is split into three chapters to clarify the different issues which need to be 
raised to consider the overall question of personality. 
Chapter One seeks to provide a theoretical backdrop to the question of personality and 
does not involve a consideration of the Palestinian situation. It is important to ground 
this study by examining how far the debate on personality has travelled before 
considering how the occurrences in the Palestinian situation may affect this area of 
international law. Three main issues are dealt with in Chapter One in order to build a 
picture of personality in modern international society. First, the nature of personality 
and the role of recognition in questions of status are considered. Second, the range of 
responses the international community has had to some specific examples of non-state 
groups which have made a claim to status in international law are examined. Lastly the 
issue of self determination in relation to claims to status by non-state groups will be 
brought into the discussion. This discussion will aim to answer questions regarding the 
link between recognition and the achievement of status by entities making a claim to act 
on the international stage. It is hoped that the discussion will provide an understanding 
of these issues which can then be built upon in the rest of the thesis. 
Once these primary issues have been considered and the theory of personality on which 
this thesis is grounded have been fully debated, the study moves on to consider how the 
Palestinian situation can be instructive in questions of personality. Since the Palestinian 
situation is extremely complicated, Chapter Two provides an account of the historical 
and political story behind the current Palestinian claims to statehood. The chapter also 
examines the question of whether the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
have a right to self determination. 
Chapter Three is the chapter upon which a major part of this thesis rests. It builds upon 
the work carried out in chapters one and two by looking at the response of the 
international community to the claims of the Palestinian representation to act upon the 
international stage. Both collective action and the responses of individual states are 
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considered. These responses are assessed in the light of the theory behind personality 
which has been asserted in Chapter One. 
Chapter Three and its conclusions are important for two reasons. First, they assist in the 
reappraisal of the law governing personality as they will either support or contradict the 
assertions made in Chapter One regarding international legal personality. Second, they 
can independently provide an assessment of the level of status which the Palestinian 
Representations claims to statehood have achieved. 
Once these conclusions regarding personality have been reached it will be possible to 
then begin to consider the consequences of such determinations. This will be carried 
out in Part II of this thesis in relation to specified areas of international law. 
CHAPTER 1 
PERSONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter seeks to provide a theoretical backdrop to the issue of personality in 
international law. This will be done using international law case studies and theories. 
Although the Palestinian question is the main case study used in this reappraisal of the 
law of personality, it will not be considered until Chapters Two and Three. ' It will 
provide the vehicle by which to analyse personality in international law. However, this 
first chapter is vital since it is impossible to analyse the way in which the Palestinian 
Representation has been treated by the international community without first 
understanding the way in which the international community reacts to claims to status in 
general and also to non-state groups which make claims to status. Later in the thesis 
(after the status of the Palestinian Representation has been considered), it may be 
possible to draw comparisons and note issues which may aid in understanding the 
nature of personality and international law more clearly and enable these conclusions to 
be applied to other distinct areas of international law. 
In order to achieve this, Chapter One focuses on three main questions. First, the nature 
of personality and the role of recognition in questions of status. Second, the range of 
responses the international community has had to some specific examples of non-state 
1 Chapter Two looks at the background to the Palestinian situation in order to place the thesis in political 
and historical context and Chapter Three examines the international legal status of the Palestinian 
Representation. The term "Palestinians" in this thesis can be taken to include only those Palestinians 
living within the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It is accepted that there are people of Palestinian origin who 
would class themselves as Palestinian living in Israel, in other parts of the Middle East and indeed the rest 
of the World. However, the Diaspora and the questions surrounding the rights of those Palestinians to 
return to Palestine, should a fully fledged Palestinian state emerge, are not considered here. This topic 
has been considered by other writers. See for example, Dimitrijevic, "Legal Position of Palestinian 
Refugees" (1968) 19 Rev. Int. Af. 427; Radley, "Me Palestinian Refugees: The Right to Return in 
International Law" (1978) 72(3) AJIL 586 and Quigley, "Displaced Palestinians and a Right of Return" 
(1998) 39 HILJ 171. 
It should be noted that the referencing system used in this study for books and articles is to provide a full 
reference on the first occasion they are used. For subsequent mention of books: the author, title (or 
shortened version of the title) plus page reference (if required) is provided. For subsequent mention of 
articles: the author, article title and specific page reference (if required) is provided. All sources are listed 
in the bibliography. 
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groups which have made a claim to status in international law. Third, the issue of self 
determination in relation to claims to status by non-state groups is considered. 
This will provide an understanding of the link between recognition and the achievement 
of personality. This understanding will help in the examination of claims of non-state 
groups to act on the international stage. 
The assertions made in this chapter should provide the tools which enable Palestinian 
status to be examined in Chapter Three. By looking at the issue of personality and 
recognition in international law it will be possible to evaluate different responses within 
the international community to the Palestinian Representation. The consideration of the 
international community's response to other non-state groups will allow comparisons 
regarding the level of status and manner of recognition to be drawn between the 
Palestinian Representation and other groups. Lastly, in the light of the consideration of 
the importance of self determination in claims to status by non-state groups which is 
provided in this chapter, later in the thesis the Palestinian's claim to self determination 
Z will be examined. 
2 This will occur primarily in Chapter Two, although the conclusions drawn are of great significance for 
Chapter Three. 
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1: THE NATURE OF PERSONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The status of an entity can be described as its international legal personality. Questions 
of status are very important to determine since international legal personality has been 
defined as "the capacity to be the bearer of rights and duties under international law. ,3 
In other words, questions of status cannot be considered in a theoretical vacuum because 
they have an effect on the rights or duties which the entity possesses in reality. 
It is important to understand how personality in international law is created and also to 
understand how personality may vary from actor to actor. This part of the chapter aims 
to address these points and looks at the value of recognition and its role in creating 
personality. 
Every entity in the international community is prone to change because of the political 
context within which it must operate. Each body which functions in international 
society and interacts with other entities cannot escape being affected by the actions of 
other states, organisations or groups. 
As a result of interacting with other entities on the international plane, the ability of an 
entity to interact with others may shrink or grow. A state, for example, may become 
more or less powerful which may have a bearing on its influence at an international 
level. 
This study aims to provide an approach to international legal personality which allows 
for the status of the body to reflect any changes the body experiences as it evolves and 
is enabled to take on different tasks. This is not to say that a State would loose its 
formal status simply because of political whim. However the extent to which it can 
influence others or act on the international stage may change according to international 
will. Thus the status of non-state groups must also be understood in the light of the 
3 Schwarzenberger, A Manual of International Law (London: Milton Professional Books) (1976), at 53, 
cited in Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press) (1979), at 25. 
4 The five permanent members of the Security Council are a prime example here. It is often argued that 
the power balance which existed immediately post World War II and has now changed considerably, 
should give way to reform of the institutions of the UN, such as the Security Council because its 
membership has not evolved alongside the changing roles of the permanent members in international 
society. See, D. Archibugi, "The Reform of the UN and Cosmopolitan Democracy: A Critical Review", 
(1993) 30(3) Al. Peace Res. 301. 
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changing international scene regarding participation in the international community. 5 
The increasing number of different types of actors on the international stage and the 
changes in international life were noted in the Reparations Case: 
"The subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical in their nature or in the extent of 
their rights, and their nature depends upon the needs of the Community. Throughout its history, the 
development of international law has been influenced by the requirements of international life, and the 
progressive increase in the collective action of States has already given rise to instances of action upon 
the international plane by certain entities which are not States. i6 
A more flexible approach to participation on the international plane in practice will 
arguably be the main facilitator assisting the eventual realisation of the ideals of a non- 
state group which makes a claim to status. 
Traditionally states have been the primary actors on the international stage and have 
governed and created international doctrine. 7 However even though the nature of 
sovereignty is changing and the circle of participants in the international community is 
growing, the role of the state is still vital and to some groups, desirable: 
"The Sovereign State is still widely perceived as both the main instrument for implementing such newly 
established rules and the main body to be held internationally accountable for their observance. 
Moreover, few international law rules can evolve without the ultimate consent of states. Furthermore the 
current wave of self determination movements evident in the former socialist countries (former 
Yugoslavia, former Czechoslovakia, Chechnya), industrialised countries (Scotland, Quebec, Catalonia) 
and developing countries, (Eritrea, Palestine, Indonesian provinces) is grounded in a desire for greater 
autonomy or ultimately even the establishment of a sovereign state. Evidently, being (or having) a state 
still matters. "8 
Therefore, whilst the state still is the primary subject of international law it can be said 
that in recent times this has begun to change and entities other than states are playing a 
more significant role in world affairs. For example, it is not unusual to suggest that 
individuals are holders of limited international rights and therefore also have a claim to 
international status, albeit a restricted one. 9 International organisations have also played 
' See Schrijver, "The Changing Nature of State Sovereignty" (1999) 70 BYBIL 65, at 81 - 83 for 
discussion regarding the "growing circle of participants in law". 
6 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (1949) ICJ Rep. 174, at 178. 
7 See also Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press) (5t' Ed.: 
1998), at 58. 
8 Schrijver, "The Changing Nature of State Sovereignty", at 65 - 66. Schrijver submits that the nature of 
statehood is qualitatively different from how it was viewed post Peace of Westphalia because of arms 
control and disarmament; management of the environment; foreign investment and peace and security. 
9 Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: a Legal Reappraisal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 
(1995), at 166. Even before the human rights movement grew in strength it was possible to argue 
effectively that the individual was under certain obligations imposed by international law and that 
disregard for such could entail punishment. For example, see the discussion as to piracy in Harris, Cases 
and Materials on International Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell) (5th Ed.: 1998), at 432 - 433 and Rubin, 
an increasingly important part on the international stage and as such, some organisations 
are considered to be subjects of international law in their own right. 10 Importantly for 
this study, groups claiming status on behalf of a people have begun to play a part in 
international life before their claim to full statehood is realised. 11 
Although the scope for recognition of non-state actors has broadened in recent times, 
the success of the claims to participate by non-state groups can vary enormously from 
group to group and it should be questioned why this is the case. 12 This will be 
discussed in parts 2 and 3 of this chapter. 
In order to make determinations about status it is vital to understand how international 
legal personality is created. 13 This involves looking at the value of recognition and 
examining the constitutive and declaratory theories of recognition so that it may be 
established which is the better description of the law. Following this some recent state 
practice from the Balkans, the Baltic States and the Former Soviet Union will also be 
considered. This may help to shed light on the role that politics plays in recognition 
decisions. 
Although later in section 2 non-state groups' claims to status will be examined, this part 
of the chapter considers the issues surrounding recognition in general so that a broad 
picture of the nature of personality may emerge. Indeed, the value of recognition must 
be the same whatever the style of entity being recognised. '4 
Ethics and Authority in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) (1997), at 59 - 61; 
"Judgment of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal, 1946" (1947) 41 AJIL 172; Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948, UKTS 58 (1970), Cmnd. 4421, UNTS 
277, (1951) AJIL Supp. 6; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 
Annex to Security Council Resolution 827, (1993) 32 ILM 1203, (1993) 2 Int. HR Rep. 510; Article 25 of 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court - Adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic 
Conference on an International Criminal Court on 17 July 1998. 
10 See for example, Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (1949) ICJRep. 
174. For a more in depth discussion see, Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (5`h Ed. ), at 
677 - 702; Chapter 2 of White, The Law of International Organisations (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press) (1996); Chapter 15 of Sands & Klein (Eds. ), Bowett's Law of International Institutions 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell) (5th Ed.: 2001) and Seyersted, "International Personality of International 
Organisations: Do their Capacities Really Depend Upon Their Constitutions? " (1964) 41nd. JIL 1. 
11 See section 2 below. 
12 Kassim, "The Palestine Liberation Organisation's Claim to Status: A Juridical Analysis Under 
International Law" (1980) Denver JILP 1, at 4. 
13 Chapter Three examines the status of the PLO and the PA in order to shed further light on international 
legal personality. 
ý4 Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) (1947), at 87. 
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1.1: What role does recognition play in questions of status? 
An entity which becomes an actor on the international stage evolves and changes over 
time. As part of this evolution the roles it plays in the international community change 
alongside it. This is true of both its own internal development and the relationships 
which it forges with the rest of the actors in the world. Even if an entity itself does not 
alter dramatically, political changes on a daily basis in the international community 
within which it operates will affect the relationships it has. 
International society is governed by many complex political forces which may work 
both for and against an entity making a claim to status and these undoubtedly play a role 
in its evolution. The question to be asked then is how much the political atmosphere in 
international society affects the role an entity has to play? This can only be tackled 
through an examination of how those claiming status become actors on the international 
stage. In order to attempt this, a discussion as to the different theoretical schools of 
thought regarding the nature of recognition in international law is required. 15 
1.1.1: The evolutionary nature of personality 
It should be said at the outset that such a discussion must be viewed from a practical 
perspective. This means taking into account the evolutionary nature of personality in 
the international community which was touched on above. Since personality is not 
static, an actor may not necessarily be created overnight simply through recognition. 
Emerging entities may be described as being in a "transitional periodi16 after they or 
their representatives have received a limited degree of recognition. In many 
circumstances this "transitional period" will end with full statehood, if that is the aim of 
the group concerned. '? Often, as in the cases of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, 
once the process has begun then it is almost certainly going to end in independence. 
The difference between the transitional period for each entity which receives a 
'S See section 1.2 below. 
16 Müllerson uses this term to describe the situation that Estonia and Lativia were in after having signed a 
Treaty with Russia regarding their future relationship but before they had declared independence: 
Müllerson, International Law, Rights and Politics: Developments in Eastern Europe and the CIS 
(London: Routledge) (1994), at 120. 
17 Although not in all cases, particularly if there is lack of international recognition or support. For 
example, in 1967 Biafra (which formed the Eastern part of Nigeria) declared its independence. It 
received recognition from only five states (Gabon, Haiti, Ivory Coast, Tanzania and Zambia). Its war of 
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reasonable amount of recognition and the next can often be simply a question of length 
of time. In a clear cut situation where the representative group and the administering 
state or state from which it secedes (for example) and also the international community 
are keen for independence to be achieved as quickly as possible and there are no 
competing claims to the territory, there is no reason why independence should not occur 
speedily. However, it is in more politically complex situations that the transitional 
period may be longer and independence may be harder to achieve without struggle. 
Therefore, in any classically difficult situation where they may be two or more claims to 
the territory and/or other historical, ethnic, political or religious claims to the area, 
recognition is important because it can help determine the length of the transitional 
period. The situation may be more complex and support may be given or withheld 
through the process of recognition in cases where there is a claim which breaks up an 
existing functioning entity. In such cases the transition to statehood may be less 
inevitable. 
It should also be noted that the theory that personality can be evolutionary does not 
necessarily only apply to states or those claiming statehood. As mentioned above, it is 
certain that an international organisation may have a degree of personality in 
international law. 18 Indeed, international organisations are a good example of the kind 
of entity whose personality and capacity to participate in international life may evolve 
and change over a period of time. The development of the personality of the European 
Union and European Communities can be said to be a classic example of this. 
Obviously such evolution does not result in statehood, as statehood itself is not claimed, 
even though an organisation may at times act on behalf of its member states. 19 As the 
organisation has grown, taken on more functions and expanded its areas of competence 
(through for example the Maastrict Treaty on European Union in February 1992 or the 
liberation with Nigeria was unsuccessful and surrendered to Nigeria in January 1970, when it conceded 
that it would remain part of Nigeria. (See Ijalaye, "Was Biafra a State? " (1971) 65 AJIL 551). 
IS See footnote 10 above. 
19 Ken LJ stated, "There can be no doubt that the EEC has legal personality in international law... there is 
equally no doubt that the EEC exercises power and functions which are analogous to those of sovereign 
states. " (See McClaine Watson v Department of Trade and Industry: International Tin Council Case 
(1989) Ch 72 Court of Appeal). The European Court of Justice has also reaffirmed the legal personality 
of the EC as separate from that of its member states in ruling as to the ultra vires nature of Commission 
action, (French Republic v Commission of the European Communities C- 327/91. See also Bray (Ed. ), 
Constitutional Law of the EU (London: Sweet & Maxwell) (1999), 611 ff and Tsebelis and Garrett, "The 
Institutional Foundations of Intergovernmentalism and Supranationalism in the EU" (2001) 55(2) 
International Organisation 357. 
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Amsterdam Treaty of October 1997) so too has its personality on the international stage 
evolved. 20 
"In their terse statement that `the Community shall have legal personality' (EEC Treaty, Article 210) the 
founder states unequivocally created a new international entity independent of its component parts and 
endowed it with the status and attributes of a legal person"Z' 
The fact that the organisation of the Communities and Union is unlike other such 
organisations and has changed over times means that, 
"There is much discussion about the nature of the entity into which the Community/Union is evolving. 
Although not a state, the Community (and to a lesser extent, the Union) possesses an institutional and 
constitutional sophistication which marks it out from normal intergovernmental associations... So the 
Community/Union may not be a State, but it displays some State-like features and it affects the nature of 
the States that are members of it. "22 
The personality of entities such as the European Communities and Union is also 
arguably dependent on the prevailing political winds and the will of states since 
personality to a degree, 
"... depends on whether the Community/Union institutions are strengthened at the expense of sovereinty 
or whether the sovereign element keeps the institutions in the servile role of functional bureaucracy. " 
Therefore the concept that personality may be evolutionary can exist in relation to all 
different kinds of actors. However, in relation in particular to entities making a claim to 
statehood the classic views of personality and its attainment are less flexible and do not 
necessarily include allowance for a transitional period. In order to consider this in 
more detail it is those which are now turned to for discussion. This will enable 
examination of the extent of the influence they have on the international legal 
personality of representative groups. 
20 Treaty on European Union (Maastrict) Official Journal C191 29/07/92 p1 and Treaty of Amsterdam 
Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and 
Certain Related Acts Official Journal C34010/11/97 p 0145. 
21 Lasok, Law and Institutions of the EU (Butterworths: London) (7`h Ed.: 2001) at 30 - 31. 22 Weatherill, Cases and Materials on EC Law (London: Blackstone Press) (5`h Ed.: 2000). 
23 Lasok, Law and Institutions of the EU, at 31. 
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1.2 : Traditional Theories on Recognition 
Before the different theories are examined it should be mentioned that underlying all 
theories of recognition is the presupposition that there are certain criteria which an 
entity should have achieved before it should be recognised as a state. For the purpose of 
this debate as to the traditional theories it can be argued that the exact description of 
which criteria these are does not matter. This is because the point of the question asked 
here is, what label is attached to recognition once a state chooses to recognise an entity, 
regardless of under what criteria they make that decision? Whether the chosen criteria 
are good or bad, may or may not help a state in recognition decisions. Indeed, it is true 
to say that the role those criteria play in the recognition decision is important as this 
may assist in deciding whether recognition is declaratory or constitutive. 24 Nonetheless, 
this is a qualitatively different debate from spending time debating exactly what the 
criteria are. 
Despite this, it seems necessary to clarify the generally recognised main criteria for the 
achievement of statehood at the outset. These are laid down in Article 1 of the 
Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States25: 
"The State as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: a) a permanent 
population; b) a defined territory; c) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with other states. " 
Whilst this list is by no means exhaustive of every situation and in some situations a 
state may be deemed to exist before it has fulfilled all of the above criteria26 it is a 
useful place to begin when considering claims of Statehood as it is "commonly accepted 
as reflecting, in general terms, the requirements of statehood at customary international 
law. "27 
These criteria can be added to and different emphasis may be placed on one or more of 
them. However for the current debate it is argued that a basic description is sufficient, 
since as stated above this part of the thesis is interested in a different question in relation 
24 As to constitutive and declaratory recognition theories see sections 1.2.1 and 1.2.2 respectively. 
25 165 LNTS 19. 
26 As will be discussed later in this chapter in relation to self determination and the examples of 
representative groups (sections 3.2.1 and 2.1.1-4 respectively). See also section 1.2 in Chapter Three 
regarding the criteria for a government in international law. 
27 Harris, Cases and Materials (5'h Ed. ), at 102. 
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to recognition rather than the complexities of exact criteria. 28 
Returning to the question asked originally, the recognition debate has traditionally 
centred around the constitutive and declaratory theories which propose different 
methods in international law for a entity to become a legitimate subject of international 
society in international law. 29 However, they both adopt an `all or nothing' approach to 
the effects of recognition (i. e.: An entity is recognised as a specific thing e. g. state or 
government or it is not recognised at all). This does not appear to encompass a theory 
which would enable representative groups to sit somewhere between unrecognised 
entities and states, thus it is questionable whether the traditional doctrines fit with more 
recent practice which can be considered to evidence a transitional period. 30 
These two differing descriptions of the law will be considered in greater detail in an 
effort to establish if either afford any insight into the role which recognition plays. This 
is important because in order to determine the value of recognition it is necessary to 
understand whether it is recognition which creates status or whether status is determined 
as a matter of fulfilment of objective criteria (whatever those criteria may be) and then 
recognition merely plays a factual role by demonstrating that an entity has fulfilled 
them. 
It has been suggested that the declaratory/constitutive debate is not sufficiently up to 
date with recent recognition practice, particularly in the light of the recent state practice 
in the former Soviet Union, the Baltic States and the former Yugoslavia. Recognition, 
which it has been argued, is governed more by political interests31 and the willingness 
of the new entity to be governed by principles of international law. 32 These theories 
rely more heavily on the technique of approaching recognition as enunciated by 
Brownlie, who advocates that what is to be sought is the intention of the government 
28 Some writers, for example, have advanced the theory that there are other emerging criteria for 
recognition. Franck discussed the potential for a right to democratic governance. See Chapter Three for 
further discussion of the possible criteria as it is more pertinent to the debate at that point in the thesis. 
Although the issue of legitimacy is also briefly dealt with in section 3.1.2 of this chapter. 
29 Notably see, Chen, The International Law of Recognition (L. C. Green (Ed. )) (London: Stevens & Sons) 
(1951); Crawford, Creation of States and Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law for detailed 
discussion regarding these two schools of thought. 
30 See above section 1.1.1 regarding the transitional period and section 1.2.4 below regarding the recent 
practice. 
Chapter 4 of Müllerson, International Law, Rights and Politics and Warbrick, "Recognition of States: 
Recent European Practice" chapter 3 from Evans (Ed. ), Aspects of Statehood and Institutionalism in 
Contemporary Europe: EC/International Law Forum II (Aldershot: Dartmouth) (1997). 
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when it recognised the relevant entity and that status is primarily a question of fact in 
any case. 33 Here, it is aimed to combine the essential discussion of the value of 
recognition with the practical factual analysis advocated by Brownlie. The factual 
approach will be taken in Chapter Three when state practice regarding Palestine is 
considered. However, the factual situation that any entity finds itself in is most often as 
a result of the international community recognising and enabling it to participate at an 
international level by allowing it access to the fora it requires in order for its voice to be 
heard. This means that even if a factual approach is taken, it is still necessary to make 
clear what the value of recognition is and whether it in itself is a creator of status. 
Even if the constitutive and declaratory theories are outdated, they must be examined 
here because they are still the primary descriptions of how recognition is linked to the 
achievement of personality and therefore are vital to understand if a valuable study of 
current recognition practice in relation to status is to be achieved. 
1.2.1: The constitutive theory of recognition 
In a nutshell, the constitutive theory bases its proposition on the assumption that the 
rights and duties pertaining to status come only from recognition. From a very ufre 
constitutive viewpoint it is impossible to argue logically that there are ever any 
circumstances which can give rise to a right to a particular level of status in 
international law. 
The theory has been supported by some of the most eminent international legal 
theorists. 34 It places emphasis on the role of existing states in determining the 
emergence of a new subject of international law. 35 By the process of recognition 
entities could be created as members of the family of nations and thus be subject to the 
rules of international law. 
32 Hillgruber, "The Admission of New States to International Community" (1998) (9) EJIL 491. 
33 Brownlie, "Recognition in Theory and Practice" (1982) BYBIL 197, at 199. 34 For example, Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law and also Oppenheim. (see, Jennings & 
Watts (Eds. ), Oppenheim's International Law (Harlow: Longman) (9th Ed.: 1992). 
ss Lauterpacht is keen to point out that this falls to states merely because an "impartial, international 
organ" has not been established to carry out this function, (Lauterpacht, ibid., at 55) and makes clear his 
preference for this function to be carried out collectively through such an organ, (Lauterpacht, ibid., at 
165-166). 
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The issue under the constitutive doctrine is whether the existing States in the 
international community choose to accept a "potential" entity as a subject in their 
international society. Under this theory the decisions of states must therefore be legally 
definitive. However, if this is a correct description of the law, 
"international law would be merely a system of imperfect communications: every rule of international 
law would be the subject of, in effect, an `automatic reservation' with respect to every State (in the 
absence of the compulsory jurisdiction of some court or tribunal). " 36 
Furthermore, if recognition by a state is decisive in law then it is extremely difficult to 
imagine a situation where recognition is deemed to be illegal and "quite impossible to 
conceive of a recognition which is invalid or void. "37 
A second criticism of this theory is that its relativism negates its worth as an acceptable 
legal theory. 38 
"... since a State actually comes into being by way of recognition, it is clear that it exists only in relation 
to those States which have recognised it. Thus, not only is the actual beginning of a State's existence 
different in time and in relation to every recognising State, but, moreover, `States exist only in a relative 
sense' (Kelsen, "Recognition in International Law" (1941) AJIL 609). In other words, they exist and do 
not exist at the same time. 9939 
Indeed, proponents of the constitutive theory do admit that this is a problem, 40 but 
generally do not regard it as a sufficient difficulty not to continue to adhere to this 
school of thought. 41 The relativism of this theory when applied to a politically divisive 
situation can cause major problems. Relativism would be a major difficulty where 
recognition of a particular entity would mean taking a political stance for or against 
another entity as a result. This might prove complicated in any scenario where there 
were competing claims to represent the territory. Recognition of a representative group 
would thus have an impact not only on the entity recognised but also the entity which 
36 Crawford, Creation of States, at 18. 
37 Ibid. However it is possible for recognition to be criticised and classed as an international delict if 
recognition adversely affects the territory of an existing state. A good example of this is premature 
recognition of a liberation movement, like the situation in Algeria in the late 1950s. See Wilson's 
description in: Wilson, International Law and the Use of Force by National Liberation Movements 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press) (1988), at 108 - 111. The attempted secession of Biafra from Nigeria in 1967 
was also recognised prematurely by a very few African States, as was the government set up by the 
PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau in 1973, except that there the United Nations General Assembly led the way in 
recognition. See section 2.1.1 below. For further discussion of premature recognition see also, 
Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law, at 7 and Marek, The Identity and Continuity of States 
(Geneva: Librarie Droz) (1968), at 153 - 154. 38 Crawford, ibid., at 19 - 20. 39 Marek, The Identity and Continuity of States, at 132. 
40 Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law, at 77 - 78. 
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was making a competing claim. States would have to chose which "side" to support and 
this may often have ramifications for the state in terms of its relations with states that 
chose to support the other entity's claims. 
Due to the political results which constitutive recognition tends to bring because of its 
relativism, politics are thus more likely to be brought into the decision-making process. 
Therefore, recognition and non-recognition and outright opposability to a particular 
level of status can be as a result of political stance. 
The essence of the doctrine of constitutive recognition is explained above, however 
when the theory is examined in greater detail it can be seen that there is a divergence of 
opinion as to the nature of the situation in law which results in the act of recognition 
itself 42 
On this issue, it may be argued either that there is a duty to recognise once an entity has 
fulfilled certain criteria, or that the recognising state chooses to do so as a matter of 
arbitrary policy. Thus states will recognise that a particular entity has fulfilled certain 
specified criteria, however it is the recognition and not the fulfilment of the criteria 
which then endows the entity with international rights and duties. Since this is the case, 
despite the `criteria requirement' this is still within the scope of the constitutive rather 
than the declaratory theory of recognition. 43 
Nonetheless, the notion of placing importance on the fulfilment of criteria does hark 
back to the declaratory theory, since by 
"... avoiding the arbitrariness, otherwise implicit in the constitutive view ... this merit... constitutes 
its 
fundamental weakness: for by postulating such conformity, the doctrine falls back on general 
international law as the only truly decisive criterion of the existence of States. This is nothing but a return 
to the declaratory theory. 
However, amongst the constitutive proponents there is far from consensus as to the 
concept of a legal duty to recognise. 45 Those constitutive adherents which disagreed 
41 See also Marek, The Identity and Continuity of States, at 132 - 134. 
42 It should be noted that recognition can be express or implied. Due to the parameters of this study this 
particular element of the general debate on recognition will not be discussed here but for more comment 
on implied recognition see, Chapter XX of Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law. 
"Ibid., at 51. 
44 Marek, The Identity and Continuity of States, at 137. 
45 Kunz, "Critical Remarks on Lauterpacht's 'Recognition in International Law' " (1950) 44 AJIL 713. 
17 
often took a positivist approach. 46 This is perhaps because positivists would tend to 
have a more state-centric theoretical perspective. 47 Thus the notion that the sovereign 
state should have less discretion to exercise in the determination of statehood due to 
being under a duty to recognise would be therefore untenable. 
46 See for example, ibid. 
47 See, Dugard, Recognition and the United Nations (Cambridge: Grotius) (1987), at 6&7-8. 
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1.2.2: The Declaratory Theory of Recognition. 
Proponents of the declaratory view take the stance that once an entity has met certain 
requirements it is automatically qualified to become a subject of international law. 48 
Recognition is then only a political act which does not affect the entity claiming status 
in international law. Recognition is thus simply the process by which states declare 
their acknowledgement of the fact that the entity is a subject of international law. 
Many eminent jurists of this century advocate the declaratory doctrine as the correct 
interpretation of international law including Chen, 49 Higgins, 50 Brierly, sl Brownlie52 
and Marek; "... recognition is both declaratory and political"53 and that "... it may be 
safely asserted that the constitutive doctrine is just as untenable in logic as it is in 
law. "54 
Consistency is certainly regarded to be one of the chief merits of the declaratory 
theory. 55 The act of recognition then being simply a mark of political accommodation 
rather than decisively constitutive. 56 This is not to argue however, that such an act 
could not then go on to have important political and even legal ramifications. 57 
Many of the writers referred to above are fairly condemnatory of the problems 
associated with the constitutive theory, particularly in relation to its relative and 
arbitrary practical difficulties, as discussed in the previous section. However, the 
declaratory doctrine is not confined to theory as there a number of instances where the 
declaratory approach has been adopted by international tribunals or commissions when 
considering recognition issues. 
sa For statehood these qualifications are generally thought to be a defined territory, a permanent 
population, a government and the capacity to enter into relations with other states see the Montevideo 
Convention, supra. note 19 - see section 1.2 above and for further discussion see Chapter Three, section 
1.1. 
49 Chen, The International Law of Recognition. 
50 See Higgins, The Development of International Law through the Political Organs of the United Nations 
(London: Oxford University Press) (1963), at 135 - 136. 
51 Brierly, The Law of Nations: an Introduction to the International Law of Peace (Waldock (Ed. )) 
cOxford: Oxford University Press) (6t° Edition: 1963), at 139. 
2 Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (5`s Ed. ), at 87 - 88. It should be noted that Brownlie 
considers that "... to reduce, the issues to a choice between the two opposing theories is to greatly 
oversimplify the legal situation. ", at 88 - 89. 53 Marek, The Identity and Continuity of States, at 131. 
54 Ibid., at 153. 
5s Crawford, Creation of States, at 20. 
56 Ibid., at 23 
57 Ibid., at 23 - 24. 
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The Tinoco Arbitration is a well known example of such an occasion. 58 Here the 
arbitrator, William H. Taft, discussed the issue of recognition. He held the view that 
recognition cannot be the sole determiner of status and that it is linked to factual 
considerations regarding the position of the entity (in that instance, the government of 
Costa Rica) which must also play a role. 59 This decision clearly supports the notion of 
personality as linked to factual criteria, meaning that it is less subjective and therefore 
that recognition is not the main creator of status. 
The Report of the Commission of Jurists on the Aaland Islands also dealt with the issue 
of recognition in attempting to establish when Finland became independent. 60 More 
recently, the situation of the Former Yugoslavia has generated further debate on the 
issues of recognition. 61 In that context the Badinter Arbitration Commission made a 
more decisive determination of the correct interpretation of international law and the 
relevance of recognition to the status of entities. 62 The Commission considered inter 
alia, the question of whether the republics which emanated from the Former Yugoslavia 
were seceding from the federation or causing its disintegration and thus whether there 
could be any continuity of statehood. Naturally the issue of recognition arose in this 
discussion and the Commission stated that: 
"The answer to the question should be based on the principles of public international law which serve to 
define the conditions on which an entity constitutes a state; that in this respect, the existence or 
58 Great Britain v Costa Rica (1923) 1 RIAA 369. 
59 This position has been adopted in relation to states as well as governments. See, Deutsche Continental 
Gas-Gesellschaft v Polish State (1929) 5 AD 11, at 13: "... the recognition of a State is not constitutive but 
merely declaratory". 
60 Aaland Islands Case (1920) LNOJ Special Supp. 3,3. One of the principal questions which arose in the 
case was the date on which Finland itself became a State. The Commissioners used examples of the 
relations which Finland had at an external level with other states as evidence of its status in international 
law but were unwilling to consider it as the sole factor for determinations of statehood. The Jurists 
looked partly at recognition but also at other conditions which they deemed to be necessary for the 
formation of a state, namely the concepts of effective government and independence (or `sovereignty') in 
their report. 
61 The EC took a particular interest in the emergence of new states in the areas surrounding Western 
Europe and it was agreed that a common position for Member States would enhance any the influence 
they had. As a result, at a meeting of Foreign Ministers in December 1991 the `Declaration on the 
Guidelines on Recognition of new States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union' was agreed upon: 
Extraordinary EPC Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, 16 December 1991; (1993) 4 EJIL 72. 
62 Arbitration Commission, E. C. Conference on Yugoslavia, January 11 1992,92 ILR. The EC proposed 
a continuing conference at the end of August 1991 between representatives of Yugoslavia and the 
Republic and the European Community and its States with provision for an Arbitration Commission, the 
President of which was Badinter. Badinter Commission Opinions can be found at (1992)31 ILM 1488 
and 92 ILR. 
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disappearance of the State is a question of fact; that the effects of recognition by other States are purely 
declaratory; ", 63 
However, the use of the declaratory theory is not limited to the international sphere. 
Domestic courts are often likely to use the declaratory theory when examining questions 
of status. 64 
Such examples are strong evidence of the support for the declaratory theory in both 
national and international practice. However, it is interesting to note that these are 
decisions of tribunals and courts. In contrast, much of the state practice which is often 
used to support the constitutive theory is generally practice of individual states and their 
governments. 65 This is perhaps an obvious statement given the policy dominated 
constitutive doctrine and the apparently more objective declaratory approach. It is then 
arguably more likely that a tribunal would be more inclined to take a declaratory angle 
to recognition since there is less likelihood of any political bias affecting decision 
making, whereas in government-made decisions a political element to all decisions is 
almost inevitable. 
However, such discussions do not make the establishment of the law any easier. As 
recognition is governed primarily by the practice of states, the task of tribunals is to 
clarify that state practice and respond to it according to the relevant law. However, if 
the states and the tribunals are starting from differing legal doctrinal bases then there is 
the danger that states practice could be used in a way which was not intended by the 
states in question. It would be simple for a tribunal to attach importance to certain 
factual criteria which did not play a role in recognition but were elements of the factual 
scenario at the time of a policy based decision, thus unintentionally distorting the 
descriptions of the state practice at hand. 
63 Ibid., Opinion No. 1, at 162. Furthermore, in response to a question as to when the dissolution of the 
former Yugoslavia was complete, the Commission noted once more that, "while recognition of a state by 
other states has only declarative value, such recognition, along with membership of international 
organisations, bears witness to these States' conviction that the political entity so recognised is a reality 
and confers on it certain rights and obligations under international law. ", Ibid., Opinion No. 8, at 199. 
64 In Democratic Republic of East Timor, FRETILIN and Others v State of the Netherlands 87 ILR 73, at 
73, the Court used the traditional criteria laid down in the declaratory theory of statehood to determine the 
status of East Timor. However, it was also stated that non-recognition by the majority of States 
"... suggested that the international community did not regard these factual criteria as having been 
fulfilled. " See also by way of example, Klinghoffer v SNC Achille Lauro 96 ILR 69 and Deutsche 
Continental Gas-Gesellschaft v Polish State (1929) 5 AD 11, at 15 
65 As demonstrated in Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law through the vast array of State 
practice presented therein. 
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Therefore, whilst being extremely useful in demonstrating the examples of the 
declaratory doctrine, state practice is not necessarily decisive as some support for each 
theory can be found, depending on what type of practice is examined. 
1.2.3: Some basic conclusions regarding the declaratory/constitutive debate 
Given the vast array of conflicting literature and practice available for study, beyond 
that which has been listed here, it is extremely difficult to come to much of a decision as 
to which is the better description of the law. There certainly seems to be truth in both 
theories as states clearly wish to retain some subjectivity in recognition decisions but 
the use of specified criteria is evident in many scenarios. The declaratory doctrine is 
more just in its application of criteria to all potential subjects of law, but suffers from 
the lure of political considerations which are so easily drawn into decision making. 
However, the categorical constitutive doctrine is unacceptable in terms of its lack of 
certainty, since in principle as an extreme example, a state should not be entitled to deny 
the existence of criteria and thus treat an entity as though it was not a state in law. 
However, the issue of recognition and at what point an entity achieves personality is not 
only of importance to the recognising state. It is vital to the activities of the entity 
seeking recognition. From the perspective of such an entity each theory has its benefits. 
The declaratory doctrine would benefit entities which satisfied the relevant criteria and 
the political problems associated with support would be less problematic as recognition 
could become the norm and not be seen so much as a declaration of policy against any 
competing state's claims. This could in turn assist in the realisation of the rights of such 
entities. 
The alternative argument is that the constitutive doctrine can enable groups seeking 
recognition to fulfil their aims even if they do not fulfil all the relevant criteria as 
sufficient recognition can assist in the creation of states or govemments. 66 Conversely, 
however, the constitutive doctrine can also serve to stop emerging entities which do 
66 See section 2.1.3 below in relation to the FLN in Algeria. 
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fulfil the relevant criteria from achieving their aims due to the political situation in 
which they operate and is therefore less desirable. 
Generally speaking however, recognition is an element of state practice which can 
potentially change on a regular basis since states face this issue in relation to many 
different entities all the time. Furthermore, as mentioned above, there have been a 
number of recent examples of state practice which have called these traditional 
doctrines into question and reasserted the political elements present in the recognition 
process. 
It is vital to look at the recent practice since it is one of the reasons that the 
constitutive/declaratory debate is under some strain. Arguably the debate is out of date 
because both theories only rely on an approach to status where an entity may be classed 
either as a full state or a government or as having no status at all. It does not allow for 
entities to obtain a status which is between the two, giving them a limited amount of 
personality in the international community during their transitional periods. 
1.2.4: Modern approaches to the recognition theories and the effect of some recent 
practice 
There have recently been a number of instances where new states have claimed or 
reclaimed their independence. Notably in the former Yugoslavia, the Baltic States and 
the disintegrating Soviet Union. These examples have provided ample chance to 
examine the emerging trends of recognition in international society. It has been 
suggested that the practice regarding these claims demonstrates the way in which 
politics can affect recognition. 67 
As both the dismemberment of the USSR and the former Yugoslavia were occurring at 
a similar time in the early nineties the political scenario was one in which the 
67 Müllerson, International Law, Rights and Politics. Rich also takes this approach, suggesting that, 
"... recent recognition practice has defeated arguments that there is a legal duty to extend recognition to 
an entity bearing the marks of statehood. Recognition of states is today more of an optional and 
discretionary political act than was thought to be the case only a year ago. ", Rich, "Recognition of States: 
The Collapse of the Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union" (1993) 4 EJIL 36, at 36. 
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governments of the Western world were not keen to set precedents regarding 
recognition to one group of states in case other groups should take that as the go ahead 
to dismember in anticipation of being treated in a similar way. 68 
1.2.4.1: The Baltic States 
The state practice in relation to the recognition which was accorded to the Baltic States 
at the time of the disintegration of the USSR is instructive regarding the way in which 
States approach the issue of recognition. 
The Baltic States (Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia) were recognised as independent States 
in the early 1920s after the First World War. In 1939 the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was 
signed which planned the annexation of the States to the Soviet Union and in summer of 
1940 a Soviet invasion put puppet governments in power which "asked" that they 
become part of the USSR. Most Western States did not cease their de jure recognition 
of the Baltic States but in practice accepted the Soviet Union's de facto control over the 
territories. 69 
It is crucial to note that many Western States had as a matter of fact recognised the 
annexation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union and treated them as part of the 
USSR, even if they then went on to deny that they had ever recognised their 
incorporation de jure. 70 This is surely evidence of states using the distinction between 
de jure and de facto recognition for their own diplomatic purposes. Recognition must 
surely be politically at the discretion of each state if a state is able to refuse to recognise 
an entity de jure and then goes on to act to all intents and purposes as it would had de 
jure recognition been granted. The fact that a state can treat a non-recognised entity as 
a fully fledged state when it is convenient, is clearly an example of the political nature 
of recognition. 
68 Senator Evans, (Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs at the time of the break-up of the Former 
Yugoslavia) identified the four criteria for statehood in the Montevideo Convention and added to that the 
criteria of the government in question being in effective control of the territory concerned. He also stated 
that, "it is a matter of adopting some consistency in the way in which one deals with these situations 
otherwise one gets caught up in the most terrible conundrums in dealing with secessionist movements or 
splits of one kind or another in states all around the world. ", Australian Hansard, Senate, 20 August 1991 
- Cited in Rich, ibid., at 40. 69 Benton, "The Plight of the Baltic States" (1985) 180 Conflict Studies 2 
70 Müllerson, International Law, Rights and Politics, at 120. 
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In addition, a further interesting point which can be drawn from the situation which 
occurred during 1992 is the importance recognising states place on the acquiescence of 
states which will loose some of their territory or authority if a new state comes into 
being - here the Soviet Union. To ensure that Western recognition would not cause a 
political row with the USSR, President Bush wrote to President Gorbachev asking him 
to recognise the Baltic States' independence speedily, noting that the West would take 
this as their lead. 71 President Bush was concerned that recognition without the blessing 
of the USSR could be seen as intervention in its domestic affairs. This raises a whole 
series of questions in relation to competing claims for sovereignty which are discussed 
below in section 3 on self determination and recognition. It demonstrates that 
recognition may be withheld until the political climate is likely to be favourable. 
The illegal annexation of the Baltic States to the Soviet Union in 1940 made it harder 
for the Western states to deny recognition for any long period of time. Therefore any 
act of recognition prior to the Soviet Union's acceptance of the disintegration of the 
Union could arguably have simply been a return to the correct legal status of the Baltic 
States. Recognition could thus have been justified on the grounds of their illegal 
annexation in 1940 because legally if a state commits an international delict, matters 
which arise as a result of it cannot be considered to be within that states domestic 
affairs. 72 
It is submitted that this recent practice demonstrates that political factors are often at 
play in the decisions which states make to recognise or not recognise a new state. This 
means that in practice each state exercises its own discretion whether or not to recognise 
a new state. There is clearly a strong element of discretion to be exercised on the part 
of states as demonstrated in the attitude of Western States to the Baltic States. Therefore 
it should be remembered that any example of recognition must be seen in the light of 
the prevailing political climate between the two entities. From these examples overall 
then the.. 
"... meaning of the term `recognition' depends entirely on the intention of the State using it within the 
factual and legal context of a particular case". " 
71 Ibid. 
n Ibid., at 121 - 122. " Talmon, Recognition of Government in International Law: With Particular Reference to Governments 
in Exile (Oxford: Clarendon Press) (1998), at 42 
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1.2.4.2: The European Community Guidelines on Recognition 
After the referendum in the Ukraine which resulted in an overwhelming vote for 
independence, the time came when the States of Western Europe needed to consider the 
issue of Ukrainian recognition. 74 
The European Community (EC) had recently taken on the task of mediating between the 
different factions in the Balkans. The EC drew up a number of guidelines in order to 
attempt to influence the situation through applying further criteria to the usual rules on 
recognition in order to try to resolve the conflict. 75 
The Declaration by the EC stated that the EC would be willing to recognise new states; 
"... subject to the normal standards of international practice and the political realities in each case those 
new states which, following the historic changes in the region, have constituted themselves on a 
democratic basis, have accepted the appropriate international obligations and have committed themselves 
in good faith to a peaceful process and to negotiations.. "76 
As was pointed out at the time, the caveat concerning the "political realities in each 
case" should be noted. This enunciates the concept as expressed in the traditional 
approach to the constitutive doctrine of recognition. 77 It has thus been argued that, 
".. the EC countries took the view that recognition should be used more as an instrument of foreign policy 
rather than a formal declaration of an ascertainable fact. "'8 
However, in addition the EC laid down a series of other criteria which had to be 
complied with before recognition would be granted: 
66 
74 However, "... there was one strong political factor mitigating against early recognition. President 
Gorbachev was working towards a Union Treaty which would preserve a Soviet centre and countries 
were loathe to undercut the stability that such a move seemed to represent, particularly in terms of 
continuing Soviet acceptance of its obligations under the various disarmament treaties. ": Rich, 
"Recognition of States: The Collapse of the Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union", at footnote 45. 
75 See also Kingsbury's analysis of `The European Community and Yugoslavia' in Kingsbury, "Claims 
b6y Non-State Groups in International Law" (1992) 25 Cornell IIJ481, at 504. 
7 Declaration on the 'Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet 
Union', cited in Rich, "Recognition of States: The Collapse of the Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union", at 
43. 
n Rich, ibid. 
78 Ibid., at 55. 
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- Respect for the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the commitments subscribed to in 
the Final Act of Helsinki and in the Charter of Paris, especially with regard to the rule of law, 
democracy and human rights. 
- Guarantees for the rights of ethnic and nation groups and minorities in accordance with the 
commitments subscribed to in the framework of the CSCE. 
- Respect for the inviolability of all frontiers which can only be changed by peaceful means and 
common agreement. 
- Acceptance of all relevant commitments with regard to disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation as 
well as to security and regional stability. 
- Commitment to settle by agreement, including where appropriate by recourse to arbitration, all 
questions concerning state succession and regional disputes. s79 
These criteria, whilst possible to class as supporting a discretionary approach to 
recognition, could also be considered to fall within a declaratory approach since they at 
least enunciate and clarify the instances in which recognition will be accorded. 
However, it is true that they can be changed at any time and are subject to the "political 
realities in each case" which weakens this argument somewhat. Indeed, this is what 
occurred in relation to the potential states of the former Yugoslavia. The EC went on to 
lay down some further guidelines in addition to their initial statement given above. 
These included: 
- They accept the commitments contained in the above mentioned guidelines. [as above] 
- They accept the provisions laid down in the draft convention - especially those in Chapter II on human 
rights and rights of nation or ethnic groups - under consideration by the Conference on Yugoslavia. 
- They continue to support: 
- the efforts of the Secretary General and the Security Council of the 
United Nations, and 
- the continuation of the Conference on Yugoslavia... 
... The Community and its Member States also require a Yugoslav Republic to commit itself, prior to 
recognition, to adopt constitutional and political guarantees ensuring that it has no territorial claims 
towards a neighbouring Community State and that it will conduct no hostile propaganda activities versus 
a neighbouring Community State, including the use of denomination which implies territorial claims. s80 
These issues can together be taken to incite value judgements about the potential states 
and show a shift away from recognition as merely a formal acceptance of rigid criteria 
as far as EC member states are concerned. 81 It should be remembered that these are 
conditions set in addition to the traditional criteria for statehood as given in the 
Montevideo Convention, rather than instead of them and that as such the original criteria 
79 Declaration on the 'Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet 
Union'. 
80 Declaration on Yugoslavia (Extraordinary EPC Ministerial Meeting). 
81 Rich, "Recognition of States: The Collapse of the Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union", at 56. 
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still stand as the accepted principles by which the declaratory doctrine operates. 82 
However, it is possible to argue this that new practice adds to these criteria the 
realpolitik of international policy. What these new criteria deal with, to a certain 
extent, is future fact in relation to the emerging states. However, as value judgements 
they are also analysing the factual scenario in each territory and, due to the nature of 
these criteria, it is suggested that they indicate a desire to accord recognition only to 
entities which will uphold basic principles of international law. 83 It may be argued 
that this simply elaborates on the 4th criteria of the Montevideo Convention which 
requires that States have the "capacity to enter into relations with other Statess84, 
however it is argued here that by giving such specific criteria which relate directly to the 
ethnic and religious problems in that situation that more of an ad hoc approach has been 
taken to recognition than was intended by the creators of the Montevideo Convention 
who were attempting to create more certainty in recognition through an international 
agreement. 
It is submitted that this practice potentially paves the way for different criteria to be set 
in relation to individual cases of recognition. As the need for recognition springs from 
different political situations the EC Guidelines would not have to be followed again and 
it remains to be seen whether they will be. It is true to say that they move away from 
the constitutive doctrine in that guidelines were set by a regional body rather than on an 
purely ad hoc basis by individual States. However, in practice the Guidelines which 
the Badinter Commission applied were not followed by the States of Europe in their 
recognition decisions. That practice is considered below. 
However, it could equally be argued that these EC conditions are new emerging criteria 
82 See above section 1.2 regarding the basic criteria for statehood. See also section 1 in Chapter Three for 
further discussion regarding criteria. 
83 A similar argument has been adopted by Hillgruber. He states that recognition in the Former 
Yugoslavia was granted based on the criteria of whether an entity was a "reliable member of the 
international community". Bosnia is cited as an example since, due to calls to "internationalise" the 
conflict in order to apply the international law of jus ad bellum and jus in bello, the status of `State' was 
conferred on it by way of a "legal fiction". He also uses the examples of the non-recognition of 
Rhodesia, the South African Homelands and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus to demonstrate that 
political decision may have legal effects - the upshot of which is that there is no right to recognition even 
if traditional criteria are fulfilled: "The power of the existing sovereign states to decide whether to 
recognise the new state, by which they evaluate its reliability as a partner in international relations, means 
that they existing states continue to be `masters' of the procedure: by exercising their prerogative to 
evaluate the new comer, they form their own final judgment concerning its ability and willingness to be 
integrated into the international community and adhere to its rules. " Hillgruber, "The Admission of New 
States in the International Community", at 494 - 5. 
84 Montevideo Convention, supra. note 19. For discussion regarding the Montevideo Convention see, 
Grant, "Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and its Discontents" (1999) 37 ColJTL 403. 
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to add to the declaratory criteria which exist already, or that they are merely guidelines 
to be borne in mind when applying the declaratory theory. It is not yet possible to 
determine whether these criteria or guidelines will be used again. As new cases of 
recognition emerge such analysis will be possible. For the moment the EC guidelines 
seem not to provide an additional set of criteria for future use, but indicate factors which 
may influence States recognition policy. Furthermore, the caveat as to political 
considerations shows that States do not consider that recognition decisions exist in a 
legal vacuum but in the realities of the domestic and international political climate. 
1.2.4.3: The Practice of the European States and the Badinter Commission 
With this in mind, it is constructive to compare what the Badinter Commission stated in 
its Opinions85 with what the European States actually did in relation to recognition. 
9 Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia86 
The Badinter Commission advised that the Republics of Slovenia87 and Macedonia" 
satisfied the criteria which had been laid down by the EC Foreign Ministers. 89 
However, in the wake of the Commission's Opinion on the achievement of the Foreign 
Minister's Criteria, Macedonia was not recognised by the European States. It was 
difficult to deny Macedonia's right to statehood; however Greece harboured concerns 
about the emerging State. It was worried that that the Northern Greek area of 
Macedonia might be under threat from the new State90 and objected partly to the naming 
of the new State identically to the northern Greek province. 91 Therefore the European 
States had in effect supported the concerns of Greece at the expense of the recognition 
of the emerging State. 
85 Badinter Commission Opinions (1992) 31 ILM 1488. 
86 hereafter 'Macedonia'. 
87 Badinter Commission Opinions no. 7, January 14 1992. 
88 Badinter Commission Opinions no. 6, ibid. 
89 See section 1.2.4.2 on EC Guidelines above for criteria. 
90 See Janev, "Legal Aspects of the Use of a Provisional Name for Macedonia in the United Nations 
System" (1999) 93 AJIL 155 and Warbrick, "Recognition of States: Recent European Practice", at 29. 







The Badinter Commission stated that Croatia did not fulfil the criteria since there were 
concerns as to the Croatian protection afforded to Serbian minorities (but that this could 
probably be amended in the near future). 92 It also seems evident that due to the lack of 
protection for the Serbian population of Croatia, parts of the territory were under de 
facto Serbian control therefore the Croatian government was not in effective control of 
the entire area. Therefore, in addition to the problems enunciated by Badinter, any 
recognition was arguably premature. 93 
However, Croatia was recognised as a State by the States of Europe. 94 This was despite 
the fact that it had not, according to Badinter, satisfied the criteria laid down by the 
Foreign Ministers. 
" Bosnia 
The Commission emphasised that in Bosnia, popular consent to independence was not 
necessarily evident. 95 The States of Europe then later offered to assist in supervision of 
a referendum on independence96 which took place on 29 February and 1 March. The 
majority of the population voted in favour of independence, however the Serbians in 
Bosnia did not vote at all and soon after this recognition was accorded. 97 
It is clear that the emphasis of the Badinter Opinion regarding the situation in Bosnia 
was once again ignored by the subsequent practice of the European States. Badinter had 
placed importance on the will of the people of Bosnia for independence but the 
Europeans had supervised and given credence to a referendum which failed to take into 
account the wishes of a significant group within the emerging state. 
92 Badinter Commission Opinion no. 5, January 14 1992. 
93 For discussion surrounding premature recognition see section 3.2.1 in this chapter and section 1.2 in 
Chapter Three. 
94 Germany initially recognised Croatia on 23 December 1991 and then other European States followed 
suit. See Warbrick, "Recognition of States: Recent European Practice", at 29 - 30. 95 Badinter Commission Opinion no. 4, January 14 1992. 
96 EUROPE, No. 5670,17 - 18 February 1992,4. 
97 Warbrick, "Recognition of States: Recent European Practice", at 30. 
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1.2.4.4: Conclusions Regarding the Badinter Commission and the Practice of European 
States 
The behaviour of the European States towards Macedonia is a clear example of the 
political concerns of one State influencing the recognition behaviour of other States. 
Furthermore, the States, in not recognising Macedonia after the effective "legal go- 
ahead" from the Badinter Commission, reaffirmed the discretion they clearly believe 
they have in relation to recognition. Suggesting that many influential States do not 
consider themselves under a legal duty to recognise even when a State has been 
declared to have fulfilled the requisite criteria which effectively they had set. 98 
The practice regarding Croatia shows that the additional criteria which the foreign 
ministers had set out were very much political guidelines rather than additional legal 
criteria. If the European States had intended them to be legal criteria they would 
certainly have refused recognition of Croatia until it was clear that minorities were 
effectively protected within the territory. The European States were thus clearly not 
following the approach to recognition as advocated by Badinter through the setting of 
criteria and were happy to import political judgement into recognition decisions. 
Indeed that caveat regarding the "political realities in each case" given in the Guidelines 
was reiterated by Mr Douglas Hurd the then British Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs. He stated in relation to the recognition of Croatia that, "we 
must deal with realities, and the reality was that Croatia existed. "99 Furthermore, later 
that same year in a letter, the Minister of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office wrote, "[The]... criteria are always subject to interpretation in the light of the 
circumstances on the ground. "loo These examples demonstrate the political reality 
which states are keen to operate in. This gives them the flexibility to use their 
discretion by balancing their needs, the needs of the international community and the 
needs of the entity claiming status. 
In Bosnia, once again the European States went against the spirit of the Badinter 
Commission's findings and also against the spirit of self determination through their 
ignoring of the Serbian population. 
98 Macedonia has since been formally admitted as a member of the United Nations: Security Council 
Resolution 817, April 7 1993. 
99 House of Commons Debates, vol. 259, col. 332: 3 May 1995; (1995) UKMIL; (1995) 66 BYBIL 616. 
100 House of Commons Debates, vol. 261, WA, cols. 478 - 9: 13 June 1995; ibid., at 617. 
31 
These examples of practice do not equate with the theory as enunciated by the Badinter 
Commission which kept to the Guidelines issued by the EC. As discussed above, whilst 
not fully in line with the declaratory theory as they were "subject to political realities" 
they did create additional criteria for a group of states which appeared to be at least less 
subject to relativism and international politics than a purely constitutive approach. 
Overall, there seems to be a gap between the theories of recognition and what states 
actually do in situations of recognition. '0' It is submitted that it is the politics of 
international society which fill this gap. This is not to suggest that politics are the only 
considerations for states when recognising other entities, however the above practice 
shows that the legal aspects of recognition are certainly far from all that states take into 
account. 
1.2.5: Recent case law regarding the Former Yugoslavia 
It is interesting to note that the International Court of Justice was also called upon to 
consider the issue of Bosnian statehood. 102 Bosnia asked the International Court to rule 
that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had committed acts of genocide by attempting 
to destroy nation, ethnic or religious (notably Muslim) groups within Bosnia. Bosnia 
also submitted that Yugoslavia had aided and abetted perpetrators, conspired, attempted 
and incited genocide and further failed to prevent and punish such acts. The action 
requested that the Court declare that Yugoslavia desist from such conduct and that it 
must endeavour to restore the situation to that which existed before its violations of the 
Genocide Convention partly through the provision of compensation for damage and 
loss. 
Yugoslavia contended that the case was inadmissible on various grounds relating to, (a) 
whether the conflict was national or international, (b) the application and interpretation 
of the Genocide Convention, (c) the effects of the non-recognition by each party of the 
other and also (d) whether Bosnia was a State and its succession to the Convention. 
101 The same can also potentially be said in relation to situations of non-recognition. A state could 
continue to give effect to the legal acts of a non-recognised government or state. For example, Taiwan. 
102 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia 
and Hercegovina v Yugoslavia) Admissibility and Jurisdiction (1996) ICJ Rep. 595. 
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Bosnia counter-claimed that Yugoslavia had abused its rights through presenting its 
arguments, objecting to the Courts jurisdiction and the admissibility of the case. The 
Court was overall very brief in its consideration of this issue and it rejected those 
arguments relating to non-fulfilment of admissibility criteria on grounds of Bosnian lack 
of statehood by a large majority. Indeed, "The Court's brevity seems an over-reaction 
to the lengthy judgments of the past as it leaves the reader uncertain about the legal 
s103 reasoning... 
However this case is very interesting when compared with the Court's opinion in a 
number of later cases brought this time by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. '°4 In 
these actions FRY submitted that the NATO countries had violated the prohibition on 
the use of force through their bombing campaign in Kosovo. 105 FRY argued that the 
Court had jurisdiction to hear this case under Article 36(2) of the Statute of the 
International Court and also under Article IX of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 106 
The NATO states submitted that their actions did not amount to genocide and that 
therefore the Genocide Convention could not be used as the basis for jurisdiction. '07 
The International Court found that the Genocide Convention could not be used by FRY 
103 Gray, "Case Note: Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosnia & Hercegovina v Yugoslavia) Admissibility and Jurisdiction" (1997) 46 ICLQ 688, at 
689. 
104 Case Concerning the Legality of the Use of Force (Yugoslavia v Belgium) Request for the Indication 
of Provisional Measures (1999) ICI Rep. Not yet officially reported. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
also brought identical actions against all members of NATO, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America, all of which are 
cited in (1999) 38ILM950. 
105 For discussion regarding the NATO bombing see, Simma, "NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: 
Legal Aspects" (1999) 10 EJIL 1; Cassese, "Ex injuria ius oritur: Are we moving towards international 
legitimation of forcible humanitarian counter measures in the world community? " (1999) 10 EJIL 23; 
Orford, "Muscular humanitarianism: Reading the narratives of the new interventionism. " (1999) 10 EJIL 
679; Cassese, "A follow-up: Forcible counter measures and opinio necessitatis" (1999) 10 EJIL 791 and 
Kritsiotis, "The Kosovo crisis and NATO's application of armed force against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia" (2000) 49(2) ICLQ 330. 
106 (1948) 78 UNTS 277. For discussion regarding the Genocide Convention and international criminal 
law see, chapter 17 "State Criminality and the Significance of the 1948 Genocide Convention" from 
Jorgensen, The Responsibility of States for International Crimes (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
(2000). 1 
107 On 8 July 2000 the Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee established to review the NA TO 
bombing campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia found that "If one accepts the figures in this compilation of approximately 495 
civilians killed and 820 civilians wounded in documented instances, there is simply no evidence of the 
necessary crime case for charges of genocide or crimes against humanity" and therefore recommended 
that "... no investigation be commenced.. . in relation to the NATO bombing campaign or incidents 
occurring during the campaign", (2000) 39 ILM 1257, both quotations found at 1283. 
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to bring the case. '08 
This outcome is interesting given the Court's attempts to apply the Genocide 
Convention to Serbia in the previous case discussed. It is submitted that this decision 
reinforces the power balance in cases of new and emerging states, which does not lie 
with the newly created entity. This case demonstrates that the world community is 
willing to use international law principles and their application in order to fit the 
individual circumstances of a particular event, particularly when they are politically 
charged. 
However, the story does not end there. In April 2001 FRY filed an Application for 
revision of the 1996 judgment delivered by the International Court of Justice in the first 
case referred to above concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The case is currently on the docket of the 
Court and FRY contends that its admission to the United Nations as a new member on 1 
November 2000 means that the earlier judgment must be incorrect since it was based on 
the continuity of statehood from the old Yugoslavia to FRY. 109 The outcome of the 
case is awaited and it remains to be seen how it will affect the points asserted in this 
chapter. Nonetheless, it demonstrates the problems which can occur when different 
parts of the international community (like the United Nations General Assembly and the 
International Court of Justice) take action which is governed by facts know at the time 
rather than by an objective set of norms which result in conflicting with each other. 
1.2.6: The Internal Aspects of Recognition Theory 
The effect of recognition decisions can also be felt at an internal level as well as on the 
international plane. Whilst this thesis deals primarily with personality at an 
108 "... the Court is therefore not in a position to find, at this stage of the proceedings, that the acts imputed 
by Yugoslavia to the Respondent are capable of coming within the provisions of the Genocide 
Convention; and whereas Article IX of the Convention, invoked by Yugoslavia, cannot accordingly 
constitute a basis on which the jurisdiction of the Court could prima facie be founded in this case; " 
Yugoslavia v Belgium, (1999) 38 ILM 950, at 960.12 votes to 4 in Belgium case, 12/4 Canada, 12/3 
France, 12/3 Germany, 13/3 Italy, 11/4 The Netherlands, 11/4 Portugal, 14/2 Spain, 12/3 UK and 12/3 
USA. 
109 Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 July 1996 in the Case Concerning Application of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia & Hercegovina v 
Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections (Yugoslavia v Bosnia & Hercegovina) (2001) ICJ Rep., not yet 
reported. 
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international level rather than at an internal level, the status accorded to an entity by a 
domestic court can also be instructive in terms of assessing what recognition it has 
received and the level of status it has achieved. Therefore by way of example, a brief 
foray into the internal aspects of recognition is needed to show how national courts have 
approached the issue of recognition. 
In the UK the problems which can arise when the government has chosen for political 
reasons not to recognise an entity but then an issue arises where the court needs to 
consider its personality are evident. In Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner & Keeler, Ltd. (No. 
2) Lord Wilberforce stated obiter dicta that it was an "open question" as to whether the 
courts must accept that there can be no validity flowing from the acts of governments 
which have not been recognised. 110 
In Gur Corporation v Trust Bank and Africa Ltd. the Republic of Ciskei was held by the 
Court to have standing to sue and be sued in English law despite the fact that it was 
unrecognised by the British Government because Ciskei was considered to be subject to 
the sovereignty of South Africa. The Court justified their decision by considering that 
Ciskei was an emanation of South Africa and was acting by virtue of a delegation of its 
legislative power. Therefore, at an internal as well as an external level it can be seen 
that courts are not necessarily bound in practice by the fiction of the recognition 
decisions made by their government. l t' This supports the assertions that decisions as to 
whether or not to recognise are not always followed in practice and that recognition 
decisions do not necessarily result in an `all or nothing' situation for the unrecognised 
entity. Lack of formal recognition by a State does thus not automatically mean that an 
entity may not act at all on the international stage. 
1.2.7: Conclusions regarding the practice 
Some general comments can be drawn from the recent practice observed above in order 
to ascertain the basic trends in recognition. It is argued that recognition policy is 
affected by politics, however this, in itself, is nothing new. The crux of the issue arises 
110 Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner & Keeler Ltd. (No. 2) (1967) 1,4C853; (1966)3 WLR 125; 43 ILR 3 
111 There are many other cases which also support this point. See Hesperides Hotels Ltd. v Aegean 
Turkish Holidays (1978) QB 205; Gur Corporation v Trust Bank of Africa Ltd. (1986) 3 WLR 583 and 
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however, in the determination of whether overall the politicisation of recognition in this 
recent practice has any bearing on the constitutive/declaratory discussion. The fact that 
states will exercise their discretion to recognise or not with the whole political scenario 
in mind, and that states are willing to allow purely political factors to influence their 
decision making, even if this goes against the apparent legal position (as in the case of 
Macedonia) clearly demonstrates that recognition cannot be solely declaratory in nature. 
Nonetheless, it would be difficult to sustain the argument that recognition is fully 
constitutive simply because of the introduction of politics to decision making as 
recognition will often only be granted when it is clear that certain factual requirements 
have been fulfilled. These requirements are often the traditional requirements of 
statehood but may also in addition include other ad hoc political or legal issues such as 
those laid down by the EC in relation to the former Yugoslavia or the new states 
willingness to be bound by international law. 112 
In the light of the foregoing discussion, recognition can thus be said to certainly have 
some specific constitutive elements. It may often serve to solidify the status of a state 
once the transitional period prior to full independence has begun. It can also serve to 
encourage other bodies and states to recognise the emerging state. If the result were to 
be that the majority of international opinion supported an entity, recognition would 
automatically affect the factual status of the entity, therefore having a constitutive 
effect. 
It should be pointed out that the former Yugoslavia and the Former Soviet-Union 
practice described above does not necessarily equate to custom as an insufficient 
number of states have participated in the decision making processes and they are 
confined to a limited geographical region. Depending on how recognition is treated 
however, particularly by other organisations in the next few years, this kind of practice 
may be viewed as an emerging trend. 113 It would be possible to submit that this 
Republic of Somalia v Woodhouse Drake & Carey (Suisse) SA and Others: The Mary (1993) 1 All ER 
371. See also, Shaw, "Legal Acts of an Unrecognised Entity" (1978) 94 LQR 500 
112 See the above section 1.2.4.2 and also Hillgruber's argument from "The Admission of New States in 
the International Community", at 494 - 5. "' It should be remembered that as organisations are formed by states and that regardless of whether one 
takes an implied or an inherent approach to their powers, following a realist approach, their policy and 
decision making is likely largely to follow a state-centric view of international society and is unlikely to 
venture outside the boundaries of the national interest when representatives are participating in voting 
and decision making. Thus it can be argued that it does not make a great difference whether states 
themselves, or organisations formed by states actually perform the recognition. 
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practice may only be likened to the break- up of federations of states in the future. "4 
However, it is also clear that it is strong evidence of the way in which issues of 
recognition have been treated and of the gap which exists between the theory of 
recognition and practice. States take into account many different considerations when 
looking at questions of recognition. Political considerations both in terms of their 
individual relations with the new entity, their relations with other politically interested 
states and with the factual situation in the new state all play important roles. They all 
point to the fact that at the heart of these is the state's own interest, since a state's own 
interests are affected by the relationships it has with other existing states and also the 
application of certain principles. These principles may often include the universality of 
international law but may sometimes be governed by more specific aspects of the law 
and politics of nations. 
However, there is one very important conclusion which can also be drawn from this 
practice, and it is crucial to the discussion as to the effect of recognition on 
representative groups. The declaratory and constitutive debate is, as demonstrated, 
antiquated and the recent practice shows that there is truth in both theories. Vital to this 
thesis it suggests that the effect of recognition for the recognised (or unrecognised) 
entity is not necessarily an "open-and-shut-case" in terms of the way it is then treated. 
Certainly the value of recognition in itself should not be underestimated as this no doubt 
affects whether an entity does eventually achieve its aims. However the theory behind 
which label recognition is accorded does not necessarily affect the status which the 
entity obtains. The theories about when or under what conditions an entity should be 
recognised in the EC Guidelines were not then followed in the practice of the European 
States. 
Indeed the case of Croatia not fitting in with the Guidelines, its progression to the 
achievement of its aims was not hindered. Although for Macedonia, the opposite was 
true as it fitted all the criteria but did not achieve its aims due to non-recognition on 
For an in-depth discussion of this issue as to the source of powers of international organisations see, 
Sands & Klein, Bowett's Law of International Institutions; White, Law of International Organisations, at 
118 - 123; Certain Expenses of the United Nations (1962) ICJ Rep. 151 and Rama-Montaldo, 
"International Legal Personality and the Implied Powers of International Organisations" (1970) 44 BYBIL 
111. 
See also, Goodwin, "World Institutions and World Order" from Cosgrove & Twitchett (Eds. ), The New 
International Actors: The United Nations and the European Economic Community (London: Macmillan) 
(1970), at 55 - 75 for a discussion as to the state- centred policy of organisations. 114 Rich, "Recognition of States: The Collapse of the Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union". 
37 
political grounds. Therefore the effects of recognition are not necessarily the same for 
the entity concerned as the theory which academics and recognising states choose to 
attach to the process of recognition itself. 
The practice can therefore be concluded to have variable outcomes depending on the 
political context in which it is accorded. It is variable on two levels. First in the sense 
that the States appear outwardly to wish recognition to seem declaratory in nature 
through the setting of guidelines and criteria. However, in practice they wish to 
override those criteria and choose in which circumstances to apply them. In some 
circumstances they are applied (like in Slovenia) and in some circumstances they are 
ignored. States thereby ensure that they retain exclusive control over recognition 
depending on the political scenario, even if that control is partly governed by the 
practice of groups of states (as in Europe). 
Second, it is variable in the sense that the effects of recognition are not necessarily 
always identical. The consequences for a recognised entity do not have to be `all or 
nothing' and depending on the will of the international community, limited personality 
may be accorded even if statehood is not immediately granted. Therefore the old 
declaratory/constitutive debate can be seen as failing to describe the process which an 
entity must go through before it achieves statehood. In fact, the best way to describe the 
situation is as a process which can vary from entity to entity. 
The conclusion that the status which an entity may be deemed to possess is not 
necessarily reflected in its level of participation in international affairs is also supported 
by state practice in the form of court judgments. National courts have been willing to a 
limited extent to take into account the de facto position as well as the de jure status. 1 15 
The effects of recognition by a state or international organisation can be studied by an 
examination of the range of responses different representative groups have received 
from the international community. This will be considered in section 2 of this chapter, 
below. From this it will be possible to determine upon what the success of 
representative groups depends. This is an integral question to this thesis since it has 
1" See section 1.2.6 above and Hesperides Hotels Ltd v Aegean Turkish Holidays (1978) QB 205; Gur 
Corporation v Trust Bank of Africa Ltd. (1986) 3 WLR 583 and Republic of Somalia v Woodhouse Drake 
& Carey (Suisse) SA and Others: The Mary (1993) 1 All ER 371. See also, Shaw, "Legal Acts of an 
Unrecognised Entity". 
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been shown that status does not only turn on which theory is attached to recognition. 
To summarise, since the response an entity claiming status may receive is variable due 
to context and politically influencing factors, it does not therefore relate directly to the 
result it has on the ability of the entity to play a part in the international community. 
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2: AN EXAMINATION OF THE RANGE OF RESPONSES 
RECEIVED BY DIFFERENT GROUPS WHICH HAVE MADE A 
CLAIM TO STATUS 
The first part of this chapter has focussed on the theoretical underpinnings of 
recognition. This has been an important part of this study, even though it has concluded 
that the relevance of recognition theory to the achievement of the aims of an entity in 
the international community is less linked than may at first appear to be the case. The 
label attached to the theory given to recognition is a jaded debate. This is because 
recognition decisions do not necessarily result in an "all or nothing" situation for an 
entity in practice. States are keen to keep a certain level of discretion in recognition 
decisions. However this can work in an entity's favour as well as against it. This, 
coupled with the changing number of non-state entities on the international stage is very 
important. As a result of these conclusions however, the foregoing discussion does not 
fully establish what does make a difference to the level of participation a group claiming 
status is able to achieve in the international community. 
In order to help clarify this section 2 aims to consider the range of responses that some 
groups claiming status have received from the international community. This will 
enable consideration of whether there are any common factors which can be said to 
influence the status of a group claiming status on the international stage. 
For the purposes of this enquiry liberation movements will be examined as they are 
classic examples of non-state groups which seek increased personality on the 
international stage. Contemporary international practice appears to widely support the 
notion that a liberation movement may be a subject of international law. '16 However, 
far from all liberation movements have been or are indeed likely to be classed as such. 
Some of the more famous examples which are brought to mind are Western Sahara, 
East Timor, Palestine, Tibet, Quebec, the Kurds, the Basques, the indigenous peoples of 
Australia or America amongst many others. In addition there are the less internationally 
renowned groups pushing for self determination. For example, those in Brittany, 
Cornwall or Gibraltar. When these are added to the many groups which have gone 
before them, particularly during the colonial period, it is apparent how important, yet 
1 16 Lauterpacht, "The Subjects of the Law of Nations" (1947) 63 LQR 438, at 444. 
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still unclear, the right to representation and the status of representatives is in 
international law. 
2.1: Overview of non-state claimants to international legal personality 
In this section an illustrative sample of the groups which have made claims to status on 
behalf of the people they purport[ed] to represent are considered. The Palestinian 
situation, though a good example is not included in this section, since it is the main case 
study used in this thesis regarding representation and will be considered fully in 
Chapters Two and Three. ' 17 
2.1.1: PAIGC 
The Partido Africano da Independencia da Guine e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) was a 
liberation group struggling for independence in Guinea-Bissau which was a Portuguese 
colony. The PAIGC rebelled against the administration in Portugal, claiming to 
represent the people of the territory. It managed to acquire armed control over 
approximately two thirds of the state and then went on to declare independence in 
September 1973. 
The PAIGC represented the people of the colonial territory of Portuguese Guinea. In a 
colonial situation the need for representation at an international level is clear and the 
PAIGC is an interesting comparative example because as will be discussed below, it 
demonstrates the difference which the support of an international organisation can make 
in the struggle for statehood. 
The PAIGC declared the creation of the State of Guinea-Bissau and within a year 
received recognition from over 40 members of the international community. The UN 
resolved that a sovereign state of Guinea-Bissau had been created'" and during the 
117 In Chapter Three the methodology used to consider the international community's response to claims 
to Palestinian status is by looking at recognition by the UN, by individual states, diplomatic relations, at a 
regional level and lastly recognition by other groups and bodies. Similar criteria will be used in this 
chapter to monitor the international community's responses to the chosen groups. 
118 General Assembly Resolution 3601 (XXVIII), 2 November 1973 (Voting: 93: 7: 30). 
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following year more and more states continued to recognise Guinea-Bissau as an 
independent state. This resulted finally in a formal agreement between Portugal and the 
PAIGC. 119 
There seemed to be little doubt that the PAIGC did not exercise effective control within 
the territory, however this did not stop the international community effectively pushing 
for the creation of a state through recognition because of the denial of self 
determination. '20 
The first opportunity for the group to represent their people came in the Economic 
Commission for Africa at the UN. Portugal, which was the administering coloniser of 
the territory, was expelled from the Commission, so it was decided that groups 
recommended by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) should be able to become 
Associate Members. 121 The PAIGC then went on to participate in the Special 
Committee on the Implementation of the Declaration on Decolonisation, although only 
on issues relating to Guinea. 122 
Despite the support it received, even as it was on the verge of achieving its aims the 
PAIGC did not achieve as much support at the UN as some other liberation groups such 
as SWAPO or the PLO. 123 In 1974 there were calls for the leader of the PAIGC, 
Amilcar Cabral, to be able to make a declaration before the General Assembly, 
however they were unsuccessful. 124 
1 19 See description of situation in Wilson, International Law and the Use of Force by National Liberation 
Movements, at 111 - 113. 120 For further discussion of premature recognition due to lack of effective control of the territory see 
Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press) (1999), at 217 - 223. 
See also section 3 below regarding self determination and representative groups and section 3.2.1 
regarding self determination and premature recognition. 
121 Resolutions 151 (VIII) (1967) and 194 (IX) (1969) of the Commission and General Assembly 
Resolution 2795 (XXVI), 10 December 1971 (Voting: 105: 8: 15 - Brazil, Costa Rica, ' France, Portugal, 
South Africa, Spain, UK and USA against). 
122 General Assembly Resolution 2878 (XXVI), 20 December 1971 (Voting: 96: 5: 18). 
'23 SWAPO and the PLO were distinct from other groups in that were invited to be observers in the 
General Assembly in plenary session and they may participate on all issues, as non-member State 
observers would do: General Assembly Resolutions 152 (XXXI), 20 December 1976 (Voting: 113: 0: 13) 
and 3237 (XXIX), 22 November 1974 (Voting: 95: 17: 19). 
124 Although the leader of the PLO was invited to address the Assembly that same year. For discussion 
see Chapter Three of this thesis and Hirst, The Gun and the Olive Branch: The Roots of Violence in the 
Middle East, (London: Faber and Faber) (1977), at 333; also cited in Burke, International Recognition of 
a Non-State Nation: The PLO and the UN, (M. Phil Thesis: Oxford) (1979), at 76. 
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Thus the PAIGC was very successful in that it achieved its aims, but it was not 
necessarily given as high a profile as those African liberation groups which achieved 
success in the mid to late 1970s. '25 This was mainly because it was operating before the 
participation of liberation movements in the international arena became more common 
practice rather than through any ideological opposition to its aims, since this was at the 
height of the decolonisation process which was spearheaded at the UN. However, it is 
interesting to note the support which the organisation gave to the new State of Guinea- 
Bissau thus implicitly supporting the PAIGC. 
Although forty States had recognised the emerging State, under the constitutive theory 
this would surely not be sufficient alone to create a State and as mentioned above the 
lack of control which the PAIGC had over the territory would not necessarily satisfy all 
the declaratory doctrine requires. 126 Therefore it can be said that the support of the UN 
was the key factor in bringing about the creation of the State. This is important because 
it shows the effect which UN backing can have on the success of a liberation movement. 
Arguably however, the success came as a result of the denial of self determination and 
the colonial situation within which the group operated, rather than through any 
particular characteristics belonging to the group as it was not clear how representative it 
was of the people whom it purported to represent. Therefore it is arguable that the 
claim to statehood must be based on sufficiently strong ground before the UN will push 
for independence. 127 
2.1.2: SWAPO 
The South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) fought against South Africa 
for the liberation of Namibia (South West Africa). Whilst this too was a colonial 
situation, the case of Namibia was special because it became a Class C Mandate under 
the League of Nations with South Africa as its mandatory power. 128 Yet, after the 
dissolution of the League, South Africa refused to place Namibia under UN 
125 Travers, "The Legal Effect of United Nations Action in Support of the Palestine Liberation 
Organisation and the National Liberation Movements of Africa" (1976) 17 HIIJ 561, at 569 and footnote 
25 for a full list of groups. 
126 Due to the requirement under the Montevideo Convention for their to be an "effective government". 
See section 1.2 in Chapter Three regarding the criteria for a government in international law. 
127 The issue of the quality and effect of claims to self determination and their impact on the recognition 
process will be examined in section 3 of this chapter. 
128 See section 1.2.2 in Chapter Two for brief information regarding the system of mandates. 
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trusteeship. 129 On this issue therefore, the relationship between the mandatory, South 
Africa and the UN was already off to a rocky beginning. The UN's stance against 
South African presence was confirmed when the Security Council and the International 
Court of Justice stated that South Africa's continuing presence in the territory was 
illegal. 130 The people of South West Africa were a people desperately in need of a 
legitimate representative to voice their interests in the international community and 
SWAPO filled this role. Indeed SWAPO did often have a great deal of control over 
Namibia somewhat akin to a government and it certainly had a fairly high level of 
popular support. '31 
Recognition of SWAPO by the OAU was a turning point for the group as the 
Organisation was an extremely influential body in terms of raising the profile of 
national liberation movements generally and had provided both financial and diplomatic 
assistance to many of the African groups in particular. 132 As a result of this and the 
increasing support for situation in Namibia, SWAPO was granted observer status by the 
UN. 133 
The practice of the UN also shows that in some respects SWAPO and other African 
movements indeed led the way regarding liberation movement participation, particularly 
through observer status at the UN. 134 In 1972 SWAPO was given the opportunity to 
129 For further discussion on the history of the trusteeship of South West Africa see Dugard, Recognition 
and the United Nations, at 117 - 122. "o See Security Council Resolutions 269 (1969) and 276 (1970) and Legal Consequences for States of 
the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security 
Council Resolution 276 (1970) ICJRep. 16, at 58. 
i31 Dugard, "SWAPO: Thejus ad bellum and the jus in belle" (1976) 93 SAL! 144. 
12 The OAU does not currently recognise any national liberation movements. The OAU is an 
international regional organisation which from time to time recognises liberation movements and has co- 
operated with the United Nations in this regard. See by way of example, General Assembly Resolution 
3280 (XXIX), 10 December 1974 (consensus), whereby the UN granted observers status to "the 
representatives of the national liberation movements recognised by the Organisation of African Unity". 
As a basic guideline, the OAU uses the criteria of effectiveness of the struggle of the movement in 
question but also looks particularly at the level of support which it has accrued. 
As discussed in relation to the PAIGC and SWAPO, the effect that its recognition had on the process of 
the granting of observer status at the UN was crucial for many groups. Such recognition often marked the 
turning point for the internationalisation of liberation conflicts and on many occasions was a precursor to 
independence 
133 This occurred in 1976 by virtue of General Assembly Resolution 152 (XXXI), 20 December 1976 
nearly two years after the initial invitation to the PLO to receive the privileges of the status of observer in 
the General Assembly. 
134 See Travers, "The Legal Effect of United Nations Action in Support of the Palestine Liberation 
Organisation and the National Liberation Movements of Africa", at 561. Travers lists the National 
Liberation Movements with observer status and OAU recognition, numbering 13, in footnote 25. 
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participate in the work of the UN Council for Namibia. 135 This was followed in 1973 
with the grant of observer status to that Council. 136 The Council made a report on the 
situation in Namibia which the General Assembly considered during it's 28`" Session. 
The report was accepted and as a result SWAPO was recognised as the "authentic" 
representative of the people of Namibia. 137 This was clearly a political victory for the 
movement and helped to cement its position as a legitimate entity in international 
affairs. 
At that time SWAPO was one of the foremost liberation movements in Africa and this 
was certainly due in part to the publicity their cause had received through the channels 
of the UN and also to the case pertaining to Namibia which had been before the 
International Court of Justice a few years before. 138 The case and the Security Council 
decisions, 139 which had both deemed South Africa's continued presence in Namibia 
illegal and also required its immediate withdrawal from that territory, added weight and 
legitimacy to SWAPO's political aims. 140 As a corollary therefore they also added 
legitimacy to their claims to status which as far as they were concerned would enable 
them to wage an international war of liberation against South Africa. 141 
SWAPO was also recognised as a NLM by the international community through the 
1977 Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions which were discussed at a Diplomatic 
Conference in Geneva which SWAPO attended. 142 The Protocols built on the existing 
International Humanitarian Law, but the issues they consider which are relevant here 
are the status of wars of national liberation and the combatants involved in them 
through guerrilla warfare. It has been argued that the reference to "racist regimes" in 
"S This was two years prior to the invitation to the PLO mentioned above which will be considered in 
further detail in Chapter Three. 
136 Wilson, International Law and the Use of Force by National Liberation Movements, at 118. 
137 General Assembly Resolution 3111 (XXVIII), 12 December 1973 (Voting: 107: 2: 17 South Africa and 
Portugal against). 
138 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (1971) 1CJ Rep. 16. It should be 
remembered that Namibia was a UN trust territory. 
139 See Security Council Resolutions 264 (1969), 296 (1969), 276 (1970), 283 (1970), 301 (1971), 310 
(1972), 366 (1974) and 385 (1976). 
140 For more analysis of the legalities of the situation see Dugard, "SWAPO: The jus ad bellum and the 
jus in bello". 
41 It can be argued that such a claim to wage war is not sound since the Articles of the UN Charter which 
pertain to the use of force do not envisage a scenario outside the use of force by states, however it is also 
possible to put forward the argument that where there is a solid claim to self determination, wars of 
liberation are international rather than internal armed conflicts. 
142 See Chapter Three section 2.7.1 regarding the PLO's participation in this Conference and Chapter Five 
section 1.3 regarding the Geneva Conventions' applicability to the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
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Article 1(4) of Protocol I relates to the situation SWAPO was in vis-ä-vis South Africa 
and that such a term was incorporated specifically to include that scenario. '43 
SWAPO was thus a strong NLM which had received a good degree of political support 
on the international stage considering that it was not a state. Some of the attention it 
received was politically motivated; however the opportunities it gained as a result of 
this action no doubt had a bearing on the activities in which it was able to take part. 
The limited status which SWAPO achieved, notably in the UN, being a prime example. 
2.1.3: FLN 
The FLN was the liberation movement in Algeria in its quest for decolonisation from 
France. The FLN fought a long drawn out war of liberation from 1954 to 1962 and 
remained the representative of the Algerian people throughout. 
The FLN are a good example of another liberation movement which attained a certain 
degree of personality in the international arena. It was afforded de jure recognition by 
some states prior to gaining independence, which raised a number of problems 
regarding the issues surrounding premature recognition144 and it even concluded treaties 
with some. '45 The FLN took part in a number of conferences in order to attempt to 
bring the war it was waging against France (the colonial power) to the attention of the 
world. If it could gain some level of international recognition as an organisation then 
143 Murray, "The Status of the ANC and SWAPO and International Humanitarian Law" (1983) 100(3) 
SAU 402, at 405. 
144 For a full list of recognising States see Wilson, International Law and the Use of Force by National 
Liberation Movements, at 110 and footnote 62. See also, Crawford, Creation of States, at 260 and 
footnote 56. Premature recognition of a government as opposed to acceptance of the authority of a 
national liberation movement raises many problems. These are discussed in section 3.2.1 below in 
relation to self determination and competing claims to status and in section 1.2 of Chapter Three. 
Brownlie declares that "premature recognition is a classic example of a breach of the principle of non- 
intervention. ": Brownlie, "Recognition in Theory and Practice", at 204. Premature recognition can be 
thought of as a breach of the principle of non-intervention, since in the context of a national liberation 
movement any recognition will involve a lack of recognition towards the other party regarding their 
competence in a particular area. However, it can be said that these problems vary from situation to 
situation. For example, the issues raised in a colonial context will be entirely different from those raised 
in the case of secession or dismemberment. 
ias For a full list of agreements signed by the Provisional Government between 1958 after its Declaration 
of Independence and 1962 when it signed the Evian Accords Peace and Referendum Agreement with the 
French Government see Talmon, Recognition of Governments in International Law: With Particular 
Reference to Governments in Exile, at 338 - 339. See also, Kassim, "The Palestine Liberation 
Organisation's Claim To Status: A Juridical Analysis Under International Law", at 11 and footnote 51. 
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the war could be classed as international rather than as domestic or civil strife within 
French territory. '46 
The Bandung Conference in April 1955 was the first main event it attended and 29 
Third World States supported the principle of self determination including 
independence in North Africa. 147 Although it was only an unofficial delegate at this 
conference, two years later in 1957 at the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference in 
Cairo it took part as an equal to the governments in attendance. 148 The FLN was 
relatively successful in achieving this, particularly after the establishment of a 
provisional government when a Declaration of Independence was made. 149 
One of the main problems for the FLN was to show that the war was one of 
decolonisation not of secession. Due partly to the huge difference in culture, religion, 
language and history between Algeria and France despite the proximity of territory "a 
large number of states eventually supported the right of Algeria to independence. " 50 
The FLN finally achieved its aims on 3 July 1962 when it was granted formal 
independence after having signed the Evian Agreements with France earlier that year. 151 
It is argued that one of the main reasons for the success of the FLN in the achievement 
of its aims was the taking up of the issue by the UN. The FLN was operating prior to 
the acceptance of liberation movements as observers at the UN and it is true to say that 
initially the UN was not wholly happy with considering the issue, demonstrated by the 
removal of the Algerian situation from the agenda in 1955.152 When it returned for 
discussion in the General Assembly in 1960 and 61 however, the Assembly called for 
negotiation "with a view to implementing the right of the Algerian People to self 
determination and independence... ". 153 The consideration of this issue at that time was 
relatively controversial due to the concerns of the colonial states about precedent- 
setting, particularly as this was a decade before liberation movements became more 
involved in the work of the UN. However, it also shows the effect which the interest of 
146 See generally, Gillespie, Algeria: Rebellion and Revolution (London: Ernest Benn) (1960) and Home, 
A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954 - 1962 (London: Macmillan Press) (1977). 
'47 Wilson, International Law and the Use of Force by National Liberation Movements, at 109. 
'48 Ibid. 14916 September 1958. 
'50 Wilson, International Law and the Use of Force by National Liberation Movements, at 111. 
's' 13 March 1962,66 Revue General de Droit International Public 686 - 92. 152 General Assembly Resolution 909 (X), 25 November 1955 (adopted without a vote). 




the UN can have on a situation. This is the case since after an extremely protracted 
conflict and nearly four years after the initial Declaration of Independence, but notably 
only a year after the General Assembly's Resolution, independence was granted. 
The Algerian example spanned the formative years of the decolonisation process and 
has been chosen here as a comparator to SWAPO and the PAIGC which both operated 
when the notion of the recognition of a liberation movement was more widely accepted 
as a possibility, partly because of the significant step which parts of the international 
community took in recognising prematurely the provisional government set up by the 
FLN. 
As one of the first major and more successful liberation movements to receive some 
international recognition, the FLN demonstrates the need for representation and indeed 
continued representation throughout the entire struggle for self determination. It is also 
an example of how the bringing of a claim for self determination is not always a speedy 
process and shows that there is a need for some level of status, and therefore voice, in 
the international community during the time of struggle as well as when self 
determination in achieved. '54 
2.1.4: FRETILIN 
The history of East Timor is a tragic case study and to this day East Timor remains on 
the UN list of non-self governing territories. East Timor was a Portuguese colony and it 
shares an island (Timor) with Indonesia, a neighbouring state. In 1974 when Portugal 
gave up its claim to East Timor, Australia and Indonesia together decided that in the 
best interests of the security of the region East Timor should be joined to Indonesia. 
Fretilin, a liberation group purporting to represent the East Timorese, was formed 
within East Timor, aiming to secure independence and thus oppose Indonesian claims to 
the territory. '55 
154 See section 3 below regarding self determination. 
155 Fretilin stands for Freute Revolucionaria Timor Leste Independente. For descriptive information 
regarding Fretilin activity and fighters see Parry, "In the jungles hills of East Timor, the resistance fights 
on after 23 years" The Independent 4 November 1998 18. 
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In the summer of 1975 Fretilin forces managed to gain control of the territory from 
Portugal and went on to declare an independent state of East Timor. Later on that year 
Indonesia invaded East Timor and overthrew Fretilin . 
Portugal, who claimed to be the 
sole entity entitled by the UN Charter to speak for the East Timorese'56 protested at the 
UN and its claims were upheld. 157 In May 1976 the Indonesian Government and the 
pro-Indonesian political parties in East Timor created an unelected "Regional Popular 
Assembly" which `authorised' the territory's incorporation into Indonesia. A guerrilla 
war between the two claimants to the territory ensued with much loss of life and 
bloodshed, notably on the side of the East Timorese. 
A "popular consultation" was set up by the United Nations to take place on 8th August 
1999 in order to assess the popular support for independence and a UN Mission was put 
in place to organise the referendum. 158 The voting took place on 30th August that year 
and 78.5% of East Timorese voted in favour of independence from Indonesia. However 
up until this UN involvement and the violence mentioned below, international interest 
in the situation has been fairly limited. 
Tragically, following the rejection by the East Timorese of integration with Indonesia 
the Indonesia armed forces waged a three week campaign called "operation clean 
sweep" in which the majority of the East Timorese infrastructure and buildings were 
destroyed. Thousands of East Timorese were also brutally executed and villages were 
burnt. 159 As a result The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor 
(UNTAET) was established. 160 
"UNTAET is unique amongst experiments in transitional administration with full legislative and 
executive powers, since it is the first time the UN has assumed its role independently of any competing 
authority. """ 
156 In its capacity as the administering power of what is still considered to be a non-self governing 
territory by the `Committee of 24' at the United Nations 
157 The UN has condemned the Indonesian invasion of East Timor but has not classed it as an act of 
aggression. The initial General Assembly Resolution after the invasion was 3485 (XXX), 12 December 
1975. See also, Security Council Resolution 384,22 December 1975. 
" Security Council Resolution 1236,7 May 1999 and Security Council Resolution 1246 11 June 1999 
respectively. 
159 Chopra, "Introductory Note to UNTAET Regulation 13" (2000) 39 ILM 936. See also Security 
Council Resolution 1264,15 September 1999 which welcomed the results of the referendum but was also, 
"deeply concerned about the deterioration of the security situation in East Timor and in particular by the 
continuing violence against and large scale displacement and relocation of East Timorese civilians. " 160 Security Resolution 1272,25 October 1999. 
161 Chopra, "Introductory Note to UNTAET Regulation 13", at 937. 
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Fretilin is no longer fighting for independence from Indonesia. However as mentioned 
above, as yet East Timor has remained on the UN's list of non-self governing territories. 
The level of international support received by Fretilin during its struggle with Indonesia 
was not great. In the Dutch case Democratic Republic of East Timor, Fretilin and 
Others v State of the Netherlands162 the Court found that as a matter of fact the 
independent State of East Timor did not exist and Fretilin had "no legal personality" 
and that therefore the case failed on admissibility grounds. The Court took into 
account the lack of recognition by the international community as evidence of their non- 
fulfilment of the criteria of statehood and government. Fretilin submitted that prior to 
the case there had been a period of time during December 1975, before the invasion by 
Indonesia, when effective control of the territory had been exercised. The Court 
considered however that this was insufficient evidence to consider Fretilin to possess 
much status in the international community. 163 
The UN did offer some support in that during the struggle there were General Assembly 
and Security Council Resolutions calling for the withdrawal of Indonesia from East 
Timor and a call to all states that they allow the East Timorese to exercise their right to 
self determinationl64 However, partly due to lack of real international pressure, 
Indonesia ignored the principle of self determination and claimed sovereignty over the 
area. 
The International Court of Justice also had to consider the issue of self determination in 
East Timor. 165 The Court stated that the people of East Timor have the right to self 
162 District Court of the Hague, 21 February 1980: 87 ILR 73. The Court was asked to withdraw export 
licences for the delivery to Indonesia of three corvettes which were to be built in the Netherlands and 
there was concern that they would be used in the fighting between the recipients and the East Timorese. 
163 The way that the court decided this case is interesting. The court stated that "the question was to be 
decided on the basis of the factual criteria for statehood laid down by international law. " Evidence of 
failure to fulfil the criteria this could be the "non-recognition by the vast majority of states" (at 73). 
Therefore a declaratory yet factual approach to recognition is taken. 
164 General Assembly Resolution 3845 (XXX), (1975) (Voting: 72: 10: 43); Security Council Resolution 
384 (1975) (Adopted unanimously). 
165 East Timor Case (Portugal v Australia) (1995) ICJRep. 90. The case was brought by Portugal on the 
grounds that the conclusion of a treaty between Australia and Indonesia regarding the exploration and 
exploitation of off-shore resources (The Timor Gap Treaty) was in violation of the rights of the people of 
East Timor. Portugal submitted further that the treaty was in violation of her rights as the competent 
authority in East Timor because she had been the colonial power in the territory prior to the Indonesian 
invasion in 1975. For discussion regarding Portugal's claim see Chinkin, "The Merits of Portugal's claim 
against Australia" (1992) 15 UNew South Wales LR 423. 
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determination and that this was a right erga omnes, but declined, however, from 
deciding the case given that Indonesia was not a party. 166 
The East Timorese were clearly a people in the kind of scenario where the need for 
representation at an international level was acute. The East Timor problem stemmed 
from the demise of the colonial period but, unlike many African states, self 
determination was not realised. Furthermore, since that time there had been many 
reports of violence between the Fretilin and the Indonesian forces and a number of 
reports claiming that the human rights of the East Timorese were being systematically 
abused. 167 It is hard to deny that there was a need for a representative group in East 
Timor; however the effectiveness of that representation and their success as a movement 
on the international stage was not great. 
Fretilin is a good example of a representative group to use in this study because it 
claims were to represent the East Timorese, who have been endorsed by the UN as 
having a right to self determination, but has had a differing level of success to the other 
groups dealt with in this chapter. 
Fretilin has not been very successful in the extent of recognition it has received from the 
international community and therefore its impact on the international stage has always 
been very unclear and certainly much limited. Obviously this is very different to the 
situations in which the aforementioned groups found themselves, particularly given the 
clarity of the self determination situation and the dire need for representation which 
existed in East Timor. 168 
It is argued that one of the main reasons why Fretilin has received such little support is 
because of the lack of participation by the movement in the UN other than through 
support for the right of self determination. 169 Fretilin was able to appear before some 
UN committees, including the Special Committee on Decolonisation and the Fourth 
166 See Chinkin, "Recent Cases: The East Timor Case (Portugal v Australia)" (1996) 45 ICLQ 712. The 
Court also refused to be drawn into a discussion regarding the consequences of a breach of the right to 
self determination. 
167 See for example Parry, "In the Jungle Hills of East Timor, the Resistance Fights on After 23 Years". 168 See Cassese's explanation of the situation which is definitive about the right to self determination of 
the East Timorese, Cassese, SelfDetermination of Peoples, at 223 - 230. 
51 
Committee. 170 However, this was infrequent and on an ad hoc basis and there were no 
moves to grant observer status. This is partly due to the fact that it was not granted 
observer status by a regional organisation such as either the Arab League or the OAU 
and their support, as shown above in relation to SWAPO, is crucial given the framing of 
the relevant UN resolutions, 171 despite the fact that there is no equivalent Asian 
organisation. 
Therefore, although the status of Fretilin during its conflict with Indonesia was unclear, 
it can be said that it did not have a significant impact upon the international community. 
This is substantially due to its lack of recognition either by individual states or 
international organisations such as the UN or other regional organisations. It is fair to 
say that this problem lies to a certain extent with the lack of a relevant regional 
organisation for Asia which would perform such a task. Lack of recognition however, 
may be as a result of the lack of availability of information as to the representative 
nature and thus legitimacy of Fretilin as a liberation movement due to the closed nature 
of the Indonesian administration. Due to lack of support for Fretilin's claims, the 
degree of personality it achieved was extremely minimal. 
2.2: Conclusions for this section. 
The examples chronicled above suggest that there is a link between political support and 
recognition resulting in a degree of international personality. Some of the groups were 
more successful on the international stage than others, (for example, SWAPO compared 
with Fretilin). In such cases it can be seen that the political support they received 
directly affected their participation at an international level (for example, SWAPO's 
being granted observer status in the United Nations). Although the achievement of 
personality is qualitatively different from gaining political support or making a political 
impact, the above study appears to support the assertion that politics and recognition are 
almost inextricably linked, particularly in the claims of non-state groups when there 
may be more than one claim to the relevant territory. 
169 The UN has condemned the Indonesian invasion of East Timor but has not classed it as an act of 
aggression. The initial General Assembly Resolution after the invasion was 3485 (XXX) 12 December 
1975. See also, Security Council Resolution 384 (1975), 22 December 1975. 
170 Shaw, "The International Status of National Liberation Movements" (1983) 5 Liverpool LR 19, at 32. 
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Due to the importance which political support plays in the achievement of status in the 
international community, it seems quite possible that, at any one point in time, a 
representative group could have more than one level of status depending on with whom 
it is interacting and on the level at which it is given the opportunity to participate and 
interact. This is important because it means that any status is potentially variable not 
only through time and the working through of a transitional period prior to statehood, 
but also through situation. Status for the representative group is therefore a politically 
complex web of relationships. 
On examination of the groups considered above it seems clear that there can be no 
substitute for recognition by the UN as the legitimate representative of a people in terms 
of the consequences which often (although not automatically) spring from this. A 
subsequent grant of observer status for a liberation movement can then surely only 
increase its level of international legal personality due to the high level of support it 
received. 
Recognition by and support from individual States is clearly important. Often however, 
formal recognition from the international community as a whole may come after the 
acceptance of the UN, as for example in the case of Guinea-Bissau. For the groups 
which achieved status at the UN, it proved to be a turning point in their struggle for 
independence. However, if observer status is not granted, the opportunity to participate 
in the work of the UN nonetheless gives liberation movements the chance to publicise 
their cause and mobilise support for their aims, as demonstrated by the case of the FLN. 
Another important issue which relates to the success of groups is the quality of their 
claim to represent. This naturally includes the people's claim to self determination and 
the problem of competing claims to the territory. In some cases, as is evidenced above 
in relation to SWAPO, the need for representation due to an unfulfilled claim to self 
determination has been the trigger for increasing support and therefore status from the 
international community. 172 However as the case of East Timor shows, the call for 
independence does not always result in a speedy international response. 
171 See section 2.2 above which deals with grants of observer status to liberation movements 
53 
The small number of groups examined briefly above supports the assertion that the 
response of the international community to group's claiming status is far from uniform. 
Each group was handled in a different manner depending, for example, upon the period 
of time when it was operating, upon the political situation it was involved in and the 
competing claims to the territory. The potential range of responses from the 
international community seems to have a direct impact on the achievement of a group's 
aims and the length of time in the transitional period prior to full independence as is 
evidenced particularly well by the East Timor example. 
All these issues lead onto the question of where the most complicated example of 
liberation fits into the scale of possibilities for types of responses to claims to status. 
The most complicated example arguably being the Palestinian situation. Chapter Three 
considers the range of responses it has received from the international community to its 
representatives' claims to status which will assist in the assessment of the theory that 
personality may be variable. However, before an examination of the Palestinian claim is 
undertaken, one more issue must be raised in order to understand both the responses 
which may be given by the international community and the claim to status itself. 
The following section considers the issue of self determination. Self determination is 
here singled out above the other factors which may have a bearing upon a group's claim 
to status. This is because it seems that the quality of the claim may affect a group's 
claim and its centrality to the international community's response is of great 
importance. 
172 The question of self determination is considered in greater detail below in section 3. 
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3: SELF DETERMINATION AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN THE 
CONTEXT OF THE SUCCESS OF REPRESENTATIVE GROUPS. 
This section considers to what extent the claim of a group to represent a people on the 
grounds of their right to self determination and the quality of that claim affects the 
recognition which is accorded to the representative group. The issues surrounding 
competing claims to territory in self determination situations will also be considered. 
This may assist in assessing whether self determination can speed up the recognition 
process and thereby reduce the transitional period between the claiming of a right and 
achievement of it. 
From this it will be possible to establish if any criteria can be seen to emerge regarding 
the response of the international community to representative groups or whether their 
approach has been at a more ad hoc level. First however, the basics of the law of self 
determination will be considered in order to place this discussion in its theoretical 
context. 
3.1: The claim of self determination in the international community. 
Self determination has been described as, 
"The right of a nation to constitute an independent state and determine its own government for itself. " 173 
There is a major hurdle in the application of this argument to the current world situation 
if it is accepted, as some have argued, that self determination is restricted to situations 
of decolonisation. 174 The implication is that a need for representation as a result of a 
denial of self determination could only occur in a colonial context, and thus that 
173 Cobban, The Nation State and National Self Determination (London: Collins) (Revised Ed.: 1965), at 
45 - 46, also cited in Vance, "Recognition as an Affirmative Step in the Decolonisation Process: 
The 
Case of Western Sahara" (1980) 7(2) YJWPO 45, at footnote 1. 
174 See for example, Gross Espiell, The Right to Self Determination. Implementation of United Nations 
Resolutions, UN doe. EICN. 4/Sub. 2/405/Rev. 1 (1980), at 10. Cf inter alia, Tomuschat, "Self 
Determination in a Post-Colonial World" from Tomuschat (Ed. ), Modern Law of Self Determination, 
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers) (1993) 1 and Cassese, SelfDetermination of Peoples. There can 
also be needs for representation at an internal level, however for the purposes of this study only 
international claims are considered. For further discussion on internal issues see, Thomberry, "The 
Democratic or Internal Aspect of Self Determination with some remarks on Federalism" 101; Rosas, 
"Internal Self Determination" 225 and Salmon, "Internal Aspects of the Right to Self determination: 
Towards a Democratic Legitimacy Principle? " 253, all from Tomuschat (Ed. ), Modern Law of Self 
Determination. 
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requirements for representation in the context of self determination are dying needs. It 
is argued however, that this is not the case. The phrase "respect for the equal rights and 
self determination of peoples" can be found twice in the Charter of the United Nations, 
at Article 1 (2) and Article 55. However these are not linked to the notion of 
decolonisation which is provided for quite separately in Articles 73 and 76.175 
Therefore, it is argued that there is still a need for representation beyond the colonial 
context at an international level. 176 Thus the question automatically arises as to who 
may legitimately claim the right to self determination. A minority within a state may be 
the kind of group which needs some form of representation, particularly if they are 
insufficiently represented within the political set-up nationally. Whether this would 
always fall within the wider and maybe more ambitious notions of the right to self 
determination is perhaps debatable, as self determination does not have to result in 
independent statehood. '77 
3.1.1: Representation of Whom? 
When linked to the principle of self determination at first glance the answer to this 
question may seem straightforward. The UN Charter refers to the "... self determination 
of peopless178, therefore the group of individuals who require representation in a self 
determination situation are a "people". However, as the wealth of discussion which this 
word has generated suggests, the answer is far from simple. 179 
The UN practice has generally limited any form of definition to peoples under "alien 
subjugation, domination and exploitation", 180 "peoples under colonial and alien 
175 See Crawford, "The Rights of Peoples: 'Peoples' or `Governments'? " 55, at 58 from Crawford (Ed. ), 
The Rights of Peoples (Oxford: Clarendon Press) (1988). Self determination is also mentioned in 
numerous General Assembly resolutions as a right of peoples (see for example, General Assembly 
Resolution 1514 [XXV], 14 December 1960 (Voting: 89: 0: 9. Australia, Belgium, Dominican Republic, 
France, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, United Kingdom and United States of American abstained)) and is 
widely discussed in literature (for a modem in depth discussion see for example, Cassese, Self 
Determination of Peoples and also Tomuschat, "Self Determination in Post-Colonial World", ibid. 
176 See Tomuschat (Ed. ) Modern Law of Self Determination. 
177 See Eide, "In Search of Constructive Alternatives to Secession" from Tomuschat (Ed. ), ibid. 139 and 
Musgrave, Self Determination and National Minorities (Oxford: Clarendon Press) (1997). 
"a Articles 1(2) and 55. 
179 See for example, Chapter III "Scope of the Principle: Definition of the 'Self" from Pomerance, Self 
Determination in Law and Practice (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers) (1982). 
180 Articles 1(3) of the Human Rights Covenants which are discussed in Chapter Five below. 
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domination", ' 81 and "racism, apartheid and activities of foreign economic and other 
interests which exploit colonial peoples". ' 82 Therefore, the term "colonial" "is often 
coupled with `racist' or `neo-colonial' concepts in the halls of the UN. "' 83 
As a result of the lack of clarity there has been some debate over how far it applies to 
minority groups and in particular ethnic groups within a state. The UN practice has 
been collectively determined as including only within its scope, "... the right of the 
majority within a generally accepted political unit to the exercise of power. "184 This 
definition still leaves the definition of the "political unit" unclear. However, as options 
which do not necessarily only include full independence and secession are considered in 
more detail, the fulfilment of the right to self determination for all peoples, whether 
considered distinct for reasons of ethnicity, culture, religion, race, or skin pigmentation 
becomes less of a radical political principle and more potentially achievable as the trend 
towards democracy in the international community grows. 185 This said, the 
international response to such groups whether ethnically distinct (like the Kurds, 
Basques or Armenians), indigenous populations (like the native peoples of North and 
South America, New Zealand or Australia), religious groups (like the Catholics in 
Northern Ireland) or linguistically distinct groups (like the Quebecois) has so far been 
poor and dogged by apathy and inaction. This is perhaps not surprising given the initial 
concern about the inclusion of the term peoples being inserted into the UN Charter at 
all. Nonetheless, if and when the notion of self determination becomes a clearer and 
more coherent legal principle a change in response may be seen. 186 
3.1.2: Representation By Whom? 
Once it is established that a particular group of people require a representative, then the 
issue arises as to how its representatives are chosen. Cassese has looked at this issue in 
relation to national liberation movements as representatives which is the kind of group 
1$' E. g.: in General Assembly Resolutions 2649 (XXV), 30 November 1970; 2708 (XXV), 14 December 
1970 and 2878 (XXVI), 20 December 1971. 
182 General Assembly Resolution 2548 (XXIV), 11 December 1969. 
183 Pomerance, Self Determination in Law and Practice, at 15. 
184 Higgins, The Development of International Law, at 104. 
cgs See Eide, "In Search of Constructive Alternatives to Secession" 139 and Salmon, "Internal Aspects of 
the Right to Self determination: Towards a Democratic Legitimacy Principle? " 253. 
186 See Cassese's description of the debate at the Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco talks regarding the 
inclusion of the principle of self determination in the UN Charter, Cassese, Self Determination of Peoples, 
at 37 - 43. 
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primarily relevant to this study. He states that a group must have a "broad support 
among those it claims to represent" before it can obtain any level of status in 
international law as a result of its position. 187 
Basically therefore the requirement is one of legitimacy in relation to the people it 
purports to represent. 188 The concept of legitimacy in relation to recognition and the 
according of status is not necessarily a new one, since it has traditionally been 
considered alongside the notion of effectiveness of government which places some 
importance on the consent of the governed. 
"... experience showed that the principle of mere effectiveness may apply a sanction for ruthless regimes 
inimical to the true will of the nation ... that experience has provided the origin of the practice according to 
which, as a condition of recognition, the will of the people sanctioning the new scheme of things must be 
substantially declared in an orderly way and in accordance with the provisions of the constitution. " 89 
These words ring true in the context of recognition of governments and this particular 
quotation is referring to internal self determination. However, it can equally be applied 
and indeed provides a stronger case in the context of the recognition of a modem day 
liberation group struggling for external self determination. 
The concept of legitimacy further ties the notions of representation with the principle of 
self determination and 
"... it remains true that the transfer of authority must be to a government which possesses the support of, 
and thus can fairly be said to be representative of , the people. "190 
It is not such a huge leap in legal thinking then to argue that if a government must have 
the support of the people, in taking over administration for that particular territory and 
people, then so must a representative liberation group. This is obvious given that 
should they be successful in their claims, the group is likely to play a large role in the 
forming of the new government. Furthermore, if the principles of democracy are 
adhered to strictly, it must also be argued that a people, even when (and perhaps, 
187 Ibid., at 166. 
181 Legitimacy in general has received a reasonable amount of attention in international law in recent 
times. See for example, Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law; Franck, The Power of 
Legitimacy Among Nations (New York: Oxford University Press) (1990); Franck, "The Emerging Right 
to Democratic Governance" (1992) 86 AJIL 46 and Murphy, "Democratic Legitimacy and the 
Recognition of States and Governments" (1999) 48 ICLQ 545. See also footnote 19 of Chapter Three for 
more discussion of Murphy's article. 
189 Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law, at 116. 
190 Crawford, Creation of States, at 220. 
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particularly when) struggling for self determination should be represented by a group 
which has the support of the majority of those of whom it claims to represent. 191 
An equally good argument for the liberation group requiring the support of the people it 
claims to represent is a straightforward one. Quite simply, if that group is able then to 
speak on behalf of the people and particularly if it takes part in international 
organisations or decision-making processes regarding the issue of self determination of 
those people, then without the support of the people the principle of self determination 
itself is devalued. 
A further issue in addition to legitimacy regarding who is entitled to represent a people 
is that of competing claims to represent a people by different groups. There seems to be 
no reason why more than one group cannot take on this task as it may even assist in the 
achievement of the people's aims if different ideological groups appeal to different 
sectors of the international community. 192 In the practice of international organisations 
such as the UN however, whilst it is by no means submitted that only one group should 
be permitted to assert its rights to represent a people, it has generally been accepted that 
each state or people should be represented by one group - usually the government of 
that particular state or the representative of that particular people. It would be very 
difficult, given the procedures of that organisation to institute alternative regulations 
regarding peoples struggle for liberation and their representatives. Were such a 
situation of multiple representation to materialise the position of the peoples and their 
representatives vis-ä-vis the powers whom they are struggling against could potentially 
be weakened, as it is arguable that support may be spread more sparingly between the 
different representatives, unless as mentioned above they were sufficiently ideologically 
distinct. 
A further issue which should be considered here is exactly what the concept of being 
able to represent a people who are not the main inhabitants of a state means. Since it is 
the defined people which the representative group can claim to represent not the 
territory, its ability to represent beyond that mandate is automatically limited for it 
draws its legitimacy from the relevant people. Therefore if the group is able to join in 
191 See also, Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law in relation to legitimacy generally but 
notably chapter 6 regarding the linking of legitimacy and self determination. 
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any international organisations or conferences it is the views of the people which it may 
voice, not views in relation to the formal administration of the territory. 193 
In order to answer the questions regarding the bearing which self determination has on 
the success of a group claiming status an examination of the importance of the quality 
of the claim to self determination is now undertaken. 
3.2: The quality of the claim to self determination 
Since, as discussed above, the principles of self determination and representation are 
inextricably linked, it seems quite logical to argue that the quality of the claim to self 
determination must have some impact on the willingness of the international community 
to recognise a representative group and encourage its participation in international 
organisations. The extent to which this is true however is debatable. The quality of the 
claim is important in that it must be seen to come within the notions of self 
determination of peoples in international law, rather than as protection for minority 
groups which would not generally come within the scope of the definition of `peoples' 
given above in section 3.1.1 and would therefore be related to internal self 
determination. Nonetheless, there are cases where the right to self determination is 
apparent, yet the claim has been unsuccessful, suggesting that the quality of the claim is 
not the sole crucial factor and that even with an extremely strong case, recognition of 
the representatives is far from automatic. 194 
However, the quality of a claim is also affected by any competing claims to territory, 
perhaps from the administering, colonial or parent state. It could be submitted that when 
a claim is based on a well-founded right to self determination that such a right should 
take priority in legal terms. However, state practice has shown this not to be the case, 
192&4 
... it is clear that this representation of a people 
does not preclude other movements from representing 
the same people. ": Wilson, International Law and the Use of Force by National Liberation Movements, at 
121. 
193 Ibid., at 122. 
19' As for many years in East Timor for example. In East Timor it has been suggested that one of the 
reasons for lack of achievement of the right to self determination was due to the fact that the international 
community did take note of "effectiveness" and the reality of the situation (i. e.: The de facto annexation 
by Indonesia). This meant that the possibility of putting into practice the concept of non-recognition of 
illegal regimes was not sufficiently explored in that situation, see Cassese, Self -Determination of 
Peoples: a Legal Reappraisal, at 229 - 230 and footnote 34. That is not to say that the international 
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since what concerns many states, when a new state is emerging under the principle of 
self determination, is the issue of counter claims. 
This was demonstrated in President Bush's letter to President Gorbachev regarding the 
position of the Soviet Union and its disintegration. 195 This is a concern for recognising 
states since they often do not wish to recognise an entity prematurely and risk 
intervening in the internal affairs of the parent state. This is probably one of the main 
reasons for the lack of recognition which most secessionist entities receive as territorial 
integrity and sovereign rights have consistently over-ridden such claims. 196 
There are nonetheless some examples where states have refused to recognise an entity if 
it would result in the denial of self determination to the population and thereby 
demonstrated their commitment to the principles of self determination where the claim 
is undeniable. 
In the case of Southern Rhodesia the international community refused to recognise the 
white minority ruling government of Ian Smith because it violated the right of the a 
black majority to freely determine their own government. The regime was almost 
universally condemned by the UN197 and the Security Council called on all states "not 
to recognise this illegal racist minority regime". ' 98 The wording of the Security Council 
statement ably exemplifies the sentiments of the international community in that 
instance and the action it was prepared to take. This situation also shows that the 
discretion which states exercise in recognition should still be in accordance with basic 
principles of international law and that the states in this situation clearly intended their 
non-recognition to be partially constitutive in nature. 
community always shies away from the possibility of non-recognition, see for example the situation in 
Rhodesia mentioned below. 
195 See section 1.2.4.1 above regarding the Baltic States and President Bush's letter. 
196 Consider the minimal recognition given to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, (See, Kingsbury, 
"Claims by non-State Groups in International Law", at 487) or the failed attempts at secession in Katanga 
in 1961 or Biafra in 1967 - 70: see Berny, "La secession de Katanga" (1965) Revue Juridique et Politique 
Independence et Cooperation' 563; Wodie, "La Secession du Biafra et le Droit International Public" 
(1969) Revue General Droit International Public 1018 and Kamanu, "Secession and the Right to Self 
Determination: An OAU Dilemma" (1974) 12 JMAS 355. Bangladesh was an example of successful 
secession. However, it may be argued that, given that the territory was not physically attached to 
Pakistan, the right to territorial integrity was not violated in its normal sense. 197 General Assembly Resolution 2024,11 November 1965 (Voting: 107: 2: 1). 
198 Security Council Resolution 216,12 November 1965 (Voting: 10: 0: 1), at para. 2. 
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If states are willing to uphold the right to self determination in this way, there seems to 
be no logical reason why recognition should not be accorded more speedily when the 
right is clear. Obviously as shown above this can be complicated by competing claims, 
however in principle this reasoning should still stand. This issue is generally known as 
premature recognition of the state in order to fulfil the right to self determination and is 
considered in the following section. 
3.2.1: Premature recognition & self determination 
The existence of a right to self determination is also important to questions of 
recognition, in the sense that in some situations it is possible to see that the thresholds at 
which recognition is sometimes granted will be lower than in comparable situations 
where the right is not evident. 
One of the traditional criteria for the recognition of governments has been that of 
effective control over its state. 199 It has already been shown that in the example of 
Bosnia Herzegovina a state came into being because the international community willed 
it even though its government was not yet fully effective. Section 2.1 also provided 
similar examples in Algeria200 and in Guinea-Bissau201 where a struggle for liberation 
by a movement which set up a provisional government resulted in premature 
recognition by States or the UN followed by States (respectively) before it had effective 
control over the whole territory. 
This shows that, in circumstances where the right to self determination is clear, 
recognition can validly be accorded prior to full independence. This action will not 
necessarily result in it being classed as premature since the need for self determination 
has the effect of lowering the required threshold of effectiveness. This reaffirms the 
point that through recognition states can uphold a claim to independence which may in 
some areas seem weak at that time. Therefore recognition can effectively shorten the 
transitional period prior to full independence. This is evidence of the importance which 
'99 See, Peterson, "Recognition of Governments Should not be Abolished" (1983) 77 AJIL 31; Roth, 
Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law, at 137 - 142. 200 See section 2.1.3 above and Wilson, International Law and the Use of Force by National Liberation 
Movements, at 110. 
201 See section 2.1.1 above and General Assembly Resolution 3601 (XXVIII), 2 November 1973 (Voting: 
93: 7: 30). 
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recognition can play in situations of self determination and the influence which it exerts 
over the whole scenario. This restates the fact that the will of the international 
community, demonstrated through recognition, is an extremely strong force and its 
value should not be underestimated. It also exemplifies the fact that there is little 




There are three main conclusions to be drawn from the discussion above. 
First, in the recognition of states there appears to be a gap between the theory of 
recognition and the effects of the practice of states. 
It is submitted that the approach of states to the emergence of new states has been on a 
relatively ad hoc basis and that states are keen to exercise their discretionary powers in 
relation to recognition. This has meant that the context, the political situation and the 
realities of the situation have been influencing factors in decision making regarding 
recognition. In practice it has also meant that states have not been willing to follow 
theoretical concepts, even when they are based on criteria specific to those actual 
situations. They have therefore adopted a variable approach where the theory behind 
the recognition process has not always been wholly linked to the final result for the 
emerging state. As far as international law is concerned, there is a wide range of 
responses which can occur when an entity claims status on the international stage. 
Therefore the debate as to whether recognition is constitutive or declaratory is 
somewhat jaded. States make their own decisions as to whether or not to recognise and 
then do not necessarily follow their decisions in practice. The declaratory/constitutive 
debate can be reconciled therefore by admitting that neither description is that close to 
the reality of international life. The result of international practice is that personality is 
not necessarily `all or nothing'. An entity does not have to be recognised as a `state' or 
`nothing at all', it could rest somewhere in between. 
Second therefore, when these ideas and conclusions are compared to situations of 
representative groups rather than States, it can been seen that a similarly ad hoc and 
variable approach has been taken which has also been very dependent on the realities of 
the situation being considered. The international community has a range of responses to 
an entity claiming status which do not necessarily all have to be the same. At any one 
point in time representative groups can therefore have varying degrees of status. For 
example depending on whether they are acting as an observer in the UN or attempting 
to woo a politically indifferent state to the needs of the people they purport to represent. 
This is interesting since it attempts to take the personality debate a step further by 
describing personality as a process which develops as the status of an entity changes 
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both from moment to moment and from situation to situation. The `process' provides, 
to some degree, a solution as to the `all or nothing' syndrome of the old debate. 
However, even within the process there are significant events which affect status in the 
international community. For example, it is true to say, that once the international 
community had found a suitable method of providing a forum for liberation movements 
to express the views of the people they purported to represent, that formula was used on 
a regular basis. The grant of observer status at the UN was an effective arena for both 
the liberation movement to make their claims and the international community to 
consider them. Nonetheless, in obtaining such a grant, liberation movements had firstly 
to have fulfilled the criteria of being the legitimate representative of their people and 
also to have been recommended by either the Arab League or the OAU as such. In 
colonial situations this was often easier to achieve as in addition, the right to self 
determination, which as shown, plays a vital role, was more apparent and well 
supported by many States. 
This leads to the third main conclusion which can be drawn from this chapter. Whilst 
the value of a strong claim to the right to self determination cannot be underestimated, 
situations like that in East Timor prove that it cannot be relied on in a vacuum and that 
States may require heavy proof of legitimacy in representation. The requirements can 
alter depending on context and political motivation, perhaps due to competing claims to 
the territory. Furthermore, States do not always wish to involve themselves at the risk 
of upsetting the doctrine of territorial integrity when claimed by a competing State. 202 it 
should be noted however that a strong claim to the right to self determination may assist 
in lessening the impact of any competing claims. The international community is keen 
to retain its discretion in recognition and as a result it ultimately governs the actors on 
its stage. It does this by varying the criteria for recognition depending on the realities 
and political scenario with which they are faced. Recognition is thus still to be highly 
prized by the representative group because of the effects it can have on their ability to 
participate albeit at a limited level. Indeed, the control and discretion which the 
international community has exercised over the recognition and success of 
representative groups has been great. 
202 This demonstrates the importance that the political scenario plays in each situation as factors like the 
recognising state's political leanings or the international community's relationship with the "parent or 
administering" State may determine whether, or at least when, recognition is granted. This will be 
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Given the wide range of responses to claims for status the question is then raised as to 
where Palestinian claims fit on the scale possible responses. Exactly how variable has 
the international community's reaction to the Palestinian situation been? Since it is 
asserted that the acquiring of status is a process through which non-state entities must 
travel, it is suggested that an examination of the Palestinian situation will be very 
instructive because it has had and continues to be involved in a very long transitional 
phase. There are other situations which could have been chosen to use as a case study, 
however as one of the most complex and laden with political and religious factors, 
Palestine should prove to be helpful in casting light on some of the assertions made 
here. Thus the following chapter provides a background to the Palestinian situation in 
order to place the discussion in factual context and then international community's 
response to Palestinian claims will be examined in Chapter Three. 
evident particularly in Chapter Three where the Palestinian Representation is considered, since 
traditionally this has been a extremely politically divisive and controversial issue. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE BACKGROUND TO THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION AND 
THE PALESTINIAN CLAIM TO SELF DETERMINATION 
INTRODUCTION 
Chapter One has considered the nature of personality and some of the range of 
responses that the international community may have to entities claiming status on the 
international stage. As a result of this examination the theory that personality may be 
variable in nature has been asserted. It is important that this theory is examined in 
practice. Therefore, in preparation for such an analysis, this chapter seeks to provide an 
introduction to the Palestinian situation and also deals with questions as to the 
representation of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This lays the 
foundation for an examination of the international community's response to claims of 
Palestinian status in Chapter Three. 
In this chapter the background to the Palestinian question will be considered first. 
Without this initial discussion it would be difficult to make any judgements about the 
claims brought by the Palestinian Representation to the international community in 
pursuance of the rights claimed on behalf of the Palestinian people. 
The story of the Palestinian Representation is intertwined with the history, politics and 
religious dimensions of the Middle East and in places this chapter will put that story in 
those contexts in order to gain a better understanding of the situation as a whole. 
Therefore historical background discussion will mainly form the first part of this 
chapter. 
Second, the discussion will turn to the Representation of Palestinians in the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip in order to clarify who is attempting to bring a claim of status on behalf 
of those Palestinians. 
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Once the background to the question of Palestinian representation is explored it will 
become possible to ask whether the Palestinians as a people have a right to self 
determination. This will form the third and last main section of this chapter. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, the quality of such claims are important as they may 
have a large impact on the success of a group and their claim before the international 
community. 
1: THE BACKGROUND TO THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION 
This section aims to provide an overview of the historical background to the Palestinian 
situation. Given the complex nature of this task, the section is split into subsections 
which deal with events chronologically. This section does not aim to provide a fully 
comprehensive description of the Palestinian situation, particularly in relation to its 
early history, as these topics, whilst interesting, have less bearing on the current 
situation than more recent historical events. Furthermore, the complexity of the history 
provides the potential for vast debates on numerous issues. These are avoided here 
however in order to raise briefly the salient historical points which have affected any 
Palestinian claims to statehood. 
It should be pointed out initially that politics have played a huge role in the creation of 
the "Palestinian problem". Before a journey through the historical background to the 
Palestinian question is embarked upon therefore, a pen-portrait of the main relevant 
political influences is undertaken. 
1.1: Political influences 
This thesis does not attempt to take on the daunting task of analysing the political 
nuances of the situation as this is an area worthy of much research on its own. However 
whilst the background to the issue is considered it is also important to remember that 
politics are germane to the situation because of the history, mixture of peoples and 
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international influences which have all had a bearing on the shape of the Middle East. 
Therefore all should continue to be borne in mind throughout the thesis. ' 
The first main political issue to note is that the creation of the State of Israel was 
opposed by all the existing Middle Eastern States in the United Nations as the Arab 
States did not relish a Jewish State as a neighbour. 2 The birth of Israel meant that for 
the first time there was a Jewish State within a traditionally predominantly Muslim 
region. The territory of Israel and Palestine also contain a number of holy places to 
Jews, Christians and Muslims (notably within Jerusalem itself) which adds fuel to the 
fire of the religious political lobbies. 3 
That said, Israel's relationship with many of her Arab neighbours has improved greatly 
since 1948. Peace treaties with Jordan and Egypt have been concluded and it is 
possible that Syria and maybe Lebanon will follow. 5 However, the Arab states are 
naturally more likely to take a pro-Palestinian viewpoint than an Israeli one when 
considering their positions on the status of Palestine. 6 
1 There is much general literature on the Middle East. For example see, Long & Reich (Eds. ), The 
Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa (Oxford: Westview Press) (1995); Aburish, 
A Brutal Friendship: the West and the Arab Elite (London: Indigo) (1998); Benin & Stork, Political 
Islam (London: I. B. Tauris) (1997); Nettleton & Ochsenwald (Eds. ), The Middle East: A History Vols. 1 
&2 (New York: McGraw-Hill) (1997) and Ovendale, The Longman Companion to the Middle East Since 
1914 (London/New York: Longman) (1998). 
2 General Assembly Resolution 181 (II), 29 November 1947 (Voting: 33: 13: 10 Those States against were 
mainly Arab or South American with the addition of Greece, Haiti and the Philippines). 
3 For example, The Temple Mount, The Church of the Holy Sepulchre and Haram al-Sharif. The issue 
surrounding ownership of territory around religious sites and access to them is one of the issues that goes 
to the heart of the conflict. This study does not attempt to answer questions regarding the title to holy 
sites in Israel and Jerusalem as this is a huge area for research independent from the questions raised here. 
For further discussion however, see England, "The Legal Status of the Holy Places in Jerusalem" (1994) 
28 Is. LR 589; Wasserstein, "Have some guts, British Jews" Independent on Sunday 11 February 2001 
and Hadi, "The Religious Significance of Jerusalem" Palestinian Society for the Study of International 
Affairs, http: //www. passia. org/jerusalem/publications/Documents_onjerusalem. htm. See also Articles 
31,32 and 33 of the Palestinian Draft Basic Law which provide for freedom of belief and worship and 
freedom of access and visit to holy places and religious buildings, Annexed to Cotran and Mallat (Eds), 
The Arab-Israeli Accords: Legal Perspectives (London/The Hague/Boston: Kluwer Law International) 
(1996). 
4 That said, in recent months the Arab/Israeli relationship has deteriorated somewhat and there has been 
sporadic, but heavy violence. See section 1.2.4 below. 
S The road to true peace between Israel and her Arab neighbours has recently been thrown into question 
given the increased hostilities between Israel and the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza Strip as this 
has once again fuelled the original rivalries and resentment of Israel in the Arab World. The Jordan/Israel 
Peace Treaty was signed on 26 October 1994. The Egypt/Israel Peace Treaty which followed the Camp 
David Accords of 1978 was signed on 26 March 1979. Israel's occupation of South Lebanon formally 
ended on 24 May 2000 and there was a strong American push for a Syrian peace agreement throughout 
2000. 
6 See, "The PLO and the Arab State Relations" chapter 4 from Lähteenmäki, The PLO and its 
International Position (Until the Palestine National Council of Algiers in November 1988), Turun 
Yliopiston Julkaisuja Annales Universitatis Turkuensis (Finland: Grafia) (1994); McLaurin, "The PLO 
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In the United Nations and at an inter-state level during the Cold War, international 
policy towards the question of Palestine was very much shaped by the two Super- 
powers. The United States has traditionally adopted a pro-Israeli approach in dealing 
with Middle Eastern issues. This is partly because of the strong Jewish political lobby in 
the United States which presses for US support for Israel, however this is also balanced 
with the need for access to oil. 7 
More recently other factors, like the punitive measures the United States has taken 
against "rogue" Arab nations, have also played a role in the United States attitude to the 
situation in the region. 8 However, United States policy is also affected by the political 
realities of its relationship with the Israeli government and the tactics of the PLO. 9 
Although the United States and the Former Soviet Union traditionally had different 
spheres of influence, meaning that relationships between the Arab regimes and the 
USSR were generally friendly, the USSR's attitude towards Palestinian Resistance and 
representation has not always been positive. Prior to the PLO's renunciation of violence 
the Soviet Union tended to support other more progressive Arab States in the struggle 
and the Arab Fertile Crescent" from Norton & Greenberg, The International Relations of the PLO 
(Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press) (1989) 12 and Chapter 5 from Kirisci, The PLO and 
World Politics: A Study of the Mobilization of Support for the Palestinian Cause (London: Frances Pinter 
Publishers) (1986). 
For more discussion on the United States attitude towards the Palestinian situation see, Watkins, "The 
unfolding US policy in the Middle East" (1997) 73 Int. Aff 1 and Slonim, Jerusalem in America's 
Foreign Policy 1947- 1997 (The Hague/London/Boston: Kluwer Law International) (1998). It can also 
be noted that much popularist Western attitude may be misinformed and ignorant, see comments by 
General Odd Bull, Chief of Staff of the UN Truce Supervision Organisation from 1963 - 1970, "An 
uncritical acceptance of the Israeli point of view in all its aspects was the rule... ": Bull, War and Peace in 
the Middle East (London: Leo Cooper) (1973) at 126. 
8 For example, cutting of diplomatic ties with Libya as a result of the Lockerbie Bombing, action against 
Iraq in the Gulf Conflict in 1991/92 and NATO enforcement action against Iraq in 1998. See, Watkins, 
"The Unfolding US Policy in the Middle East". 
After the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin, the new Government of Binyamin Netanyahu was not as 
popular at the White House and a new relationship was forged between the Americans and the 
Palestinians, culminating in a visit by President Clinton to the Gaza Strip in late 1998. The former Israeli 
Prime Minister, Mr Barak, made a number of diplomatic visits to Western European States and the USA 
in order to cement relationships (see, Macintyre, "Clinton Dreams of Glory From Barak Accord" The 
Times 16 July 1999 16 and Tanner and Cockburn, "Barak calls on Blair to back peace" The Independent 
22 July 1999 13). It remains to be seen how the new Israeli premier, Ariel Sharon deals with foreign 
relations and how the US/Israeli relationship develops. It can already been seen however that the US is 
willing to take a firm hand with the new Israeli administration. For example, in late April 2001the Israeli 
military return to some of the PA controlled areas was strongly advised against by the US and as a result 
Israel pulled out of the areas it had temporarily taken over - see Adams, "Excessive and 
Dissproportionate" 648 MEI 20 April 2001 1. For discussion regarding Sharon's victory see, Kidron, 
"The Fruits of Victory" 644 ME123 February 2001 4 and Baram, "The Worst Man Won" 644 MEI 23 
February 2001 7. 
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against Israel, such as Egypt under President Nasser. 1° However, this was mostly an 
attempt to prevent full scale war from breaking out as were this to occur it would have 
been difficult for either super-power to avoid involvement. 
With the thawing of the Cold War many commentators thought that the time for peace 
had truly come since the deadlock in the international community which had helped the 
process to stagnate was at an end. 11 However, whilst this seemed possible for a while 
and as the PLO was able to increase its international position, internal changes in the 
Israeli government during the Netanyahu government once again created a stand off 
between themselves and the Palestinian Representation. 
Since the end of the Cold War in particular, the European Union has taken an interested 
role in the Middle East but their support for Palestinian Statehood was recently set out 
more specifically. European Union leaders at an EU summit in Berlin in March 1999 
declared the "continuing and unqualified Palestinian right to self determination, 
including the option of a state". The EU also stated that member states are "ready to 
consider the recognition of a Palestinian State" and that they "look forward to the early 
fulfilment of this right. "12 
African and many Asian States have also traditionally supported the Palestinian 
Representation in their quest for self determination. This support only really came after 
the 1967 war but this was coupled with the ending of much of the colonial period in 
African history. 13 Therefore, due to the large number of African States which had to 
undergo a similar struggle for self determination, their solidarity with other peoples in 
this position was undeniably strong. As the complexion of world politics changed and 
the balance of power, particularly in the United Nations General Assembly changed, this 
support became extremely important and an analysis of voting patterns shows that it has 
very much influenced the status of the Palestinian Representation at an international 
level. '4 
1° Nassar, The PLO: From Armed Struggle to Declaration of Independence (New York: Praeger) (1991), 
at 158. 
1 Alting von Geusau, "Breaking Away Towards Peace in the Middle East" (1995) 8 Leiden ILJ 81. 
12 Islam, "Europe Declares" 597MEI9 April 1999 9. 
13 The 1967 war is discussed below in section 1.2.4. See also Kirisci, The PLO and World Politics, at 89. 14 See table 6.6 on page 85 of Kirisci, ibid. 
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Whilst this has still been a rather lengthy "brief' look at the political issues which can 
influence the Palestinian situation and the international community's response to it, it is 
submitted that this is the minimum number of points which need raising in order to 
demonstrate that politics underlie much activity in the Middle East. These influences 
are reflected in the reactions of the international community throughout the rest of this 
and the following chapters. 




Before the birth of Christ, Jerusalem and the surrounding areas were besieged by a 
number of different rulers: Assyrians, Philistines, Arabs, Syrians, Babylonians, 
Egyptians, Persians and Greeks in 332 AD. 16 The earliest known inhabitants are 
Canaanites who settled there around 3000 BC. 17 They, together with the Philistines and 
Israelites, were the peoples who are written about in the Old Testament of the Bible and 
they most likely originated from Elyria. 18 
is For a constitutional history of Palestine see, al-Qasem, "The Draft Basic Law for the Palestinian 
National Authority During the Transitional Period" chapter 6 from Cotran and Mallat (Eds), The Arab- 
Israeli Accords. 
16 Hyamson, Palestine Old and New (London: Methuen) (1928), at 76, cited in Cattan, The Palestine 
Question (London: Croom Helm) (1988), at 5. 
17 Caftan, ibid., at 3. See also Tubb who would date the occupation of the Levant area as far back as the 
8`h millennium BC: Tubb, Canaanites (London: British Museum Press) (1998) - this conflicts with 
Cattan's dating which suggests that the Canaanites arrived in the area around 1175 BC. 
' Who probably came to Palestine in the latter part of the second millennium BC, around 1175 BC - 
ibid., at 3. In 587 BC the Kingdom of Judah was captured by the Babylonians and the Jews were sent into 
captivity in Babylon. Judah was one of the two Jewish Kingdoms, the other called Israel. These 
Kingdoms which had previously been unified during the rule of King David (1006 to 972 BC) were split 
after the death of King Solomon (King David's son who ruled from 972 - 932 BC). However, both Kingdoms fell. Israel collapsed at the hands of the Assyrians in 721BC and in 587 BC the Babylonians 
burned Solomon's Temple in Jerusalem which signalled the end of the Kingdom of Judah. 
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In 63 BC the Romans invaded and did not leave until the 7th Century. After that yet 
more changes in rulers came including the Muslim Arabs'9, the Crusaders2° and the 
Turks21. Then in 1517 Ottoman rule came to the area. 22 Due to the number of times the 
Palestinian area was conquered, Palestinians do not necessarily make any claims to 
racial purity, indeed they do have somewhat diverse ethnic origins. 23 However, there 
have been those of Palestinian origin living within the territories of Israel and the 
Middle East for thousands of years. 
The Ottoman rule lasted for much of the latter half of the second millennium, but in the 
nineteenth century the Empire began to crumble. 24 When the likelihood of the Empire's 
disintegration began to grow during the First World War, the Entente Powers began to 
negotiate over the allocation of the relevant Arab territories. 25 
The Sykes-Picot Agreement, 26 which was created through negotiations between Britain, 
France, Russia and also Italy, made clear that there would be recognition of an 
independent Arab State or of a confederation. This was partly because of the surge in 
Arab Nationalism which was challenging the Ottoman rule. Indeed this was taken 
further by Great Britain, who began to make promises of Arab independence for after 
victory in the war. 
19 There were two periods of Muslim Arab control - directly after the Romans and then again between the 
Crusaders and the Turks. 
20 For further discussion regarding the Crusades see Hillenbrand, The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press) (1999). See also, Runciman, A History of the Crusades Vols. 1 
2&3 (London: Penguin) (1971). 
21 The Turks kept control until 1517 other than for a short period in the thirteenth century when the 
German, Emperor Frederick II liberated the Jerusalem. 
u See Tannous, The Palestinians (New York: I. G. T. ) (1988); Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson) (1973); Karpat (Ed. ), The Ottoman State and Its Place in World History 
(Leiden: E. J. Brill) (1974). See also Brown (Ed. ), Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans 
and the Middle East (New York: Columbia University Press) (1996) for a range of discussion on inter 
alia the economic, political, religious and linguistic effect of the Empire on the Arab World. 
' Gilmour, Dispossessed: The Ordeal of the Palestinians 1917 - 1980 (London: Sidgwick & Jackson) 
(1980), at 20. See also, Rodinson, Israel and the Arabs (London: Penguin) (1968). 
24See Palmer, The Decline and Fall of the Ottoman Empire (London: John Murray Publishers Ltd. ) 
(1992). 
25 The Sykes-Picot Agreement, 16 May 1916, dealt with the allocation of Ottoman Arab territories. At the 
outset an international regime was suggested for Palestine, because of the various places of religious 
importance in the area. This however did not transpire. The Arab peoples were somewhat concerned 
about the Sykes-Picot Agreement and what it meant for their independence, so a message was sent from 
the British Government to Sherif Husain on 4 January 1918. It stated that the Arab peoples would be 
given "full opportunity of once again forming a nation in the world" and also that in the case of Palestine 
"no people shall be subject to another". For more discussion regarding the Sykes-Picot Agreement see 
Chapter I, part I A, 13 - 17 of Temperley (Ed. ), A History of the Peace Conference of Paris (London: 
Henry Frowde & Hodder Stoughton) (1924) Vol VI. 
26 16 May 1916, see Temperley, ibid. 
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The British Authorities corresponded with the Arab people through Sherif Husain (the 
He thus acted as their representative, even though he did not actually Emir of Mecca)?? 
have any political authority over all Arabs. These correspondences stated that, "Great 
Britain is prepared to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs in all the 
regions within the limits demanded by the Sherif of Mecca. , 28 
When considering the administration and governance of the area the emphasis at that 
time was much more linked to the distribution of territory and an intention to create 
European influenced areas, rather than to democracy and the wishes of the people living 
in the territory. The fact that the European powers made contact through the Sherif of 
Mecca demonstrates that they intended to stir up anti-Ottoman sentiment. However it 
can be suggested that they also realised that sovereignty would remain with the rulers 
and people of the Middle East, rather than in their hands. 
The need for Arab consent grew and the French and British governments later stated 
that that, 
"The object aimed at by France and Great Britain in prosecuting in the East the War let loose by the 
ambition of Germany is the complete and definite emancipation of the [Arab] peoples and the 
establishment of the national governments and administrations deriving their authority from the initiative 
and free choice of the indigenous populations. " (7 November 1918). 
This shows that the Europeans were aware of the emerging political notion of self 
determination. However, it was very much in its infancy and related much more to the 
concepts surrounding internal representation for the people of Palestine, rather than to 
the external question of Statehood which is at the heart of the issue of Palestinian 
Representation today. 29 This came at a similar time to the prominence of the principle 
of self determination as propounded by the American President, Woodrow Wilson, 
which was yet to evolve into the principle as is meant in today's terms. 30 
21 These correspondences are known as the Hussain-McMahon correspondence after the Emir and Sir 
Henry McMahon (the British High Commissioner in Egypt). 
28 British Government, Correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon and Sherif Hussain of Mecca, Cmd. 
5957 (1939) 50. 
29 The Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem: 1917 - 1988 Part I The Department of 
Palestinian Rights, United Nations: http: //www. un. org/Depts/dna/gpal/DPR pp 1 htm 
30 See section 3 below and also Pomerance, "The United States and Self Determination: Perspectives on 
the Wilsonian Conception" (1976) 70 AJIL 1. 
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However, at this time the promises made to the Arabs were not the only political factors 
at play. The root of the Palestinian problem lies in the competing claims to territory of 
the Palestinians and the Jews. Although not a new concept, the Jewish claim to 
Palestine was pushed at an international level particularly from the late 18`h Century 
onwards by Theodor Herzl, 31 notably as a result of anti-Semitism in Europe and the 
massacres of Jews in Russia and Poland. 32 But without a greater number of Jews in 
Palestine than there were at the turn of the Century (approximately 50,000 compared 
with well-over half a million Palestinians), Jewish settlement there held insufficient 
political or legal weight to be realised. 33 
Some Zionists were keen to take a more careful approach to the adoption of Palestine as 
the Jewish national homeland, due to concerns about the rights of the Palestinians. 34 
Nonetheless, the pleas fell mainly on deaf ears and the Organisation continued 
mobilising support for their aims. 
The question of Palestine in external self determination terms was complicated yet 
more, and for good, through the contradictory approach taken by the British 
Government towards the issue. At the same time as making assurances to the Arabs 
through the Sherif of Mecca it also began to make promises to the World Zionist 
Organisation about the establishment of a Jewish National Homeland in Palestine. Lord 
Balfour, the British Foreign Secretary sent a letter to Baron Rothschild which provided 
that: 
"His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the 
Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of the object, it being 
clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing 
non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other 
country. %35 
31 Founder of the Zionist Movement. 
32 Initially, Herzl considered both Palestine and Argentina in his quest to find a suitable Jewish homeland. 
However, in 1897 the first Zionist Congress in Basel, Switzerland declared that Palestine was the 
preferred choice. Unfortunately for his cause, the Ottoman authorities rejected his plans but various 
Western European Governments suggested places such as Cyprus, East Africa and the Congo, although 
they were not adopted. Despite lack of initial international support at an early stage the goal of the 
Zionists was clear: the creation of a Jewish State in Palestine. 
33 See, The Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem. 
34 For example, Ahad Ha'am See, Kohn, "Ahad Ha'am: Nationalist With a Difference" from Smith 
(Ed. ), Zionism: The Dream and the Reality (New York: Harper and Row) (1974). 
75 
These two contradictory statements by the British government paved the way for strife 
in the area. Both Jews and Arabs believed that they had a right to external self 
determination in Palestine and to form their own state. Indeed the crucial role which the 
Balfour Declaration has played in the question of Palestine should not be 
underestimated, particularly as a result of its inclusion in the League of Nations 
Mandate for Palestine. 36 At the time of the Declaration there was much debate 
regarding its meaning and what implications it had for both Jews and Palestinians. 37 
The British Government made several drafts of the Declaration before the final wording 
was agreed upon. In the end it received criticism from Jewish and non-Jewish and 
circles. 
One of the main Jewish critics was Sir Edward Montagu who was British Secretary of 
State for India and a prominent Jew (the only Jew in the British Cabinet at the time). 
His opinions were made clear to the Government in secret Cabinet memoranda which 
have since been made public. 38 In them he disagreed with Zionist aims due to his belief 
that Judaism was a universal faith rather than a description of nationality. He also 
considered that Zionist claim to speak on behalf of all Jews was flawed. He believed 
that should a Jewish State be created, Jews that did not emigrate there would be denied 
the privileges and liberties they received as regular citizens of the States where they 
currently resided and thus be classed as outsiders. Montagu, further stated that although 
Palestine played a large role in Jewish history, it was equally important to the Muslim 
and Christian faiths and denied "... that Palestine is today associated with the Jews or 
properly to be regarded as a fit place for them to live. s39 
Montagu's suggestions were left unheeded however, and Lloyd George, the British 
Prime Minister made clear that when the time came to create representative institutions 
in Palestine, if the Jews had a sufficient majority within the area, then statehood would 
be afforded them. 
35 Letter from Foreign Secretary, Sir Arthur James Balfour to Lord Rothschild, 2 November 1917. For a 
full historical account of Zionism and the effect of the Balfour Declaration see, Stein, The Balfour 
Declaration (New York: Simon and Schuster) (1961). 
36 See below. 
37 See, Stein, The Balfour Declaration and Jeffries, Palestine: The Reality (London: Longman Publishing) 
(1939). 
38 British Government, British Public Records Office, Cabinet No. 24/24, August 1917. 
39 Ibid. 
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Therefore, despite the supposed safeguards for Palestinians in the wording of the 
Declaration - "... nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious 
rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine... " - the Palestinians inheritance 
of the land was beginning to be eaten away at even before mass Jewish immigration had 
begun. 
Through the Balfour Declaration, in addition to the denial of possible rights to the native 
Palestinian population, the British Government was making promises regarding the 
future of the land before it had even ceased officially to be part of the Ottoman Empire. 
Therefore, by some, the Declaration has been regarded as being contrary to international 
law. 40 This issue will be returned to below as it requires some examination. However it 
is also important to note that the Declarations flaws do not end there. Through the 
contradictory promises made to the Zionists and the Arabs, incompatible expectations 
were created about independence. Also as a result of the Zionists' and British 
Government's intentions the inheritance of the native Palestinian population were in 
effect ignored. Furthermore, the Palestinians did not have an effective organisation to 
represent their collective views and mobilise support, other than the Sherif of Mecca, 
who was not as active as the Zionist Organisation. 
As far as discussions regarding the Palestinian question before the international 
community were concerned, the issue was not properly introduced in the League of 
Nations until towards the end of the First World War. At a similar time the League had 
introduced the system of mandates into the international community so the question of 
mandating the area of Palestine was raised. Mandates attempted to balance the demands 
of the colonial period with the need to also recognise the rights of the people 
colonised 41 Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant placed certain territories 
under the "tutelage" of more developed nations. Notably, Article 22 also stated that the 
mandate should be for the "well-being and development" of the people in the territory. 
One particularly relevant issue for this study, relating to the creation of the mandate, is 
the poor representation that the Palestinians received during discussions about it. For 
°° See, Cattan, The Palestine Question, at 30 - 33. 41 For discussion regarding mandates and trust territories see, Brierly, "Trusts and Mandates" (1929) 10 
BYBIL 217 and Chapter 13 "Mandates and Trust Territories" of Crawford, The Creation of States. 
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example, the Paris Peace Conference, of 1919 was attended by Sherif Husain's son, 
Emir Feisal who was the sole Arab delegation. To add to the delegation's isolation, it 
was reported that Feisal was somewhat ignorant of the full aims of Zionism, was not 
used to European style diplomatic discussion and possessed a weak command of the 
English language. This meant that the Palestinians were not sufficiently well 
represented and again suffered from the extremely polished diplomacy of the Zionists. 
Furthermore, it has also been suggested that the impartiality of Feisal may be questioned 
due to his wish to also serve his family's own interests in power. 42 
Arab Nationalists did prove to be a better representative force at the King-Crane 
Commission which was set up under the influence of United States President, Wilson, 
following the Paris Peace Conference. 43 They suggested full independence for Syria (to 
include the territories of Lebanon and Palestine) without the need for any mandate 
system 44 
The Commission rejected this, suggesting instead a more impartial American mandate 
over Syria. Importantly, however, the Commission did stress the need for self 
determination of the Palestinian population. Unfortunately, due to the strong allied 
policies on Palestine and the United State's choice to remain outside the League of 
Nations the King-Crane Commission's recommendations received scant support. 45 
Ultimately, the area of Palestine was classed by the League of Nations as a `Class A' 
Mandate which meant that it was fairly well developed and it needed only 
42 The Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem, at 17. It should be noted however that Feisal did 
not ask for an extension of his Father's territory, "In placing the Arab case before the conference the Emir 
and his advisers do not seem to have thought it politic to be quite so explicit. The Emir, who asked for no 
extension of this father's territories, confined himself to pleading for the independence of all Arab 
countries and urging that together they formed a racial and economic unit. He does not appear to have 
referred to the question of what Power or Powers should be given control. It is said that he asked for an 
international commission of inquiry on the subject. " From Temperley (Ed. ), A History of the Peace 
Conference of Paris, at 144 - 145. " For a brief description of Arab Nationalism in the early part of last century see Chapter I, Part I A, 
Temperley (Ed. ), ibid., at 118 - 133 and 170 - 176. u The Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem, at 18. 
45 See Nutting for a more detailed description of events: Nutting, The Arabs, (London: Hollis and Carter) 
(1964), cited in The Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem, at footnote 49. 
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administrative advice and assistance from a mandatory power so that it would be able to 
become fully independent as soon as it was capable of standing alone 46 
The mandate for Palestine was awarded to Great Britain and despite the original 
objections to the Balfour Declaration, 
"In its third recital, the mandate declared that recognition was thereby given to the `historical connection' 
of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that 
country. "47 
The mandate was approved by the League on 24 July 1922 and came into formal effect 
in September 1923. The approval of the League meant that in effect the Balfour 
Declaration was sanctioned by League members - the strongest elements within the 
international community. 
It has been argued that the mandate was invalid under international law for three main 
reasons. First, that given the inclusion of the Balfour Declaration in the wording of the 
mandate, the League did not possess the power to grant any promises regarding the 
establishment of a Jewish National Home and dispose of the territory in such a manner. 
This is particularly so when it is considered that this went against the sovereignty of the 
Palestinian people and effectively gave an alien people rights within that territory4s 
Second, the mandate violated the "spirit and letter" of Article 22 because the "well- 
being and development" of the Palestinians was clearly not to plan for Palestine to 
46 Mandates were provided for in Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant. The degree of assistance 
for each mandated territory depended on the level of its internal development and could be classed as 'A', 
`B', or `C' ('C Class' mandates being the least developed). 
47 Cattan, The Palestine Question, at 25. 
48 Ibid., at 30 - 33. See also Crawford's discussion on the validity of the mandate in Crawford, "Israel 
(1948 - 1949) and Palestine (1998 - 1999): Two Studies in the Creation of States" chapter 5 from 
Goodwin-Gill and Talmon, The Reality of International Law - Essays in Honour of Ian Brownlie 
(Clarendon Press: Oxford) (1999), at 104 - 106. Some have submitted that in international law a 
"... unilateral declaration issued by the competent authorities of a state can have a binding effect upon that 
state, if such were the intention behind it" based on the decisions in the case concerning Legal Status of 
Eastern Greenland (1933) PCIJRep. Series A No. 53; (1933) 3 World Court Reports 151, at 192 - 194 
and the Nuclear Tests Cases (1974) ICJ Rep. 253,267,457,472 cited in Dinstein, "The International 
Legal Dimensions of the Arab-Israeli Conflict" from Kellerman, Siehr and Einhorn (Eds), Israel Among 
the Nations: International and Comparative Law Perspectives on Israel's Se Anniversary (The 
Hague/London/Boston: Kluwer Law International) (1998) 137, at 139. 
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become a Jewish National Homeland 49 Third, the inclusion of Balfour Declaration was 
incompatible with the promises made in the Husain-McMahon correspondences. 50 
However, as was generally the case at that time, the Palestinian people were not in a 
position to be able to argue against the wording of the mandate and therefore the 
granting of the mandate and the plans for a Jewish homeland went ahead. 
This theory that the mandate is in violation of international law is possibly supported by 
the decision in the Namibia case, however for different reasons from those given 
above. 5' The South African presence in South West Africa was deemed to be illegal 
because the Court upheld the validity of the termination of the Mandate. The Court 
noted that even though the principle of self determination was not alive in its current 
form at the time of the creation of the mandate that, 
"An international instrument has to be interpreted and applied within the framework of the entire legal 
system prevailing at the time of interpretation. In the domain to which the present proceedings relate, the 
last fifty years.. . have 
brought important developments. These developments leave little doubt that the 
ultimate objective of the sacred trust was the self determination and independence of the peoples 
concerned. s52 
Given that South West Africa was aC Grade mandate it therefore needed more 
assistance from the international community than Palestine supposedly did, for the 
Palestinian mandate was grade A. Under this reasoning, when the claim to Palestinian 
self determination is considered, if it is found to be valid, it may be possible to submit 
that there is an even stronger case for suggesting that the Palestinian mandate was 
illegal. 53 However even if it is acceptable to retrospectively claim illegality, unlike in 
South West Africa, the Palestinian mandate was never tested in this manner since the 
time when self determination theory has become more cemented in international law. 54 
At this point therefore, when the mandate was created, the area of mandated Palestine 
did possess international legal personality as a mandated territory. However all powers 
49 Cattan, The Palestine Question, at 30 - 33. 
50 Ibid. 
S' Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (1971) ICJ Rep. 16 
52 Ibid., at 31. 
53 The Palestinian claim to self determination is considered in section 3 below. 
so 
of legislation and administration were vested in the mandatory and it was therefore 
ss practically limited in the status it truly possessed. 
1.2.2: The Period of the Mandate 
During the time of the mandate, British policy was directed towards the end result of the 
creation of a Jewish National Home. After the Balfour Declaration was made public in 
1920, the Palestinians were not willing to simply accept such a denial of their rights 
within the territory, so sporadically there were outbreaks of violent Palestinian 
resistance to these plans. 
The Zionist campaign continued nonetheless and it was claimed that there was an 
historical connection between the Jews and the Palestinian territory since Old Testament 
times when they emigrated there from Pharaonic Egypt and formed the twelve tribes of 
Israel. Although some Jews have lived in the region ever since, they were very thin in 
numbers after their second revolt against the Romans and numbers did not increase until 
immigration began in the nineteenth century. 
As Jewish immigration escalated, Arab nationalism and discontent grew and there were 
a number of outbreaks of violence during the 1920s and early 1930s. 56 In the early 
1920s in London the Muslim-Christian Association of Palestine tried to provide a voice 
for Palestinians and lobbied the British in both Palestine and London, mostly in order to 
provide an alternative option to the growing Zionist campaigning. However, they were 
not very effective. 
The British Government continued to build upon the Balfour Declaration, making more 
plans for Jewish immigration. 57 This, coupled with the additional Zionist policies of 
54 In the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Case (1924) PCIJRep. Series A. No. 2, the Court implicitly 
ruled in favour of the mandate's validity through the way it interpreted its terms, despite the fact that it 
was argued that it was invalid because of the denial of self determination. 
ss See Cattan, Palestine and International Law (London: Longman Publishing) (2°d Ed.: 1976), at 116 - 
121 for further discussion regarding the sovereignty of mandated territories. 
56 Compared to 100,000 immigrants in the 1920s, during the 1930s about 232,000 Jewish people legally 
migrated to mandated Palestine - See, The Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem. 
57 For example, The "Churchill Memorandum" 1 July 1922 which stated that Jewish immigration was 
necessary in order to fulfil the policy laid down in the Balfour Declaration - British Government, 
Palestine: Statement of Policy, Cmd. 1700 (1922). 
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land-purchase and preferential treatment of Jews in employment, meant that the goal of 
a Jewish State was already well on its way. 
National Committees which formed the Arab High Committee were established 
throughout Palestine by the Palestinians in order to oppose the British rule and Jewish 
immigration and to assume overall Palestinian leadership. The Palestinians took some 
comfort from a 1930 White Paper which seemed to reverse partially the solely pro- 
Zionist British policies. 58 However, a later letter from the British Prime Minister, 
MacDonald, to Dr Weizman (the leader of the Zionist Organisation) which was read out 
in the House of Commons, permitted further immigration and dashed Palestinian hopes 
for a more moderate approach to the situation. 
Palestinian resentment grew and violent outbursts increased in frequency and severity. 
These were often directed at the Jews in Palestine as a result of the Jewish immigration, 
Palestinian political and economic treatment and Palestinian frustration at support for 
Zionist aims and lack of realisation of their own rights. 
By 1933 the Palestinian resentment towards the mandate was so strong that the various 
different Palestinian political parties and groups decided to unite to create an Arab 
Executive Committee in order to provide a better front against the British Authorities. It 
had the aim of attempting to co-operate with the British in the hope of progress towards 
a more Arab orientated outcome. 59 
Nothing concrete came from this, however, and a surge in immigration in 1936 led to an 
Arab revolt. The immigrants to Palestine were predominantly Jewish due to the Nazi 
persecution of the Jews in Europe, (persecution which at that time had reached a 
devastating level). As the revolt continued and violence and striking increased, the 
Jewish community in Palestine responded to the Arab revolt with counter-violence. The 
Palestinian authorities reacted poorly and were unable to suppress the population, so 
60 other Arab leaders were asked to mediate in order to halt the revolt, which they did. 
58 "The Passfield Whitepaper", Palestine: Statement of Policy, Parliamentary Papers - Cmd. 3692 (1930). 59 The Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem, at 34. 
60 For the Commission's Report on the Strike see, British Government, Palestine Royal Commissions: 
Report, Cmd. 5479 (1937). 
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The revolt was only followed by yet more violence and after the assassination of a 
British Direct Commissioner, the Arab Higher Committee was proscribed and many of 
its leaders arrested. The Mufti of Jerusalem escaped to Lebanon and continued to take 
charge of some of the organisation of the revolt which continued until 1939 and resulted 
in large scale British military mobilisation. 
Following every outbreak of serious violence the mandatory set up a Commission to 
investigate the situation. 61 Each Commission found that hostility towards the Jewish 
immigration and their plans for a homeland, coupled with Arab desires for 
independence were the causes of the problems. The last of these Commissions 
recommended the termination of the mandate and the partition of the State. 62 After the 
report of a another Commission however, set up by the British Government, partition 
was considered to be impracticable. 63 
In 1939 the British adopted something of a reversal in policy. A White Paper planning 
to limit Jewish immigration and to grant Palestine independence within five years was 
announced. " There was a huge Jewish backlash to this directed against Arabs and the 
British. 
As an international political backdrop to these events, in 1939 Germany invaded Poland, 
in whose defence Britain and her allies were compelled to go to war. The liberation of 
the concentration camps in 1945 revealed the extent of the atrocities of the Second 
World War. A significant proportion of this violence had been directed towards the 
Jewish population of Europe and it is estimated that up to 6 million were executed 
during this time. After the war ended in 1945 this resulted in a very strong push for 
mass Jewish emigration to Palestine. 
With the dissolution of the League of Nations in 1946 the mandates created under article 
22 of the Covenant officially came to an end. This, coupled with pressure from the 
United States to allow more Jewish immigration into Palestine, the British Government 
61 There were Commissions in 1920,1921,1929 and 1936. 
62 The Peel Commission: Cmd. 5479, July 1937. 
63 The Woodhead Commission: Cmd. 5854, November 1938. 
" Cmd. 6018, May 1939. 
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referred the question of Palestine to the newly formed United Nations for discussion. 65 
A special session of the General Assembly was convened to look at the issue of the 
future of Palestine on 28 April 1947. 
After months of deliberation at the UN in the General Assembly the United Nations 
Special Committee on Palestine was established where both Jews and Arabs and 
Palestinians were represented in discussions. There was disagreement in the Committee 
as to the best course of action. Eventually however, the General Assembly adopted 
resolution 181.66 
1.2.3: 1948 - present 
Resolution 181 provided for the partitioning of Palestine into two States; one Arab and 
one Jewish. The Resolution also provided for a corpus seperatum for Jerusalem which 
would be subject to an international regime. The Arabs in the region were firmly 
against this action and when the British mandate was terminated the birth of the State of 
Israel was declared. 67 No Arab State was declared due to opposition about the land 
allocated to the Jews. In defence of the Palestinians, due to Israeli territorial control 
being taken, an invasion of Israel was mounted by Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. 68 
The 1948 war resulted in territorial expansion for Israel compared with the land they 
were allocated in Resolution 181 and an exodus of many Palestinians from much of the 
69 territory Israel seized. 
65 Letter from the British Government to the Secretary General of the United Nations, 2 April 1947. 
66 (II), 29 November 1947 (Voting: 33: 13: 10 Those States against were mainly Arab or South American 
with the addition of Greece, Haiti and the Philippines. ) There has been debate over the legality of 
Resolution 181. Questions have been asked in particular regarding the United Nations competence to 
partition Palestine see Wright, The Middle Eastern Crisis, address to the Association of the Bar of the 
City of New York, November 1968, cited in chapter 6 of Cattan, The Palestine Question. However, since 
that time many of the Israeli and Palestinian negotiations have been based around Resolution 181 and 
therefore it is submitted that there is implicit recognition of its contents. 
67 15 May 1948. 
68 The war was officially concluded by four agreements signed between Israel and Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan 
and Syria. (24 February 1949,23 March 1949,3 April 1949 and 20 July 1949 respectively). 69 Resolution 181 proposed Israel covered 14,500 km squared and after the 1948 war Israel occupied 
20,850 km squared. Notably Israel seized and annexed Modem Jerusalem and its Western environs 
during the 1948 war. However Israel was defeated by the Jordanian army when it attempted to annex the 
Old City of Jerusalem therefore it stayed in Jordanian control until the 1967 war which is mentioned 
below. 
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When the war was over, Israel saw a dramatic increase in the amount of land it had 
under her control and various parts of the proposed Arab State were absorbed into some 
of the invading States. 70 During the war many hundreds of Arab villages had been 
depopulated through expulsion and massacres by the Israeli Army. 71 The Palestinians 
who fled became refugees in various other States, whilst some of Palestinians stayed in 
Israel. 
Post 1948 Palestinians can basically be classed into four main groups. Firstly there were 
the Palestinians living as a minority within the State of Israel. Secondly there were the 
Palestinians living within Jordan on the West Bank. Thirdly, those living in the Gaza 
Strip under Egyptian administration and finally those who sought refuge in 
neighbouring Arab States or in the Diaspora. 72 The question of the Palestinian refugees 
who now live outside the areas of the West Bank and Gaza Strip is to this day a major 
issue in peace negotiations and United Nations debates. 73 As noted in Chapter One this 
thesis deals with those Palestinians who reside either within the West Bank or Gaza 
Strip. 
The creation of the State of Israel was opposed by all the existing Middle Eastern States 
in the United Nations74 and the subsequent Middle Eastern War of 1948 was an 
immediate attempt to halt the partitioning of Palestine. The Arab States did not relish a 
Jewish State as a neighbour. However, the Arab States were defeated and, as a result, 
Palestine as it was, ceased to exist. This conflict sowed the seed of Palestinian guerrilla 
movements. 
The guerrilla movements decided to take matters into their own hands as they believed 
that the Arab States lacked the will to crush Israel. Furthermore, they also believed 
that by carrying out small guerrilla attacks against Israel, Israel would be forced to 
70 The West Bank by Transjordan and the Gaza Strip by Egypt. 
71 For a detailed account see, Tannous, The Palestinians, at 633 if. See also Caftan, The Palestine 
Question, chapters 9,10,11 and 12. 
72 See, Cattan, ibid., chapter 10. 
73 See footnote I in Chapter One for some references to literature regarding Palestinian refugees. 
74 General Assembly Resolution 181. 
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respond in kind against the Arab nations, at which point they in turn would fight back, 
hopefully then bringing the State of Israel to its knees. 75 
The problems in the region continued and war broke out again in 1967. Israel pushed 
her borders further forward through concerns about security and a wish to increase the 
amount of territory under her control. The war itself lasted only six days, however Israel 
managed to poach land from her neighbours and through it came to occupy the West 
Bank, the Gaza Strip, Arab East Jerusalem (including the Old City), the Golan Heights 
and the Sinai. 6 
The 1967 war led to the adoption of Security Council Resolution 242 which called inter 
alia for, 
"1 (i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict; 
(ii) termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of 
the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their 
right to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries free from threats or acts of 
force. "77 
The requirements of Resolution 242 were not followed by Israel or enforced by the 
international community. The hostilities in the region continued and war broke out 
again on 6 October 1973.78 On this occasion Egypt and Syria attacked Israeli forces in 
the Sinai and Golan Heights, (lands which were seized from them in 1967). Egypt 
managed to recover some land; however both states were unsuccessful to a large 
degree. 79 
After the Camp David Accords and the Israeli/Egyptian peace agreement in the late 
1970s, the Palestinian issue resulted in sporadic violence and little international action. 80 
In 1982 Israel invaded Lebanon for the purpose of increasing its security by making a 
's Lähteenmäki, The PLO and its International Position, at 43. 
76 The Sinai was handed back to Egypt in 1978 after United States support for agreement between the two 
States: The Camp David Agreements, 17 September 1978. The Old City contains the majority of the Holy 
places in the city. 
Security Council Resolution 242 (XXII), 22 November 1967 (Adopted unanimously). 
78 The Yom Kippur War - so called as attacks were launched on Judaism's most holy day, Yom Kippur. 79 A cease fire was reached on 24 October 1973. Prior to this the Security Council had called for a cease 
fire in Resolution 338 (1973). 
ß° See section 1.1 above regarding the politics of Israeli/Egyptian agreements. 
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cordon sanitaire around the Northern Israeli border. A corollary of the war was that 
Israel attempted to flush the PLO bases out of Beirut in Lebanon. 81 
In 1982 the Palestinian people began to create popular uprisings against their situation. 
The period of unrest was called the intifadah and during this time a further important 
stage in the history of the Palestinian question arose. In November 1988 the Palestinian 
National Council, which is the legislative and decision-making authority body of the 
PLO, declared the State of Palestine after more than two decades of Israeli occupation. 82 
This was greeted with a mixed international response but overall the status of the 
occupied territories did not change significantly and official statehood remained 
elusive. 83 
The process towards settlement did not really move forward again until the Oslo Peace 
Agreements in 1993 which set out a time scale for agreement on various issues of 
Palestinian/Israeli importance, including that of occupation and Palestinian self 
determination. 84 It remains to be seen how successful the Oslo Accords have been as 
they have not yet been fully implemented. However, it can already be seen that they 
have failed to achieve their goals within the time frame envisaged by the agreement. 85 
The Accords led to the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA) which is considered 
below. It also led to a mutual recognition of the PLO as legitimate representatives of all 
81 See section 2.1 below. 
82 See Appendix I for a PLO organisation chart. 
83 Palestine National Council, Declaration of Independence, 43 GA OR Annex 3, Agenda Item 37,13 UN 
Doc. A/431827, S/20278,1988; Palestine National Council Political Communique and Declaration of 
Independence, November 15 1988 (1988) 27 ILM 1660. See Chapter Three section 2.2.1 for discussion 
regarding the international community's response to the 1988 Declaration. 
sa A Copy of the full text of the Declaration of Principles signed at Oslo can be found in an Israeli 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Publication, Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government 
Arrangements (Jerusalem: Israel Information Centre) (1993) and can also be found at (1993) 32 ILM 
1525. See also, Schulman, "The Israel-PLO Accord on the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self - 
Government Arrangements: The First Step Toward Palestinian Self Determination" (1993) 7 Emory ILR 
793; Cotran and Mallat (Eds), The Arab-Israeli Accords and McKinney, "The Legal Effects of the Israeli- 
PLO Declaration of Principles: Steps Toward Statehood for Palestine" (1994) 18 Seattle ULR 93. The 
Accords have received some criticism see, Rabbani, "Oslo is the problem, not the solution" 636 MEI 27 
October 2000 20. Some have questioned whether the interim agreements leading from the Oslo Accords 
are treaties in international law: see Quigley, "The Israel-PLO Interim Agreements: Are they Treaties? " 
(1997) 30 Cornell ILJ 717. 
85 For example 4 May 1999 saw the end of the five year interim period laid down in the Oslo Accords. By 
this time the Accords had envisaged a final agreement being reached on the Palestinian question. The 
PLO had threatened to declare State on 4 May 1999, however this action was not taken. See, Usher, 
"Arafat Evades the Issue" 559 MEI7 May 1999 3. 
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Palestinians and the right of the State of Israel to exist. 86 It was also at this time that the 
PLO renounced all violence and terrorism which increased the likelihood of a successful 
peace agreement. 87 
The Declaration of Principles (DOP) stated that, 
"The aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle East Peace Process is, among 
other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim Self- Government Authority, the elected Council..., for the 
Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip... "88 
The PA's jurisdiction covers the West Bank and Gaza Strip89 and will last in its current 
form until an agreement about the permanent status of the occupied territories is reached 
between Israel and the Palestinian Representatives. 90 
The PA is a form of quasi-government which has 20 ministers in its cabinet and is led 
by a President - Yasser Arafat. There is also a Legislative Council which has 88 
members. 91 These members have been elected by the Palestinians in the West Bank, the 
Gaza Strip and Jerusalem. This means that it is more likely to reflect accurately the 
wishes of the Palestinians in those areas than the legislative wing of the PLO - the 
Palestinian National Council. 92 This is important since it is given the authority to 
legislate in its areas of competence for the regions within its jurisdiction. 93 Although 
there has been transfer of authority to the PA, as Israeli troops withdraw from the Gaza 
Strip and parts of the West Bank, jurisdiction for Israeli settlements in the area and 
Israeli nationals has stayed under the control of the Israeli government . 
9a 
Other powers were transferred to the PA immediately after the entry into force of the 
DOP and the first stage of Israeli troop withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area. 
These were provided for in Article VI paragraph 2 and were given, "... with the view to 
86 The letters of mutual recognition are printed in, Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government 
Arrangements (Jerusalem: Israel Information Centre) (1993). 
87 See section 2.1 and 2.2 below. 
88 Article I, DOP. 
89 Article IV, ibid. 
90 Article I, ibid. 
91 See Appendix I for an organisation chart of the PA. 
92 The PNC has 669 members which have mostly been appointed by the executive Committee of the PLO. 
The members of the Executive Committee are elected by the PNC and in turn the Executive Committee 
elects the Chairman of the whole organisation. 
93 Article IX, DOP. 
94 Annex II, Article 3(b), ibid. 
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promoting economic development in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.. " Authority for 
"... education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism" were 
agreed upon as well as the authority to "commence in building the Palestinian police 
force". 95 
The building of the Palestinian Police Force was also considered in Article VIII - "In 
order to guarantee public order and internal security for the Palestinians of the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip... ". However, Article VIII also makes clear some of the limits 
of the PA and reaffirms its lack of statehood by stating that some of the rights which are 
generally attached to statehood (such as the use of force in certain situations) are to 
remain within Israeli competence: 
"... Israel will continue to carry the responsibility for defending against external threats, as well as the 
responsibility for overall security of Israelis for the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and 
public order. " 
Overall the Authority was given powers in the three generally accepted main branches 
of government; legislative, executive and judicial. 96 The existence of these three 
elements means that the PA can in some respects be likened to a regular government of 
a state in international law, even though it does not possess all the powers of a 
government of a state. As a result of the establishment of the PA and the granting of 
some domestic powers, the Israeli military withdrawal and the disbanding of the Israeli 
civil administration for the areas could then commence. 97 
Although the PA exercises some of the elements which a regular government would 
undertake, as far as representation of the Palestinians is concerned, the Authority is very 
much the internal representative body and undertakes municipal functions. 98 Although 
95 Article VI, paragraph 2, ibid. 
% Article VII(2), ibid. The lack of separation of powers in the establishment of the PA has been criticised 
as it has affected the rule of law within the territories and has resulted in a lack of safeguards for the 
protection of human rights - this issue is revisited in detail in Chapter Five of this thesis in section 1.1.2. 97 Article VII (5), ibid. 
98 See Chapter Three for examination regarding to what extent the PA can be considered to possess the 
attributes of a government of a State in international law. It should be noted in relation to its municipal 
functions that for example, the Interim Agreement also transfers authority in the following areas: 
agriculture, forests, direct taxation, education and culture, gas, fuel and petroleum facilities, health, 
insurance, interior affairs, labour, land registration, legal administration, local government, parks, 
planning and zoning, population registry and documentation, postal services, telecommunications, 
tourism, transportation, public works and housing and holy sites. For more description see, Danjani, 
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there is undoubtedly overlap between the Authority and the PLO in both ultimate aims 
and also in personnel, it is the PLO which represents the Palestinians in all negotiations 
with Israel and, to the extent it is able, at an international level. In very basic terms the 
PA is in "a position of subordination to both the PLO and Israel". 99 
Foreign relations is also an area in which Israel has retained competence under the 
DOP. 100 Nonetheless, this has not necessarily stopped the PLO seeking and sometimes 
improving Palestine's status within the international community and at a bilateral level 
with some States, as will be examined in the following chapter. 
Initially the PA only had jurisdiction in the Gaza Strip and Jericho area of the West 
Bank. 101 In September 1995 the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement extended that 
jurisdiction by splitting the West Bank into A, B and C areas. 102 In Area A which 
comprised mostly large urban areas the PA took immediate control of public order and 
internal security. In Area B, comprising mostly small villages within the West Bank, 
the PA took control of public order and internal security of Palestinians. 103 In Area C 
there was a plan for Israel to gradually hand over control to the PA during the period of 
time before a final settlement was reached. '°4 
Although the time frame envisaged in the DOP for reaching a final agreement about the 
status of the occupied territories has passed, the PA is continuing its task of 
administering the area in the fields of competence which it was granted in Article VI. 105 
If and when a final agreement is negotiated the powers of the PA may well increase. 
"Stalled Between Seasons: The International Legal Status of Palestine During the Interim Period" (1997) 
26 Denver JILP 27, at 67. 
99 Danjani, ibid., at 90. 
100 Annex II, Article 3 (b), DOP. Singer submits that, "These arrangements, therefore, are indicative of 
the intention of the parties to establish autonomy, and not an independent entity, in the Gaza Strip and the 
West Bank" - Singer, "Aspects of Foreign Relations Under the Israeli-Palestinian Agreements on Interim 
Self Government Arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza" (1994) 28 Is. LR 268, at 296. 
101 Israel-PLO: Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, May 4 1994: (1994) 33 ILM 622. 
102 Israel-PLO, Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, September 28 1995: (1995) 36 
ILM 551. This Agreement is sometimes referred to as Oslo H. 
103 Israel remained in control of security for Israeli nationals within the area and terrorism. 104 "Areas A and B together contained about 68% of the population of the West Bank and 23% of its 
land. " - Bisharat, "Symposium: The Legal Foundations of Peace and Prosperity in the Middle East. 
Peace and the Political Imperative of Legal Reform in Palestine" (1999) 31 CWRJIL 253, at 258. 
105 May 1999 was the deadline laid down in the DOP. 
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Indeed they would have to increase if a Palestinian State came into existence, unless an 
entirely new governmental body were to be formed. 
The situation is not wholly straightforward, however, since the exact extent of the PA's 
power in the Gaza Strip and West Bank in international law is not fully clear from 
considering only the DOP. Israel has argued that, although the creation of the PA 
meant that the Israeli Civil Administration for the territories was dissolved, the military 
government has not been (even if there has been a troop withdrawal). 106 This means 
that military government still has residual powers in the functions and territorial areas 
which have not been transferred to the PA. 
However, the de facto status of the PA is also dependent on the recognition and 
interaction it has with the rest of the international community. It is this aspect of the PA 
which will be considered in the next chapter. 
Since the Oslo Accords there has been a continued search for peace between the Israelis 
and Palestinians, particularly regarding issues such as the sovereignty of Jerusalem and 
the final settlement of the Palestinian question. However, despite small Israeli troop 
withdrawals and limited agreements, significant steps forward have not been taken. 107 
Indeed some of the years have been marred by violence and recriminations on both 
sides. Recently there has been a particularly heightened level of tension within the 
territories. September 2000 saw the violent clashes between Israelis and Palestinians 
reach a disturbing level, to the point where the term intifadah was once again being used 
to describe the situation in the West Bank. 108 In April 2001 the fighting between Israel 
and Palestinians had reached such a level that the Israelis attempted to regain control 
over parts of the Gaza Strip which had already been handed over to the PA. A hasty 
retreat was made by the Israelis after the United States of America referred to their 
106 See Malanczuk, "Basic Aspects of the Agreements Between Israel and the PLO" (1996) 7 EJIL 485, at 
494 - 498. 107 For example, The Wye River Agreement or the Hebron Troop Agreement. 
'oa Usher, `The Long Haul" 639 MEI 8 December 2000 7. The intifadah was initially sparked by Ariel 
Sharon (before he became Israeli Prime Minister) in September 2000 when he visited the Temple Mount 
(claimed by both Jews and Muslims to be a sacred site), for a discussion regarding Jewish and Muslim 
claims see, Wasserstein, "Have Some Guts British Jews". It has been reported that Fateh, Yasser Arafat's 
political and military movement which is very influential in PLO policy has been the driving force behind 
the latest intifadah, see Usher, "Going Up in Flames" 636 MEI 27 October 2000 4. For a discussion 
regarding the UN response to the intifadah see Williams, "United Nations: The US reverts to type" 636 
MEI 27 October 200013. 
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action as "excessive and disproportionate". 109 Nonetheless, it remains to be seen 
whether the seemingly intractable problem of Palestine can be resolved effectively and 
even more problematically, peacefully. 
With the Palestinian situation now placed in historical context, the discussion can now 
turn to consider the representation of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
2: THE REPRESENTATION OF PALESTINIANS, 
PARTICULARLY IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP. 
Whilst this study predominantly looks at representation of Palestinians within the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip it is also interesting to briefly consider the gaps in representation 
for other Palestinians. 
This gap was disputed by some as the creation of the State of Jordan, which came out of 
some of the British mandated area, was arguably the embodiment of a Palestinian State 
in the region. However, as not all Palestinians, and certainly not all Palestinians that 
had once resided within historical Palestine were living within Jordan, the needs of 
many for representation failed to have been met. 
However, even those Palestinians living within Israel had very little effective or official 
representation at either national or international level for Israel predominantly 
represented Jewish views and aspirations at an international level. The Arab nations 
and the Arab League did offer some form of representation for Palestinians generally 
and the hostile political climate between Arab and Jewish neighbours in the Middle East 
meant that the Palestinian cause would be frequently brought up and discussed in the 
international community. "" However, what the Palestinians lacked was a cohesive, 
effective group to make their collective views known at an international level. This 
109 Remarks made by the United States of America Secretary of State Colin Powell. See Adams, 
"Excessive and Disproportionate" 648 MEI April 20 2001 1. 110 The Arab League was founded in Cairo on 22 March 1945. Its founding members were: Egypt, Iraq, 
Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Trans-Jordan, Yemen and a Palestinian Representative. 
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need was acute given the intention to attempt to raise support for the creation of an Arab 
State within the boundaries of historical Palestine. 
Since the PLO takes a very active role on the international stage in representing 
Palestinians the following section considers its make-up and history in a little more 
detail. It is true to say that the PLO officially represents all Palestinians, however for 
the purposes of this study their representation of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip will be examined as this is the area in which it is intended to create a Palestinian 
state. 
2.1: The PLO" 
The PLO was founded in 1964 by the First Summit of Arab leaders. 112 Egypt's 
President Nasser led the way in forming the PLO along with the support of the 
consensus of Arab States. Ahmed Shuqairy, a distinguished Palestinian diplomat who 
had worked for Syria, Saudi Arabia and the Arab League was appointed with the task of 
raising support for the new organisation. There was a mixed response within the Arab 
world to the plans, particularly within the pan-Arabist groups which tended to support 
only entities which worked for the greater Arab cause rather than separatist issues. 
Support for the PLO was vital at this stage if it was to present a coherent resistance 
organisation with the aim of Palestinian liberation. It was important for it to be on good 
terms with Fateh - an underground liberation group which had formed in the late 50s 
and early 60s and was committed to an armed struggle. Fateh was not wholly 
supportive but about 12 Fateh delegates did attend the PLO's founding conference in 
May 1964. At the end of the month the Palestinian National Charter was issued, as was 
the Basic Constitution of the PLO. ' 13 
:I See Appendix I for organisation chart of the PLO. 
112 Cobban notes that, "Actually, two summit meetings of Arab Heads of State had preceded the 1964 
gathering, in May 1946 and November 1956. But the January 1964 summit has gone down in history as 
the `First Arab Sununit', and subsequent summits have been numbered accordingly" - Cobban, The 
Palestine Liberation Organisation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) (1984), at 275, footnote 17. 
113 The full texts have been published by the PLO, however they have also been printed in Becker, The 
PLO: The Rise and Fall of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson) 
(1984), at 230 - 240. 
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However, this did not present a unified front as internal quarrelling about territorial aims 
and bad relations with the Arab High Committee in Palestine and Fateh dogged PLO 
politics for a number of years. "4 Fateh continued to make preparations for its own 
armed struggle which it commenced in the mid years of the 1960s. 
It was only after the 1967 war in which Israel was victorious that the various Palestinian 
resistance movements began to form a more organised and concerted effort under the 
heading of the PLO. Fateh was at that time headed by Yasser Arafat and it was this 
group which took many of the more senior positions within the PLO. In 1969 he 
became the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the organisation and it became 
more central to the role of mobilising Palestinian support. ' 15 In the following years 
many of the Palestinian Resistance Groups began their campaign of international 
terrorism in order to attempt to bring the notion of Palestinian Statehood to the 
attention of the world. At the same time, the PLO began to set up various internal 
organisations relating to health, education and other relief services within Palestine. 
The PLO had thus become an umbrella organisation for various Palestinian factions and 
took on a central role of energising the Palestinian cause both internally and at an 
international level. 
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan did try to take on the task of representing 
Palestinians for a period of time after 1948. The formation of the PLO, however, in 
1964 caused this to be particularly questioned by the Palestinians of the West Bank and 
during the early 1970s this issue was an on-going debate. 116 After much discussion, in 
1974, Jordan agreed that the PLO may represent all Palestinians on occupied land once 
it had been liberated. ' 17 This decision was taken by Jordan (along with the other Arab 
states) at the Seventh Arab Summit Conference at Rabat in October 1974. This 
1 14 For a detailed discussion regarding the PLO, its organisation, goals and means including is political, 
psychological, economic and military strategies see, O'Brien, "The PLO in International Law" (1984) 3 
BUIIJ 349, at 350 - 368. ýs See Appendix I for Organisation chart within the PLO. 
16 See, Becker, The PLO, at 48 - 55. 117 Jordan disputed the PLO claim to be legitimate Palestinian representative at the Arab Summit in 
Algiers in November 1973, however in Rabat in 1974 this position was reversed in favour of the PLO. 
See Kassim, 'Ile Palestine Liberation Organisation's Claim To Status: A Juridical Analysis Under 
International Law", at 18 and footnote 99 and Silverburg, "The PLO in the UN: Implications for 
International Law and Relations" (1977) 12 Is. LR 365, at 372. 
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occurred mostly as a result of the PLO diplomatic successes through being invited by 
the General Assembly to have UN observer status. "8 
Israel was unhappy with the Palestinian resistance movements and the methods they 
used to make their cause known. Many of the Palestinian resistance leaders within the 
PLO were resident in Beirut so in 1973 the Israeli Army raided the Centre of the city 
and tried to flush out the Palestinian Resistance movement. The PLO was damaged but 
Arab diplomatic victories that same year, when the PLO was recognised by the Arab 
Summit in Algiers as the sole representative of the Palestinians, meant that its influence 
on behalf of the Palestinians was increasing. 119 
Throughout the 1970s the PLO's position in the international community increased and 
it gained more legitimacy as the representative of the Palestinians, in both international 
organisations and with individual States. 120 By the beginning of the 1980s Palestinian 
nationalism was rising and there was a growing sense of dissatisfaction within the 
occupied territories. The safety net of Arab support had been weakened by the 1978 
Camp David agreements and the growing Israeli/Egyptian peace initiatives. For the 
PLO however, this at least meant that the different factions within Palestinian resistance, 
although not wholly unified, were pulling together far more than before and linking 
themselves more strongly to the Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. 
After the Palestinian uprising (intifadah) had begun in 1982, the next major turn in the 
road came in 1988 when the State of Palestine was declared by the Palestinian National 
Council. 121 Although this was an important date for the PLO in its efforts to liberate 
Palestine and act as representative of the Palestinian people, perhaps more significant 
are the steps it took in the early 1990s. 
Discussions with Israel in Oslo in 1993 led to the Declaration of Principles which 
created the beginning of some level of Autonomy for Palestinians in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip. Most importantly for the PLO at the time of the Accords, Israel recognised 
"a General Assembly Resolution 3237 (XXIX), 22 November 1974 (Voting: 95: 17: 19). For more 
discussion on the Palestinian delegation at the United Nations see Chapter Three section 2.1. See also 
Burke, International Recognition of a Non-Nation State: The PLO and the UN (M. Phil Thesis: Oxford) 
(1979), at 78 - 79. 19 Algiers, 26 - 28 November 1973. The Jordanian delegation expressed some reservations on this issue. 120 See the many examples given in Chapter Three. 
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the PLO as being the "representative of the Palestinian people". 122 At this time the PLO 
also recognised "the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security". 123 
In considering the representations of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip it 
is also important to consider whether there are any competing claims to represent 
Palestinians. 
2.2: Competing claims to represent the Palestinians 
The task of representing the Palestinians is fraught with internal politics, both within the 
PLO itself and within the community of Palestinians. There are other factions which 
have varying levels of support within Palestine which have different political 
complexions and sometimes different ultimate goals from the PLO. Harnas, the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Islamic Jihad and the Democratic Front of the 
Liberation of Palestine all take slightly different stances to the PLO on Palestinian 
question and therefore appeal to different elements of Palestinian society. 
The PLO is perhaps the most liberal Palestinian liberation organisation in terms of the 
concessions about territory and struggle it has made in order to attempt to reach some 
kind of breakthrough in peace negotiations. 124 This is partly because the external 
political arena within which any Palestinian representatives must operate can greatly 
affect the support which they receive and ultimately the success of their struggle. When 
that support is reliant on inter-state power struggles and old friendships however, the 
situation can be more susceptible to the trappings of politics rather than solely the merits 
of the issue at hand. This can be seen in Chapter Three where the international 
communities response to the Palestinian representation is considered. 
121 Palestine National Council Declaration of Independence (1988). 
122 Letter of recognition from Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel to Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the 
PLO, 9ih September 1993, printed in Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs Publication, Declaration of 
Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements. 
123 Ibid. 
124 See Adams, "Smacking of Desperation" 599 MEI7 May 1999 1; Usher, "Arafat Evades the Issue" 599 
MEI7 May 1999 4 and Usher, "From Wye to Final Status" 608 MEI 17 September 1999 4. 
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It can be argued that the PLO has come too far in its struggle for recognition to be easily 
questioned now as the legitimate representative of the Palestinians. The current level of 
recognition has taken over three decades to accrue and for the Palestinians to change 
their national and international representative would set the peace process even further 
back. Negotiation would be impossible due to the strong likelihood that Israel would 
not recognise a new group. 
The dominance of the PLO through recognition over any other group has meant that 
other claimants, competing with the PLO, to represent the Palestinians have been left to 
fall by the wayside to a large extent. Groups like Harnas, Islamic Jihad and the 
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine have not received the recognition 
which the PLO has and have thus not achieved even the level of a legitimate 
representative. 125 The practice of recognition has acted as a further filter (in addition to 
political questions about the groups) in questions about their representation of the 
Palestinians. ' 26 
There are reports however, that since the establishment of the PA in Gaza and the West 
Bank, the popular support for the PLO has decreased. 127 There have been reports that 
125 Although it should be noted that the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and Hamas do both 
have some seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council, the Legislative Wing of the PA (see Appendix I for 
organisation chart). 
126 It has been suggested recently that Yasser Arafat has pandered to the requests of the United States of 
America on the conditions for deployment of troops from the West Bank laid down by Israel regarding the 
Wye Agreement at the expense of democratic decision making and Palestinian national policy. This kind 
of criticism leaves the door ajar for competing claims to represent the Palestinians to gain more political 
ground on the basis of lack of democracy in the current representation. However, despite calls from some 
groups for a "rival PLO" to be set up it seems that presently "further political action in the occupied 
territories" is the approach that will generally be taken. - quotation from Nayef Hawatmeh of the 
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, quoted in Fisk, "And They Called it Peace" The 
Wednesday Review: The Independent 16 December 1998 5. 
127 In the 1996 elections Yasser Arafat received nearly 88% of the popular vote and Fateh (his political 
party and a strong influence within the PLO) achieved 50 seats in the PA's Legislative Council. Fateh's 
influence in the PA may be stronger that the figure of 50 seats suggests as it has been reported that of the 
35 Independent members of the Legislative Council "many" lean towards Fateh - Jerusalem Media and 
Communication Centre, The Palestinian Council 14 (2°d Edition: 1998), cited in Bisharat, "Symposium: 
The Legal Foundations of Peace and Prosperity in the Middle East. Peace and the Political Imperative of 
Legal Reform in Palestine", at 258. It is of interest to note that in addition to Palestinians in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip being allowed to vote that the franchise was extended to those Palestinians living in 
East Jerusalem, even though the status of Jerusalem was an issue left for discussion to talks on the Final 
Status of the territories - see Wing, "The Palestinian Basic Law: Embryonic Constitutionalism" (1999) 31 
CWRJIL 383, at footnote 4. 
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the PA has abused the human rights of some Palestinians, which has been confirmed by 
the Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group. 128 
Furthermore, PLO and PA relations with Hamas, a militant Islamic Group, which is the 
PLO's closest rival for representation and power are extremely bad. 129 Harnas rejects 
any political settlement with the Israelis and proclaims jihad against the Jewish State. 
Hamas is of the belief that too many compromises have been made on the part of all 
Palestinians in the name of peace. 130 
When the peace process and the negotiations between the Israelis and the PLO are at a 
difficult stage and there is mistrust of the PA, the popularity of the PLO drops 
significantly. It can be argued that a government is not likely to always be popular with 
its electorate; however the PLO's obvious concern as to this point was notably realised 
13' through the postponing of the municipal elections in the occupied territories in 1998. 
During these difficult times for the PLO within Palestine, Hamas appears to have seized 
the opportunity and is making a concerted effort to attempt to raise its popular support, 
which if successful will affect the true legitimacy of the current Palestinians 
representatives. The PLO and the PA are not showing much outward concern regarding 
the claimed 25% Palestinian support for Hamas, despite the fact that in international 
law, it could affect their status. 132 In reality however, it is clear that legally there is not a 
128 Silver, "Arafat's Authority Tortures its People" The Independent 18 December 199714 - where 18 
cases of Palestinians prisoners who have died since 1994 are cited. See also Chapter Five of this thesis 
which deals with the question of responsibility for Human Rights abuses in the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
on both the Israeli and Palestinian sides. 
129 Harnas has a non-military, administrative, charitable and political wing and a military wing which has 
launched many deadly attacks against Israeli civilians and soldiers. Harnas means "zeal" in Arabic and is 
the acronym of "harakat al-mugawima al-islamiya" meaning "arab resistance movement", see Bisharat, 
"Symposium: The Legal Foundations of Peace and Prosperity in the Middle East. Peace and the Political 
Imperative of Legal Reform in Palestine", at 275 footnote 89. Some of the Harnas leaders were resident 
in Jordan, however, in an unusual move, Jordan deported 4 senior members to Qatar on 21 November 
1999, see Kamal, "Hamas: Has Jordan Gone too Far? " 613 ME126 November 1999 4. 
130 Sharrock, "Albright attacks `dangerous' mistrust of Middle East Forces" The Guardian 28 April 1998 
14. 
131 Palestinian Times Staff "Arafat Scraps Municipal Elections for Now" Palestinian Times 16 September 
19983. 
132 Chapter Three deals with the status of the PLO and PA in international law therefore debate as to this 
issue is left for that discussion. This section aims to provide a brief overview of the competing claims to 
represent Palestinians. D'Amato remarks that within situations of self determination it is important that 
there is still diversity of opinion within them: "As we begin to define groups by their feeling of self 
determination - by their own sense of autonomy - it may develop that individual dissent within that group 
is quickly snuffed out because the group cannot tolerate dissent. ": "Communities in Transition: 
Autonomy, Self-Governance and Independence" (1993) Proc. ASIL 248, at 252. Whilst it is hard to 
predict how much this occurs in any situation, it is not a particular known concern in relation to the 
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great challenge to the their position as legitimate representative of the Palestinians 
because as a result of state practice they are in a strong position in relation to 
recognition by states and international organisations. 133 
Very importantly, since their recognition by Israel, the PLO has had the opportunity to 
represent the Palestinians at peace negotiations. This in itself has increased its profile in 
the international community. Furthermore, it is certain that Hamas (or indeed any other 
current group) would be very unlikely to gain such international recognition and even 
less likely to be allowed to join in negotiations by the Israelis, as by their own 
admission, they have been behind many of the killings and bombings within Israel and 
do not appear likely to renounce their tactics. 
Overall it can be argued that the status of the PLO and the PA as legitimate 
representatives is both assisted and hindered by the current climate in the occupied 
territories. Nonetheless, the hindrances, such as the support for Hamas, which perhaps 
comes partly through the dissatisfaction with the peace process, does not change the 
reality of the situation. The reality is such that Palestinian representation by the PLO 
and PA is now well accepted in the international community and at present no other 
viable opposition exists. 
In any situation where claims are being made to territory by a group purporting to 
represent a people the question of self determination becomes an issue. In such cases 
the legitimacy of a people's representatives will be under scrutiny, hence the preceding 
debate. Given that in the previous chapter the nature of a group's claim to self 
determination was singled out as an important issue in achieving status, the Palestinians 
claim to self determination based on some of the evidence provided above will now be 
considered. 
occupied territories, particularly as there are various groups on the political scene; however it is certainly 
an issue which should be borne in mind. 
133 See Chapter Three. 
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3: THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION; REPRESENTATION AND 
SELF DETERMINATION 
The issue of international status and representation for the Palestinians has always been 
linked to the notion of self determination. The `basics' of self determination have 
already been considered in the previous chapter. 134 Since this chapter hones in on the 
Palestinian situation it is important to apply those principles to that situation as the 
quality of the claim to self determination can affect the mandate of the representatives to 
represent and the effectiveness of their "case" as presented to the international 
community. 135 
In the light of the previous chapter already having considered the issue of a post colonial 
right to self determination, the issues in need of discussion here relate to whether the 
Palestinian situation is one within which the claim can be brought and within this 
whether the Palestinians are a `people' under international law. From there it is 
necessary to move on to consider if the PLO and the PA are legitimate representatives of 
their community. Much of this may be able to be done by referring back to the factual 
evidence provided in sections 1 and 2 above. 
3.1: Is the Palestinian situation one in which the right to self determination can be 
claimed? 
It should be stated at the outset that the DOP does not conclusively settle the issue of 
self determination, despite this issue being at the heart of the need for the peace 
agreement in the first place. 
Although the DOP does not mention external self determination, the Articles which 
provide for the setting up of the PA do, in effect, consider the need for internal self 
determination. This can be seen in Article III which deals with elections to the PA, 
: 34 See Chapter One, section 3. 
135 See Chapter One, section 3.2 regarding the importance of the quality of the claim to self determination. 
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"1. In order that the Palestinian People in the West Bank and Gaza Strip may govern themselves 
according to democratic principles, direct, free and general political elections will be held for the 
Council under agreed supervision and international observation... 
2. ... 
3. These elections will constitute a significant interim preparatory step toward the realisation of the 
legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements. " 
Without giving any indication of the extent of the legitimate rights and just 
requirements for the future, this Article places importance on democratic principles and 
the legitimacy of the PA itself. It was necessary for these issues to be at the heart of the 
creation of the PA if it was (and is) to have any political credibility and legitimacy 
amongst both the Palestinian people and other parts of the international community. 
At a more international level, State opinion and UN resolutions gleaned through an 
examination of the UN discussions on the topic show that the majority of States and 
World organisations support a Palestinian right to self determination. 136 It seems that 
this is generally based on the right to self determination for peoples under foreign 
military occupation. 137 
There are various different viewpoints within the existing literature on Palestinian self 
determination. Some have argued that the Palestinian question relates primarily to the 
issue of a non-Muslim state in the Middle East and that the Palestinians in the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip are not "racially, religiously or culturally distinct from the 
Arabs in the surrounding countries; they are of the same race speak the same language, 
and practice the same religion as the Arabs in Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, or 
Kuwait. t9138 Others have said that the Palestinians clearly have a right to statehood 
because they have lived in that region "... forever, since time immemorial. v9139 
Much of the question as to whether one believes that the Palestinians do have a right to 
self determination and independent statehood however, comes down to the legal 
136 See General Assembly Resolutions 2672C (XXV), 8 December 1970; 2649 (XXV), 30 December 
1970; 2792D (XXVI), 6 December 1971; 2963E (XXVII), 13 December 1972; 3089D (XXVIII), 7 
December 1973; 3236 (XXIX), 22 November 1974. The right of Palestinians to self determination is 
regularly reaffirmed by the United Nations General Assembly. 
"' The United Nations has stated that the need for self determination can arise as a result of "alien 
subjugation, domination and exploitation", (Article 1(3) International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (1966), 999 UNIS 171), or if a people are under "colonial and alien domination", e. g.: in General 
Assembly Resolutions 2649 ibid.; 2708 (XXV), 14 December 1970 and 2878 (XXVI), 20 December 
1971. See also section 3.1.1 in Chapter One. 
" Halberstam, "Nationalism and the Right to Self Determination: The Arab Israeli Conflict" (1994) 26(3) 
NYUJILP 573, at 578. 
101 
definition of self determination and who can claim such a right. 140 The following 
section addresses this issue in relation to the Palestinian question. 
3.2: Are the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip a "People" under 
International Law? 
A definition of what kind of group is a people under international law is still far from 
clear. A people has been referred to as a "community with a distinct character"; 141 
however a more precise working definition seems necessary. There is an inherent 
problem when attempting to find a definition for self determination as any claim may 
conflict with other rights claimed by different entities. For example, some have 
considered the issues of claims regarding territorial integrity and state sovereignty as 
automatically linked with self determination and have examined whether they are 
compatible. 142 If when compared, state sovereignty and state boundaries are more 
important than self determination, a restrictive approach to a definition would be 
adopted. This would ensure that the candidates for self determination are fewer. 143 
However, it is arguable that even if a restrictive approach is taken, the Palestinian 
situation (in terms of those Palestinians living within the West Bank and Gaza Strip) can 
be held to fall within a definition of self determination because the territorial boundaries 
are unclear and the map has been re-drawn a number of times due to occupation, the end 
of the mandate, the partition plan laid down in Resolution 181 and Jordanian 
annexation. 
Peoplehood may also be said to be dependent on the fulfilment of both a subjective and 
an objective set of criteria. The objective criteria relates to there being an ethnic group 
where the individuals in that group are linked by a common history. The ethnicity, it 
can be argued is not necessarily dependent on shared religious beliefs, language or 
territory as these can easily be taken away from a group by through being split up due to 
39 Boyle, "The Creation of the State of Palestine" (1990) 1EJ1L 301, at 302. 
Sao See section 3.1.1 in Chapter One regarding who can claim the right to self determination. 
141 Brownlie, `"The Rights of Peoples in Modem International Law" from Crawford (Ed. ), The Rights of 
Peoples 1, at 5. See also Bassiouni, "Self Determination and the Palestinians" (1971) 65 Proc. ASIL 31. 
142 Falk, `The Rights of Peoples (In particular indigenous peoples)" from Crawford (Ed. ), The Rights of 
Peoples 17, at 25 - 26. 
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the "vicissitudes of history". 144 The subjective element is that that the group members 
must feel psychologically attached to each other and feel that they as a group belong 
together - having a will to live together and "continue common traditions". 
'45 
Although it is possible to say with a reasonable degree of certainty that some groups 
definitely do constitute a people and that some groups definitely do not, it is hard to be 
sure when a group does not clearly fall into either the does or does not category. 146 
In the case of the peoplehood of the Palestinians there have been various viewpoints put 
forward. It has been argued that the Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 
are not "racially, religiously or culturally distinct from the Arabs in the surrounding 
countries. s147 Therefore some might suggest that the creation of the State of Jordan 
satisfied the need for a Palestinian State within the Middle East. 
However, if the notion of having a shared common experience and a psychological 
element to peoplehood is considered then the fact that Palestinians in the occupied 
territories are similar religiously, culturally, linguistically or racially to those in Jordan is 
perhaps not the only important issue. After having suffered alien occupation and 
conflict for over three decades and also expulsion from parts of the place they were 
living in 1948 then a shared common experience is perhaps the most binding factor for 
Palestinians in the occupied territories. 
Given the number of UN Resolutions and the weight of academic opinion, it is not 
difficult to argue that the Palestinians are indeed a people entitled to self determination, 
certainly within the confines of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and that, as a result, they 
"; See section 3.1 in Chapter One for more discussion regarding definitions of self determination. 
144 Dinstein, "Self Determination and the Middle East Conflict" from Alexander and Friedlander (Eds. ), 
Self Determination (Boulder: Westview) (1980) 243, at 246 - 247. 145 Renan, "Qu'est-ce qu'une Nation? " in Ouevres Completes (Paris: Calmann-Levy) (1947) 1: 887, at 
904, cited in Dinstein, ibid., at 246 - 247. 
Bassiouni also considered this issue at a meeting of the American Society of International Law. He adds 
the idea of permanency to the psychological elements of peoplehood - Bassiouni, "Self Determination 
and the Palestinians", at 32. 
146 For example, it seems clear that the East Timorese are a people under international law, whereas the 
Quebecois whilst distinct from Canadians in some respects do not have a right to secede from Canada in 
international law - see Cassese, Self Determination of Peoples, at 251. See also section 1.4.1 in Chapter 
Three which discusses the Parti Quebecois and looks at recent developments in the campaign for 
secession. 
147 Halberstam, "Nationalism and the Right to Self Determination: The Arab Israeli Conflict", at 578. 
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are entitled to their own representatives in the international community. From this 
however, the question arises as to who is entitled to represent the Palestinians. 
3.3: Who can represent the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip? 
In sections 2.1 and 2.2 above the PLO was examined and it seems that it is the most 
suitable entity to class as the representative of both Palestinians in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip and indeed of Palestinians in the wider diaspora. In section 3.1.2 in the 
previous chapter the requirements for representatives of a people were considered. The 
test suggested by Cassese was used. He stated that a group must have a "broad support 
among those it claims to represent" before it can obtain any level of status in 
international law as a result of its position. 148 Under this criteria it does appear that the 
PLO satisfies the test of legitimacy, as even if there are some issues regarding its 
popularity it is still the only feasible option. 149 
Overall it does appear that the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip have a 
strong claim to self determination and a legitimate representative in the form of the PLO 
which is able to bring that claim into the international arena. The impact this claim has 
had can be seen by examining the response the PLO and the Palestinian question have 
had on the international stage. This will be done in the following chapter. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The preceding sections have considered the background to the question of the status of 
Palestinian Representation. The status of that representation in the international 
community does affect the way in which the Palestinians are able to present their claims. 
Therefore the type of representation and its claim to represent a people is vital to the 
fulfilment of its aims in terms of whether it is given the opportunity to make its case 
heard. 
148 Cassese, Self Determination of Peoples, at 166. 
149 For issues of popularity see discussion in section 2.1 and 2.2 above. 
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In total however this chapter has three main observations to draw. First, to confirm that 
the political and religious aspects of the Palestinian question have affected the territory 
and the peoples who have lived there on their passage through history. 
Second, it has been shown that the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as a 
people, have a right to self determination and that this could be achieved through the 
creation of a Palestinian State. This means that the representatives of the Palestinians, 
in the form of the PLO and the PA do have a legitimate claim to bring before the 
international community. As was discussed in the previous chapter the quality of that 
claim can affect the likelihood of success. Therefore, although the Palestinian claim is 
sound and it would logically appear that success should follow, the historical and 
political issues surrounding the question and the competing claim to territory make a 
solution harder to find. 
Third, in the shape of the PLO, the Palestinians have found an effective representative. 
It has grown into an organised, complex entity with a governmental like structure and 
commands a good deal of respect beyond Palestine itself. Given the range of opinion 
within Palestine and the Arab world about the Palestinian question, for a group to have 
been able to form such a cohesive body is impressive. 
It is true to argue that the PLO has not been wholly effective, since its aims for 
Palestinian statehood have been modified and not yet realised. Nonetheless, given the 
exceptionally complicated political situation within which it operates and the intricate 
story behind the claims of the Palestinians, to have even reached the negotiating table 
was not a simple task. 
Now that such initial questions have been discussed, the main issue to be considered in 
the next chapter concerns the status that Palestine and its representatives have accrued in 
international law. The question raised there will enable the theories regarding variable 
personality in Chapter One to be tested by using the Palestinian example. However, 
such discussion will also enable objective opinions to be drawn about the level of status 
achieved by the representatives of the Palestinians. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE STATUS OF THE PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter One it was asserted that a good description of the practice relating to the 
achievement of personality is that it can be variable. It was suggested that personality 
can be variable at many different levels: first, in terms of the range of responses of 
recognising states to non-state groups; second, in terms of the transitional period 
between claiming and achieving statehood; third, in terms of the different levels of 
status that an entity can have at any one point in time, depending upon with whom and 
under what circumstances it is acting. As discussed previously, an entity does not exist 
in a vacuum and a determination of a particular level of status is not merely a theoretical 
pronouncement. Determinations of status are important in terms of assessing the 
development of an entity's personality and attaching relevant rights and duties. 
In order to build upon the work in Chapter One regarding variable personality, this 
chapter studies the Palestinian situation and considers how a non-state entity with a 
complex political, religious and historical background can be compared with it. The 
discussion in Chapter One regarding the value of recognition was important because it 
provided the tools by which to help assess the examples of state practice towards the 
Palestinian Representation. The views of the international community expressed 
through action and opportunities given to the Palestinian Representation to participate in 
international life can be used in order to help make a determination of the kind of status 
it can be deemed to possess. This will naturally involve drawing conclusions about the 
personality of the Palestinian Representation, however it will also provide information 
about the concept of personality in international law. This information will assist in 
understanding some of the concepts described in chapter one and help to determine 
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exactly how variable practice in relation to status and ultimately legal personality can 
be. 
As was considered in Chapter One personality may be considered variable partly 
because the nature of the status accorded to an entity may change and evolve over a 
period of time. This transitional period is extremely important in the study of the status 
of the Palestinian Representation, since as a representative body which aspires to 
achieve Palestinian Statehood, a notion of personality which does not allow room for 
change would not be consistent with an achievement of their aims. Since States are 
keen to retain a certain amount of power when making determinations on status, often 
due to the political environment which undoubtedly influences their decision making 
processes, personality is automatically subject to external factors and thus must 
ultimately be flexible to a degree. Therefore it was suggested that the personality of a 
entity can change vis-ä-vis other entities but also in terms of its own position in 
international society. 
However, an evolutionary approach to personality does not make it any easier to 
establish status. Chapter One noted the continued importance which political factors 
can play in recognition decisions, for example when the former Yugoslavia was 
considered. Indeed examining status becomes more difficult as, depending on the 
context of recognition and the political scenario in which a decision to recognise occurs, 
an entity may well be recognised or treated as having differing levels of status by 
different sections of the international community. This is the time when it is of the 
utmost importance to understand the value of recognition. Therefore the examination in 
Chapter One has been useful in terms of that understanding and it can be applied in this 
chapter. 
Enquiries regarding status must thus be carried out by an examination of the levels of 
status which an entity has achieved as a matter of fact and considering what the 
intention of the recognising body was in making such a determination. ' 
Keeping in mind the theory asserted in Chapter One, that personality can be variable, the 
aim of this chapter is to examine how far this is true in relation to a particular entity, the 
1 Brownlie, "Recognition in Theory and Practice", at 198 -199. 
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Palestinian Representation. This will be examined through the recognition it has 
received from the international community. Various different sources will be examined, 
including the practice of individual states and that of international and regional 
organisations - including the United Nations. From this it will be possible to draw 
conclusions about its relative level of status in various contexts. 
2 The practice of states and organisations is the "crucial test" in establishing status - Shaw, "The 
International Status of Liberation Movements", at 32. 
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1: VARIABLE PERSONALITY 
Each relationship between every actor and another on the international stage is subtly 
different. That difference may amount to the consideration of an entity as an entirely 
different style of subject in international law - at one end of the scale. Or may simply 
be that slight political nuances alter specific interactions at that time - at the other end 
of the scale. 3 
Within the variable personality theory it is argued that there are a whole range of 
possibilities which an entity may class another entity as. The spectrum is wide and may 
range from considering an entity as a State (at the highest point) to a Terrorist 
organisation, for example (at the lowest point). In between these two points at the ends 
of the spectrum of possibilities come a number of other options, for example, a 
government (or provisional government) may be considered to exist before statehood is 
accorded. An entity may be classed as a national liberation movement which aspires 
towards statehood and within this category there are various levels of status for national 
liberation movements. Or an entity may be considered to be a group which represents a 
people or a proportion of that people but does not interact with other actors at the level 
which a national liberation movement might do. Beyond that, lower down the scale of 
progression an entity would perhaps not be recognised at all and would obviously only 
sink to the classification of terrorist if it performed acts of terrorism. ' 
Furthermore within each of these categories there are spectrums of their own which 
determine their interactions with other entities. For example, even within the category 
"State", perhaps a `rogue' state which has committed a number of international wrongs 
is likely to be treated differently from an old ally. 
3 The same can be true of an entity's obligations. They may vary, depending on whether they are party to 
particular treaty regimes or members of particular international organisations, for example. Although it is 
status which is dealt with in this chapter the conclusions which are drawn may affect obligations, since in 
some circumstances Entity A may not be deemed to have sufficient capacity to enter into a treaty (for 
example) with Entity B. 
4 See section 1.2 below regarding the international legal criteria for a government. 
s The notion of an entity as terrorist will not be considered here since the Palestinian Representation have 
now renounced violent tactics and also because it is an extremely broad issue and would merit separate 
enquiry of its own, (see section 1.2.4 in Chapter Two regarding the PLO's renunciation of violence). 
Suffice to say that classification as a terrorist organisation is within the bounds of possibility on the 
spectrum of actors on the international stage. 
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In this section the various points on the spectrum of possibilities which relate most 
directly to the Palestinian Representation will be examined. If there are any accepted 
criteria for that particular status they will be considered. Then in section 2 this study 
will consider some of the evidence of the defining occasions when the Palestinian 
Representation has acted on the international stage and with whom. This will enable a 
picture of where the Palestinian Representation falls on the spectrum of possibilities and 
in relation to whom to emerge. In turn this will assist in questioning the validity of 
claims that personality is variable. 
1.1: The International Letal Criteria for Statehood 
The Palestinian Representation has been recognised as a State by some States in the 
international community. This will be considered below. It should be borne in mind 
when these occasions are examined that there are some international criteria which are 
often applied when an entity seeks to become a state. As has been discussed in the first 
chapter, the issues of which theory regarding the value recognition is a better description 
of the law are less important than may first appear. 6 Indeed the international community 
often chooses to apply specific criteria in specific situations (and even then may not 
necessarily abide by them), as demonstrated through the promulgation and subsequent 
application of the EC Guidelines? 
The importance of recognition in the creation of States has already been discussed in 
Chapter One, as have some of the basic criteria for Statehood. 8 However to re-cap, these 
are generally considered to be possessing a permanent population, a defined territory, a 
government and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. 9 
Whilst this list is by no means exhaustive of every situation and some of and in some 
situations a state may be deemed to exist before it has fulfilled all of the above criteria, 
6 The Declaratory/Constitutive debate as examined in section 1.2 of Chapter One. 
Declaration on the 'Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet 
Union', 16 December 1991 - see section 1.2.4.2 in Chapter One. 8 See section 1.2 in Chapter One. 
9 Article I Montevideo Convention. 
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it is a useful place to begin when considering claims of Statehood. 10 
There are no upper or lower limits to a States population and there is plenty of evidence 
that a state does not necessarily have to have defined boundaries to satisfy the criteria of 
territory - Israel being a prime example, since her boundaries have never been finally 
l settled. " 
The issues surrounding when an entity can be classed as having a government are 
considered below in section 1.2. Having the "capacity to enter into relations with other 
States" is most often interpreted in line with Judge Anzilotti's opinion in the Austro- 
German Customs Union Case. 12 He referred to independence in law rather than a State 
being subject to the authority of any other State and therefore possessing the capacity to 
enter into relations with other states. 13 
1.2: The International Letal Criteria for Recognition of a Government 
The criteria regarding when an entity may be classed as a government in international 
law undoubtedly also relate to when an entity achieves statehood, given the Montevideo 
criteria listed above. The time at which an entity can be said to become a government 
is an issue which can only be truly answered by considering the State practice in that 
area. 
"There has been only one rule governing decisions on whether to grant or refuse recognition to a new 
government: the necessary, but not sufficient, criterion is whether a government effectively controls its 
state. " 14 
In other words the requirement that a government must actually and truly be able to 
discharge all the functions of the State. 15 Such a condition has been referred to as a 
`sine qua non' of recognition of an entity as the government of a state. 16 
10 As was discussed in Chapter One in relation to self determination and the examples of representative 
groups which were examined in section 2. See also section 1.2 below regarding the criteria for a 
government in international law. 
1 See also, Deutsche Continental Gas-Gesellschaft v Polish State (1929) 5 AD 11. 
12 Advisory Opinion (1931) PCIJ Rep. Series A/B No. 41. 
" Ibid. For a more in depth discussion of statehood and recognition see, Crawford, Creation of States and 
also some of the literature referred to in the relevant sections of Chapter One. 
'4 Peterson, Recognition of Governments Should Not Be Abolished", at 37. 
15 Effectiveness and "display[s] of State authority adduced as evidence of that sovereignty" (effectivites - 
III 
Furthermore, 
"Within the limits of this rule, which forbids recognising before control is shown or continuing to 
recognise after control is lost, governments are free to adopt any one of a number of rules for decision. To 
add to the confusion most governments have asserted several at once, choosing among them as 
circumstances warrant. "" 
Other additional criteria are frequently suggested, however they do not have the weight 
of opinion which supports the criterion of effectiveness. They include, popular 
support, 18 legitimacy19 and ability and will to fulfil international obligations. 20 These 
additional criteria are probably optional for states in their decisions as to whether to 
accord recognition however, and it seems that the only decisive requirement is that of 
effectiveness. 
see The Western Sahara Case (1992)ICJRep. 39: cited in Shaw, "The Heritage of States: The Principle of 
Uri Possidetis Juris Today" (1996) 67 BYBIL 75, at 134) have also been used as a way to establish title to 
territory - which is ultimately one of the effects which determining a government will have. 
In the Palestinian situation the proposed partition plans of mandated Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab 
State (see Chapter Two, end of section 1.2.3 and beginning of section 1.2.4) did not follow the principles 
of uti possidetis because their application would probably have constituted a threat to the peace and 
security of the area. 
Since there is a factual dispute as to where the borders of Israel and Palestine lie a court or tribunal for 
example could use "traditional mechanisms of territorial acquisition, which revolve around many of the 
techniques used in establishing the uti possidetis line such as the search for titles, effectivites, recognition 
and acquiescence, treaty interpretation, practice and estoppel. " (See Shaw, ibid., at 153. ) 
16 Harris, Cases and Materials (5th Ed. ), at 157. 
"Peterson, "Recognition of Governments Should Not Be Abolished", at 37. 
IS Lack of agreed definition of `popular support' which at a minimal level could merely refer to 
acquiescence, however those proponents of it usually suggest that it should involve either a plebiscite or 
referendum or voluntary obedience to the regime. Such definitions clearly link to the concept of self 
determination at an internal level and as a result lack of `popular support' has been considered as a 
specific reason for non-recognition. See Peterson, Recognition of Governments: Legal Doctrine and 
State Practice 1815 - 1995 (New York: St Martin's Press) (1997), at 52 - 56. 19 Traditionally legitimacy has referred to the concept that one particular type of government is best. 
More recently this has included the notions of democratic legitimacy which obviously raises a whole 
series of issues regarding the definition of democracy. See Peterson's exposition in Peterson, ibid., at 56 - 
68. Franck has also argued that there could be a right to democratic governance, see Franck, "The 
Emerging Right to Democratic Governance" (1992) 86 American Journal of International Law 46. Since 
Franck raised these issues (which are extremely interesting but unable to be considered here in great depth 
due to the limits of space and time) other writers have taken the question a step further. In a study 
questioning whether democracy is a new criteria for recognition Murphy notes that (a) there is no norm 
obligating states not to recognise a non-democratic regime; (b) democratic referendums are important for 
those claiming status, but not decisive as other factors are also important; (c) when a non-democratic 
regime ursurps a democratic regime the international community may react by refusing to recognise it in 
an effort to get a return to democratic rule and (d) the international community is interested in democratic 
legitimacy but it is equally interested in economic development, international peace and security and 
stability. See Murphy, "Democratic Legitimacy and the Recognition of States and Governments". 
20 This includes a `physical and administrative capacity', an `intention and volition' to fulfil obligations 
which can cover both `general and regional international law and the obligations contained in agreements 
with one or more states' - Peterson, Recognition of Governments, at 68 - 69. 
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Individual governments or organisations may choose to implement one of the others, 
but their interrelated natures, which depends partly on their interpretation, is no doubt a 
bar to setting their place in definitive international legal requirements. An ability to 
carry out international obligations will naturally go alongside the notion of an effective 
government and an interpretation of popular support which merely requires 
acquiescence is not sufficiently different from the concept of control. 21 
It seems clear from an examination of the state practice that the effectiveness of the 
government concerned is the only definitive criteria applied generally at an 
international level. 22 There has been a move away from the use of optional criteria by 
governments throughout this century, despite the fact that many still reserve the right to 
apply such criteria should they choose to. 23 
The recognition of governments is an issue which from time to time is required to be 
considered in domestic courts. 24 Such decisions constitute state practice on the issue and 
are thus useful in this examination. Domestic courts have traditionally often referred to 
statements by the executive wing of government as to the status of foreign regimes, 
however in recent times many states have now abolished or almost stopped the formal 
act of recognition of governments. 5 Therefore courts have been required to consider 
the criteria by which a government may be deemed to exist as the government of a 
particular state. In the instructive case of Republic of Somalia v Woodhouse Drake & 
Carey (Suisses) SA and Others26 in the UK courts where this issue was considered in 
relation to the government of Somalia, Hobhouse J held that, 
"Accordingly the factors to be taken into account in deciding whether a government exists as the 
government of a state are: a) whether it is the constitutional government of the state; b) the degree, nature 
and stability of administrative control, if any, that it of itself exercises over the territory of the state; c) 
whether Her Majesty's government has any dealings with it and if so what is the nature of those dealings; 
21 Peterson, ibid., at 72. See also, Klinghoffer v SNCAchille Lauro 96 ILR 69, where the court stated that 
an entity (in this instance the PLO) cannot have the capacity to enter into formal relations with other 
nations unless it has a defined territory which is under unified governmental control since it is unable to 
implement such obligations. 
See, Peterson, ibid. for a comprehensive and insightful examination of almost two centuries of state 
ractice. 
See ibid., at 74. 
24 The internal aspects of recognition theory were considered in Chapter One section 1.2.6 where some 
examples of national courts involved in questions surrounding recognition were examined. 25 Peterson, Recognition of Governments, at 178 - 184. 
26 [1993] 1 All ER 371. 
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and d) in marginal cases, the extent of international recognition that it has as the government of the 
state. , 
27 
When all is considered the conditions which were laid down in this case (which were 
based on criteria given in previous cases covering a similar issue) are very similar to 
those laid down above as the criteria in international law. There is an emphasis on a 
declaratory approach to recognition, given the importance placed on it in the final 
sentence of the quotation above. Notably, effectiveness and control are still the 
determining factors. 
However, even effectiveness is a somewhat nebulous concept: "The appreciation of 
effectiveness remains essentially one of fact and a delicate task". 28 Even if recognition 
policies are altered so as not to make unilateral determination of recognition 
statements, 29 the "courts and departments of State will still need to decide when a 
particular government began to function with sufficient effectiveness", 30 for which a 
detailed assessment of the facts is required. 
" States without effective governments? 
Whilst it is true that States do consider many of the issues noted above when deciding 
whether to accord recognition to a government, it can be said that as discussed in 
Chapter One, the rules regarding recognition will be manipulated by the international 
community if it wants to admit a member to its society. 31 When considering recognition 
accorded to emerging states which are represented by liberation movements it seems 
true that the criteria of effectiveness is sometimes lowered, so that a new government 
claiming to represent a people with a right to self determination can be formalised. 32 
Certainly, in a situation where the international community has wanted to punish a 
government which was in power contrary to the right to self determination, it has 
27 Ibid., at 384. 
28 Brownlie, "Recognition in Theory and Practice", at 210. 
29 Hansard House of Lords Debates Vol. 408 Cols. 1121 -2 (28 April 1980), cited in Brownlie, ibid., at 
209 - 210, note 36. 30 Brownlie, ibid., at 210. 
31 See section 1.2.7 in Chapter One. 
32 See section 3.2.1 on premature recognition in Chapter One. 
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refused to recognise such a government. In Southern Rhodesia, recognition of a 
government had been denied and the unilateral declaration of a regime almost 
universally condemned by the United Nations as a result of a denial of self 
determination to the majority of the population. 33 In Southern Rhodesia the minority 
government exercised effective control, however the Security Council still called upon 
all States "not to recognise this illegal racist minority regime". 34 
Some examples from state practice can be drawn upon to support the theory that there is 
a lower threshold of effectiveness in self determination situations. 35 They are colonial 
examples so the territory and population to the state in question were already settled. 
The issue was one of government and control. Although these examples have been used 
already in Chapter One, section 2.1, they are worth re-emphasising here in order to 
illustrate this point. 
In Algeria the Provisional Government, which was set up by the FLN, was recognised 
by a number of states whilst it was still in its infancy and unable to carry out the 
functions of effective government. As time went on many newly independent and 
communist states accorded de jure recognition to the provisional government, despite 
the fact that, 
`by the traditional standards of effective government the GPRA [provisional government], not even 
located in the territory it claimed to govern, could not conceivably have been recognised as the 
government of Algeria. , 
36 
A further example is that of Guinea-Bissau which was a Portuguese colony struggling 
for independence through the movement Partido Africano da Independencia da Guine e 
Cabo Verde (PAIGC). 37 Within about 12 months of struggle the PAIGC declared the 
creation of the State of Guinea-Bissau and was recognised by over 40 states. The UN 
agreed that a sovereign state of Guinea-Bissau had been emerged and over the next year 
increasing numbers of states continued to recognise the sovereign State of Guinea- 
38 Bissau. To formalise this there the PAIGC entered into an agreement with Portugal. 
33 General Assembly Resolution 2024 (X)Q, 11 November 1965 (Voting: 107: 2: 1). 
24 Security Council Resolution 216,12 November 1965 (Voting: 10: 0: 1), at para. 2. 
's See also discussion in Warbrick, "Recognition of States: Recent European Practice", at 14. 
36 Wilson, International Law and the Use of Force by National Liberation Movements, at 110. See also 
section 2.1.3 in Chapter One regarding the FLN. 
37 See also section 2.1.1 regarding the PAIGC. 
38 General Assembly Resolution 3601 (XXVIII), 2 November 1973 (Voting: 93: 7: 30). See description of 
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This all occurred despite the fact that the PAIGC did not exercise effective control 
within the territory. Nonetheless, the force of the international community pushing for 
the creation of a state through recognition due to the denial of self determination 
appeared to override this issue. 
Whilst such examples initially appear to be contrary to the practice described above 
regarding the Montevideo Convention criteria, it is submitted that the existence of an 
unfulfilled right to self determination may alter the definitions of the criteria to be 
classed as a government. Therefore the requirements of the Montevideo Convention 
themselves are not dismissed, they are still applied, albeit with more flexible 
thresholds. 39 
Furthermore, in situations of self determination it is very difficult to judge criteria such 
as effectiveness against bodies which are not the sole authorities in that area, 
particularly as control may not be achieved until claims to self determination are also 
successful 40 However, a situation such as a colonial one, where the State already exists 
and for example, it is the title to territory which is disputed and who or which groups 
should be in power by applying self determination principles or through the will of the 
international community, can be resolved by lowering effectiveness criteria. Is the 
issue the same when the question is asked in reverse however? Can a government be 
held to exist without the existence of a State? 
9 Governments without States? 
Within the question as to whether the PLO or the PA (or indeed any claimant to be a 
government of a non-state actor) can be considered to possess the qualities of a 
government, the state practice considered above begs the question as to whether it is 
possible to declare that a particular entity is a government if the state which it is 
declared government of does not exist in international law? The answer to this lies 
perhaps partly in the theory which is adhered to regarding recognition of states. If the 
situation in Wilson, International Law and the Use of Force by National Liberation Movements, at 111 - 
113. 
39 See discussion in section 3 in Chapter One regarding self determination and claims to status. 40 See section 3.2 in Chapter One. 
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declaratory theory is held to be correct then it is possible to argue that a government 
may exist in international law before a state is formally recognised by other states or 
organisations. However, such a position would be untenable if the constitutive theory 
were considered to be the right method for determining statehood. 
Alternatively, if as suggested in Chapter One through an examination of recent state 
practice both theories are flawed and a better description of the law is that an entity 
becomes a subject of international law when the international community wills it to be 
such, then it does not necessarily matter that the government exists formally or not since 
members of the international community use their discretion to either allow the entity to 
participate as a government or not 41 
The State practice demonstrates that in international law it is possible for there to be a 
government of an autonomous region where the status of that region is not fully 
determined. Taiwan is a clear example of this for it declines to be a State. Taiwan has 
been described as a "consolidated local de facto government in a civil war situation. s42 
Despite the fact that it is not a state it is submitted that it has a certain level of status in 
international law. Evidence of this is the fact that the its government is capable of 
entering into relations with other states, by for example the fact that it can be party to 
treaties and therefore can bind the People's Republic of China in relation to the area 
which it controls. 43 
Courts which have had to deal with the issue of the status of Taiwan have from a de 
facto point of view considered it to be a: 
"Well defined geographical, social and political entity (with)... a Government which has undisputed 
control of the island. "" 
State practice does not necessarily deny that recognition of a government can 
potentially be independent of recognition of statehood. The situation in Eritrea can also 
be submitted as evidence of this fact. After the Eritrean struggle for independence, 
41 See section 1 on recognition in Chapter One. 
42Crawford, Creation of States, at 149 - 150 43 See Harris, Cases and Materials (5th Ed), at 104. For example, see Mutual Defence Treaty between the 
Republic of China and the United States of America 1954,161 British and Sovereign State Papers 598, 
Article VI, cited in Crawford, Creation of States, at 145. 
"A. G. v Sheng (1960) 31 ILR 349, cited in Crawford, ibid., at 151. 
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which lasted for around 30 years, the Ethiopian army was finally defeated in 1991. A 
provisional Government was formed which for two years after taking office did not 
formally declare a state. The provisional government had limited diplomatic relations 
with other states, including some Arab States, some Western European States and some 
African States. The government was effectively in control of the territory. In 1993 
there was an OAU/UN sponsored referendum where 99.7% of the population voted for 
independence. After this the international community came forward and recognised the 
statehood of Eritrea de jure. The context in which the provisional government was 
operating meant that it was much easier for it to have some level of international 
recognition prior to the referendum because the post-struggle new Ethiopian 
Government was supported by the Eritrean independence, thus issues such as 
intervention did not arise 45 
The situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the state practice which occurred in relation to 
its recognition may also be instructive on this issue. It seems that at the time of 
recognition Bosnia-Herzegovina did not constitute a state as it did not fulfil all the 
criteria for statehood, since its recognised government only effectively controlled the 
minority of the territory. Recognition was then a substitute for the meeting of the 
criteria because despite its lack of effective government, through recognition a state was 
created 46 Thus in state practice in the same way as lack of fulfilment of the criteria for 
a state will not necessarily preclude the recognition of a government, as in Eritrea, lack 
of effective government will not necessarily preclude recognition of a state. 7 
1.3: The international legal criteria for a national liberation movement 
This is a difficult area to consider in terms of specific criteria as there are less examples 
in international practice of recognition of liberation movements than there are of states 
or governments. In addition the recognition that has been accorded has not necessarily 
been uniform in terms of at what stage in the movement's development, and why, it has 
been accorded. 
45 Information from a telephone conversation with Mr. Abraha, Representative of Eritrea to London, the 
High Consulate of Eritrea, London, on 14 December 1998. 
46 Hillgruber, `The Admissions of New States to the International Community", at 493 - 4. 47 Therefore the State practice is not necessarily compatible with the criteria laid down in the Montevideo 
118 
Also, as will be seen when the recognition which the Palestinian Representation has 
been accorded at the UN is considered below, there is a scale of status within this 
category itself and some groups are allowed to participate at a higher level than others. 49 
Broadly speaking however, contemporary international practice appears to widely 
support the notion that a liberation movement may be a subject of international law. 49 
Cassese has stated that in deciding whether a liberation movement should be deemed a 
subject of international law the international community makes reference to two factual 
issues: 
"Firstly, reference is made to the movement's political goals. Do the movement's goals fall within the 
scope of the principle of self determination; is the movement fighting a colonial power, foreign occupier, 
or racist regime? In addition, is the aim to acquire effective control over a population living in a given 
territory? Secondly the representative factor is called into account. Is the movement a legitimate 
representative of the oppressed people? Does it have a broad-based support among those it claims to 
represent. "so 
1.3.1: Do the movement's goals fall within the scope of the principle of self 
determination? 
Under this heading only groups which are fighting to bring an end to colonialism, 
foreign occupation or racism can be entitled to international status as these are the 
situations which come within the principles of external self determination. 51 They must 
also be aiming to change the government of the State so that it reflects the wishes of the 
self determination unit from whom their claim to status stems. This raises the equally 
important issue of whether a group can claim status if they are not representative of the 
people on whose behalf they claim to act. 
Convention since effective government is a requirement for Statehood. 
48 See section 2.1 below 
49 Lauterpacht, "°Ihe Subjects of the Law of Nations", at 444. 
50 Cassese, Self Determination of Peoples, at 166 - 167. 
51 See section 3.1.1 in Chapter One regarding the international claim to self determination for further 
description of those who may claim the right. 
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1.3.2: Broad support among those it claims to represent? 
This can be a complicated issue since a number of questions presuppose the question of 
whether a group has broad support. Namely, who the liberation movement claims to 
represent and how it is possible to establish broad support when due to the lack of self 
determination the wishes of the people may have not been ascertained for perhaps many 
years? 52 Indeed, a people may all wish power in the state to change hands but may not 
all want the same group to represent them. This problem can be compounded if more 
than one group is making a claim for status. As was examined in the previous chapter 
in relation to the PLO, it is often the group which can best woo the international 
community which may achieve success on the international plane. 53 
The UN does attach great importance to the will of the people concerned, as without 
such emphasis the value of self determination is lost. To this end it has often organised 
plebiscites or supervised elections in non-self governing territories to ascertain the will 
of the people, although this has generally been to establish whether they aspire to 
independence or integration with another country, rather than to determine support for 
an individual group. 54 
It is not clear exactly what "Broad support" means in terms of precise levels support for 
a particular organisation. However there can be no doubt that it must be coupled with 
the political aims of the group and therefore a people's wishes in terms of goals will 
affect support. 
52 See section 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 in Chapter One regarding who can claim the right to self determination and 
who is entitled to represent them. 
53 See section 3.2 in Chapter One regarding the importance of the quality of the claim to self 
determination and Section 2.1 and 2.2 in Chapter Two regarding the PLO and other competing claims to 
represent the Palestinians. Whilst the PLO does clearly have a good level of popular support it is far from 
beyond criticism in the Palestinian community and there are other rival groups who have achieved a 
certain level of support within Palestine and the rest of the Arab world. 
54 E. g.: British Togoland (General Assembly Resolution 1182 (XII)); British Northern Cameroons 
(General Assembly Resolution 1350 (XIII)); British Southern Cameroons (General Assembly Resolution 
1608 (XV)); Rwanda-Urundi (General Assembly Resolution 1580 (XV)); Western Samoa (General 
Assembly Resolution 1569 (XV)); Cook Islands (General Assembly Resolution 2005 (XIX)); Equatorial 
Guinea (See UN Yearbook 1968,741); Papua-New Guinea (General Assembly Resolution 2516 
(XXXVIII)); New Zealand Territory of Niue (General Assembly Resolution 3285 (XXIX)); Ellice Islands 
(General Assembly Resolution 3288 (XXIX)); Northern Marianas (General Assembly Resolution 2160 
(XLII)); French Comores Islands (General Assembly Resolutions (see D. Rouzie, `Note' in (1976) 103 
JDI 392 - 405. See also Cassese, Self Determination of Peoples, at 76 - 79. See also section 2.1.4 in 
Chapter One regarding the situation in East Timor where the UN arranged a plebiscite. 
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1.4: The International Legal Criteria for recognition as a Representative Grou 
This is an even more difficult notion to assess than that of the liberation movement and 
contains more scope for a varying degree of status within the category. Groups which 
claim to represent a people or a minority but which do not fit within Cassese's 
requirements noted in the previous section regarding "political goals" and "broad 
support" may be deemed to come within this category. 
This might also include groups which are almost worthy of the title of liberation 
movement in terms of the recognition they have received, but are not likely to ever 
achieve statehood, perhaps due to their claims not falling within external self 
determination rules. 
At the other end of the scale, however, this category may also include virtually unknown 
and completely internationally unrecognised groups which claim to represent minorities 
within States and are never likely to gain any level of international legal status. 
Given below are examples of two groups which may be deemed to fall within this 
category - the Parti Quebecois in Quebec and the IRA/Sinn Fein in Northern Ireland. 
These are both groups which represent a significant yet minority group within Canada 
and Northern Ireland respectively. They have been chosen for brief examination here as 
they are well known, important groups which both clearly play a role in political 
processes but do not necessarily fall within the requirements for a liberation movement. 
1.4.1: The Parti Quebecois 
Quebec is one of the ten nations provinces of Canada. 80% of the population of Quebec 
are French speaking, whereas Canada overall is predominantly Anglophone. The Parti 
Quebecois was founded in the mid nineteen-seventies with the political goal of securing 
independence from Canada for the province. In 1976, with Rene Levasque as its leader, 
the party gained control of the Quebec legislature. Levasque promised a referendum on 
the secession issue which was held four years later. It resulted in a majority of "No" 
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votes. 55 In 1980 there was another referendum where only 40.5% of Quebec voters 
voted for "la Souverainete". 56 
Since then there have been a number of agreements to attempt to give more autonomy to 
Quebec, however none have been successful. 57 In 1992 there was a further referendum 
within Canada on the Quebec issue and in Quebec itself there was a 54% "No" vote. In 
1995 in another Quebec referendum, still only 49.4% of Quebec voters voted for 
58 independence. 
Currently the separatist Parti Quebecois is not the majority party within the Quebec 
legislature - the power is held by the Liberal party - however it does have a good deal of 
influence over political activities in Quebec, since one third of the electorate are 
declared separatists. 59 Its leaders use constitutional law and international law to support 
their claims to secession, however the validity of these legal arguments have been 
doubted 60 
Therefore, given the results of the referendums in Quebec no-one would deny that there 
is a good level of support for the political goals of the Parti Quebecois. However, these 
goals do not fall within the external right to self determination as a minority of the 
population support them. This is because international law does not grant autonomous 
regions or States within a federal system the right to determine their international status, 
even if they as a matter of fact represent a section of the state which is ethnically or 
culturally different from the rest of the inhabitants. 61 The minority represented by the 
Parti Quebecois, whilst sizeable, is not sufficient to come within the criteria of "broad 
ss 1,900,000 against secession and 1,300,000 for secession. 
56 26 Keesings Contemporary Archives 30464A. 
s' For example, the Meech Lake Accord which was negotiated during the mid 1980s in Quebec was 
brought down by both Anglo-Canadian and Native-Canadian opposition: see Cassese, Self Determination 
of Peoples, at 249 - 250. so (1995) 41 Keesings Record of World Events 40766. 
59 Cassese, Self Determination of Peoples, at 250. 
60 Ibid., at 251. There was reference to the Court by the Canadian Governors in Council to the Supreme 
Court in Canada in 1998 regarding international law and possible secession of Quebec. The Governors 
asked to the Court to consider, (1) Can the Canadian Legislature, under the Canadian Constitution, effect 
the secession of Quebec unilaterally? To which the Court said "No"; (2) Does international law give the 
Legislature the right, through self determination to unilaterally effect the secession of Quebec? To which 
the Court gave a qualified "Yes" considering that there are other issues such as recognition by the 
international community which may also play a role in the future of that secession and (3) in the event of a 
conflict between domestic and international law which takes precedence? To which the Court stated that 
it would not consider this question in this particular reference. Reference Re: Secession of Quebec (1998) 
2 Supreme Court Reports 217. 
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support" (as discussed above) and therefore the party may not be classed as a national 
liberation movement. However, it clearly represents a significant minority within 
Quebec, hence its classification as a representative group. 
1.4.2: The IRA/Sinn Fein 
The IRA is Northern Ireland's biggest republican paramilitary group. It was founded 
about 80 years ago and its aim is to unite Northern and Southern Ireland. In 1969 the 
IRA split into the Official and Provisional wings. The Provisional IRA is the more 
militant of the two groups and is generally referred to as the IRA. Although the Official 
IRA still exists it is less active. 
Sinn Fein is one of the political parties which claims to represent the views of a section 
of the Northern Irish electorate. It has always been generally thought of as the political 
wing of the IRA, however the party deny that this connection exists. Like the IRA, Sinn 
Fein is a republican group which is keen to establish a united Ireland. 
The party dates back to before the First World War, however its current form was 
developed in 1970 when Provisional Sinn Fein split from Official Sinn Fein. This split 
mirrored the division of the IRA mentioned above. 
During the 1980s Sinn Fein grew in strength and at the 1997 UK General Election it 
won 16% of the Northern Irish vote and returned two MPs to Westminster. 62 In the 
recent UK General Elections in 2001 Sinn Fein increased its representation at 
Westminster to four MPs. 63 
At the 1999 elections to the devolved Northern Irish Assembly64 Sinn Fein was elected 
to 18 seats. The electoral system used was Single Transferable Vote which is a highly 
proportional method and therefore it can be said that overall Northern Irish support for 
61 See, Cassese, ibid., chapters 2 and 4. 
62 Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness. Neither have ever sat at Westminster as they refuse to take an 
oath of allegiance to the Monarch. 
63 Gerry Adams, Pat Doherty, Michelle Gildernew and Martin McGuinness. 
64 See Northern Ireland Act 1998 which established the 108 seat Assembly and also the Northern Ireland 
Act 2000 which removed the power of the Assembly due to a failure to decommission IRA weapons 
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Sinn Fein is likely to stand at around 17% of the population. 
Therefore Sinn Fein and the IRA are groups which represent a minority of their 
population. This means that they cannot be classed as falling within Cassese's criteria 
of broad support and political goals, however they nonetheless represent a significant 
proportion of relevant popular views and have achieved a certain level of political 
success. Therefore they can be considered as a Representative group upon the scale of 
possibilities. 
Now that the main possibilities of status have been considered this study turns to the 
status of the Palestinian Representation. Various examples of recognition within a 
range of fora will be examined in order to determine when and where it has fallen on the 
spectrum of possibilities and therefore to what extent it is a body which possesses a 
variable level of personality. 
within a specified time frame. 
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2: HOW HAS THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TREATED 
THE PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION? 
The question which needs to be asked is how the international community has treated 
the Palestinian Representation? As discussed briefly at the beginning of Chapter Two, 
since the Palestinian situation is a politically divisive issue it can be difficult to assess 
acts of recognition enabling the Palestinian Representation to participate in the 
international community objectively. 65 It is important to consider whether States have 
not allowed Palestinian representatives not to participate simply on the grounds that 
Palestine is not officially a State or whether in fact they have adapted to allow 
participation. Following on from this it can be examined why the international 
community has taken such a stance on Palestinian participation. This discussion being 
built upon the conclusions in Chapter Two regarding the strong right of Palestinians to 
self determination and also a realisation that the State of Palestine is likely to exist at 
some time in the future and that as a result therefore needs some level of representation 
on the international plane. 
" What do the PLO and the PA claim to be? 
First, it is necessary to consider what the entity in question purports to be and it is with 
this issue that this examination begins. The position of the PLO, though perhaps 
somewhat obvious, is worth quoting. It was made particularly clear when the PLO 
chairman, Yasser Arafat addressed the UN General Assembly in 1974.6 Arafat referred 
to the PLO as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people". Then in 
1988 the Palestinian National Council (the legislative wing of the PLO) claimed to be 
the government of the State of Palestine when it unilaterally declared the existence of 
the State of Palestine - 
"The Palestine National Council hereby declares, in the name of God and on behalf of the Palestinian 
Arab people, the establishment of the State of Palestine" 67 
65 See section 1.1 in Chapter Two. 
66 General Assembly Official Records, XXIXth Session, 2282°d Meeting, A/PV. 2282 and Corr. 1 paras. 
63 -6 are of particular interest. 67 Palestinian National Council Declaration of Independence. 
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Since that time, the PA has come into being through the DOP. 68 Therefore, now the PA 
would be considered to be the governmental style body for the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip and indeed the degree to which it exercises some governmental style functions is 
considered below. This raises problems of exactly when a government may be classed 
as such. 69 Any recognition which is discussed in the following sections which occurred 
before 1993 and the DOP can be assumed to be in relation to the PLO, unless it is stated 
otherwise. Recognition post 1993 is often aimed at the Palestinian cause more generally 
(the PLO and PA being representative bodies of that cause) and it would be up to the 
relevant body within the PLO or PA framework to decide exactly which Palestinian 
body would undertake the task of representation. 70 
However, not all entities which recognise the Palestine or its Representatives do so for 
the same range of purposes and therefore it may be recognised as having different levels 
of status in different scenarios. This demonstrates the importance which should be 
placed on the context of recognition and shows that an entity may have more than one 
dimension to its status depending on which other entities it is interacting with at any one 
time. 
Therefore, prima facie an entity may be able to occupy more than one category of status, 
(like for example, national liberation movement or government) at any given moment. 
Thus, in reality the situation which may occur is that the Palestinian Representation is 
recognised as being at different places on the scale of possibilities by various other 
international actors. 
2.1: Recognition by the United Nations 
One way in which to assess the international impact of a representative group is to look 
at the way in which it has been treated at the UN. Whilst it is generally agreed amongst 
68 As discussed in section 2 of Chapter Two. 
69 See section 1.2 above on recognition of governments. 
70 See PLO/PA Organisational Chart in Appendix I. (It should be remembered that the PLO would 
generally take on the task of representing at an international level as it represents all Palestinians (even 
though it has recently focussed on the creation of state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and that this 
would therefore affect predominantly the Palestinians who already reside there). The PA however is the 
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jurists that recognition by the UN does not automatically imply recognition by its 
individual members71, it can be said that it provides evidence of the level of status 
which that movement has accrued. 72 
As it is not a State, Palestine has not been accorded the status that a fully fledged 
member would be given. However, this has not stopped the UN granting some level of 
status to Palestinian Representatives. For indeed, lack of Palestinian Representation at 
the UN would be incompatible with the UN's stance on Palestinian self determination. 73 
The PLO was granted the status of observer in 1974.74 This status has changed 
somewhat since that time and the UN has allowed the personality of the representation 
to evolve alongside changes in its make-up and aims which has on occasion meant that 
it has fallen more in line with accepted international opinion. 75 
However, in order to understand the importance of such a grant of observer status a brief 
examination of the nature of observer status at the UN should first be considered. 
2.1.1: The Nature of Observer Status at the United Nations 
Observer status at the UN has been granted on an ad hoc basis. It is a device which 
allows non-member States, organisations, groups and national liberation movements to 
have a meaningful relationship and participate at varying levels in the activities of the 
Organisation. The precise specifications of observer status cannot be given since the 
internal governmental style entity which represents those within the areas its franchise extends to. 71 See inter alia, Aufricht, "Principles and Practices of Recognition by International Organisations" 
(1949) 43 AJIL 679; Kato, "Recognition in International Law: Some Thoughts on Traditional Theory, 
Attitudes and Practice by African States" (1970) 10 Ind JIL 299; Wright, "Some Thoughts About 
Recognition" (1950) 44 AJIL 548. This is not to argue that the UN does not playa role in the recognition 
of entities (see, Dugard, Recognition and the UN, at footnote 9 in chapter 4 where a worthy examination 
of collective recognition regarding the UN is expounded both theoretically and through practice) but 
simply to suggest that collective recognition through the UN is still not a viable determinative option. Cf. 
Green, "Representation Versus Membership: The Chinese Precedent in the United Nations" (1972) 10 
Can. YBIL 104 and Alexandrowicz, "The Quasi-Judicial Function of States and Governments" (1952) 4 
AJIL 631. 
72 See also, Claude, "Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the UN" (1966) 20 Int. Org. 367. 
73 See Chapter Two. 
74 General Assembly Resolution 3210 (XXIX), 14 October 1974. (Voting: 105: 4: 20. Bolivia, Dominican 
Republic, Israel and the United Kingdom against). 
7S See discussion below regarding the increased international support after the PLO renounced its tactics 
of violence and it recognised the right of the State of Israel to exist in the DOP. 
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UN has never formally defined the relationship and it has been used as and when the 
need to involve a non-member has arisen, often due to political considerations. 6 
Therefore an examination of what role the observer plays at the UN must be undertaken, 
"since the role is based on usage, not legal prescription, its meaning must be found in the behaviour, 
privileges, and liabilities of observer countries as they actually function at United Nations 
headquarters". 77 
Traditionally such status was generally granted to non-member states. However since 
the mid-1970s NLMs have been granted some limited participation in the activities of 
the UN. Observer members are not given the same rights as states and an observer so 
far has never been allowed to vote. The rights granted can vary according to the 
situation and the UN can increase the extent or number of rights should it consider it 
necessary. This is amply demonstrated by Resolution 250 of the 53rd Session of the 
General Assembly which conferred extra "unprecedented" rights on the Palestinian 
Observer Delegation and is discussed below. 78 
Practically, observer status means that a non-member government (for example) can be 
involved in forum where international affairs are being discussed and decisions, perhaps 
relating to their own situation, are being considered. Since now many observers have 
the right to speak in discussions, for some only those regarding their own situation, they 
can even have an indirect impact on that decision making. 
Whilst increasing the rights and privileges of the body to which status is granted, the 
endowment of observer status also has some limitations. Observers are not able to 
76 See, Sybesma-Knol, "The Continuing Relevance of the Partcipation of Observers in the Work of the 
United Nations" from Wellen (Ed. ), International Law: Theory and Practice. Essays in Honour of Eric 
Suy (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers) (1998) 371; Mower, "Observer Countries: Quasi-Members 
of the United Nations" (1966) 20 Int. Org. 266, at 272. Although, since the participation of liberation 
movements as observers it could be said that political considerations include the pursuance of the right to 
self determination. 
A further important issue to note in relation to observer status is that whilst it is not argued that collective 
recognition through the UN is akin to recognition by states on an individual basis, it can provide evidence 
of state intention. There is an academic debate as to whether recognition can be implied through 
resolutions of international organisations. See Harris, Cases and Materials (5`h Ed. ), at 147 for brief 
overview of the modes of recognition. 
The nature of observer status was also considered in the Advisory Opinion, Applicability of the 
Obligation to Arbitrate Under Section 21 of the United Nations Headquarters Agreement of 26 June 1947 
(1988) ICJ Rep. 12 see, The Contents of the Dossier transmitted by the Secretary General of the United 
Nations, part II, Materials Relevant to the Observer Status of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, 
Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents, at 87 - 107. 
77 Mower, "Observer Countries: Quasi Members of the United Nations", at 267. 
78 General Assembly Resolution 250 (LII), 7 July 1998 (Voting 124: 4: 10). See section 2.1.3 below. 
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participate in the distribution of UN communications in the same way a member can and 
since many observers are not able to speak if an observer is attacked in debate it may be 
unable to defend itself through reply. 79 As stated above the status of observer has been 
developed on an ad hoc basis, however on the whole observers speak only after 
Members States have spoken '80 and 
have varying degrees of participation in terms of 
rights of reply, sponsorship of proposals and other procedural issues. 81 
2.1.2: Palestinian Representation at the UN 
The PLO was the first NLM to be extended the privilege of observer status through a 
resolution of the General Assembly, by which a Palestinian representative was entitled 
to participate in plenary meetings on the question of Palestine. 82 In a further resolution, 
later that same year the PLO itself was invited to be an observer of the work of the 
General Assembly. 83 
When the PLO's claim to represent the Palestinians is considered, it should be 
remembered that, "... it is clear that this representation of a people does not preclude 
79 cf the Palestinian Delegation - see below section 2.1.3 regarding Resolution 250. so See "Practice of the General Assembly and Its Main Committees Regarding Statements Made by 
Observers" from Chapter VI: Selected Legal Opinions of the Secretariats of the UN and Related 
Intergovernmental Organisations (1982) UN Jur. YB, at 160. 
81 See "Status of the PLO in the UN - Summary of the Principal Developments in the Evolution of the 
Status of the PLO with the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, 
Other UN Agencies and Intergovernmental Organisations" from Chapter VI: Selected Legal Opinions of 
the Secretariats of the UN and Related Intergovernmental Organisations (1982) UNJur. YB, at 156 -159. 82 General Assembly Resolution 3210 (XXIX), 14 October 1974 (Voting: 105: 4: 20. Bolivia, Dominican 
Republic, Israel and the United Kingdom against). It is interesting to note the Israeli and UK votes since 
they are traditionally states which have been less politically inclined to support increased rights for 
Palestinians. Given the historical relationship between the Palestinians and both the British and the 
Israelis discussed in Chapter Two this is not surprising. 
83 General Assembly Resolution 3237 (XXIX), 22 November 1974 (Voting: 95: 17: 19. The 17 States 
against PLO participation in the General Assembly were: Belgium, Bolivia, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, 
Denmark, Germany (FRG), Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, 
UK, USA). It vital to note that with the exception of Israel, these States are Western European or within 
the Americas. When this is compared with the responses to the letters (see Appendix III) and the 95 
States which recognised the State of Palestine in 1988 it can be seen that these two groupings are 
politically similar in their response to the sovereignty of the Palestinians. 
The 19 States which abstained were: Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Columbia, France, Greece, Haiti, 
Honduras, Jamaica, Japan, Laos, Malawi, New Zealand, Panama, Paraguay, Swaziland, Sweden, 
Thailand, Uruguay. Once again, with the exception of two States from Australasia, two from Asia and 
two States from Africa, all the others are from either Europe or the Americas, thereby demonstrating the 
continental splits regarding the Palestinian question. 
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other movements from representing the same people. 9984 However, in organisations such 
as the UN, it is general practice that each group (or state or people) should be 
represented by one group - usually the government of that particular people or state. It 
has already been shown in Chapter Two that the PLO and the PA are considered to be 
the legitimate representatives of the Palestinians. 85 It would be very difficult, given the 
procedures of that organisation, to suggest that more than one group could represent the 
defined people struggling for liberation. Therefore, here the question of who should 
represent the Palestinians in the UN is not a great issue. 
The practice of inviting liberation movements to participate in some UN activities 
continued after the initial invitation to the PLO. Together with assistance from the 
OAU and later the Arab League, the General Assembly classified three kinds of NLM 
which were eligible for such recognition - those under "colonial domination, alien 
occupation and racist regimes. s86 A clear example of an invitation such as this is the 
resolution which allowed liberation movements which had been recognised by the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to join in work which related to their countries87 
It has been suggested that the category of "peoples fighting against alien occupation" 
was created specifically for the Palestinian situation. 88 If so, this is certainly strong 
evidence of the will at the UN to involve the Palestinian representation more fully in 
their activity. Furthermore, the status granted to the PLO was greater than that accorded 
to the OAU recognised movements. The difference lay in the fact that the PLO was able 
to participate in areas which went beyond the context of Palestine, whereas as 
mentioned above the OAU recognised groups only participated in work related to their 
situation. However, "In practice, the PLO has limited its participation to issues relating 
to Palestine .,, 
89 This is evidence that as early as the mid-1970s it was possible to view 
84Wilson, International Law and the Use of Force by National Liberation Movements, at 121. 
85 See section 3.3 in Chapter Two. 
86 Freudenschuss, "Legal and Political Aspects of the Recognition of National Liberation Movements" 
(1982) 11 Millennium Journal of International Studies 115, at 116. 
87 General Assembly Resolution 3280 (XXIX), 10 December 1974 (adopted by consensus). See also 
section 2 in Chapter One which considers the grant of observer status to some NLMs and also the 
influence of the OAU. The basic criteria which the OAU used for recognition of National liberation 
movements was effectiveness of struggle, coupled with popular support. They are applied fairly carefully, 
as evidenced by the withdrawal of recognition in 1964 from the FNLA of Angola for no longer meeting 
the criteria: see, Shaw, "The International Status of Liberation Movements", at 23 and note 16. 88 See Baxter, "Humanitarian Law or Humanitarian Politics? The 1974 Diplomatic Conference on 
Humanitarian Law" (1975) 16 HILJ 12. 
89 Wilson, International Law and the Use of Force by National Liberation Movements, at 119. 
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the PLO as a more advanced movement which was potentially able to participate in 
work on any issue, unlike the other NLMs whose observer grants were more limiting. 
90 
The distinction between the OAU recognised movements and the PLO at the UN can 
also be seen in the practice of the organisations as well as in its resolutions. For 
example, in 1974 there were calls by some States who supported the liberation of 
Guinea for the leader of the PAIGC91, Amilcar Cabral, to be able to make a declaration 
before the General Assembly. However they were unsuccessful. Despite this, Yasser 
Arafat was invited to address the Assembly that same year. He gave a speech lasting an 
hour and forty minutes and symbolically was seated in a place that was usually reserved 
for Heads of State. 92 
Thus through its participation in the life of the UN the PLO clearly paved the way for 
the SWAPO which just over two years later in 1976 was given the opportunity to join in 
plenary sessions of the General Assembly. 93 
This lead and marking out of the PLO as different from other movements continued in 
the Security Council as well as the General Assembly. In December 1975 the Council 
invited the PLO to participate in the consideration of an issue which would have 
condemned Israel for air attacks on Palestinian Refugee Camps in Lebanon. 94 Prior to 
this some representatives of African liberation movements had taken part in Security 
Council discussions by virtue of Rule 39 of the Council's Rules of Procedure, which 
allows the Council to invite members or other persons whom it `considers competent' to 
assist or give information during meetings. 
90 For example, for the African Portuguese territories, FREMILO, MPLA, FNLA, UNITA and for 
Southern Rhodesia, ZAPU, ZANU - See ibid., at 120. 
91 A movement struggling for the liberation of Guinea. For a basic description of the history of PAIGC 
see Wilson, ibid., at 111-112. 
92 Hirst, The Gun and the Olive Branch: The Roots of Violence in the Middle East (London: Faber and 
Faber) (1977), at 333; also cited in Burke, International Recognition of a Non-State Nation, at 76. 
93 See section 2.1.2 in Chapter One regarding SWAPO and General Assembly Resolution 152 (XXXI), 20 
December 1976. (Voting: 113: 0: 13. The abstaining States were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, El 
Salvador, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, United Kingdom, USA, Uruguay). 
It is interesting to note that with the exception of El Salvador, the abstaining States here also either voted 
against in the Resolution which granted the PLO observer Status in 1974 discussed above. Again, they 
are all from Western Europe or the Americas. 
94 30 SCOR 1859th meeting (1975) 3. 
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When the PLO was invited to attend, the procedure for invitation was carried out under 
the authority of Rule 37, which states that any UN member which is not a Council 
member may be invited to take part in discussion without the need for a vote if the 
interests of the member are affected by the issue at hand. 
The majority of the Council was clear that the PLO should participate with the same 
rights as conferred on a member state, however, there was some dissent on this issue. 95 
Nine members voted in favour, three against, with three abstentions, voting followed 
fairly predictable political lines with the United States, the United Kingdom and Costa 
Rica against. The United Kingdom stated that: 
"the granting to the PLO of this exceptional status... constitutes an undesirable and unnecessary departure 
from the established practice of the Security Council. The provisional rules of the Council provide only 
for Member States of the Organisation to enjoy such treatment. " 
96 
The resolution was passed despite the votes against since the President considered it to 
be on a procedural, rather than a substantive matter. 97 This was an important decision as 
far as the PLO were concerned since it could be said that it implies that the concept of 
Palestine as a full member is not necessarily an impossibility and that a majority of the 
Security Council gave the PLO greater privileges than other observers. 
However, Rule 38 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council 
governs the rights which a member invited under Rule 37 is granted. They include the 
right to submit proposals and draft resolutions. Such drafts may only be put to a vote if 
a representative of the Council requests it. Whilst this may seem like a reasonably high 
level of participation, particularly for an observer such as the PLO, it is true to say that 
the effect of such participation on substantive issues is surely limited. This is because 
through taking a political stance they would be likely to be subject to a permanent 
member's veto (although this perhaps would not be as predictable in the current political 
95 For further description of this occasion see, Gross, "Voting in the Security Council and the PLO" 
(1976) 70 AJIL 470, at 475 - 482; Levine, "A Landmark on the Road to Legal Chaos: Recognition of the 
PLO as a Menace to World Public Order" (1981) 10 DenverJILP 243, at 243 - 246; and Travers, "The 
Legal Affect of United Nations Action in Support of the Palestine Liberation Organisation and the 
National Liberation Movements of Africa" (1976) 17 HIL1561, at 572 - 573. 96 30 SCOR 1859th meeting (1975) 3, at 38 - 40, also cited in Levine, ibid., at 243 - 244 97 Ibid., at 41. Levine questions the validity of the adoption since the second part of the resolution was 
substantive, (at 244) and Gross, "Voting in the Security Council and the PLO", suggests that to declare 
that a non-state may be treated as a state is an ultra vires action on the part of the Council, (at 479). 
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climate). Nonetheless, this was an important step for the PLO, especially as it had only 
been granted observer status the previous year. 
This style of invitation to the observer for Palestine to join in the discussion at the 
Security Council continued and when Palestine was invited it was generally under Rule 
37. However, there is always some dissent as to this practice. 98 The United States 
always votes against and strong American allies, the United Kingdom and other Western 
European States always abstain. The lack of American willingness to allow the 
Palestinian Representatives to participate under Rule 37 is because of a concern that it 
would amount to de facto recognition to a representative of the nation of Palestine. 99 
This once again is indicative of the varying light in which the Palestinian representation 
is held by differing members of the international community. 
A further example of this type of voting split on the issue of Palestinian participation in 
the Security Council occurred in 1990. The Council was due to discuss the situation in 
the occupied territories and some members wanted Yasser Arafat to attend the meeting 
in New York. 10° The United States made known its intention to refuse him a visa to 
enter America, so the Security Council moved the venue for its 2923`d meeting to 
Geneva. 101 The vote regarding Arafat's attendance followed typical political lines - 11 
votes to 1 (USA) and 3 abstentions (UK, France, Canada). 102 Since this was a 
procedural rather than a substantive vote the USA did not have the power of veto and 
therefore Arafat did address the meeting. 103 
In recent years however, there has been an alteration in wording of the invitation for the 
Permanent Observer for Palestine to participate in Security Council meetings so that the 
Rule 37 issue is not so pointed. On 28 February 1994 an invitation was granted to 
98 By way of example: At the 2973rd, 2980th and 2989th meetings the United States voted against and 
Belgium, France and the United Kingdom abstained. 
At the 2910th, 2845th and 2863rd meetings the United States voted against and the United Kingdom, 
Canada and France abstained. 
At the 2781st meeting the United States voted against and France, Germany, Italy and the United 
Kingdom abstained. 
" Washington Post I1 January 1989 Sec. A. 14, cited in Talmon, Recognition of Governments in 
International Law, at 89. 
1°° A representative of Bahrain wrote to request this: letter dated 21 May 1990, S/213000. 
101 S/21309,22 May 1990. 
102 SCOR: 45th Year, at 5-6. 
103 See the discussion of this occasion in Bailey & Daws, The Procedure of the UN Security Council 
(Clarendon Press: Oxford) (3rd Ed.: 1998), at 43. 
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Palestine to participate "in accordance with the rules of procedure and the previous 
practice in this regard. "104 For the first time the USA did not object to participation and 
therefore ever since this wording has been used. 105 It is interesting to note that this 
change in attitude by the United States came after the DOP. This indicates the 
importance of the DOP in terms of the Palestinian Representation's acceptance at an 
international level, even by States which have traditionally opposed extending 
Palestinian participation in the life of the international community. At a bilateral level it 
is a clear example of the evolving relationship between Palestinian Representatives and 
the USA. 
The delegation of Palestine at the UN is also involved with the working of the United 
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). 
In 1994 the General Assembly decided that the Advisory Commission of UNRWA 
should establish a working relationship with the PLO. The PLO now often shares in 
meetings with the Advisory Commission and a copy of the annual draft report of 
UNRWA's Commissioner General is "shared" with a representative. '06 It should be 
noted, however, that despite the "sharing" of the report with the Palestinian 
representative, the PLO is not accorded the same status as the representative of the 
Government of Israel, whose comments on the report are given "due consideration" by 
the Commissioner General. 107 This is a good example of the fact that even in a 
relatively `Palestinian sympathetic' scenario, a distinction is still drawn between the 
representative of a liberation movement and the government of a state. 
It is interesting to note the General Assembly Resolution of 15 December 1988 where 
the UN responded to the proclamation of the State of Palestine by the Palestinian 
National Council. 108 That Resolution `acknowled[ged]'109 the proclamation and 
104 S/PV. 3340,28 February 1994. 
los See, Bailey & Daws, The Procedure of the UN Security Council, at 160. 
106 See, Letter from Peter Hansen the Commissioner General of UNRWA to the President of the General 
Assembly in the Report of the Commissioner General of the UNRWA for Palestinian Reuses in the Near 
East. 1st July 1995 - 30thJune 1996 GAOR 51st Session, Supp. 13. 
See also the letter from Peter Hansen the following year - GA OR 52nd Session, Supp. 13. 107 Letter from Peter Hansen 51" Session, ibid. 
108 General Assembly Resolution 177 (XLIII), 15 December 1988 (Voting: 104: 2: 36 The United States 
and Israel against. The 36 abstaining States were, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, 
Barbados, Belgium, Bhutan, Canada, Central African Republic, Costa Rica, Cote D'Ivoire, Denmark, 
Finland, France, FRG, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malawi, 
Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago, UK, 
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decided that the designation "Palestine" would be used in the UN system in place of 
"PLO" from then on. This was a symbolic victory for the PLO and the Palestinians as 
the notion of Palestine was accepted even if the political actualities of such a concept 
were not on the horizon. 
As a result of its role as observer the PLO has been a party to a case in the courts of the 
United States of America. The United States challenged the right of the PLO to 
maintain its observer mission in New York which it is permitted to do under the terms 
of the Agreement between the USA and the United Nations Organisation regarding the 
Headquarters of the United Nations, 1947. The challenge was brought on the grounds 
of the Congressional enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1987.110 This Act overruled 
the provisions of the Headquarters Agreement and it was questioned whether as a result 
the PLO would not be able to maintain their Permanent Observer Mission Offices in 
New York. l lt The court held that the statute did not override the Headquarters 
Agreement since there was no explicit intention expressed on the part of Congress to 
that effect. It is important to note, however that regardless of the issues in the case itself 
there was no recognition of the PLO as having status in international law other than 
through the observer status it receives at the UN. The court referred to a congressional 
determination which stated that, "... the PLO and its affiliates are a terrorist organisation 
and a threat to the interests of the United States, its allies and to international law... "' 2 
Uruguay, Venezuela, Zaire). It should be noted that 32 of the 36 abstentions were from States which did 
not recognise the State of Palestine at a bilateral level in 1988 and that 84 of the 104 affirmative votes 
were from States which had recognised Palestine bilaterally (see Appendix II for list of States which did). 
Of those 20 States which had not recognised Palestine at a bilateral level, yet still voted in favour of this 
resolution, 12 of them were from the Americas, 6 were from Asia, 1 was from the Middle East and 1 from 
Africa. This reflects the patterns of support which can be seen when most examples of Palestinian 
recognition or opposition are examined. 
109 General Assembly Resolution 177, ibid., at para. 1. 
110 22 USC Sections 5201 - 3. For discussion regarding the case and also regarding the conflict between 
United States national and international law see, Home, "United States v Palestine Liberation 
Organisation: Continued Confusion in Congressional Intent and the Hierarchy of Norms" (1989) 10 Mich. 
JIL 935. 
111 United States v The Palestine Liberation Organisations and Others 82 ILR 282. 
112 Ibid., at 299; Appendix A: Title 22, United States Code (Foreign Relations) Chapter 61 - Anti- 
Terrorism - PLO, section 5201 (b). 
Currently the United States has designated 28 groups around the world as foreign terrorist organisations 
which means that they are classed as non-US organisations that engage in terrorist activity that threatens 
US nationals or national security (see definition in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
1996). A list of Foreign Terrorist Organisations is published in the Federal Register. The PLO is not one 
of the organisations currently designated, however there are other Palestinian groups which are. Foreign 
Secretary Madeline Albright designated 28 groups as Foreign Terrorist Organisations on October 8 1999, 
they are: Abu Nidal Organisation, Abu Sayyaf Group, Armed Islamic Group, Aum Shinrikyo, Basque 
Fatherland and Liberty, Gama'a al-Islamiyya, Harnas, Harakat ul-Mujahideen, Hizbullah, Japanese Red 
Army, al-Jihad, Kach, Kahane Chai, Kurdistan Workers' Party, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, 
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On 2 March 1988 the General Assembly resolved to request an advisory opinion from 
the International Court of Justice on the Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate 
under s21 of the United Nations Headquarters Agreement of 26 June 1947.113 The 
Court was required to establish mainly whether, given that the USA could not guarantee 
that the PLO Observer Mission would not be affected, a dispute between the UN and the 
USA concerning the interpretation and/or application of the Headquarters Agreement 
existed and thus the USA would be required to enter into the pre-arranged dispute 
settlement mechanisms. 114 
The Court was not actually called upon to consider the legal question underlying the 
Anti-Terrorism Act - i. e.: that if it became law the USA would be in violation of the 
Headquarters agreement. However, some passages of the Case do suggest that the USA 
was under a duty not to interfere with the PLO Observer Mission as its legality was not 
in question. ' 15 The Court opined that that a dispute did exist between the UN and the 
USA and that there was an obligation upon the USA to enter into arbitration. 116 
On the whole however, the judgment of the Court does not lead directly to conclusions 
relevant to this study - other than to reaffirm the status of Palestinian Representatives as 
permanent observers and their right to maintain a permanent mission in New York. 
However, a general conclusion may be drawn from the fact that no other UN members 
chose to stand with the USA and support them in their action. This could be taken to 
suggest that other members support the Palestinian participation in UN activities. 
As has been already demonstrated through the USA's change in reaction to Palestinian 
participation in the Security Council, the USA's stance has changed considerably over 
Mujahedin-e Khalq Organisation, National Liberation Army, Palestine Islamic Jihad-Shaqaqi faction, 
Palestine Liberation Front - Abu Abbas, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Popular Front for 
the Liberation of Palestine- General Command, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia, Revolutionary 
Organisation 17 November, Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front, Revolutionary People's 
Struggle, Shining Path and Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement. For discussion regarding the 
consequences of designation see, "Contemporary Practice of the United States" (2000) 94 AJIL 364. 
1 13 General Assembly Resolution 229 (XLII), 2 March 1988. 
1 14 Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate Under Section 21 of the United Nations Headquarters 
Areement of 26 June 1947 (1988) ICJRep. 12. FSee 
separate opinion of Judge Schwebel in particular at page 52. For a discussion of the Case see also, 
Sybesma-Knol, "The Continuing Relevance of the Participation of Observers in the Work of the United 
Nations", at 381- 384. 
116 Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate Under Section 21 of the United Nations Headquarters 
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the last decade. However the fact that the USA wanted to close the permanent mission 
in New York is a good example of the different light in which the PLO was held by the 
United States compared to other more politically sympathetic bodies. "? The PLO was 
not even considered as a liberation movement in this sphere, however such non- 
recognition is most likely political. Perhaps as a result of the PLO tactics of violence at 
the time and the USA's relationship with Israel. 118 This is interesting since it suggests 
that personality is clearly evolutionary and that it is also affected by political context. 
However, it also indicates that status can be variable in the sense that one entity may 
consider the Palestinian Representatives to be undesirable and therefore try to limit its 
participation. At the same time other entities are attempting to secure Palestinian 
participation in the international community. 
It is also interesting to note that the UN has played an important role in the Israeli/PLO 
peace process by giving international approval to both the process itself and the decided 
aims of the DOP. General Assembly Resolution 48/58119 "Expresses full support" for 
the process and was almost adopted by consensus with only four States voting either 
against or abstaining. '20 
2.1.3: Recent Changes for the Palestinian Delegation at the United Nations 
The status of an entity is clearly affected by the roles it plays, and perhaps more 
accurately, those roles it is legally and politically granted the ability to play. Therefore, 
it is important to also consider the recent changes in the way in which the Palestinian 
representatives are able to participate in the work of the UN. Although there is not yet 
sufficient evidence available to state exactly how these changes will practically affect 
the Palestinian representation at the UN and the PLO, it is necessary to examine the 
Agreement of 26 June 1947 (1988) ICJRep. 12, at para. 58. 
117 See for example the discussion regarding the PLO's relationship with the United States of America in, 
chapter 6 "The PLO and the International Community" of Nassar, The PLO: From Armed Struggle to 
Declaration of Independence. See also section 1.1 in Chapter Two. 
18 United States v The Palestine Liberation Organisations and Others 82 ILR 282, at 299. Appendix A: 
Title 22, United States Code (Foreign Relations) Chapter 61 - Anti-Terrorism - PLO, section 5201 (a). In 
section (a) examples of PLO violence against American citizens and diplomatic agents are cited as 
evidence for the determination of it as a terrorist organisation. 
'" 14 December 1993. 
120 Voting: 155: 3: 1. (Iran, Lebanon and Syria against and Libya abstained - again an example of the 
political groupings within the UN as anti-Israeli States failed to affirm this resolution). 
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changes listed in General Assembly Resolution 250,7th July 1998 121 in order to 
determine how they have affected their status. 122 Such an examination is important in 
assessing the degree to which the Palestinian Representatives' status have varied since 
their initial invitations to participate in the work of the UN. 
Resolution 250 is interesting and crucial both in terms of the Palestinian delegation and 
the concept of observer status. It is crucial to the Palestinian representation since it 
increases the level of its participation and recognises it as being qualitatively different 
from other observer groups at the organisation. It is interesting in relation to the concept 
of observer status because in effect it creates two differing levels of observer; general 
observer and super observer. These differing levels have correspondingly differing 
levels of involvement in UN activity. 
It is also important to consider whether this unprecedented action by the UN can be used 
as a model for other potential future national liberation movements and observers 
claiming a certain level of status in international law. The resolution must be an 
example of the potential status they may aspire to and demonstrates that despite not 
being a full state a reasonable level of participation in a respected and legitimate 
international body is attainable. Resolution 250, 
"Decides to confer upon Palestine, in its capacity as Observer and as contained in the Annex to this 
resolution, additional rights and privileges of participation in the sessions and work of the General 
Assembly and the international conferences convened under the auspices of the Assembly or other organs 
of the United Nations as well as in United Nations conferences. " 
121 General Assembly Resolution 250 (LII), 7 July 1998. (Voting: 124: 4: 10). On the whole this was a 
strong signal that Palestine's new status at the UN was well supported and necessary. This change in status 
had been called for by some members of the United Nations. See for example the statement by Mr 
Chodhury the representative for Bangladesh - GAOR 52nd Session, 58th plenary meeting, 1 December 
1997, at It. 
There is a note from the Secretary-General in relation to the working of resolution 250 at A152/1002,4 
August 1998,, Agenda Item 36. 
However, the voting still followed fairly predictable political lines - the States which voted against the 
resolution were: Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia and USA. 
122 Prior to Resolution 250 the PLO already was able to make oral statements, reply to statements, have 
written statements or documents circulated but was excluded from voting, sponsoring substantive 
proposals, amendments or procedural motions, from raising points of order or challenging rulings made 
by the Chairman. These rights exceeded the rights of other observers - see, "Participation of the PLO in 
the 'Sessions and Work of the UN' Under General Assembly Resolution 3237 (XXIX) - Limits to the 
PLO Entitlement to Observer Status in Subsidiary Organs of Limited Membership - Discretion of Such 
Organs, in the Absence of Instructions to the Contrary from the Establishing Authority, To Decide 
Questions of Participation by Non-Members, Including Participation in Closed Meetings - Extent of 
Observer Participation in the Light of the Practice of Main Committees of the General Assembly", from 
Chapter VI: Selected Legal Opinions of the Secretariats of the UN and Related Intergovernmental 
Organisations, (1980) UNJur. YB, at 188 -189. 
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The Annex to the Resolution then goes on to grant various rights "without prejudice to 
the existing rights, privileges and practice: " The Palestinian representatives are thus 
enabled to participate, 
"in the general debate of the General Assembly"; "have the right of inscription on the list of speakers 
under any agenda items other than Palestinian and Middle East issues at any meeting of the plenary"; have 
"the right of reply"; "the right to raise points of order related to the proceedings on Palestinian and Middle 
East issues"; "the right to co-sponsor draft resolutions and decisions on Palestinian and Middle East 
issues" and "the right to make interventions, with a precursory explanation or the recall of relevant 
General Assembly Resolutions being made only once by the President of the General Assembly at the start 
of each session of the Assembly". 
These rights referred to above, however helpful to the Palestinian cause and inclusive of 
the Palestine representatives, do not by any means place Palestine on an equal footing 
with other member states of the organisation. Indeed the resolution is not silent on this 
issue and makes is abundantly clear that this is not its aim. There is a definite hierarchy 
within the structure of the organisation which is mentioned within the resolution. The 
Annex details the "right of inscription on the list of speakers... " coming "... after the 
last member state on the list of that meeting". It also provides that despite the "right to 
co-sponsor draft resolutions and decisions on Palestine and Middle East issues, such 
resolutions and decisions shall only be put to a vote upon request from a Member State. " 
This hierarchy is perhaps crudely, but effectively illustrated by point seven in the Annex 
which notes, "Seating for Palestine shall be arranged immediately after non-member 
states and before other Observers. " 
The previous sentence, however, also graphically depicts the newly enhanced position 
of the Palestine over and above other Observers and thus also over all other bodies and 
representatives pushing for liberation of people and territory in terms of its international 
status. Actions such as this by the UN are evidence of the success of the PLO as a 
liberation movement and exemplify the distance it has travelled since its inception in 
1964 to the body behind the representation of a "super-observer", which comes second 
only to full member states in large international organisations. Indeed, the "upgrade" 
which Palestine received through this resolution has been hailed as "An essential step 
towards full membership. "123 This statement clearly prefigures the emergence of the 
Palestinian state and thus the non-static nature of the Palestinian representation at the 
123 Press Release, Department of Public Information, United Nations News Coverage Service, New York, 
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UN. Importantly for this thesis it also demonstrates one of the range of responses the 
international community may have towards a non-state entity. Furthermore it reaffirms 
the idea that the label attached to an entity (e. g.: "NLM" or "observer") does not 
necessarily have to define its capacity to act on the international stage. By taking an ad 
hoc and discretionary approach to personality the international community is able to 
vary the capacity of a entity to participate if it wishes. 
The rights and privileges accorded to Palestine in this resolution have already been put 
to use. On 28 September 1998 Yasser Arafat made his first address in the General 
Assembly general debate124 This is quite a milestone for the participation of the 
Palestinian Delegation at the UN since participation by the proclaimed President of the 
PA in General Debate would have been thought unbelievable less than ten years ago. 
Also, the Palestinian delegation has been engaging itself in co-sponsoring drafts 
resolutions125 and the observer for Palestine has also exercised his right of reply126 as a 
result of the additional rights laid down in Resolution 250. 
However, not all resolutions regarding the status of the Palestinian delegation at the UN 
have been successful. Only the year before Resolution 250 was adopted, a draft 
resolution was proposed which would have given Palestine similar rights to a member 
state, with the exception of voting and candidature rights. However, the proposals were 
rejected by 65 votes to 57, with 32 abstentions. 127 This demonstrates that although the 
Palestinian Representation has become a well-represented NLM, an insufficient 
proportion of the international community is willing to grant it rights and duties akin to 
that of a State. 
The grant of observer status is also of utmost importance in relation to the diplomatic 
status of organisations. It provides firm ground on which an organisation such as the 
PLO may be able to build diplomatic ties since no other scenario can give as much 
53rd General Assembly, 18th Meeting (Plenary), GA9456,28 September 1998. 
124 Ibid. 
125 See for example, inter alia, the co-sponsored General Assembly Resolutions L. 49,50 and 51 from the 
73rd and 76th plenary meetings in the 53rd session of the General Assembly. 
126 Press Release, Department of Public Information, United Nations News Coverage Service, New York, 
53rd General Assembly, 74th Meeting (Plenary), GA9520,1 December 1998. 
127 GAOR 52nd Session, 68th plenary meeting, 9 December 1997, at 8- 12. Draft General Assembly 
Resolution L. 53/Rev. 1(LII) and the amendment contained in document A/52/L. 59. 
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access to other actors on the international stage. Furthermore, the access those actors 
also have to information regarding the Palestinian question is automatically heightened. 
In this respect the UN is certainly the Palestinian's most valuable forum for debate and 
publicity. 128 
2.2: Recognition of the Palestinian Representation by States 
Different states may each recognise the Palestinian Representation as falling at various 
points on the scale of possibilities for status. This section aims to examine some of the 
occasions on which individual states have recognised the Palestinian Representation and 
at what level. This will enable a conclusion about exactly how variable the status of the 
Palestinian Representation is to emerge. It is possible that due to the political facets of 
the recognition process it may be that the widest range of recognition of the Palestinian 
Representation is demonstrated by states than by any other type of international actor. 
The political scenario in which the Palestinian Representation operates means that the 
context in which recognition is de facto or de jure accorded can mean that support or 
condemnation is given to the Palestinian Representation through the process of 
recognition or non-recognition. These issues can make it hard to establish the status of 
the Palestinian Representation. However this section will consider the occasions on 
which the Palestinian Representation has been classed as a NLM and as a government of 
a State since these are the two main levels of status which members of the international 
community have chosen to accord in this instance. 
At the inception of the PLO in 1964 there was no real likelihood of achieving any 
similarity to a status of government as it was as a matter of fact much more akin to a 
guerrilla group. Since that time the relationship between representatives of the 
Palestinian people and the states of the world has changed dramatically. 
It has been suggested that the PLO had been exercising governmental authority in many 
areas, such as war situations, extradition and taxation since as long ago as during the 
128 See chapter 8, "The Mobilization of Support at the United Nations Level" in Kirisci, The PLO and 
World Politics. 
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1970s when it can be said that it was in its infancy, particularly regarding the authority 
which it is known to exercise today. 129 Proponents of such ideas provided strong facts 
and arguments as evidence of this, however it is argued that these alone do not amount 
to objective governmental status other than in the context it was accorded, particularly 
as it was in a politically sympathetic scenario. 130 They do nonetheless show that the 
PLO has been building upon its status over a period of time. It is clear at least that at 
that time it exercised power greater than that of other liberation movements and since 
then has gradually increased its status little by little. 131 
The fact that such claims were being made in the 1970s and that the face of the 
Palestinian Representation has changed significantly since then, particularly in the wake 
of the DOP in 1993, demonstrate the evolutionary nature of its status. Indeed, the 
Palestinian Representation's capacity to act and be recognised as a government has not 
remained static during the time it has existed. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, due to the politicisation of the conflict in the Middle East 
where the Palestinian issue has always accompanied the problems associated with a 
non-Muslim state in the region, the Arab States led the way in recognition of the 
Palestinian Representation as a government, 132 whereas Western States have 
traditionally been less keen to make this step and consider it to be an NLM. 133 
2.2.1: Recognition after the 1988 Declaration of Statehood 
On November 15 1988 the Palestinian National Counci1134 took the step of declaring 
the State of Palestine. 135 This momentous event resulted in 95 states recognising the 
129 Kassim, "The PLO's Claim to Status: A Juridical Analysis Under International Law", at 22 - 25. 130 See for example the discussion regarding war situations, extradition and taxation authority in Kassim, 
ibid. 
131 See the conclusion to Part I of the thesis for a discussion of this issue. 
132 See, McLaurin "Me PLO and the Arab Fertile Crescent", at 12. 
133 For example, it has been stated that the PLO is a "national liberation movement" and while "these 
relations, although they are regular and have reached the highest levels... retain a 'formal character, 
different from that of normal relations between States"' - from Re Arafat and Salah (1985) (1988) It. YBIL 
295, also cited in Talmon, Recognition of Governments in International Law, at 150. It should be noted 
that this reference is over a decade old and prior to the DOP and thus the establishment of the PA. 134 The Palestinian National Council considered itself to be a Parliament in Exile and is the highest 
legislative organ of the PLO. It has an Executive Committee which it appoints and it is the driving force 
142 
State of Palestine. 136 Since a government is generally an integral requirement of 
statehood, as discussed above, it can be argued that the states which recognised it also 
implicitly recognised a Palestinian Government in the shape of the Palestinian National 
Council, albeit arguably prematurely. 137 
It is instructive to break down those 95 states into smaller groups in order to examine in 
which areas of the political international community the Declaration received the most 
support. From this it will be possible to tell if the recognition granted was at least in 
part a political gesture. 
Of the 95 states which recognised the State of Palestine 14 were Middle Eastern 
States. 138 This high number, given the size of the area, is not surprising because of the 
traditional Arab support for the Palestinian cause and a dislike of the Israeli agenda. 
Therefore these acts of recognition cannot be seen as impartial or even as necessarily 
stating that Palestine at that time fulfilled all the requirements of Statehood. 139 
A clear example of this is the Omani recognition of Palestine. On 12 December 1988 
the Omani Foreign Ministry formally recognised the State of Palestine. Just over a 
month later on 17 December 1988, Sultan Quabus of Oman was interviewed by a 
Kuwaiti newspaper, (Al-Siyasa). He said that: 
"... the desire to establish the State of Palestine has been declared, but the state itself has not yet been 
established. Hence what has actually taken place was the decision to establish this state ... 
The Palestinian 
brothers have explained to us the nature of recognition which has moral dimensions, so we immediately 
announced our recognition. " 
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Whilst recognition influenced by political or moral issues certainly existed at the time of 
the Declaration of Statehood as demonstrated by the above example, it should not 
automatically be assumed that all recognition was on a purely political platform. 
behind PLO activity. 
135 Palestine National Council, Declaration of Independence. 
136 See Appendix I which lists the 95 states and demonstrates the trend in recognition from Arab, African 
and non-aligned States. They are also listed in, "For the Record: The State of Palestine" (1989) V Pal. 
YBIL 290, at 291- 293. 
137 See above, sections in 1.2 on "States without effective Governments" and "Governments without 
States" 
"$ Bahrain, Democratic Yemen, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen. 
139 See section 1.1 above for discussion on requirements of Statehood. 
140 Cited in Talmon, Recognition of Governments in International Law, at 41- 42. 
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Indeed, some elements of Statehood may have been deemed to exist in sufficient form, 
particularly given that some Middle Eastern States have been treating Palestine as a full 
State for many years prior to the 1988 Declaration. 141 
African States were also keen to recognise the Palestinian State and of the 95 States, 42 
were from the African continent. 142 African States, like Middle Eastern States have 
traditionally been supporters of the Palestinian cause. The fact that many African States 
had to struggle for self determination from colonialism during the last century no doubt 
influences their policy making and this is reflected in the number which recognised 
Palestine in 1988. 
The remaining recognising States were made up of 23 Asian States, '43 8 Eastern 
European, 144 3 Russian '145 
3 Western European 146 and 2 from South America. 147 This 
demonstrates the general political divides within the world in relation to the Palestinian 
situation very well. '48 
A majority of the 95 States recognised the State of Palestine by the end of November 
1988. Indeed of those 95 states which recognised the State of Palestine by the end of 
149 
November 1988 many have full diplomatic relations with Palestine and a Palestinian 
Embassy exists within their State. 150 
141 See Chapter Two on the background to the Palestinian question regarding the existence of the State of 
Palestine in factual terms. With regard to the way in which Middle Eastern States have treated Palestine 
before the 1988 Declaration see discussion above regarding the PLO's governmental style authority and 
also Kassim, "The PLO's Claim to Status: A Juridical Analysis Under International Law", at 22 - 25. 142 Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Comoros, Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea- 
Bissau, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia (SWAPO), Niger, 
Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, 
United Republic of Tanzania, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
143 Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, China, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea, India, Indonesia, Korea (North), Laos People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, 
Maldives, Mauritius, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, People's Republic of Kampuchea, Philippines, Senegal, 
Seychelles, Sri Lanka, Togo, Turkey, Vietnam. 
144 Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, 
Yugoslavia. 
'45 Byelorussian SSR, Ukrainian SSR, USSR. 
46 Austria, Cyprus & Malta -some of the States on the edge of Western Europe. 147 Cuba, Nicaragua. 
148 See Chapter Two and the discussion on the political nature of international opinion on the Palestinian 
Question which occurs at the beginning of this chapter. 
149 68 out of 95 States had recognised by the end of November. Of those 68,25 were African, 19 were 
Asian, 6 were Eastern European, 11 were Middle Eastern, 3 were Russian, 2 were Western European and 
2 were South American. 
150 19 of the early African recognising States host a Palestinian Embassy as do 10 of the Asian States, 6 of 
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Even if the constitutive theory of recognition were held to be a good description of the 
law relating to the creation of states, which it suggested in Chapter One it is not, 95 
states are not sufficient to satisfy the creation of a state through the constitutive method 
as this is nowhere near international consensus. However, it certainly is evidence of a 
significant proportion of the community's weight pushing towards this result. 
Some of the remaining states of the world which were not in the 95 recognising ones did 
not make any move to either recognise or not recognise the declared state, whereas some 
states made a conscious choice not to recognise it. Israel and the United States of 
America being two obvious examples. Given the former's influence on the situation and 
the latter's influence on the international community in general, the effect of such 
opposition should not be underestimated. 
" International activity regarding Palestine beyond the 1988 Declaration 
Following its 1988 Declaration, the PLO decided to act in some respects as a State. It 
sent a communication to Switzerland, 151 stating that it was acceding to the 1949 and 
1977 Geneva Conventions and Protocols. 152 Switzerland then sent a "Note of 
Information" to all the State parties which provided that, 
"Due to the uncertainty within the international community as to the existence or the non-existence of a 
State of Palestine and as long as the issue has not been settled in an appropriate framework, the Swiss 
Government, in its capacity as depository ... is not in a position to decide whether this communication can 
be considered as an instrument of accession in the sense of the relevant provisions of the Conventions and 
their additional Protocols... the unilateral declaration of application of the four Geneva Conventions and 
of the additional Protocol I made on the 7 June 1982 by the Palestine Liberation Organisation remains 
valid. "'s3 
the Eastern European States, all of the Middle Eastern States, I of the Russian States and 1 of the Western 
European States. It should also be noted that some of the early recognising States have a Diplomatic 
Mission rather than an Embassy - for example Austria. However, the African or Middle Eastern States 
which are traditionally very supportive of the Palestinian Cause tend to have an Embassy or nothing, 
suggesting perhaps that lack of an Embassy may be due to lack of Palestinian funds rather than lack of 
recognition. See section 2.2.3 for further discussion of the diplomatic relations of the Palestinian 
Representation. 
'S' The depository State. 
152 See also the discussion regarding these Conventions and Protocols and their relevance to the 
Palestinian question in section 2.7.1 on Conferences below. 
153 Embassy of Switzerland, Note of Information sent to State Parties to the Convention and Protocol, 13 
September 1989, cited in Crawford, "Israel (1948 - 1949) and Palestine (1998 - 1999): Two Studies in 
the Creation of States", at 116 -117. 
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These reservations about the status of Palestine were also reflected in the deferment of 
both UNESCO'54 and the World Health Organisation (WHO)'55 on the issue of whether 
Palestine should be granted membership. The USA had threatened to withhold its 
payments to the WHO if Palestine were to be admitted as a full member -a clear 
example of American opposition to Palestinian Statehood in practice. 156 UNESCO did 
however resolve to allow Palestine the greatest opportunities to participate in the 
organisation's work, without actually going as far as granting the same rights as it would 
a member. 
These examples of the failure of Palestinian attempts to be treated as a State 
demonstrate the fact that not all States responded to the 1988 Declaration positively. 
However the example of UNESCO shows that despite the anti-Palestinian lobby, efforts 
were made to ensure Palestinian participation. Therefore at a practical level, such 
opposition did not necessarily mean that Palestinian Representatives were unable to 
participate to a high degree in the life of the international community. This is 
indicative of the variability of personality which an entity may have at one organisation 
compared with another. The action of UNESCO also suggests that the international 
community is willing to be somewhat flexible in terms of Palestinian participation in 
practice if not formally though the granting of membership. 
It is important to remember that the distinction must be made between political non- 
recognition and non-recognition on legal grounds. 157 It can be argued that political non- 
recognition, since it is discretionary, has very limited effects on the legal situation due to 
the fact that states can assume any political stance they wish at whim. 158 Non- 
recognition in legal terms may be refused as a result of non-fulfilment of one of the 
criteria of statehood. In the same vein, recognition may also be political in that it may 
be granted even if an entity has not truly fulfilled the necessary criteria. In a situation as 
politically sensitive as the Palestinian one it can be hard to differentiate between these 
types of non-recognition, as often political grounds can be disguised as legal grounds in 
154 UNESCO 132 EX/31,29 September 1989 - cited in Crawford, ibid., at 116. 
Iss WHO A42/VR/10,12 May 1989 - cited in Crawford, ibid., at 116. 
156 See Kirgis, "Admission of `Palestine' as a member of a Specialised Agency and Withholding the 
Payment of Assessments in Response" (1990) 84 AJIL 218, regarding the legalities of the American threat 
to withhold payment of assessments to WHO if Palestine was granted membership. 
157 Crawford, Creation of States, at 121. 
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order to give them more weight in international relations and the facts of an individual 
scenario can be twisted to suit either party. '59 
To be sure, non-recognition and opposability does affect the relationship of any entity 
with the non-recognisers/opposers at a bilateral level. However, after the 1988 
Declaration, since the tally of recognising states was 95 - evidence of a huge divide in 
world opinion as to Palestinian statehood - it can be argued that any recognition (or 
otherwise) mainly affected the factual position of the PLO as a government and/or its 
relations with individual states. 
At an international level then Palestine had not objectively actually become a full State 
in international law as it did not possess all the necessary qualities of Statehood and 
even some of those States who recognised it as such did so with political motives. As a 
result of this the status of the PLO had not moved into the category of government in 
international law. In some international organisations and in some relations with 
individual states it was being treated as a government and this increased its objective 
status. However this can not be said to amount to a change in the overall category on 
the scale of possibilities within which it could be deemed to fall. 
As far as the PLO was concerned the large support for its ultimate goal was an 
important political victory for the organisation. 160 Through the 1988 Declaration the 
status of the PLO had thus altered to a limited extent again. The 95 states had in effect 
stated that they at the very least considered that Palestine should become a full state in 
international law in the future or in some cases that it already had. However, other 
states, like Israel and the United States of America had made definite decisions to 
oppose such statehood. 
158 Ibid. 
'59 See Boyle, "Creating the State of Palestine" (1987/88) N Pal. YBIL 15 and Crawford, "The Creation 
of the State of Palestine - Too Much Too Soon? " 1990 1 EJIL 310, as an example of how, even in strict 
legal analysis the given facts can produce extremely different results in law. 
160 Since the 1988 Declaration, many states have gone on to recognise the PLO at least as a legitimate 
representative of the Palestinians. Most significantly Israel and the PLO have signed letters of mutual 
recognition at the time of the signing of the DOP in 1993. The PLO have recognised Israel's right to exist 
in peace and security and Israel recognised the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people - 
(Letters of mutual recognition were signed by each leader on 9 September 1993: Declaration of Principles 
on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (Jerusalem: Israel Information Centre) (1993)). In addition 
whilst there is no clear determination on the part of the Israeli government to Palestinian statehood there is 
a commitment to permanent settlement of the situation based on United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions 242 and 338. (Article 1, DOP) 
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The preceding examples demonstrate that different States responded in different ways to 
the 1988 Declaration, by either recognising, opposing or not responding. However, 
equally importantly, it is also clear that even amongst the 95 recognising States there 
were various intentions behind recognition. Indeed not all recognising States responded 
to the Declaration as quickly as others. Therefore, importantly for the theory asserted in 
Chapter One, the personality of the Palestinian Representation after the 1988 
Declaration continued to be variable even amongst those which traditionally have 
supported Palestinian Statehood. 
2.2.2: After the 1993 Declaration of Principles 
The Declaration of Statehood was made about five years prior to the DOP and thus 
before the inception of the PA. If the PLO was thought of in some circles as a 
government before the DOP (despite some opposition) then it is vital to assess its 
current stature as its functions and status have changed considerably in recent times. '61 
Naturally, one of the important features of the functions of a government is to represent 
its people at an international level. In this respect the Palestinian delegation at the UN 
fulfils this task in a limited manner. When faced with a situation of occupation it is of 
primary importance for a people that their voice is heard in an international setting. 
Admittedly, as discussed in Chapter Two, Israel still controls some aspects of the 
occupied territories' external relations as laid down in the DOP. 162 The Palestinian 
Representation is able to negotiate with overseas governments and international 
organisations on issues relating to economic development, aid, cultural, scientific and 
educational matters. 163 However, under the provisions of the DOP, it is not able to 
161 As noted in the previous footnote the relationship between Israel and the Palestinian representation has 
changed dramatically as a result of the DOP. Notably since the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin (who 
played a leading role in the bringing about of the DOP for a brief but informative tribute to his work in the 
Middle East see Hausman, "Tribute to Yitzhak Rabin" (1996) 37(2) HILJ 521) in 1996 and the change of 
Israeli leader coupled with the disillusionment of the Palestinians with the slow moving peace process, 
Israeli/Palestinian political relations have deteriorated. Nonetheless, the DOP is a benchmark in the 
Palestinian situation and it would be politically very difficult for the Israelis to relinquish their recognition 
of the PLO and the PA as, at the very least, the Palestinian representative. 
162 See section 1.2.4 in Chapter Two. 
163 Gaza-Jericho Agreement, Article VI (2) (b). 
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conduct full foreign relations with other governments. l64 
As mentioned briefly above "... the responsibility of national liberation movements 
recognised by the United Nations is to express the views of the people in their 
respective territories. 165 It does not include conduct of their international relations 
beyond expressing these views. "166 This function is still left to the administering power 
and is therefore a tangible limit on the status of the movements concerned. Indeed, 
certainly legally, and potentially politically (depending on the situation at hand) the 
status and control of the administering power remains unaffected. It can then perhaps 
be questioned exactly what Wilson meant by the phrase, "It does not include conduct of 
their international relations beyond expressing these views. " If, in its narrow sense, this 
means liberation movements are restricted to expressing the views of the people they 
represent regarding the issues surrounding their self determination then it can be argued 
that the current rights and privileges of the Palestine representatives at the UN exceed 
this definition. Suggesting firstly either that Wilson's interpretation is outdated and that 
the potential role for liberation movements has moved on since that time. Or secondly 
that the Palestine representation which grew out of the PLO can no longer be classed 
solely as a liberation movement since it has gone beyond the boundaries which up until 
recently have provided a guideline regarding the kinds of tasks a liberation movement 
would perform. 
As to whether the DOP does lead to an independent government for the Palestinians is 
debatable since in many respects the emerging state of Palestine is still subject to Israeli 
control. 167 For example, the Palestinian economy and political structures are still 
subject to Israeli policy, the Palestinian police force's functions and conduct and the 
structure and elections of the PA itself are "seriously dependent on Israel". 168 Indeed it 
was reported recently that Israel owes the PA a large amount of money (up to half of its 
annual budget) and that this is affecting the PA's ability to perform its tasks. 169 Such 
financial dependence does not hark of independence. 
164 Foreign relations is also an area in which Israel has retained competence under the DOP; Annex If, 
Article 3 (b). 
165 See section 2.1.1. 
166 Wilson, International Law and the Use of Force by National Liberation Movements, at 122. 167 See, Rishmawi, "Features of the Administration of Justice Under Palestinian Rule" (1994) 53 Rev. Int. 
Comm. Jur. 25. 
168 Ibid., at 26. 
169 BBC I O'clock News Report, 10 July 2001. 
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Therefore, the PA is not a fully autonomous government within the criteria specified in 
Section 1.2 since it does not exercise effective control throughout the territory it lays 
claims to. 170 However, arguably one of the reasons the Palestinian Representation has 
had a high level of success in terms of international recognition is because of the 
existence of the unfulfilled right to self determination of the Palestinians. It was 
submitted in Section 1.2 that the criteria of effectiveness can sometimes be lower if the 
emerging government is acting in a self determination situation. 171 Palestinian claims to 
statehood and the legitimacy of the PLO as Palestinian Representatives have been 
considered in Chapter Two, but are equally important here. This is the case since if it 
can be shown that the concept of a Palestinian state is viable in international law then 
there is no reason why lack of recognition of a Palestinian state should debar it from 
being considered to have a government. 
It may be that the State of Palestine does exist in all elements save that of recognition, 172 
and that the 
"... actual creation of the state of Palestine could develop a universal consensus among all states of the 
international community that the Palestinian people are entitled to implement their international legal right 
of self-determination in the Occupied Territories and that Israeli occupation forces must withdraw. s173 
However, this has been refuted and it has even been denied that the Palestinian situation 
is one of self determination, let alone one of Palestinian statehood, 174 because arguably 
the situation relates to the issue of a non-Muslim state in the region of the Middle 
170 However arguably one of the reasons the Palestinian Representation has had a high level of success in 
terms of international recognition is because of the existence of the unfulfilled right to self determination 
of the Palestinians. 
i" Also in section 3.2 in Chapter One the importance of the quality of the claim to self determination was 
considered. 
172 Boyle, "Creating the State of Palestine". 
73 Ibid., at 42 - 43. 174 Crawford responds to Boyle's article, arguing that his claims are "weak and unconvincing" on the 
grounds inter alia of lack of "regard to some of the post-1945 developments" and a twisting of facts to fit 
within the criteria laid down in the Montevideo Convention rather than in relation to self determination as 
Halberstam suggests (Halberstam, `Nationalism and the Right to Self Determination: The Arab Israeli 
Conflict"): Crawford, "The Creation of the State of Palestine - Too Much to Soon", at 313. See also 
Kirgis who does raise this as an issue in relation to Palestine seeking membership of the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) after its 1988 Declaration of Independence and the subsequent United States threat 
to withhold its assessed dues if the it was admitted. He claims that however the territory or population of 
"Palestine" is defined the population has never been under the control of the PLO. It can be submitted 
that the situation in Palestine is now different on both counts as a result of the 1993 DOP and the 
establishment of the PA, as opposed to at the time when Kirgis wrote the article - Kirgis, "Admission of 
`Palestine' as a member of a specialised agency and withholding the payment of assessments in 
response. ", at 220. 
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East. 175 Whilst this is a valid political consideration it is becoming less so as relations 
between Israel and other Arab States improve. Furthermore, such views would hardly 
propound the concept of the PLO or the PA as a government. It should be remembered, 
however that whilst the concept of Palestinian government may potentially be affected 
by lack of Palestinian statehood, the same is not true in reverse. Although generally 
effective government is a prerequisite for statehood if a state has been held to exist, 
changes of government or debates as to the control of the government in power over the 
territory and people, do not necessarily negate the existence of the state itself as a 
separate entity in international law. 
With this in mind it is reasonable to submit that vis-a vis some states the PA is at the 
very bottom of the scale of governments within the illustrated scale of possibilities 
given at the start of this chapter. In relation to this it is interesting to consider what the 
95 States which recognised the State of Palestine have done in the light of the DOP, 
since the mere existence of the DOP arguably reaffirms the fact that Palestine has not 
achieved full statehood in international law. As Crawford rightly states it is a 
misrepresentation of the situation ".. to claim that one party already has that for which it 
s176 is striving (if so, why strive? ). 
Such an analysis is not easy to achieve, given that States were not required to respond 
specifically to the DOP in the same way as they were if they wanted to respond 
positively to the 1988 Declaration. However, it is possible to draw some conclusions 
about this if the letters written to States, (which are reproduced and analysed in 
appendix III) are considered. '77 
" Individual State responses to the question of the status of the PLO posed in a 
information gathering exercise. 
Fairly early on in conducting the research for this thesis a letter was written to each State 
which had an embassy in either London or Paris in order to establish what status 
175 See for example, Halberstam, "Nationalism and the Right to Self Determination: The Arab Israeli 
Conflict". 
176 Crawford, "Israel (1948 - 1949) and Palestine (1998 - 1999): Two Studies in the Creation of States", 
at 122. 
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individual states considered the PLO to have, when they considered it had achieved this 
status and also whether in their opinion it was the legitimate representative of the 
Palestinian people. '78 There is a copy of the letter I wrote, a copy of each answer 
received and a more detailed analysis of the letters in Appendix III which should be 
referred to for further information. 179 However overall, it is interesting to note that 24 of 
the 56 replies to the letters were from States which had already recognised the State of 
Palestine in 1988.180 
Some of the States wrote in their letters that they see the PLO as a government of an 
emerging State. 181 Zimbabwe stated that it was a government in exile and 3 others stated 
that Palestine was recognised as a State, from which it can be assumed that the 
Palestinian Representation is classed as its government. 182 
The majority of the other respondents to my letters which also recognised Palestine in 
1988 stated that they considered the PLO to be either a national liberation movement or 
the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. 183 This is obviously 
recognition which is substantially different to recognition as a government. However 
since the majority of these States have a Palestinian Embassy it is possible that in some 
respects the Palestinian Representation is treated in a similar way a government would 
be even if it is not formally recognised as such. 184 
These examples show that some States have clearly modified their responses to the 
Palestinian Representatives at a nominal level but not at a practical one. Therefore the 
DOP and the implicit admission that Palestine is not a fully fledged State did not 
change the relationship of the Palestinian Representation with individual States at a 
practical level or decreased in any way its international participation. It should also be 
177 See Appendix III for discussion of the content and full responses to the letters. 
178 A copy of this letter is provided in Appendix III, as are copies of the replies received from States. 
179 It is particularly interesting to consider the analysis there which takes into account political state 
groupings and their responses to the Palestinian question as it builds upon some of the work in Chapter 
Two regarding politics and the part of this chapter regarding individual state's responses. 
180 Algeria, Austria, Bangladesh, Brunei, Burundi, Cambodia, Cyprus, Hungary, Indonesia, Korea, 
Lebanon, Madagascar, Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Nepal, Philippines, Poland, Slovak Republic, Sudan, 
China, Tanzania, Ukraine, Zimbabwe. 
181 Algeria & Philippines. 
'82 Cambodia, China, Mauritius. 
183 Bangladesh, Brunei, Burundi, Hungary, Indonesia, Korea, Madagascar, Maldives (recognised as 
"legitimate representative"), Malta, Slovak Republic, Sudan, Tanzania, Ukraine. 
184 See following section on diplomatic recognition for examples of States which have a Palestinian 
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mentioned that as some States recognised Palestine in 1988 in order to demonstrate a 
political stance on the issue and to offer moral support to the Palestinian cause that they 
may not have considered the PLO to be a full government at that stage. 185 Therefore 
the DOP does not necessarily require them to alter their perception of the precise status 
of the Palestinian Representation. 
However, this does not fully answer the question as to whether the DOP leads to an 
independent Palestinian Government? A sustainable argument can be made that the 
DOP places the government of Israel and the PLO as the primary parties to the 
agreement as two equal subjects in international law. In support of this are the letters 
of explicit mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO and the fact that the 
Declaration recognises the right of the Palestinian people to "govern themselves". 186 
Surely, "the consequence of recognising the Palestinian people and its right to govern 
itself in the West Bank and Gaza is recognition of the principle of the right of this 
people to establish a state in these areas if it so desires. "' 87 
However, whilst the DOP has created a greater element of equality between the two 
parties, on the international stage simple recognition by a neighbouring state cannot alter 
the status of an entire organisation so dramatically in international law. Although in the 
future, if the climate is right, it is very likely that the PA will become a fully fledged 
government of a full state, the DOP alone does not lead to such a conclusion as it gives 
no mention of Palestinian sovereignty over the West Bank or Gaza Strip. 
Furthermore, at the time of the DOP the PLO were clearly the weaker side in the 
negotiations. The PLO may have been accepted by the Israeli government as an equal 
party for the purposes of negotiations at an operational level, however the text of the 
Declaration demonstrates that in reality this is far from the truth. The DOP refers to the 
Palestinian negotiators as the "PLO Team" whilst the Israelis are "the Government of 
the State of Israel"! 88 
Embassy. 
iss See example of Oman in previous section. 
iah Article III (1), DOP cited in Benvenisti, "The Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles: A 
Framework for Future Settlement" (1993) 4 EJIL 542, at 544. 
197 Ibid. 
188 DOP, Preamble. See also Falk's argument on this issue: Falk, "Some International Law implications 
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It can be seen then that the Palestinian Representation has a good number of 
governmental style features, particularly when the combination of the PLO and the PA 
are taken together as the "government". However, it is not a full government in 
international law and is not sufficiently recognised as such, even by those States which 
had previously recognised the State of Palestine. Recognition post DOP therefore is 
variable depending on who or what is doing the recognising and can range from 
considering the Palestinian Representation as a full government in international law'89 
to a national liberation movement which is a legitimate representative of the 
Palestinians. ' 90 
The key occurrence post DOP is not necessarily the change in attitudes of Palestinian 
supporters but in opposers. This is evidenced by the acceptance of Israel and the USA 
of the PLO presence at the negotiating table and the mutual Israeli/PLO recognition. It is 
clear that the DOP was a milestone for the Palestinian Representation's status in terms 
of vital bilateral relationships which have the influence to potentially further help 
change its status. 
2.2.3: The Diplomatic Relations of the Palestinian Representation 
The PLO and the PA have established a good diplomatic network outside the UN with 
individual states since their representation extends beyond international organisations, 
conferences and other fora. In 1975, only just after their acceptance at the UN, the PLO 
had 57 Information Offices. Not all of these offices had full diplomatic status, since 
some were in states which did not recognise the PLO, however they all assisted in 
increasing awareness of the Palestinian question. 191 They can be regionally categorised 
as being 
"17 in the Middle East; 11 in Africa; 10 in Asia; 8 in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union; 7 in Western 
Europe; and 4 in the Americas. "I92 
of the Oslo/Cairo Framework for the PLO/Israeli Peace Process" (1994/95) VIII Pal. YBIL 19, at 28. 
189 E. g.: Poland - see letter from Poland in Appendix III. 10 E. g.: Maldives - see letter from the Maldives in Appendix III. 19' Burke, International Recognition of a Non-State Nation, at 90 - 91. See also, Silverburg, "The PLO in 
the United Nations", at 369. 
192 Burke, ibid., at 90. See also, Silverburg, ibid. 
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The level of Palestinian diplomatic representation has increased since that time. Whilst 
the political nature of some of the geographical areas given above have changed 
somewhat, the same regions will be used to demonstrate the changing nature of political 
acceptance of the PLO by individual states. 193 
There are currently'94 15 in the Middle East'95; 20 in Africa196; 12 in Asia (including 
Australasia)' 97; 11 in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union' 98; 17 in Western 
Europe' 99; and 10 in the Americas. 200 There is clearly now much greater acceptance of 
the PLO by both Western European and American governments. This is surely 
indicative of the changing nature of the Palestinian representation in the occupied 
territories themselves and at an international level. 
Indeed, most States which recognised the State of Palestine in 1988 after the Declaration 
of Independence have elevated the PLO office in their State to an Embassy. An clear 
example of this can be found in the action of the Soviet Union in 1990. Edvuard 
Shevardnadze, the Soviet Foreign Minister stated that the Soviet Union had "consented 
to let the PLO `reorganise' its Mission in Moscow into the embassy of the State of 
Palestine in the Soviet Union. "201 
For a small, financially limited body like the PLO this is impressive and demonstrates 
both its enthusiasm for building diplomatic ties and its acceptance by the international 
community at a high level, thus positively impacting on its status. 
193 For example, although the political make-up of Eastern Europe has changed and the Soviet Union has 
been dismantled the states which were part of this grouping will still be considered part of it for the 
purposes of this example. 
194 This information was provided by the Palestinian General Delegation in London (12 October 1998) 
195 All of which are embassies - Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia (Jeddah & Riyadh), Syria, United Arab Emirates, Yemen. 
196 All of which are embassies - Algeria, Congo, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mali, 
Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
197 10 of which are embassies - Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri 
Lanka, Vietnam, 1 is an embassy with a non-resident Ambassador - Philippines and 1 is a General 
Delegation - Australia. 198 9 of which are embassies - Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Khazakstan, Poland, Russia, 
Turkey, Uzbekistan, Yugoslavia and 1 is a General Delegation - Romania. 1" 2 of which are embassies, Cyprus, Greece; 14 are General Delegations - Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK; and 1 
is a Diplomatic Mission - Austria. 200 3 of which are embassies - Cuba, Mexico, Nicaragua; 4 are General Delegations - Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Columbia; I is a Diplomatic Mission - Chile; and 2 are Information Offices - Peru, USA . 201 Washington Post 11 January 1990 Sec. A., 28, cited in Talmon, Recognition of Governments in 
International Law, at 158, footnote 236. 
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In the past some States which do not consider that Palestine is entitled to full diplomatic 
status along with all the privileges and immunities it brings nevertheless allow it to 
benefit by letting Palestinian Representatives participate as members of diplomatic 
missions of third states. For example, in Italy, the Foreign Ministry stated that the PLO 
Office established in 1974 in Rome, 
"has not been recognised as having a diplomatic status in the strict sense but, in practice, it has been 
arranged in such a way that the directors of the office have been allowed to enjoy such status, allowing 
them to be accredited by one of the Arab embassies located in the capital among the members of its own 
staff "202 
This demonstrates that in reality some states will give practical or de facto rights or 
privileges to an entity even though formal recognition would not normally be accorded. 
This means that States can enable the Palestinian Representation (or other non-state 
entities) to take an active role in the international community without prejudicing their 
own international relations policies. It also suggests that the assertions made in Chapter 
One regarding the fact that states do not necessarily consider themselves bound in 
practice to adhere by decisions as to formal recognition of an entity are correct. 
Reinforcing the assertions that the label attached to an entity can vary from the capacity 
in which it acts in practice in international life. 
Overall however, it is clear that over the last 25 years the number of Palestinian Offices 
has increased throughout the world. There is therefore no doubt that the status of the 
Palestinian Representation has developed, however the fact that some States have an 
Information Office whilst others encourage an Embassy once again demonstrates the 
varied status which the Palestinian Representation is accorded throughout the 
international community. 
2.3: Arab Recognition of the Palestinian Representation 
The varying degrees of acceptance the Palestinian representation has received from 
different political groupings within the international community is evident when 
202 Re Arafat and Salah (1985): (1988) 71t. YBIL 295, at 296 -7 cited in Talmon, ibid., at 158, footnote 
237. This style of representation was used on many occasions by the provisional government setup by the 
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examples of recognition by sympathetic Arab groups are examined. 203 The PLO was 
recognised by all the Arab States (which included Jordan) as the sole legitimate 
representative of the Palestinians at the Rabat Summit Conference in 1974, not 
surprisingly, before any other large groups of states had taken this step. 204 
The Arab States have thus led the way in terms of recognition over the years. For 
example, the Palestinian delegation at the UN has been the chairman of the Arab Group 
of states at the UN205 -a post which in most groups would be filled by a Member State. 
After the Palestinian National Council's Declaration of the State of Palestine in 1988 the 
states of the Middle East were some of the first to extend formal recognition. 206 The 
vast majority did so within the first couple of days, which demonstrates the support 
which the Arab States have given at a political level for the existence of a Palestinian 
State. 207 
Palestine has been admitted as a full member of the League of Arab States which is 
evidence of a high level of status within the organisation and can be used as evidence of 
its status in international law. 208 When the Arab States recognised the PLO's 
representation of the Palestinian people in this manner it was accompanied by 
acceptance of certain powers of administration like diplomatic immunity, extradition, 
guarantees, loans, military agreements and taxation. 209 This style of acceptance of 
Palestinian statehood is certainly far from universal. However, it indicates that the 
status of the Palestinian Representation is not universally the same as a state due to its 
variability, in the sense that it is of a much higher level in relation to certain bodies or 
groups of states than others. However, given the political context in which such 
FLN in Algeria when States were not keen to damage their relationship with the colonial state - France. 
203 For examination of the political relationship between Arab States and the Palestinian Representation 
see the following books: chapter 5 "The Arab Governmental Level" from Kirisci, The PLO and World 
Politics; chapter 4 "Me PLO and Arab State Relations" from Lähteenmäki, The PLO and Its 
International Position; chapter 5 "The PLO and the Arab States" from Nassar, The PLO: From Armed 
Struggle to Declaration of Independence and McLaurin "The PLO and the Arab Fertile Crescent". 
204 Burke, International Recognition of a Non-State Nation, at 73. 
205 S/19951376 (A/50/176) - Letter of 8th May from Palestine as Chairman of Arab Group at the UN for 
May 1995 transmits Resolution 5487, "The Issue of Jerusalem", adopted by the Council of the League of 
Arab states at its extraordinary session, 6 May 1995. 
206 See Appendix II. 
207 With the exception of Iran who waited until 4 February 1989. See Appendix II for precise dates for 
each State. 
208 The Arab League Council accepted Palestine, as represented by the PLO, as a full member of the 
League with particular competence for questions concerning Palestine - 9th September 1976. 
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recognition is accorded, the implicit political angle to all recognition decisions regarding 
Palestine is underlined. 
The Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development admitted the PLO as Palestinian 
representative to the Board of Governors as a full member in 1976210 Then later that 
same year the Board allowed the PLO to guarantee loans given in order to fund projects 
within the area of Palestine. This was made possible by virtue of Article 12 of the initial 
agreement which has set up the Fund. The interesting point to note is that Article 12 
states that guarantees may be given by the "Government" of the state in question and 
that therefore the PLO was de facto recognised as the government of Palestine through 
this Decree. 11 The PLO, even at this stage, was enabled by the other Arab States to 
exercise "authority almost reminiscent to that of an established government. , 212 When 
this is compared with the more far limited acceptance of the PLO within Western States 
(as discussed above) the variability of questions of status and the range of possible 
responses to claims of status is reaffirmed. 
2.4: European Union Recognition of the Palestinian Representation 
The PLO was first specifically mentioned by the major European leaders in June 1980. 
The nine European Economic Community (EEC - as it was then) Heads of Government 
gave a unanimous declaration which favoured the "recognition of the legitimate rights 
of the Palestinian people". 
213 Furthermore they seemed keen to admit that the PLO 
would participate in the process of achieving those rights. Margaret Thatcher, the then 
British Prime Minister stated that the Venice Agreement, "accepts the PLO as one of the 
participants that must be involved in the talks. s214 Although, the PLO did not accept 
this limited recognition graciously, this does not change the fact that the Venice 
209 See Salmon, "Declaration of the State of Palestine" (1989) V Pal. YBIL 48, at 69. 
210 Decree No. 4 1976: See Kassim, "Me PLO's Claim to Status: A Juridical Analysis Under 
International Law", at 21. 
21' Ibid. It should also be noted that some academics state that de facto recognition should have almost as 
much influence as de jure since it is often very highly regarded in courts where recognition is an element 
of a- case: Brownlie, "Recognition in Theory and Practice", at 207. 
212 Kassim, "The PLO's Claim to Status: A Juridical Analysis Under International Law", at 19. 
213 Venice Declaration, June 13 1980. 
214 cited in Friedlander, "The PLO and the Rule of Law: A Reply to Dr Anis Kassim" (1981) 10 
DenverJILP 221, at 222. 
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Declaration endorsed a new line of European policy regarding the Palestinian 
situation. 215 
Ever since the time of the Venice Declaration the relationship between the European 
Union (EU) and the PLO and now the PA has continued to grow. The Commission of 
the EU stated that the "Goal of EU assistance to the Palestinian people of the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip should be to support Palestinian political, institutional and 
economic empowerment. "216 The term "empowerment" is important in that it suggests 
that the EU wants to assist the Palestinians to help themselves and recognises their 
ability to do so through political, institutional and economic means. This is once again a 
good example of the changing nature of the Palestinian status and the international 
community's recognition of this fact. The responses of the international community 
thus are not limited by the variable nature of personality over a period of time. 
The EC started to provide direct support to Palestinian institutions in the West Bank and 
Gaza in 1987 in order to facilitate this "empowerment" and after the first PLO- Israeli 
Interim Agreement of May 1994 which established the PA, much support has been 
channelled specifically towards the PA. 
Such action certainly impliedly recognises the PLO and the PA as representatives of the 
Palestinians since it is an absurdity to suggest the a body can receive such assistance 
without actually existing. Nonetheless, the European Union has generally been fairly 
careful in the wording of statements and has thereby hedged the issue of the precise 
status of the Palestinian Representation. However, this equivocal nature is also 
evidence of a type of response on the scale of possibilities. It suggests that parts of the 
international community are willing to be flexible and allow Palestinian Representatives 
to act on the international stage without necessarily according them a specific degree of 
status. This in itself indicates that an entity's ability to participate in international life is 
as much (if not more) affected by de facto practice as de jure recognition. 
215 ibid. 
216 Communication from the Commission to Council and Parliament on Future European Union Economic 
Assistance to the West Bank and Gaza Strip" October 1995: Found at 
http: //europa. eu. int/en/comm/dgib/en/cisjoren. htm 
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However even post-DOP the EU did not specifically recognise the Palestinian 
Representation as having full legitimacy since it pledged to assist in the Palestinian 
elections because "the democratic legitimacy of the PA is the central piece for 
Palestinian political empowerment. "217 
Significantly for the PA, the EU invited it to participate in the Euro-Mediterranean 
Ministerial Barcelona Conference of November 1995 as a full partner. The conference 
marked the launching of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership which aims towards 
establishing a free-trade area. Participation as a full member in such conferences, 
particularly those organised by a respected and powerful predominantly Western 
European organisation is clearly a leap forward for the Palestinian representation, and 
both politically and in terms of its growing factual status. Indeed such the effects of 
such participation should not be underestimated. 
As a result of the Barcelona Conference the Commission adopted a recommendation for 
Decision on 17 July 1996 which authorised the Commission to negotiate on the 
Community's behalf with the PLO (representing the PA). 218 The negotiations led to a 
Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement with the PLO on behalf of the PA 
which came into force on Ist July 1997.219 The interim agreement which was 
concluded for an interim period of 5 years, pending a conclusion to the Euro- 
Mediterranean Association Agreement, includes a wide range of economic and 
commercial relations between the EU and the PA and defines the stages which will lead 
to the full liberalisation of trade between the EU and the Palestinian territories. 
Furthermore, the PLO and the EU also issued a joint statement, which was signed at the 
same time as the interim agreement, which sets up regular political dialogue between the 
two parties. 220 
This kind of activity is good evidence of the Palestinian Representation fulfilling the 
usual capacity within which a government would act in a particular sphere. This move 
on the part of the EU, despite not being explicit recognition of the Palestinian 
Representation as a government, is particularly important because it has occurred in a 
217 Ibid. 
218 EUBulletin 7/8 - 1996. Mediterranean and Middle East (13/17). Point 1.4.102. 
Z" Euro-Mediterranean interim association agreement with the PLO, Document 297AO716 (01). Official 
Journal of the EU No. L 187,16 July 1997,3 - 135. 
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traditionally less politically sympathetic context and thus is a good indication that at 
least some of the legal criteria regarding a government's administrative effectiveness 
and capacity to enter into relations with other bodies have been fulfilled. 
The Barcelona Conference and Euro-Mediterranean Association interim Agreement 
show that for the purposes of making trade and economic agreements the EU will treat 
Palestinian Representatives as a government and involve it in negotiating. This is 
particularly important given that the EU has recently reaffirmed "the continuing and 
unqualified Palestinian right to self determination... " but has for the first time stated 
that this should include "the option of a State" and that the Union "looks forward to the 
early fulfilment of this right. P%221 
This statement suggests that although the EU has still not specifically stated what it 
recognises the Palestinian Representatives as, there is political support for the 
emergence of a state. This coupled with the practice of treating Palestinian 
Representatives as a government in spheres relevant to the EU and to any future 
government of Palestine could be interpreted to suggest that the EU considers there to 
be an emerging government within Palestine which requires a reasonable level of 
participation in international affairs which affect its interests. 
At the Berlin Summit the EU went on to state that it is ".. convinced that the creation of 
a democratic, viable and peaceful sovereign Palestinian State on the basis of existing 
agreements and through negotiations would be the best guarantee of Israel's security and 
Israel's acceptance as an equal partner in the region. s222 This support for the Palestinian 
cause from a traditionally less supportive, yet influential, region of the world was an 
important political victory for the cause for Palestinian statehood. 223 
The EU thus certainly considers the current Palestinian Representation as the legitimate 
representative of the Palestinians, but has not specifically stated at what level it 
220 EUBulletin 1/2-1997, point 1.3.98. 
221 "Statement on the Middle East Peace Process" European Union Summit, Berlin, 25 March 1999. 
222 Ibid. 
223 It is interesting to note that the EU has generally showed its willingness to support the PA, the PLO and 
the peace process in general through actions as well as words. In Summer 1997 the EU sent a Council and 
Commission delegation led by the President of the Council, Mr Jacques Poos to the Middle East to 
confirm the support for peace. The delegation met various Heads of State and Foreign Ministers from the 
region including representatives from the PA. 
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recognises the Palestinian Representation. However, the fact that it is willing to 
negotiate with the Palestinian Representatives in a sphere normally reserved for 
governments (economic and trading relations) and that it has stated its "readiness" to 
consider recognition of Palestinian statehood suggests that on the scale of possibilities 
the EU, at least in some areas, treats the Palestinian Representation as a government of 
an emerging state or a liberation movement able to participate at the highest levels. 
Furthermore, there does not appear to currently be any reason why the EU/Palestinian 
relationship should not be built upon in the future given the progressive way it has 
evolved in recent years. 
2.5: The OAU and recognition of the Palestinian Representation 
The Organisation for African Unity (OAU) is an international regional organisation 
which from time to time recognises liberation movements and has co-operated with the 
UN in this regard. 224 As a basic guideline, the OAU uses the criteria of effectiveness of 
the struggle of the movement in question but also looks particularly at the level of 
support which it has accrued in order to determine whether it deserves recognition by 
the organisation. 225 
The OAU has been an extremely influential body in terms of raising the profile of 
NLMs generally and has provided both financial and diplomatic assistance to many of 
the African groups in particular. 226 As discussed above, the effect that its recognition 
had on the process of the granting of observer status at the UN was crucial for many 
groups. Such recognition often marked the turning point for the internationalisation of 
liberation conflicts and on many occasions was a precursor to independence. 
However, in such a politically emotive area as self determination and liberation it would 
be churlish to suggest that political and ideological factors do not also play a role. For 
example, in the mid-1970s there was a strong call for the Polisario movement in 
Western Sahara to be recognised by the OAU, however Morocco and Mauritania 
ua See section 2.1 on United Nations Recognition above. 
Ibid. 226 The OAU does not currently recognise any national liberation movements. 
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threatened to leave the organisation if this call was realised. At the expense of Polisario, 
their threats were heeded. 227 
The example given above is not intended to suggest that the OAU is any more 
susceptible to political considerations than any other regional organisation, it is merely 
provided to show that the recognition of NLMs does not occur in a vacuum and that the 
prevailing political climate can greatly influence their success. 
Given the trends in the OAU to offer recognition to NLMs it is instructive to consider 
how it has responded to the Palestinian Representation. The regional organisation 
which covers the area in which the PLO and the PA operate is clearly the Arab League, 
however the OAU has also established a good relationship with the Palestinian 
representation and been sympathetic to the situation in the occupied territories. 
The OAU has never extended formal recognition to the PLO or the PA, since it is OAU 
policy that declarations of recognition to states and governments should be carried out 
by "Member States in their individual capacities as a matter of national policy. s228 It 
can be seen from the list of States in Appendix II that many of the recognising States 
after the 1988 Palestinian Declaration of Statehood229 were African members of the 
OAU, demonstrating African support for the newly declared state of Palestine. 230 
Yasser Arafat has, on a number of occasions, attended OAU Summit meetings as an 
invited guest. However this is only evidence of the strong relationship which has been 
developed between the two bodies, not of any recognition or status with the OAU itself. 
However, the Palestinian representation has never requested any form of observer status 
within the OAU so it is difficult to ascertain exactly how the OAU views its capacity to 
become an observer or member since no specific moves have been made by either body 
to clarify this. 
227 Shaw, "The International Status of National Liberation Movements", at 23. 
u$ Letter from Professor T. Maluwa, Legal Counsel and Head of Legal Division, OAU 24 November 
1998. 
229 Palestinian National Council Declaration of Independence. 
2'0 See Appendix II. 
163 
Nonetheless, it is possible to examine resolutions adopted by the organisation in order to 
attempt to establish where on the scale of possibilities for status in international law the 
Palestinian representation may be considered to be by the OAU. 
At the 62nd ordinary session in Addis Ababa (21 - 23 June 1995) the Council of 
Ministers of the OAU reaffirmed "the legitimacy of the struggle being waged by the 
Palestinian people under the leadership of the PLO, their sole legitimate 
representative. ..,, 
23 1 This is a clear statement as to the legitimacy of the PLO which 
suggests that it could, as a minimum be classed as the legitimate representative of the 
Palestinians or maybe a NLM (assuming other criteria, discussed above had also been 
fulfilled). 232 However, the resolution goes further than this. In paragraph 6 the 
resolution refers to the "PLO and its National Palestinian Authority and the interim 
Palestinian government" and to the "Palestinian national economy". 233 Such 
terminology is at least indicative of a pro-Palestinian statehood stance. The use of the 
word "national" suggests the existence of a state or at least support for the emergence of 
a state. Also the fact that the PA is referred to as an "interim government" indicates that 
the concept of a full government in time is not contrary to the stance of individual 
Member States. 
It can thus be shown that the OAU, whilst having not made a specific determination on 
the status of the PLO and the PA is an extremely sympathetic forum for discussion of 
the Palestinian situation. Therefore, given the OAU support for African liberation 
movements and its support for the PLO and PA in its resolutions there is clearly strong 
evidence that the OAU objectively class the Palestinian Representation as falling at least 
within the category of NLM on the scale of possibilities. Indeed, if an international 
organisation can only express the views of the sum of its members then given the 
African States responses to Palestinian Statehood, the Palestinian Representation may 
even be classed higher on the scale - perhaps as a government. 
However, given the OAU membership, which in section 2.2 were shown to be in favour 
of Palestinian statehood through their responses to the 1988 Declaration of 
Independence, overall support for the Palestinian cause is not surprising. Since OAU 
CM/Res. 1590 (LXII). Resolution on the Question of Palestine, preambular para. 3. 
232 See section 1.3 above. 
233 CMIRes. 1590 (LXII). Resolution on the Question of Palestine, para. 6. 
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policy is to leave recognition decisions to individual member States, the actions of the 
OAU in expressing support for the Palestinian Representatives is at the highest level 
possible, without actually breaching this policy and formally granting recognition. 
2.6: The Palestinian Representation and Other Groups and Bodies 
It is also instructive to consider the other, less well-known examples of bodies where the 
Palestinian Representation is allowed to participate, or has been supported. This will 
add to the broad picture of the Palestinian Representation's participation in international 
life. 
The large number and range of groups which support the Palestinian cause was ably 
demonstrated by the various statements at the 242nd Meeting of the United Nations 
Committee on the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, on 30 November 1998, 
the annual observance of International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People. 234 
Statements of support were read by representatives of the Committee on the Inalienable 
Rights of the Palestinian People, the General Assembly, the Deputy Secretary-General, 
the President of the Security Council, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, the 
Movement of Non-aligned Countries, League of Arab States, the International Co- 
ordinating Committee of Non-Governmental Organisations on the Question of Palestine 
and the Chairman of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices affecting the 
Human Rights of the Palestinian People. 35 
The Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee (AALCC) is an example of an inter- 
governmental body which has accorded the Palestinian Representation a high level of 
status in its organisation. Membership of the AALCC is only open to Governments in 
Asia or Africa. The AALCC Secretariat received a request from the State of Palestine 
for membership in December 1989, about a year after their Declaration of Independence 
in 1988. Since membership is accepted unless one third of Member States object, and in 
the case of Palestine only one member did object on the grounds that it did not 
234 General Assembly Resolution 40B (XXXII), December 1977 called for the annual observance of this 
day of solidarity. 
2s Committee on inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, 242nd Meeting. GA/PAIJ788, Press 
Release, Department of Public Information, News Coverage Service, New York, 30 November 1998. 
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recognise Palestine as a state, "Palestine was duly admitted as a participating state on 
25th January 1990. "236 
The PLO is also a full member of the Group of 77, the Non-aligned Movement, the 
Group of Asian States at the UN, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, the 
Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia. 237 As these groups also only admit 
States for membership, this is a good example of the Palestinian Representation being 
treated like a government of a State. This means that in all these spheres the Palestinian 
Representation would be classed in the category of "government" on the scale of 
possibilities for status. When compared with the lesser degrees of recognition by 
Western States or organisations it can be seen that the status of Palestine and its 
representatives is variable depending upon the context in which it is operating. 
It should once again be remembered that on the whole the non-aligned States, the 
African States and the Islamic States238 are politically supportive of the concept of a 
Palestinian State and thus much more politically inclined to make a gesture such as 
allowing full Palestinian participation in their organisation. Therefore this treatment 
cannot necessarily be seen as impartial. However, there is no doubt that it impacts on 
the role which the Palestinian Representation is able to play on the world stage. Indeed, 
even if the member States of the above organisations declared that they admitted the 
Palestinian Representation in order to make a political stance, it would still be that as a 
matter of fact the Palestinian Representatives were able to act in the manner of a 
government within those spheres and this could be taken as evidence of fulfilment of 
some of the criteria for status. 
This kind of political support for Palestine is important from a legal point of view as it 
provides factual evidence of the way in which Palestinian Representatives have been 
received within the international community. The fact that many of the same States, (or 
at least States from the same political groupings), belong to the international 
26 Information and quotation taken from a letter from Tang Chenyuan, Secretary General of the AALCC, 
dated 26 November 1998. It is not clear from his correspondence which State objected. 
2" Cited in the Final Declaration of the 11th Conference of the Heads of State or Government of the 
Movement of Non-aligned Countries, held at Cartagena, Columbia from 18 - 20 October 1995, para. 134. 238 At a Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Islamic Countries held in Libya in March 1973 the 
delegates reaffirmed that the "PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian People" and 
have continued to do so at later meetings see: "PLO Al-Kitab al-Sanawi al Filastini" (1974) Palestine 
Yearbook 1974 (Beirut: PLO Research Centre) 58. 
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organisations and groups which have allowed Palestinian Representatives to participate 
as Representatives of a State and that those groups which have not allowed Palestine to 
participate as a State belong to different political groupings is important. It provides 
evidence of the varied responses to the Palestinian question at a political level 
throughout the international community. 
This shows that the Palestinian Representation have a different level of status within 
different parts of the international community and adds weight to the theory from 
Chapter One that its personality can be variable. 
This kind of activity which the Palestinian Representation has been part of also 
demonstrates the wide range of fora in which the Palestinian people are now being 
represented . 
239 The international community seems to have adopted an inclusive 
approach to assisting the Palestinians by allowing their views to be shared with state 
groups such as the one mentioned above. This, whilst obviously helping the 
Palestinians in a practical way with support and aid, also impacts on representation 
issues. The more widely that Palestinian representatives are accepted and the more the 
"Palestinian voice" is heard, the more likely that representation will grow and become a 
norm rather than an exception. Representation, leading to acceptance then can impact 
on recognition. Although arguably this is a chicken/egg scenario, the point is perhaps 
that together representation at varying levels and in many different groups and 
recognition gradually enables the status of the Palestinian representation to evolve. 
Evolutionary status also being part of the theory that attainment of personality is a 
process in which the level of status may vary over a period of time. 
Any activity at this level suggests that the PLO at a minimum may overall be classed as 
a legitimate representative group. However, given the practice of many international 
organisations to allow only groups which have achieved a very high level of status prior 
to achieving statehood to participate in their activities, it is suggested that from the 
evidence above, the PLO may objectively be classed as a NLM at the highest level or 
the PA may be considered, less objectively (by pro-Palestinian States), as a government. 
239 The PLO is also an observer member of the following specialised agencies: ILO, UN Food & 
Agriculture Organisation, UNESCO, WHO, ICAO, Universal Postal Union, International 
Telecommunications Organisation, World Meteorological Organisation, Intergovernmental Marine 
Consultation Organisation, World Intellectual Property Organisation, International Fund for Agricultural 
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2.7: Conferences 
The Palestinian Representation has also been able to participate in conferences in the 
international community. This is significant since they have been of a varying nature 
and participation has not only been on issues which affect Palestine directly but on a 
number of different aspects of international law and relations. 
2.7.1: 1974 Conference on International Humanitarian Law 
An example of the Palestinian Representation enjoying a high level of participation in 
international legal conferences is the 1974 Conference on Humanitarian Law which 
resulted in the 1977 Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 240 This had 
important ramifications for national liberation movements, including the PLO, both in 
terms of international humanitarian law and in status. The PLO attended the Diplomatic 
Conference in Geneva that led to the Protocols. It was one of 11 national liberation 
movements which took part and although there was some opposition to its participation, 
overall it was an important signal of the international community's willingness to allow 
it to play a part in debating issues which directly could affect the applicability of 
international humanitarian law to the occupied territories. 241 The PLO's participation 
was most certainly as a result of success at the United Nations, however its significance, 
at an extremely high level international forum should not be diminished. 
Article 1(4) of Protocol 1 provides that "armed conflicts in which people are fighting 
against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the 
exercise of their right to self determination" may now come within the definition of 
"international armed conflicts" under Common Article 2 of the 1949 Conventions. This 
is clearly important for all NLMs since it confirms the internationalisation of their 
Development - see Appendix V of 
Kirisci, The PLO and World Politics. 
240 Protocols I& II Additional to the Geneva Conventions (Red Cross) relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1125 UNTS 609. Chapter Five considers the issues raised by 
human rights, international humanitarian law and variable personality. 
241 Murray, "The Status of the ANC and SWAPO and International Humanitarian Law", at 408. 
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struggle and justifies at least a claim being made on the behalf of the people they 
represent. 
However, particularly of importance to groups such as the PLO, Article 96(3) of 
Protocol 1 grants a kind of limited treaty making power through the fact that by making 
a "unilateral declaration addressed to the depository" a NLM may seek to bind 
themselves to the Geneva laws of war in relation to their conflict of liberation. 
However, the liberation movements only take on the duties under the protocols and 
cannot necessarily insist on the benefits. 
Being party to the documents which conferences produced is even stronger evidence of 
such status. There was a lengthy debate about the inclusion of liberation movements in 
the conference and some concerns voiced in relation to the signing by the PLO of the 
1977 Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 242 However a compromise was 
reached whereby the participating NLMs signed a different page to sovereign states and 
it was noted that this would in no way affect the position of individual states in relation 
to them. 243 At the time this was clearly a leap forward for a NLM like the PLO. 
However, the distinction between the importance of multilateral recognition and 
bilateral recognition should be emphasised, since the status of the PLO vis-a-vis other 
signatories is not specifically affected. The fact that there were conflicting opinions as 
to how the PLO should sign the documents is once again further evidence of the range 
of responses the international community has to claims to participate by Palestinian 
representatives. 
Moreover, as a result of the PLO's participation at the Additional Protocols Conference 
and at the World Population Conference in Bucharest and the World Food Conference 
in Rome in the same year as observer, the General Assembly invited the PLO to 
participate as an observer "in the sessions and the work of all international conferences 
convened under the auspices of the General Assembly" and "other organs". 244 
242 Opposition came mainly from Western States and Israel - see Lysaght, "The Attitude of Western 
Countries" from Cassese (Ed. ), The New Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict (Naples: Editoriale 
Scientifica) (1979) 354. 
243 Cmnd. 6927,16. Cited in Shaw, 'The International Status of National Liberation Movements. ", at 27. 
244 See General Assembly Resolution 3237 (XXIX) and Freudenschuss, "Legal and Political Aspects of 
the Recognition of National Liberation Movements", at 118. 
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The Palestinian Representation continues to represent Palestinian interests at 
international legal conferences. More recently for example, it participated in the 
discussions relating to the setting up of the new International Tribunal on the Law of the 
Sea245 
The fact that there was debate about whether the PLO could participate in the some of 
these conferences reinforces the fact that different states within the international 
community treat the Palestinian Representatives differently. Some are not willing to let 
participation occur without question, reminding the onlooker of the variable status it is 
deemed to possess throughout the international community. 
2.7.2: Recent Conferences on the Palestinian Question 
In 1998 there were a number of different conferences regarding the question of Palestine 
which were particularly poignant due to the 50 year anniversary of the creation of the 
State of Israel. In the majority of these there was Palestinian participation. 
One of these conferences was The Conference in Support of the Inalienable Rights of 
the Palestinian People246 which was attended by 102 Governments, 10 UN organs, 
agencies and bodies, 6 intergovernmental organisations, 47 non-governmental 
organisations and 3 special guests. Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the Executive 
Committee of the PLO and President of the Palestinian Authority also took part on 
behalf of the Palestinian people and addressed the plenary session of the conference. 
The participation of such large number of groups and States demonstrates the general 
level of support for resolution of the Palestinian question amongst the international 
community and to a limited extent an implied recognition of the Palestinian Right to self 
determination. 
The PA has also been able to participate in Conferences at Ministerial level regarding 
financial assistance to Palestinians. In Paris on 9 January 1996 when the PA gathered 
with representatives of the donor community. The ministers there placed importance on 
245 See Article 287 Law of the Sea Convention, Annex VI Special Arbitral Tribunal, UN Doc. A/Conf. 
62/1122; (1982) 21 ILM 1261. 
246 Brussels, 24 - 25 February 1998: http: //domino. un. org/UNISPAL. nsf/SymboYBrussels98rptl 
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the Core Investment Programme which had been unanimously adopted by the 
Palestinian Cabinet and significantly had been presented by the PA at a meeting of the 
Consultative Group of the World Bank on 18 October 1995247 
There have also been various non-governmental organisation conferences dealing with 
the Palestinian question. These have taken part in almost every corner of the globe 248 
At each Palestine has been represented by the Palestinian delegation at the UN by virtue 
of its status as a permanent observer and also by Dr Nasser Al-Kidwa (Permanent 
Observer of Palestine to the United Nations) by virtue of his role as a delegate of the 
Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People. 
These conferences have been well attended by not only non-governmental organisations 
and UN bodies, but also many governments and inter-governmental organisations. 
Between them, these conferences attracted over 79 different governments and 6 
intergovernmental organisations, including the EU, the OAU and the League of Arab 
States. Whilst by no means universal, such strong support for conferences must be good 
evidence of the wealth of feeling in the international community regarding the peaceful 
settlement of the Palestinian question and the role of the Palestinian Representation in 
this process, given that such a settlement is unlikely to occur without the creation of a 
Palestinian state in some form. The role of the PLO and the PA in the discussions 
leading to such a situation is vital. Importantly regarding status, the governments 
involved in these conferences do not make any opposition to the notion that the PLO 
and the PA are the legitimate representatives of the Palestinians. This type of activity 
strengthens the PLO's position as objectively fulfilling the criteria for a national 
liberation movement or a legitimate representative. 
It is understandable that the Palestinian Representation is a participant in conferences on 
the Palestinian question and these examples in fact only reaffirm the Palestinian 
Representation's role of legitimate representative of the Palestinians. However, this 
247 Ministerial Conference on Economic Assistance to the Palestinian People, Final Communique, 
paragraph 3.9 January 1996. 
48 for example, The United Nations Latin American and Caribbean Seminar and NGO Symposium on the 
Question of Palestine, Santiago, Chilie 26 - 29 May 1998; The United Nations North American NGO 
Symposium on the Question of Palestine, New York, United States of America, 15 - 17 June 1998; United 
Nations International NGO Meeting on the Question of Palestine, Cairo, Egypt, 25 - 26 April 1998; 
United Nations European NGO Symposium on the Question of Palestine, Brussels, Belgium, 26 February 
1998. 
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should not be underestimated as it is a solid foundation on which to build a claim to a 
higher degree of status. The most important examples of participation in conferences 
are those such as the international humanitarian law conferences or the tribunal on the 
law of the sea, mentioned above. Whilst the Palestinian Representation did not 
participate as a full member, it is interesting to see that the international community did 
not fail to include a Palestinian delegation simply on the ground that it was not 
representing a full state. The level of participation on the scale of possibilities was then 
not as great as being classed as a government, but surely indicates that the Palestinian 
Representation was considered to be a NLM which could be deemed to be operating at 
the highest levels possible for a body limited by its lack of Statehood. 
It is interesting to further note that the occasions on which the Palestinian 
Representation is treated as a liberation movement with a high degree of status are those 
occasions when participation in the Conference (e. g.: international humanitarian law 
conferences 24) or Organisation (e. g.: General Assembly of the United Nations250) are 
almost universal. Within those forums there exist both politically sympathetic and less 
politically sympathetic States. This sees the Palestinian Representation's status resigned 
to that of NLM, rather than to the higher level of government which it is granted in 
politically pro-Palestinian arenas - e. g.: the Arab League. 251 
249 See section 2.7.1 above. 
250 See section 2.7.2 above. 
251 See section 2.3 above. 
172 
CONCLUSIONS 
The examples provided in this chapter demonstrate three main points. First, it gives 
examples of occasions on which the Palestinian Representation has been recognised and 
shows that a broad picture of the level of its participation in the international community 
can be seen. However, second and importantly for this overall thesis, the material 
gathered together and presented here suggests that the level of participation of the 
Palestinian Representation on the international stage is variable. That is, it is treated in 
different situations as a different style of eniity falling at varying points on the scale of 
possibilities discussed at the beginning of this chapter. Third, and in relation to the 
issue of variability, the action of those recognising the Palestinian Representation has 
also been variable. Even if it has not been formally recognised, the members of the 
international community have not necessarily stopped it from participating in 
international life. Therefore, the actions of states in the process of recognition is not 
only `all or nothing', as was asserted in Chapter One. 
The many occasions on which the Palestinian Representation has been able to 
participate in activities at an international level suggest that personality is not an open 
and shut case where only states may participate or where the label officially accorded to 
an entity necessarily affects the role it can play. The non-state can therefore also play a 
role, which may fall short of full participation at all levels but is nonetheless significant. 
Furthermore, whilst account must be taken of action which occurs in a politically 
sympathetic environment all the given examples of Palestinian participation are 
evidence of a high degree of international legal personality, albeit not statehood. 
The variable level of Palestinian status can be seen by comparing the treatment it has 
received at the hands of those politically supportive States and organisations (e. g.: the 
Arab League or the African or Middle Eastern States) and those less politically 
supportive States (e. g.: USA and Israel). Examples of the former's support for the 
Palestinian cause and inclusions of the Palestinian Representation in international life 
can be seen inter alia in their response to the 1988 Declaration of Statehood. The 
latter's behaviour is exemplified by the fact that they only recognised the Palestinian 
Representation as the legitimate representatives of the Palestinian people at all at the 
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time of the DOP and have consistently voted against increased Palestinian participation 
in the UN. 252 
The politically more supportive States have arguably not always been able to treat the 
Palestinian Representation in the manner their other behaviour indicates they would 
choose to. For example, in the UN the Palestinian Representation is not treated as a 
government due to the influence of other less supportive States. However, as shown, it 
does command a high degree of status which is largely as a result of the support it has 
received from a significant proportion of the world's States. Therefore, there are not 
inconsistencies in the way in which States behave towards the Palestinian 
Representation or the areas in which they allow it to participate. It is a fact of modem 
international relations that on each side compromises must be reached and therefore 
whilst this may suggest inconsistency, when voting patterns are analysed it can be seen 
that States are generally consistent in their overarching policies towards the Palestinian 
Representation. 253 The same is true of those politically less sympathetic States - there 
exists no inconsistency in their overall policies towards Palestinian participation. For 
example Israel's lack of recognition until the DOP is reflected in its voting patterns at 
the UN, despite the UN policy of including the Palestinian Representation in its 
activities. 254 
Thus the status of the Palestinian Representation depends upon who or what is 
recognising it at any one point in time. Although there were shifts in its objective 
status, 255 recognition or lack of recognition tended at the time of recognition to mainly 
affect its bilateral relations rather than its overall status as almost no recognition could 
be safely deemed to be without political undercurrents. If a sufficient number of States 
chose to support the Palestinian cause through recognition then this in turn could impact 
on its objective status within other bodies on a future occasion. For example, 95 States 
which recognised Palestine in 1988 clearly influenced the UN in the increasing of 
Palestinian participation. 
252 See section 2.1.2 and 2.1.3 above. 
25; See section 2.1.2 above for analysis of voting patterns in the UN. 
234 See section 2.1.2 above for analysis of voting patterns in the UN. 
255 most notably in 1974 when it was granted observer status at the UN, after the 1988 Declaration, after 
the 1993 DOP or in the light of the 1998 General Assembly Resolution 250. 
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The examples of recognition or opposability given within this chapter demonstrate 
without any room for doubt that the Palestinian Representation falls at different points 
on the scale of possibilities - ranging from legitimate representative to government. 
Due to the political circumstances underpinning the existence of the Palestinian 
Representation, their status is surely a classic example of variable personality in the 
international community today. This is vital to this thesis since it suggests that the 
assertions made in Chapter One are borne out through the examination in detail of at 
least one strong example in the international community. 
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CONCLUSION TO PART I 
It is submitted that the first half of this thesis has resulted in the achievement of three 
main conclusions. The first relates to international law in general, the second to the 
PLO and the third to non-state entities in the international community. Each shall be 
dealt with in turn. 
A): VARIABLE PERSONALITY 
The first chapter of this thesis considered the issue of recognition and personality in 
international law. The assertions made there suggested that the existing theories 
regarding recognition and the achievement of status in international law did not 
necessarily correspond with recognition practice in the international community. 
It has been discussed in Chapter Three how this theory is supported in the international 
community when examined in relation to a specific example, (that of Palestine), which 
was shown to basically be a complex web of bilateral relationships between the 
recogniser (or opposer) and the entity being recognised (or opposed). The will of the 
international community was therefore the driving force behind participation of the 
Palestinian Representation at an international level, particularly since the example 
chosen is a non-state entity making a claim to status. The theory that status is not an 
open and shut case and that entities other than states may have a meaningful degree of 
participation in international life is furthered. 
Overall in terms of international law this suggests that law is not providing a coherent 
and comprehensive set of guidelines by which the international community is 
attempting to act. This is partly because international law seems to see the acquiring of 
status as an event rather than as a process which can have variances within it. 
Individual practice (which may vary from an entity's de jure position regarding 
recognition) and political will are overriding what had been considered to be the 
international norms which thus do not reflect the practice of states. 
The theory is asserted that international legal personality is variable by nature both in 
terms of being non-static as an entity's relationships evolve but also and most 
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importantly, as between the entity and the different States or organisations which may 
or may not choose to recognise it. In other words, at any one point in time an entity 
may be a Government, a national liberation movement or political party, depending on 
with whom, when and where it is acting. Personality therefore is not `all or nothing', 
there is a scale of possibilities within which an entity's status may fit. 
(B): THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITY OF THE 
PLO. THE PA AND PALESTINE IS VARIABLE. 
It is submitted that the entities chosen for examination (the PLO, the PA and Palestine) 
have very variable levels of status in the international community. Examples of 
recognition by States and individual organisations were considered in Chapter Three 
and it appears that the personality of the case study is variable because it has evolved 
and changed over the period of time it has existed. Vitally, to support the theory 
explained in (A) above the PLO, PA and Palestine have been shown to participate in the 
international community at various different levels and are viewed as differing styles of 
entity due to the range of responses which the international community has had to them. 
Indeed it is submitted that this case study provides a classic example of variable 
personality from its inception to the present day. This for the reasons as explained in 
(A) is an important conclusion for the overall theme of this study. 
(C): THE `SUPER' NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT 
Whilst it was not the aim of this thesis to consider the nature of national liberation 
movements in international law, it has transpired through this study that an additional 
conclusion to the two above can be drawn. The recognition which the PLO has received 
is far greater than that accorded to any liberation movement before it. This is 
demonstrated particularly well by the response of the United Nations and the increase in 
powers the PLO received in the late 1990s. When compared with the personalities of 
the liberation movements examined in Chapter One it seems that the PLO has achieved 
a much greater level of status than SWAPO, Fretilin, the PAIGC or the FLN. To be 
sure, these are not the only national liberation movements which could be used in 
177 
comparison, however it is argued that they represent some of the more successful 
groups in terms of the status they achieved whilst still liberation movements. 
It is true to say that this phenomenon is partly as a result of the fact that there is 
arguably an inverse relationship between the time spent as a national liberation 
movement seeking Statehood on behalf of a people and the level of status accrued. ' 
However, the example of the PLO demonstrates that a new breed of `Super' non-state 
entity or liberation movement may be achievable in the international community. This 
affirms the potential for different types of actors on the international stage is still able to 
develop. 
The conclusions drawn here are important as they deal with one of the primary issues in 
international law, that of personality. In Part II of this thesis the conclusions raised here 
about the nature of personality are put to the test by examining how the factual situation 
of entities with variable levels of status, such as the PLO, the PA and Palestine hold up 
in practice against other areas of international law. 
1 Furthermore, the PLO's strong claim to self determination and its renunciation of violence, both of 
which are discussed in Chapter Two are factors which have played significant roles in the level of status it 
has achieved. 
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INTRODUCTION TO PART II: 
THE BROADER IMPLICATIONS OF VARIABLE PERSONALITY 
In Part I of this thesis the theory that international legal personality may be variable has 
been examined. Variable personality is a descriptive theory which best explains some of 
the problems which were identified in Chapter One. However, international legal 
theories do not exist in a vacuum and every determination that an entity has a variable 
level of personality will affect all its interaction on the international stage, given that it 
is only able to interact by virtue of the level of personality it has achieved. Whilst this 
is somewhat of a chicken and egg debate, the central issue remains the same - the 
determination that an entity has a variable personality has broader implications for other 
areas of international law. It is some of these implications that Part II of this thesis 
aims to consider. The discussion which follows will also help to draw a conclusion as 
to whether the theory of variable personality is descriptively accurate. 
The fact that an entity which has a changeable level of status may have ramifications for 
other areas of international law and therefore make an impact on other actors on the 
international stage is not in question. For example, recently the Committee Against 
Torture considered the case of Sadiq Shek Elmi. l Elmi was a Somali national from the 
Shikal clan and had applied for asylum in Australia because of a fear of torture or 
execution by the rival and majority Hawiye clan which was in effective control of parts 
of Somalia. Australia rejected his application and intended to expel him from the 
country and send him back to Somalia. In response Elmi alleged that his expulsion was 
a violation of Article 3 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Australia submitted inter alia that the case was 
not admissible on the grounds that the Convention was not applicable to the facts of the 
case. Australia stated that since the alleged threat of torture would be carried out by 
members of the Hiwaye clan that it did not fall within the definition of torture in Article 
1 of the Convention because Article 1 requires that the torture be, "committed by, or at 
the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or any other 
person acting in an official capacity". 
' Communication no. 120/1998: Australia. 25 May 1999. CAT/C/22/D/120/1998. 
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The Committee disagreed with Australia on this issue and found for Elmi. They stated 
that, 
"The Committee notes that for a number of years Somalia has been without a central government, that the 
international community negotiates with the warring factions and that some of the factions operating in 
Mogadishu have set up quasi-governmental institutions and are negotiating the establishment of a 
common administration. It follows then that, de facto, those factions exercise certain prerogatives that are 
comparable to those normally exercised by legitimate governments. Accordingly, the members of those 
factions can fall, for the purposes of the application of the Convention, within the phrase `public officials 
or other persons acting in an official capacity' contained in article 199.2 
This stance taken by the Committee against Torture illustrates a willingness within the 
international community to recognise that the existence of entities with an unclear level 
of personality, which are also highly likely to be variable, can and do have 
consequences in other areas of international law. 3 
This is important as the range of possible areas affected by the determination of variable 
personality are immense. Part II therefore aims to consider some of these areas in more 
detail in order to gain a better understanding of how variable personality operates in 
practice in conjunction with other areas of international law. 
Given the open-ended nature of such a task two specific areas have been chosen for 
discussion. First, Chapter Four looks at the question of responsibility in a situation of 
variable personality. This discussion is carried out on a general level in relation to some 
of the questions surrounding responsibility as traditionally applied to state entities. 
Second, Chapter Five then develops the question of responsibility by looking at the 
specific issue of variable personality and the responsibility for protection of human 
rights. This question being particularly pertinent given the kinds of situation in which 
variable personality may arise as an issue due to conflicting claims, also being those 
where human rights can easily be targeted for abuse. 
2 Paragraph 6.5. 
3 It would be possible to critcise the decision of the Committee on the grounds that although their decision 
was a good one given the facts of the case, by recognising the power which the clan held in Somalia, their 
regime was validated to a degree because for every responsibility accorded to an entity there is a 
corresponding right. This is a fair point, however it can be counter claimed that the factual existence of 
such entities should not disadvantage other actors in the international community (in this case Elmi). It 
could also be argued that when this argument is run in relation to situations of variable personality such as 
the Palestinian example it is weak. This is because the position of the PA and the PLO are more 
structured and formalised than was the case in Somalia because of agreements such as the DOP and the 
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As in Part I these discussions are placed in a practical setting by considering them in the 
context of the Palestinian situation. Therefore, at times during the next two chapters 
variable personality is prevalent in the discussion and at others it is the Palestinian 
situation. It should be kept in mind that the Palestinian situation is the vehicle by which 
it is possible to discuss the problems raised by the theory of variable personality. 
international community's reactions and recognition. In this respect Palestine is an important area to 
study in relation to the implications of variable personality. 
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CHAPTER 4 
VARIABLE PERSONALITY AND RESPONSIBILITY 
INTRODUCTION 
As discussed in the Introduction to Part II of this thesis, it is important to consider how 
the theory of variable personality may impact on other established areas of international 
law. As mentioned previously, a classic situation where an entity with variable 
personality would be likely to exist is one where there is conflict and competing claims 
to territory, particularly as this may result in differing political stances being taken as to 
sovereignty. A relevant issue to such situations is responsibility. ' The question of 
responsibility is a natural topic in relation to which the implications of variable 
personality should be discussed as it is a well established idea that with a claim to status 
comes a corresponding duty when that right is fulfilled: 
"Since all legal relations, however numerous and complex, can be reduced to the relations of one man 
with another - of one individual with another - every such relation has two ends. s2 
It seems that the rationale behind extending responsibility in international law to non- 
state entities and those with variable personality is clear. Responsibility is simply `the 
other side' of personality and should be considered in relation to any actor on the 
international stage. 
It is with this in mind that responsibility has been chosen as one of the areas of law to be 
considered in relation to the theory of variable personality in order to assess how this 
description of the process of recognition impacts on the rest of international law. 
1 Responsibility is generally referred to as 'State Responsibility' in international law since it has generally 
been states which have been considered to incur responsibility in certain circumstances and for certain 
actions. However, since this thesis considers the notion that there are entities other than states in the 
international community which may also have rights, privileges, obligations and duties which may differ 
from both entity to entity and also from situation to situation, the chapter refers to `responsibility' thereby 
not prejudging the issue. 
2 From the forward by Arthur L. Corbin to, Cook (Ed. ), Hohfeld: Fundamental Legal Conceptions (New 
Haven & London: Yale University Press) (1966). 
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However, there is very little international law writing on the issue of State responsibility 
which takes into account the rise in the number of non-State entities which are now 
actors at an international level and certainly none that considers the potentially variable 
nature of their personality. 3 
This is not surprising, however, given that current international law does not 
acknowledge that the theory of variable personality exists because states do not say that 
their practice is variable and results in variable levels of status. Variability is a 
description of what states do in practice, rather than what they purport to do. It is 
precisely because of this gap that the responsibility of non state entities with variable 
personality should be examined. 
This gap between law and practice means that on the whole at a basic level there has 
been a failure to consider whether there is, or should be, a link between personality and 
responsibility because responsibility is generally thought of as `state' responsibility 
where the level of status is fixed at statehood. 
This chapter looks at the current law relating to responsibility, and questions whether it 
is compatible with variable personality and therefore whether overall it supports the 
theory that variable personality is a justifiable way of classifying recent state practice in 
the field of recognition. It may then be necessary to consider whether variable 
3 Amerasinghe, State Responsibilityfor Injuries to Aliens (Oxford: Clarendon Press) (1967) does look at 
individuals as claimants but does not look at the issue of claims against non-state entities. Brownlie, 
System of the Law of Nations: State Responsibility Part I (Oxford: Clarendon Press) (1983) provides a 
thorough and useful examination of many issues regarding responsibility from the premise that states are 
the entities against which potential claims arise. Eagleton, Responsibility of States in International Law 
(New York: New York University Press) (1928) as the title suggests, and like pre-war writing in general, 
the main actor on the international stage is assumed to be a state. Lillich (Ed. ), International Law of State 
Responsibilityfor Injuries to Aliens (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia) (1983) works from the 
premise that claims will be made against states and therefore does not consider the link between 
personality and responsibility. Randelzhofer & Tomuschat (Eds. ), State Responsibility and the 
Individual: Reparation in Instances of Grave Violations of Human Rights (The Hague/London/Boston: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers) (1999) despite being a fairly recent collection of contributions on the topic 
this book focuses on human rights abuses and claimants rather than on the range of entities against which 
claims could be brought. Spinedi & Simma (Eds. ), United Nations Codification of State Responsibility 
(New York/London/Rome: Oceans Publications Inc. ) (1987) does begin to include issues relating to the 
possibility of expanding the categories of those against which claims could be brought in the contribution 
by Atlam, "National Liberation Movements and International Responsibility" 35. For further references 
to works on State Responsibility in general see, Jennings & Watts (Eds. ), Oppenheim's International 
Law, Vol. 1, peace. Introduction and Part I (London: Longman Publishing) (9 Edition: 1992), at 498 - 
499. 
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personality and responsibility should or need to be compatible with one another and 
how this could be achieved. 
To answer some of these questions it will be important to continue to look at the case 
study of Palestine which has been one of the themes of this thesis so far. The fact that 
Palestine has not achieved statehood in international law but is a classic example of 
variable personality in practice will facilitate the examination of some of the issues 
which arise regarding the responsibility of a non-state actor with variable status. 4 
In order to consider these fundamental issues this chapter can be split into three main 
sections. The first section provides an overview of the general international law of 
responsibility and then moves on to look at the work of the International Law 
Commission (ILC) on responsibility. This examination will enable conclusions to be 
drawn about the existence of a link between personality and responsibility, and if one 
exists, to consider its importance. 
The second section considers the theory of responsibility in the context of non-state 
actors and looks not only at the work of the ILC, but also at notable issues which may 
arise where non-state actors with variable personality are potentially entities which 
could incur international responsibility. This will assist in establishing whether the 
ideas enunciated in Part I of this thesis are reflected in the area of non-state actor 
responsibility. 
The third section deals with the practical side of these questions and examines them in 
the Palestinian context by looking at the possibilities of Israeli and Palestinian 
responsibility for internationally wrongful acts within the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
This section enables the full implications of either ignoring, or working with, any links 
which have been shown to exist between personality and responsibility to be explored in 
a practical context. From this it will be possible to consider how compatible variable 
personality and responsibility are in practice as opposed to on paper. 
4 As discussed in Chapter Three. 
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1: RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
1.1: An Overview of Responsibility 
"In international relations, as in other social relations, the invasion of the legal interest of one subject of 
the law by another legal person creates responsibility in various forms. i5 
The potential breadth and complexity of issues of responsibility - covering as it does 
many "legal interest[s] " and affecting all "legal person[s] "- makes it a difficult area 
of study. However the complexity is increased by the fact that the law of responsibility 
has not kept pace with other developments in international law. As already discussed 
in the introduction, there has been an increase in the number of non-state actors on the 
international stage and there is also a dimension to personality which means that an 
entity may have a differing status depending on with whom or what it is interacting at 
any given time. With these developments in mind, this section aims to look at the 
basics of the law of responsibility in order to be able to place in context the questions 
regarding whether the theory of variable personality is supported by other areas of 
international law, such as responsibility. 
The law of responsibility is governed chiefly by customary international law which in 
some cases has been examined and enunciated by relevant claims tribunals or the 
International Court of Justice. The most important study of the law of responsibility has 
been that of the ILC, 7 which in 1949 identified `State Responsibility' as one of 14 topics 
which it considered to be ready for codification. This study now turns briefly to the 
work of the Commission in order to examine its contribution to the law of 
responsibility. The ILC's response to the issue of personality and responsibility and the 
way it has treated the issue of non-state actors and responsibility will be considered in 
sections 1.2 and 2 below. 
S Brownlie, System of the Law of Nations, at 1. 
6 The American Society of International Law has begun to consider this issue, although not only in 
relation to entities such as the Palestinian Representation but regarding corporations for example - "State 
Responsibility in a Multiactor World" (1998) 92 Proc. ASIL 291- 312. 
7 The International Law Commission was established by virtue of General Assembly Resolution 174 (II), 
21 November 1947. The Statute of the Commission is annexed to Resolution 174. For a detailed 
discussion of the work of the Commission see, Sinclair, The International Law Commission (Cambridge: 
Grotius Publications Ltd. ) (1987). For an examination of the Commissions pre-1980 work see The Work 
of the International Law Commission (New York: United Nations) (3rd Ed.: 1980). 
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1.1.1: The Work of the International Law Commission 
In 1953 the General Assembly requested that the ILC take on the task of codifying the 
law of state responsibility. 8 This work is done by producing a codification of the pre- 
existing rules of general international law on the topic of responsibility by drawing 
together the different sources of international law in the area and making them into a 
series of articles which enunciate the rules more clearly in one continuous piece of 
work. The initial examination undertaken was not wholly successful in terms of 
furthering the codification of international law and in establishing the areas which the 
ILC would examine-9 The General Assembly was not keen to narrow the work of the 
ILC1° and a sub-committee agreed unanimously to recommend that the Commission 
deal primarily with the general rules governing the international responsibility of 
states. 11 
As a result of these deliberations, in 1963 Mr. Ago was appointed as the new Special 
Rapporteur on state responsibility. He submitted his first report to the Commission in 
1969 at its 21st session when the topic was finally agreed and discussions could begin 
properly. 12 
During the 25th session the Commission at last began the laborious task of drafting 
articles on State Responsibility, the first six of which were produced in that session. 
$ For discussion regarding the set-up of the ILC see Briggs, The International Law Commission (New 
York: Cornell University Press) (1965). 
For example, Mr. F. V. Garcia was appointed as a special rapporteur on the area in 1955 at the ILC's 
seventh session, however the 6 reports he submitted during his 7 years in the post had not been considered 
by the Commission. (The reports can be found (in chronological order) in, YBILC (1956) Vol. II 173; 
YBILC (1957) Vol. II 104; YBILC (1958) Vol. 11 47; YBILC (1959) Vol. II 1; YBILC (1960) Vol. II 4; 
YBILC (1961) Vol. II 1. ) 
For general examination of the ILC and the development and codification of international law see, 
Ramcharan, The International Law Commission: Its Approach to the Codification and Progressive 
Development of International Law (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers) (1977). 
10 Garcia's reports had advocated that the codification be confined at this stage to "responsibility for 
damage caused to the person or property of aliens" (See in particular his first two reports in YBILC (1956) 
Vol. II 173 and YBILC(1957) Vol. 11 104. ) 
11 See YBILC (1962) Vol. 12 - 45 regarding the Commission's debate and YBILC (1962) Vol. 1188 - 189 
regarding the issue in their report to the General Assembly. The report of the sub-committee can be 
found at YBILC (1963) Vol. 11227. 
12 For Ago's report and the Commission's report to the General Assembly see, YBILC (1969) Vol. II. 
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After seven more reports from Mr Ago, 13 the Commission looked specifically at those 
articles which dealt with issues relating to general principles of responsibility; the act of 
the state under international law; breaches of international obligation; the implications 
of states in the internationally wrongful acts of other states and also the circumstances 
which may be considered to preclude wrongfulness, including attenuating or 
aggravating circumstances. 14 
Then, in 1978 at the 300' session, the ILC gave the first three chapters of part I of the 
draft articles to Governments in order that their opinions be understood and taken into 
consideration. In 1980 the Commission's work on the first part of State Responsibility 
was completed and the final chapters (four and five) were handed to Governments for 
further written observations. 15 The same year the Draft articles were adopted by the 
Commission. 16 
1980 proved to be a busy year for the Commission on the topic of State Responsibility 
for it also began its work on the second part of the draft articles. Also, as a result of Mr. 
Ago's election to the bench of the International Court of Justice, the post of Special 
Rapporteur was taken over by Willem Riphagen, who presented a report on the second 
part of the draft articles regarding the content, forms and degrees of responsibility. '7 
The ILC continued to work on part II and produced articles 36 - 53. These included 
key sections relating to the obligations which fall on the wrongdoing state, particularly 
regarding reparation (draft articles 42 - 44), the limits of the injured state's right to 
engage in countermeasures against the offending state (draft articles 47 - 50) and also 
deals with the notion of international crimes (draft articles 51 - 53). Part III deals with 
issues of a more procedural nature by presenting the draft rules for the settlements of 
disputes regarding State Responsibility. Although Parts II and III are would by no 
13 For Ago's Reports in chronological order see, YBILC (1970) 177; YBILC (1971) Vol. H (part 1) 199; 
YBILC(1972) Vol. II 71; YBILC (1976) Vol. II (part 1) 3; YBILC (1977) Vol. II (part 1) 3; YBILC (1978) 
Vol. II (part 1) 31; UN Doc. A/CN. 4/318,24 January 1979 (and Addenda 1 to 7). 
14 See Brownlie, System of the Law of Nations, in particular pages 13 - 18 for a more detailed discussion 
of the history of the ILC's discussions regarding the issues they intended to consider in their sessions on 
state responsibility, along with relevant extracts from the sessions and the reports to the General 
Assembly. 
is YBILC (1980) Vol. II (part 2) 26 - 62. 
16 For a full draft of the adopted articles and an introductory note see (1998) 37 ILM 440. 
" U. N. Doc. A/CN. 4/344,1 May 1981. For an exposition of some of Riphagen's views on State 
Responsibility see Riphagen, "State Responsibility: New Theories of Obligation in Interstate Relations" 
from MacDonald & Johnston, The Structure and Process of International Law (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers) (1983), at 581. 
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means be classed as straight forward, their passage through the Commission was less 
time consuming than the extended period which was taken to produce Part I. 
Riphagen attempted to see through the completion of Part II (and also Part III) during 
his time in office as Special Rapporteur. However, the task proved too large and 
cumbersome and was finally completed during the time of Mr. Arangio-Ruiz, who held 
the post between 1987 and 1996.18 
The Draft Articles have not been without criticism from both governments and 
academics, often as a result of the abstract nature of some of the provisions in Part 1,19 
and because of the alleged failure to remain in keeping with customary international law 
in the area. 20 
The current Special Rapporteur is Mr James Crawford. He has the job of assisting the 
Commission in their task of reviewing the articles again. This involves taking into 
account some of the new case law in the area of responsibility and integrating them into 
the structure of the Draft Articles. 21 
At the end of the 52°d session of the Commission in 2000 the Drafting Committee 
provisionally adopted a complete text of the substantive Draft Articles on a2 °d 
1$ In General Assembly Resolution 160 (LI), 16 December 1996, there is a request for states to provide 
comments on the Draft Articles. 
19 See comments in Sinclair, The International Law Commission, at 86. See also the symposium on State 
Responsibility in (1999) 10 EJIL. See also the attacks on the draft articles by Allott, "State 
Responsibility and the Unmaking of International Law" (1988) 29(1) HILJ 1, who states that, "They [the 
draft articles] seek to find universally coherent rules covering the whole of the international behaviour of 
states. But they are particularising in their substance. They are not self-interest universalised but rather 
self-interest multilateralised - and the interest in question is the interest of governments. They take 
international law in precisely the opposite direction from that which the survival and progress of 
international society now demands. ", at 25. 
20 The United States Government submitted its comments on 30 October 1997 which were very detailed 
and expressed concern on the articles lack of conformity with current customary international law. 
21 See the symposium on State Responsibility in (1999) 10 EJIL on the revision of the Draft Articles. See 
particularly, Crawford, "Revising the Draft Articles on State Responsibility" (1999) 10 EJIL 435. 
Crawford states that, "It involves bringing into account the more recent case law of the International 
Court (e. g.: Diplomatic and Consular Personnel, Nicaragua, ELSI, Phosphate Lands, Gabcikovo- 
Nagymaros), relevant cases of the various tribunals (especially the Iran-United State Claims Tribunal and 
ICSID tribunals; more recently WTO panels and the Appellate Body) together with the jurisprudence of 
the human rights courts and committees... ", at 436 - 437. 
For discussion regarding the continuing role of the ILC and its aim of progressively developing 
international law see, Anderson, Boyle, Lowe and Wickremansinghe (Eds. ), The International Law 
Commission and the Future of International Law (London: British Institute of International and 
Comparative Law) (1998). 
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Reading. 22 However the Commission's tasks in the field of responsibility are not yet 
finished. 
At the time of writing, the ILC is currently at work in its 53rd session which is being 
held in Geneva from 23 April to 1 June and from 2 July to 10 August 2001.23 Although 
it remains to be seen exactly what will be discussed by the Commission, in his 4ch 
Report on State Responsibility, James Crawford stated that all that is left for main 
consideration is (a) dispute resolution and (b) the form of the draft articles. 24 Within 
which the substantive issues to be discussed are, "what constitutes injury and damage", 
"serious breaches of obligations to the international community as a whole" and 
"countermeasures". Therefore, whilst it is possible that other issues may be raised 
through such examinations, it seems highly likely that the issue of non-state groups and 
responsibility and the issue of whether there is a link between personality and 
responsibility will not be debated. Depending on what is discovered regarding the way 
in which the Commission has dealt with the question of personality and responsibility 
previously, this does hint at the idea in the light of the theory asserted in part I of this 
thesis, that the topics are ripe for reappraisal. 
However, before the ILC's responses to the question of personality and also to the 
question of non-state entities are considered, let us first turn to the basic provisions of 
the Draft Articles in order to set this issue in context. 
1.1.2: Basic Provisions of the Draft Articles 
Article 1 of the International Law Commission's Draft Articles on State responsibility 
provides that, 
"Every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of that State. "25 
Article 3 and 4 then go on to provide that, 
u A/CN. 4/L. 600 
' In accordance with General Assembly Resolution 152 (LV), 12 December 2000. 
24 A/CN. 4/517 
25 Parts I and 2 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility have been provisionally adopted by the 
Drafting Committee of the International Law Commission: See UN Doc. A/CN. 4/L. 569,4 August 1998. 
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"Article 3: There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of an action or 
omission: 
a) Is attributable to the State under international law: and 
b) Constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State. 
Article 4: The characterisation of an act of a State as internationally wrongful is governed by 
international law. Such characterisation is not affected by the characterisation of the same act as lawful 
by internal law. s26 
These articles outline the very basic principles of state responsibility17 and are followed 
by more specific details about inter alia the categories of conduct attributable to 
states, 28 breaches of international obligations, 29 responsibility of states for the acts of 
another state, 30 and circumstances which may preclude the wrongful act. 31 
Articles 1 and 2 demonstrate that responsibility is attached to a state by virtue of its 
position as an international legal person. So the question of personality is raised 
through the Draft Articles themselves. The issue to be considered here is the way in 
which the ILC has dealt with personality in their deliberations on responsibility. This 
discussion is likely to lead on to further issues regarding the personality of entities 
against which claims of responsibility could be brought. However, initially the study 
must examine the response of the Commission purely to personality as this will surely 
affect it's response to any further questions which are raised. 
1.2: Is there a Link Between Personality and Responsibility? 
The ILC has always been very clear in its approach towards personality in the context of 
discussing responsibility. 
"The existence of an insurrectional movement per se creates certain specific problems which cannot be 
ignored in a draft codification of the rules of international law governing State responsibility. But taking 
these problems into consideration certainly does not make it necessary, in the course of the present 
codification project, to spell out the requirements imposed by international law for a given movement to 
be classed as an "insurrectional movement", or to specify under what condition, at what time and in 
relation to whom such a movement can be regarded as endowed with international personality and what is 
26 ibid. 27 Chapter 1 of the Draft Articles. 
28 Chapter 2 of the Draft Articles. 
29 Chapter 3 of the Draft Articles. 
30 Chapter 4 of the Draft Articles. 
31 Chapter 5 of the Draft Articles. 
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then the scope - which will in any event vary from one case to another and, in any one case, with the 
passage of time - of its international legal capacity. The consideration of all these questions - which, for 
that matter should be raised equally, mutatis mutandis, in relation to States and in relation to international 
organisations - does not fall within the topic of the present study but rather within other major branches 
of international law, namely those dealing with subjects of international law. 02 
The Commission clearly recognises that there is a direct link between personality and 
responsibility. However, they choose not to let personality play a major role in their 
decisions. The rationale behind their reasoning is clear, for personality is an entire area 
worthy of study on its own. However, surely it is not, and indeed should not be as 
simple as to divorce the two without further examination. 33 
It should be noted that the Commission's opinion is stated on more than one occasion 
and it appears equally determined not to consider the issue of personality each time, 
other than to take the link between personality and responsibility as a given and in need 
of no further discussion in the context of responsibility. They seem to assume that the 
personality of an entity at any one point in time is clear and that it does not impact on 
the issue of responsibility. In their eyes an entity either has personality which would 
lead to the incurring of responsibility or it does not. 34 
"It was precisely in order to avoid prejudging such solutions that the Commission had preferred the 
formula `in any case in which such attribution may be made under international law', to any of the other 
expressions suggested during discussion, such as `possessing separate international personality', `if it 
controls part of the State in question', or `the international status of which is applicable to the relations in 
question'. The use of any of those expressions might have given the impression that the Commission 
intended to take a position on problems which, as already mentioned, are not relevant to the subject- 
matter of the present draft codification. 05 
In some parts of the discussion regarding whether the issue of personality should play a 
substantive role in the discussions about responsibility it is almost as if it was pushed 
aside because of its complexity: 
"Like most of the members of the Commission he [Mr. Ramangasoavina] believed that it would be better 
not to raise the question of international personality; for an insurrectional movement could be recognised 
32 YBILC 1975 Vol. H 92. 
33 It should be noted that courts have been willing to link personality with the notion of responsibility in 
terms of a non-state entity. For example, in Maclaine Watson & Co. Ltd v Department of Trade and 
Industry and Related Appeals and Maclaine Watson & Co Ltd v International Tin Council (1989) 3 All 
ER 523, the House of Lords held that, "... the ITC was invested with both a legal personality distinct from 
its members and the power to contract as principal, and therefore, applying the principle that no one was 
liable on a contract except the parties to it, the member states were not liable for the debts of the ITC 
because they were not parties to the ITC's contracts", at 524. 
34 Whether an entity is capable of incurring responsibility will be considered below in section 2 which 
discusses the Commission's response to non-state actors. 
35 Report of the Commission to the General Assembly, YBILC 1975 Vol. 11 99. 
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by some States and not bey others, and it was very hard to determine the proper criteria for granting it 
international personality. " 6 
However, not all the Commission members were so keen to readily dismiss the question 
of personality. Mr Ustor was of the opinion that the Commission "... could not ignore 
that question"37 and Mr Moreno stated that: 
"It might be better to deal with the topic [personality] in a separate article, but it was far to important to 
be ignored. "38 
Mr Bedjaoui pointed out that "the question of how and why it possessed personality was 
not part of the subject under study; it belonged to another sphere. " In purely practical 
terms Mr Bedjaoui is surely correct as the personality of an entity is a different question 
from that of responsibility. However, as shown above, the Commission noted that the 
two are inherently linked. It is submitted here that the history of the movement and any 
political motivations which have contributed to its personality are not strictly relevant. 
However these issues do contribute to the story of the level of an entity's personality, 
which if attempts are made to attribute responsibility to it, are important. 39 
The ILC does recognise that personality is a key factor when attempting to attribute 
responsibility to a newly formed state which grew out of a successful insurrectional 
movement; 
"... the affirmation of the responsibility of the newly-formed State for any wrongful acts committed by the 
organs of the insurrectional movement which preceded it would be justified by virtue of the continuity 
which would exist between the personality of the insurrectional movement and that of the state to which it 
has given birth. s40 
The fact that the ILC noticed and placed some importance on the link between 
personality and responsibility is a very good start, even if they then chose to ignore it. 
However, in the light of the theory which has been asserted in Part I of this thesis 
regarding the nature of personality this approach does not go far enough. Therefore the 
remainder of this section sets out the reasons why there is a need of further 
36 YBILC 1975 Vol. 1 55. Other members of the ILC also acknowledge that the PLO has a "separate 
international personality" - see Mr. Elias, YBILC 1975 Vol. I 50. See section 3 below for consideration 
of the responsibility of the PLO and the PA. 
" YBILC 1975 Vol. 145. 
38 See comments of Mr. Moreno, YBILC 1975 Vol. I 53. It should be noted that Mr. Moreno generally 
took an inclusive approach to the topic of the subjects of international law, "He himself was among the 
few jurists who considered that any international body was a subject of international law. ", ibid., at 53. 
39 As will be seen below in section 2 when the issue of non-state entities and responsibility is considered 
specifically. 
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consideration of the personality issue, and an re-appraisal of some of the issues which 
the ILC was examining. 
If the link between personality and responsibility is important it follows that unless the 
ILC has an extremely clear picture of the question of personality in international law, it 
must be unable to reach a satisfactory position regarding responsibility. This is because 
the question of an entity's personality must surely pre-date all other questions of 
international law, and must therefore have a bearing on every other question of 
international law. As a matter of logic, until the question of personality is settled and 
the subjects of international law are known, it is impossible to answer other 
international legal questions. Only with a clear picture of the workings of personality in 
international society is it possible to create an operative and effective system of 
international rules and progressively develop a coherent body law. 
It is submitted that the ILC failed to recognise the true nature of international 
personality and that therefore their dismissal of importance of the link between 
personality and responsibility is flawed. The Commission does note that personality 
can change and evolve over a period of time: 
"Furthermore the insurrectional movement may vary in scope and importance as the struggle waxes and 
wanes. For example, the territory in which the movement exercises its authority may contract or expand, 
and the financial or other resources under its control may also fluctuate. All these considerations create a 
climate of uncertainty regarding the prospect of obtaining from that movement, in the course of the 
struggle, reparation for an internationally wrongful act. i41 
However, this conception of personality is linear and affected only by the ravages of 
time. As has been asserted in the first part of this thesis, the question of personality is in 
fact far more complicated. At any one point in time an entity's status may be variable. 
It's personality is a complex web of bilateral and multilateral relations which may vary 
from relationship to relationship. 
As mentioned above, one of the members of the Commission, Mr Ustor, did try to look 
more closely at the issue of personality and go further than simply viewing it as 
determined by objective criteria: 
40 YBILC 1972 Vol. 1113 1. 
4' Report of the Commission to the General Assembly, YBILC 1975 Vol. 11 93. 
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"With regard to insurrectional movement, he was not sure that the capacity of such a movement could be 
determined solely by objective criteria as in the past when an insurrectional movement has acquired 
international personality on reaching a certain size. It might be asked whether the capacity of an 
insurrectional movement did not now also depend on its recognition. Yet, in all the precedents cited and 
in the text proposed the Special Rapporteur had taken the relatively simple position based on the text of 
pure `effectiveness'. In international relations however, when there was an internal conflict, the problem 
might arise of the international, not constitutional, legitimacy, either of the government or of the 
insurrectional movement itself. That problem had already arisen in the context of decolonisation and 
would continue to arise in cases of aggression. The very clear principles stated in article 12 would 
therefore need some modification - if only in drafting - if the Commission decided to take account of the 
question of international legitimacy. His own view was that it could not ignore that question. 9A2 
However, even this more realistic appreciation of the achievement of personality, which 
also took into account other relevant questions such as legitimacy, did not result in the 
description of personality as potentially variable at one single moment in time. 43 This 
linear conception of personality is in evidence throughout the Commission's 
deliberations. By extracting a section from one of the quotations used above it is 
possible to demonstrate this point further: 
`But taking these problems into consideration certainly does not make it necessary, in the course of the 
present codification project, to spell out the requirements imposed by international law for a given 
movement to be classed as an "insurrectional movement", or to specify under what condition, at what 
time and in relation to whom such a movement can be regarded as endowed with international personality 
and what is then the scope - which will in any event vary from one case to another and, in any one case, 
with the passage of time - of its international legal capacity. "44 
In the light of firstly the ILC's lack of willingness to consider personality alongside 
responsibility, and secondly the linear conception of personality upon which this 
decision partly rests, it is surely time to re-appraise the question of the responsibility of 
such entities. This should be done by bearing in mind the issue of variable personality 
and allowing the topics of responsibility and personality to complement each other and 
therefore work together. The ILC's theory of responsibility and it's discussion of 
responsibility and non-state actors will be considered below in section 2. However it 
must be recognised that their treatment of the issue makes it difficult to find in their 
work support for the theory of variable personality when it does not acknowledge its 
possible existence. 
Earlier on in this section it was demonstrated that the ILC considered personality to be a 
complex area which should therefore not be examined at the same time as responsibility 
42 YBILC 1975 Vol. 1 45. 
" As was discussed in Chapter Three legitimacy is a vital question when considering the status of 
liberation movements and can result in different levels of personality because of the differing views of 
other parts of the international community on the legitimacy of the struggle. 
"YBILC 1975 Vol. II 92. 
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but that the existence of personality should be taken as a given. 45 For precisely the 
reasons that the ILC fail to consider personality and a fortiori that they do not realise it 
is a more complex issue than they understood it to be, it should be re-considered 
alongside other areas of international law. It is only by the linking of areas of 
international law together that a cohesive body of international law may be formed in 
both the area of personality and responsibility. This is much needed if international law 
itself it to progress and a workable set of rules created which are not in conflict with 
each other. Moreover, the description of personality as variable is a reflection of the 
practice of States and organisations, whereas the draft articles are a merging of lex lata 
and lexferanda. Therefore it is surely the Draft Articles which should adapt to work 
alongside the existing practice within other fields of international law, rather than 
attempting to force States to give up all discretion regarding recognition through 
suggesting that personality may not be variable and therefore should not be so affected 
by bilateral relations. 
In previous times States alone used to be the subjects of the law of nations46, however as 
was considered in Chapters One and Three this position has now changed and entities 
such as organisations47, liberation movements48 or non-state territorial areas49 are all 
considered to have the potential to possess some degree of international legal 
personality. Therefore, this study now turns to consider the question of the 
responsibility of non-state entities in the light of the variable nature of personality. 
4s See comments of Mr. Ramasoavinga above, YBILC 1975 Vol. 155 
Some modern international legal theorists have blamed early international legal theorists for structuring 
descriptions of international society around the concept of the nation state being at the centre of 
international life, and argued that this has had too great an influence on the creation of international 
norms. For example, see Allott's criticism of the works of de Vattel and Wolff in Allot, Eunomia: A New 
Order for a New World (New York: Oxford University Press) (2°a Ed.: 2001) and Allot, International 
Law and International Revolution: Reconceiving the World (Josephine Onoh Memorial Lecture: Hull 
University Press) (1989). 
47 For example the United Nations itself - see Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the 
United Nations (1949) ICJ Rep. 174. 
48 Such as the PLO (see Chapter Three) or SWAPO (see Chapters One section 2.1.2 ). 
49 Such as Hong Kong for example. 
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2: RESPONSIBILITY AND NON-STATE ACTORS 
As mentioned throughout this thesis the number of actors on the international stage has 
increased dramatically over the last century, indeed, it has been considered in Part I of 
this thesis that there are scenarios in which two groups may exist within an area of 
territory, each having a distinct personality, yet one having a variable level of status. 
In many situations these two groups may be categorised as the State itself and a non- 
state entity which is attempting to gain some level of control over all or part of the 
territory within the State's boundaries. In the previous section the approach of the ILC 
towards the link between personality and responsibility was considered. Much of its 
consideration of this link resulted from the need to look at the issue of the responsibility 
of non-state actors. Overall, this chapter aims to examine responsibility in the context of 
variable Palestinian personality. Therefore, it is important to think about the question of 
non-state actors and their responsibility from a theoretical perspective so that in the next 
main section, these ideas can be examined in the context of the Palestinian situation. 5° 
It is true to say that the international law relating to responsibility is making steps 
forward in terms of taking into account the fact that States may not be the only entities 
able to take responsibility for their unlawful actions. For example, an international 
organisation, as a bearer of rights may also incur responsibility for its unlawful 
actions. 51 Indeed, whilst the question of the responsibility of international organisations 
is not fully developed in international law, it is not a novel concept. 52 One of the 
practical issues which may arise in attempting to attribute responsibility to an 
organisation is the question surrounding in which arena such a claim may be brought. 
These are similar issues to those which may occur in relation to other non-state groups 
(which are discussed below). For some organisations, such as those which have their 
own judicial body, this is not such a problem. 53 In order to attempt to draw together 
and clarify the law relating to the responsibility of international organisations at their 
52°d Session, after a feasibility study had been carried out, the ILC reported that it 
sa intends to consider this topic as part of their future programme of work. 
so See section 3 for discussion of responsibility in the Palestinian context. 
51 French Republic v Commission of the European Communities C- 327/91,9 August 1994. 
52 See Amador, "State Responsibility: Some New Problems" (1958) 94 Hague Receui1410 and Eagleton, 
"International Organisations and the Law of Responsibility" (1950) 76 Hague Receuil 319. 
s' For example, the International Court of Justice or the Court of Justice of the European Communities. 
54 ILC Report, A/55/10, para. 729 of Chapter IX Re: Long Term Programme of Work. 
196 
However, organisations are not the only non-state entities which can incur international 
responsibility. This can be seen in the examples of the International Criminal Tribunals 
for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (see section 2.1 below) where individuals have 
been held responsible for their breaches of international humanitarian law and also in 
the creation of an International Criminal Court. 55 
In the context of truth and reconciliation commissions there has at times also been a 
culture which has involved the responsibility of individuals or non-state entities, such as 
NLMs. Since truth commission's are generally used to investigate situations of alleged 
mass human rights abuse they are returned to in section 4.2 of Chapter Five which deals 
with the issue of the protection of human rights. However, it is important to note that in 
that context a NLM has been found responsible for human rights abuses. The El 
Salvadoran Truth Commission found that the Farabundo Marti Liberation Front 
acquiesced in the assassination of civilian mayors and that the People's Revolutionary 
Army had committed a significant number of executions. 56 
However the examples of liberation movements being found responsible are few and far 
between. Also the developments in the Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
and relate specifically to individual responsibility. It is submitted that the true breadth 
of non-state actors on the international stage (such as the PLO or the PA) is not fully 
realised in the law of responsibility. 
Despite this, the ILC has deliberated the question of the responsibility of non-state 
actors and produced a Draft Article on the topic. Draft Article 15 attempts to deal with 
the situation of non-state actors in the form of NLMs by considering a scenario where a 
NLM exists alongside a sovereign State. It provides that: 
ss For more details see Cassese, "The Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some Preliminary 
Reflections" (1999) 10(1) EJIL 144 and Arsanjani, "The Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court" (1999) 93 AJIL 22. For general information regarding international criminal law see Paust, 
Bassiouini, Williams, Scharf, Gurule, Zagaris (Eds), International Criminal Law, Cases and Materials 
cCarolina Academia Press: Durham) (1996). 
6 Crahan, "The Salvadoran Truth Commission in Comparative Perspective" from Cancado Trindade 
(Ed. ), The Modern World of Human Rights: Essays in Honour of Thomas Buergenthal (San Jose: Inter- 
American Institute of Human Rights) (1996) 473. The reports of the South African Commission should 
also be noted as these investigated inter alia African National Congress activity: African National 
Congress: Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Complaints By Former African National Congress 
Prisoners and Detainees (1992) and Reports of the Commission of Enquiry into Certain Allegations of 
Cruelty and Human Rights Abuse Against ANC Prisoners and Detainees by ANC Members II (20 August 
1993). 
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I. The conduct of an insurrectional movement which becomes the new government of a State shall be 
considered an act of that State under international law. 
2. The conduct of a movement, insurrectional or other, which succeeds in establishing a new State in 
part of the territory of a pre-existing State or in a territory under its administration shall be considered 
an act of the new State under international law. 
3. This article is without prejudice to the attribution to a state of any conduct, however related to that of 
the movement concerned, which is to be considered an act of that State by virtue of articles 5 to 
10s" 
The ILC saw fit to distinguish between those insurrectional movements which were 
successful and those which were still in dispute with another entity resulting in the 
continuation of conflict. 58 Under Article 15 the conduct of an insurrectional movement 
which is successful is therefore attributed to the newly formed State, as an attribute of 
its international legal personality. 59 
Once an insurgent group becomes the new government of a State then its responsibility 
for acts carried out during the revolution, "would be only natural". 6° Therefore a 
newly formed government from a national liberation movement is responsible for the 
acts it committed and also those of the previous government by virtue of the fact that it 
is the government of a State which had previously existed. This reasoning and the 
principle of attribution of responsibility on achievement of Statehood appears to be 
sound. Indeed, there are advantages in waiting until a liberation movement is successful 
before claiming, as it is surely easier to claim from an establishment which has a certain 
level of financial security than from a potentially poor group with limited internal 
structure to deal with such claims. 61 
There are obviously many practical problems associated with attempting to bring a 
claim against a group before full statehood is achieved. One of the main issues being in 
what kind of forum such claims could be brought. There are some examples of cases 
involving representative groups in the national courts and it would be possible to set up 
S' In its revising of the original articles, Article 14 has been dropped and new Article 15 incorporates the 
substance of old articles 14 and 15. See Crawford, "Revising the Draft Articles on State Responsibility". 
S$ The International Law Commission did not distinguish between insurrectional movements and national 
liberation movements - see discussion in, Atlam, "National Liberation Movements and International 
Responsibility". 
59 See YBILC 1975 Vol. 1191 - 92, paragraphs 3- 6 and Ago (Special Rapporteur), 4th Report on State 
Responsibility, YBILC 1972 Vol. H 128 onwards, Doe. A/CN. 4/264 and Add. 1. 
60 See YBILC 1975 Vol. II 101. 
61 Since it does seem to be mainly practical problems which stop an unsuccessful group being held 
responsible it is possible to further argue that in a culture which attempts to encourage responsibility to be 
taken that unsuccessful groups should incur responsibility for their unlawful actions. Indeed once 
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a claims tribunal with the agreement of the group if there were a sufficiently large 
62 number of claims to be brought. This would however be a very unusual step. 
Nonetheless, despite these practical problems this does not alter the theoretical question 
of whether such claims should or could be made. 
The theory that a successful group may be held responsible for its internationally 
wrongful acts is also supported in state practice. By way of example, the ILC notes that 
this approach has been almost uniformly followed in the case law of arbitration 
Commissions. In the decision concerning the Bolivar Railway Company, Umpire 
Plumley for the British Venezuelan Mixed Claims Commission states that, 
"The nation is responsible for the obligations of a successful revolution from its beginning, because in 
theory, it represented ab initio a changing national will, crystallising in the finally successful result' ; 63 
A similar approach was taken in the Dix case where it was stated that, 
"The same liability attaches for encroachment upon the rights of neutrals in the case of a successful 
revolutionary government, as in the case of any other de facto government. "" 
This approach is typical of most state practice in the area and is of the kind taken by 
many arbitral tribunals. For example, in the French-Mexican Claims Commission of 
1924 the President of the Commission stated that, 
"... if the injuries originated... by revolutionaries before their final success, or if they were caused... by 
"6s successful revolutionary forces, the responsibility of the State, in my opinion, cannot be denied. 
However, the responsibility accorded in these cases is not really as a result of 
attempting to widen the possible number of entities which could be held responsible 
personality has been achieved at whatever level then a corollary of that claim is the corresponding duty to 
take responsibility for unlawful actions. 
62 For example, the PLO and Fretilin: Democratic Republic of East Timor, FRETILIN and Others v State 
of the Netherlands 871LR 73; United States v The Palestine Liberation Organisations and Others 82 ILR 
282 
63 IX RIAA 445, at 453. Similar lines of argument were taken in the following cases which inter alia the 
International Law Commission also refer to: Puerto Cabello and Valencia Railway Company Case IX 
RIAA 513; The Dix Case IX RIAA 120; French Company of Venezuelan Railroads Case X RIAA 285; 
Pinson Case V RIAA 353. The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal also noted the rule in Article 15 
regarding responsibility of a successful movement, see Rankin and Iran (1987 - IV) 17 Iran-US CTR 
135. 
64 United States-Venezuelan Mixed Claims Commission: The Dix Case, ibid. 
65 Pinson Case V RIAA 353. Also cited in YBILC (1975) Vol. II, at 102. 
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under international law and therefore accountable for their actions, or to promote a 
culture in which entities are encouraged to take responsibility. Indeed only successful 
groups are held responsible since: 
"Responsibility comes because it is the same nation. Nations do not die when there is a change of their 
rulers or in their forms of government. These are but expressions of a change of national will. "66 
Since these examples of state practice occurred in the early part of the twentieth century 
international society has changed somewhat, and as mentioned before, the number of 
non-state entities which have a degree of international legal personality has increased. 
In the light of this and particularly because of the existence of actors with variable 
levels of status there is a flaw in the ILC's appraisal of the situation of the non-state 
entity and the limitation of the attribution of responsibility to successful groups. This is 
because the ILC does not give sufficient consideration to the variety of potential 
situations in which wrongful acts may occur. For example, it does not sit well with 
situations in which the NLM has a significant, yet variable level of international legal 
capacity but has not however been fully successful in achieving its aims of statehood. 
Particularly if the movement is a long standing actor on the international stage. 
By only making successful groups responsible, international law could create a vacuum 
in the law of responsibility. The problem with the approach of the ILC, in not 
considering in further detail the moment at which the level of personality is sufficient to 
entail responsibility, 67 is that then there are occasions on which this could give rise to a 
vacuum where no one entity is responsible for the acts of insurgents. 68 
The variable personality theory can lengthen the time between the first moment of 
recognition to achievement of the aims of an insurrection movement due to the lack of 
need for international consensus on personality. This in turn potentially lengthens the 
time in which internationally wrongful acts could occur. Under the principles laid down 
by the ILC those wronged would be unable to seek redress until finally the movement is 
66 Bolivar Railway Company Case IX RIAA 445, at 452. 
67 Other than on achievement of statehood. 
68 Draft Article 14 provides that acts of the organs of insurrectional movements within the territory of a 
State are not to be considered as acts of that State. It is possible that this is mainly a foreseeable problem 
in prolonged struggles for independence or prolonged belligerent occupation as otherwise claims could be 
made against the government or a new government as soon as the revolution is over as there would not be 
too much delay. This is obviously particularly relevant for this thesis as there is more potential for delay 
when the entity concerned has a variable personality. 
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recognised internationally as the legitimate government of a State, and in some cases, 
until a new State comes into being. 
One way to plug this vacuum could be to change the moment when a revolutionary 
movement can become responsible by using the test of effective control, rather than 
simply waiting until it officially gains statehood. 
2.1: The test of Effective Control 
It is submitted that a more appropriate way to determine whether it should be possible to 
attribute responsibility to an insurrectional movement is to use the test of `effective 
control. ' The test to establish responsibility is whether the administrative authority has 
`effective control' over the entity which committed the internationally wrongful act. 
This has been used before in relation to States, for example, in the Nicaragua Case by 
the International Court of Justice. 69 Here the Court did not find that the unlawful acts of 
the `Contra' forces could be attributable to the United States government because: 
"For this conduct to give rise to legal responsibility of the United States, it would in principle have to be 
proved that that State had effective control of the military or paramilitary operations in the course of 
which the alleged violations were committed. i70 
In the Namibia Case71 the International Court of Justice used a similar test to that of 
effective control which they simply called by a slightly different name. They referred to 
`physical control' in relation to the attribution of responsibility. It seems that physical 
and effective control are both extremely similar in nature and are assessed on a de facto 
basis; 
"Physical control of a territory, and not sovereignty or legitimacy of title, is the basis of State liability for 
acts affecting other States. »72 
69 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, Merits (1986) ICJ Rep. 
14. 
70 Ibid., at 65, cited in Jennings and Watts (Eds. ), Oppenheim's International Law, at 541. 
71 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (1971) ICJRep. 16. 
72 Ibid., at 54. See also Brownlie, System of the Law of Nations, at 180 - 181, for further discussion of the 
Namibia Case and responsibility. 
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This test has been further developed in the recent case law of both the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). 73 
In the case of Tadic, the ICTY Appeals Chamber rejected the effective control test of 
the Nicaragua Case when dealing with State control of military or paramilitary groups 
and adopted the test of "overall control" instead: 
"Control by a State over subordinate armed forces or militias or paramilitary units may be of an overall 
character... The control required by international law may be deemed to exist when a State... has a role in 
"74 organising, co-ordinating or planning the military actions of the military group... 
In both cases referred to below (Musema and Blaskic), the criminal Tribunals were 
considering the slightly different issue of individual responsibility of superiors for those 
in their control. However the principles are possibly capable of being transferred to the 
similar issue of the overall responsibility of an entity for those who are fighting or 
acting on its behalf (as is the case when considering responsibility of NLMs which as 
yet are not fully successful). 
In the Musema Case a civilian who wielded a significant amount of power within the 
local area was prosecuted under Article 6 (3) of the ICTR Statute which provides that 
accused persons can be held criminally responsible as a "superior" for the failures to 
act. The test used to establish whether Article 6 (3) is fulfilled was in effect one of 
effective control: 
"It is appropriate to assess on a case-by-case basis the power of authority actually devolved on an accused 
to determine whether or not he possessed the power to take all necessary and reasonable measure to 
prevent the commission of the alleged crimes or to punish their perpetration. Therefore the superior's 
actual or formal power of control over his subordinates remains a determining factor in charging civilians 
with superior authority. 05 
73 Respectively officially entitled: International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in 
the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations 
Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States Between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994 and 
The International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991. See 
Security Council Resolution 955 (1994) and Security Council Resolution 827 (1993) respectively. 
74 Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT - 94 -1-A (15 July 1999), at paras. 124 - 125. This 
quotation is also reproduced in Prosecutor v Tihomir Blaskic, Case No. IT - 95 - 14 -T (3 March 2000), 
at para. 121. 
's Prosecutor V Musema, Case No. ICTR - 96 - 13 -T (27 January 2000). Also cited in Aptel & 
Williamson, "Case Note: Prosecutor v Musema" (2000) 1(1) Melbourne JIL 131, at 135. It is interesting 
to note in relation to Musema that he was a civilian who exercised a degree of superiority over others as a 
result of his position within the society he lived in. 
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The ICTY has also used similar principles to find General Blaskic individually 
criminally responsible for the actions of those under his control. The Trial chamber 
stated that one of the elements needed to find a person guilty under Article 7 (3) of the 
ICTY Statute is that: 
"There must be a superior-subordinate relationship between the commander and the perpetrator. Not 
limited to individuals who are formally designated commander and possess de jure command, but also 
includes a person who possesses de facto command (effective control) over the perpetrators of the 
crime. »76 
As mentioned above it is possible to distinguish the example of a non-state actor 
potentially being held responsible with that of an individual. For that reason it could be 
argued that the refinements to the test of control provided in Musema and Blaskic 
should not be used in relation to an emerging state and that the essence of the test as laid 
down in the Nicaragua case should be applied. This is a valid point, however it is 
submitted that it is somewhat academic because the thrust of the test is the same. The 
central issue to note is that whether the test is called `overall control' or `effective 
control' and whichever elements are used to establish responsibility, a de facto 
approach is taken to determine responsibility, be it state or individual. Furthermore, the 
de facto approach has been consistently adopted throughout the cases laid out above 
over a significant period of time. 
The use of a test of effective control has already been discussed in relation to the 
criteria for a government in international law. " However, this topic must be revisited in 
relation to responsibility. It is easy to understand why a test of effective control is used 
in relation to state responsibility, since if an entity has no control over the actions of 
another entity it would not seem right that it incurred responsibility for those actions, as 
76 Prosecutor v Tihomir Blaskic, Case No. IT - 95 - 14 -T (3 March 2000), at para. 300 - 301. For 
further discussion regarding the laws relating to the responsibility of those in authority see, Bantekas, 
"ne Contemporary Law of Superior Responsibility" (1999) 93 AJIL 573. 
77 See Chapter One and section 1.2 of Chapter Three. See also, Peterson, "Recognition of Governments 
Should not be Abolished", at 3; Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law, at 137 -142. 
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it would in effect be acting simply as an insurer for all people or property within their 
territory. 
One potential problem with the test of effective control lies in the fact that with some 
non-state entities it may be possible for them to be in possession of some degree of 
control, perhaps over part of the territory, but would not necessarily be classed as 
having full effective control. 
However, this is overcome because the test of effective control is a de facto test and 
their actual responsibility over the specific act in question could be the decisive criteria 
for the attribution of responsibility. Since the theory of variable personality can also 
mean that the length of time it takes for an entity to finally achieve its goals can be 
lengthy, without the use of the de facto test for liberation movements which have not 
yet achieved statehood, there is the real possibility that a vacuum without responsibility 
could be created. The vacuum would mean that an entity or individual which/who 
wanted to bring a claim against the non-state group could be unable to do so until it 
achieved statehood - which when the example such as Palestine is considered, is an 
extremely long time. 
In section 3 below the issues which have been raised so far will be applied to the 
Palestinian situation. When this is done, it may be possible to see the test of effective 
responsibility more clearly and also the implications that variable personality can have 
on the workings of responsibility in practice. 
Remaining with the theories of attribution of responsibility to non-state entities, this 
study now turns to the question of what or whose acts may be possible to impute to such 
an entity. The next section aims to look at the imputability problems which could arise 




Under customary international law a State is not responsible for all acts of all entities or 
individuals within its jurisdiction. Acts must be attributable to a State through 
establishing proof of a principal-agency relationship. 78 
If an act is carried out on behalf of a State it would not be difficult to establish such a 
relationship. When the entity claimed against is a State, the relevant law on 
imputability of acts of organs of state, international organisations and agents is laid 
down by Draft Articles 5- 13 on State Responsibility. However, in situations where 
there is an attempt to impute responsibility to a non-state entity the situation is less 
clear, and there is potentially greater scope for problems to arise in the establishment of 
the principal-agency relationship. Many of the problems could arise out of the fact that 
claims may well be made as a result of the struggle or insurgency itself. The question 
of whether the non-state group is responsible for the actions of all individuals of the 
population who rise up against the existing administrative or State power, or whether it 
is only responsible for the acts of its agents is most certainly an issue. This is so 
particularly as it could be argued that the actions of a group of individuals who are 
involved in an uprising are acting on behalf of an insurrectional movement, albeit not 
with specific authority. 
In order to consider the different layers of responsibility which a non-state entity could 
incur, it is perhaps simplest to create a number of example situations and then examine 
how the relevant case law applies. 
i) First, let us imagine the situation where for example, a UK citizen is in the territory 
of a State where a struggle is being waged between a non-state insurrectional movement 
and an existing State. The UK citizen is then caught up in the struggle and is injured by 
a bullet from the rifle of a member of the insurrectional movement itself who has been 
ordered by the movement command to storm a governmental building. 
78 See for example, Caire Claim, France v Mexico, French - Mexican Claims Commission (1929) V RIAA 
516. See also, Lillich and Magraw (Eds. ), The American Society of International Law: The Iran-United 
States Claims Tribunal: Its Contribution to the Law of State Responsibility (New York: Transnational 
Publishers) (1997), at 126. 
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It is generally accepted that, "a State whose government is the expression of a 
successful insurrectional movement must be answerable for the acts committed by 
agents of that movement during the struggle". 79 Therefore in a situation where the 
organs or agents of a non-state entity, which has a variable but significant level of 
personality, inflict damage upon a UK citizen, it is possible that international 
responsibility could be attributed. The action would be attributed on the basis that the 
insurrectional movement group satisfied the de facto test of effective control and that 
the acts of its agents or organs were deemed to be acts of the movement. 
The basic principle of attribution is laid down by the ILC in Draft Articles 580 and 681 
and case law also supports the theory that a State is responsible for the actions of agents 
and organs of a successful insurrectional movement. In Short v Iran82 it was held that 
the government is responsible for the acts imputable to the revolutionary movement 
which subsequently took over the running of the State, even if those acts occurred prior 
to its establishment. 83 
The situation could become more complicated if the question arises as to whether 
certain parts of the movement towards revolution which actually committed the act are 
in fact organs or agents of the insurrectional movement. This issue was also raised in 
" YBILC 1975 Vol. 11104. 
80 "For the purpose of the present articles, conduct of any State organ having status under the internal law 
of that State shall be considered as an act of the State concerned under international law, provided that 
organ was acting in that capacity in the case in question. " 
81 "The conduct of an organ of the State shall be considered as an act of that State under international law 
whether that organ belongs to the constituent, legislative, executive, judicial or other power, whether its 
functions are of an international or an internal character and whether it holds a superior or subordinate 
position in the organisation of the State. " 
Z (1987- III) 16 Iran-US CTR 76. 
83 The case of Short v Iran comes from the case law of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal. It provides the most 
up-to-date comprehensive set of case law regarding responsibility during times of revolution. The claims 
tribunal was set up in 1981 in order to settle the many claims between the United States of America and 
Iran. These had arisen because of the revolution which occurred in Iran during the 1970s. The Shah who 
was in power before the revolution occurred had encouraged mass American investment in Iran and many 
civilian and military Americans had been sent to Iran in connection with these businesses and military 
activities. The progressive events of the revolution in Iran notably during 1978 -9 meant that many 
Americans were forced to leave, their business interests were affected or they were personally injured. 
During the course of the revolution there was a great deal of anti-American feeling in the State and there 
were numerous strikes and demonstrations which were often accompanied with violence. The Americans 
saw the culmination of this anti-western feeling embodied in the seizure of the American Embassy in 
Tehran on 4 November 1979 by students and the later endorsement of this action by the Iranian leaders. 
The Shah was toppled and the Pahlevi monarchy was replaced with an Islamic Republic which actively 
discouraged American involvement in the State. For further discussion of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal 
see, Aldrich, The Jurisprudence if the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (Oxford: Clarendon Press) 
(1996); Lillich and Magraw (Eds. ), The American Society of International Law: The Iran-United States 
Claims Tribunal; Mouri, The International Law of Expropriation as Reflected in the Work of the Iran/US 
Claims Tribunal (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers) (1994). 
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the Iran-US Claims Tribunal in relation to the Revolutionary Guards who were 
revolutionaries loyal to the insurrectional movement and new government. However, 
they did not receive a permanent position within the structure of the Islamic government 
until after the new government was installed in office. Nonetheless, during the 
revolution and its immediate aftermath they were formed in organised groups and acted 
as local security forces which the Ayatollah Khomeini (of the new government) 
supported. The Tribunal stated on this issue that, 
"... since they [the revolutionary guards] were not recognised during the period relevant to this case, 
attributability of acts to the State is not limited to acts of organs formally recognised under internal law. 
Otherwise a state could avoid responsibility under international law merely by invoking its internal 
law... The Tribunal finds sufficient evidence in the record to establish a presumption that the 
revolutionary guards ... were acting 
in fact on behalf of the new government, or at least exercised 
elements of governmental authority in the absence of official authorities, in operations in which the new 
government must have had knowledge and to which it did not specifically object. i84 
It can be seen then that a de facto approach is taken in deciding whether a person or 
group is an agent or organ of the State. It is submitted that whilst this is potentially 
problematic in terms of evidence for situations of claims against non-state insurrectional 
movements, in principle the question of what is imputable can be the same as in relation 
to states. 
The employment of the test of effective control to establish potential responsibility of 
the insurrectional movement, coupled with the test of imputability of the act itself, 
means that the possible vacuum of responsibility is filled as effectively as if the claim 
was being made against a state. Moving on from this fairly straightforward example, a 
different scenario will now be considered in order to examine the further layers of 
imputability. 
ii) In the second example the facts are the same as in the first, however the member of 
the insurrectional movement which fires the rifle is not involved in a specific group 
action. In firing the rifle an individual is acting beyond the extent of the authority s/he 
has as a result of a position. 
In domestic law there is a long standing principle that ultra vires acts of public 
authorities are still subject to legal consequences for those affected by the action. In 
84 Yeager v Iran (1987) 17 Iran-US CTR 92, at 102 - 4. For further discussion of the issue of the 
Revolutionary Guards see, Aldrich, ibid., at 196 - 200. 
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international law the situation is not quite so clear. If the test of effective control was 
satisfied, as before, it seems logical that the test to establish whether the act is imputable 
to the insurrectional movement is the same as if the act were to be imputed to a state. 
In the Caire Claim85 it was held that responsibility is imputable to the State for ultra 
vires action if, 
"... it is necessary that they should have acted, at least apparently, as authorised officials or or ans, or 
that, in acting they should have used powers or measures appropriate to their official character... " 6 
The distinction between private acts of officials which are outside the scope of Draft 
Article 10 (see below) and of acts which are within the apparent scope of authority, and 
thus imputable to the state, is very difficult to draw and situations must therefore be 
treated on a case by case basis. This difficulty is demonstrated in Youmans case. 87 in 
this case responsibility was imputed to the state. However the Commission noted that, 
"Soldiers inflicting personal injuries or committing wanton destruction or looting always act in 
disobedience to some rules laid down by superior authority. There could be no liability whatever for such 
misdeeds if the view were taken that any acts committed by soldiers in contravention of instructions must 
always be considered as personal acts. " 
The status of these cases as customary international law on the topic seems to be 
uncontroversial, indeed Draft Article 10 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility by 
the ILC was attempt to codify these customary rules. It provides that: 
"The conduct of an organ of a state, of a territorial governmental entity or of an entity empowered to 
exercise elements of the governmental authority, such organ having acted in that capacity, shall be 
considered as an act of the state under international law even if, in the particular case, the organ exceeded 
its competence according to internal law or contravened instructions concerning its activity. " 
The principle emerging from this article could be ambiguous. However the ILC did 
give an example of what kind of situations would not be covered by Draft Article 10: 
"If a policeman off duty uses the weapon supplied to him by the state for the purposes of killing an alien 
of whom he is jealous, that is not sufficient, in the eyes of the Commission, to justify attributing such 
action to the State under international law. "88 
85 (1929) V RIAA 516. The Claim related to the fact that money had been demanded from Caire on pain 
of death by a senior ranking officer in the Mexican Conventionist forces. He then ordered that the 
shooting of Caire when he did not pay up. 
86 Ibid., at 530. This passage is also cited by Brownlie, Systems of the Law of Nations, at 146. 
87 (1926) IV RIAA 110. In this case soldiers were meant to be protecting aliens from rioters, but instead 
participated in the violence which resulted in the death of the aliens. 
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The question of ultra vires action has been raised in a recent well-known case in the 
United Kingdom. In the Pinochet case the former Head of State of Chile was held 
accountable for acts of torture allegedly committed whilst he was in post. The series of 
cases regarding General Augusto Pinochet Duarte was complex and interesting for a 
number of different reasons both relevant to national and international law. 89 However, 
for the purposes of this examination it is important to note that when examining the 
issue of immunity from action, as a result of his status as Head of State, for alleged acts 
of torture and human rights abuse, the House of Lords considered what would fall 
outside the protection of sovereign immunity. The Law Lords ruled that under s 20 of 
the State Immunity Act (1978) a former Head of State enjoys immunity only for acts 
done in his or her official capacity. The alleged acts of torture were potentially 
international crimes against humanity and as such there could be no immunity under 
national law. A fortiori there could be no immunity after December 1988 when the 
International Convention Against Torture (1984) had been ratified by Chile (the place 
where the alleged acts had occurred), Spain (the State seeking extradition of Pinochet 
for those crimes) and the UK (where Pinochet was residing). 90 
The Pinochet case is distinguishable from the scenario (ii) considered in this chapter 
above because here the question of the responsibility of a non-state group is being 
considered, and in Pinochet it was individual responsibility. However it is instructive 
insofar as it demonstrates that courts are less willing to accord protection to individuals 
who commit human rights abuses, or other actions, which are clearly outside the remit 
of their authority. 
Once again, whilst the questions surrounding ultra vires actions and their imputability 
are not easy to answer, there doesn't appear to be any reason why the same tests cannot 
be applied if such a claim were to be brought against a non-state entity. 
iii) In the third scenario the situation is basically the same as the first, except the UK 
citizen is this time injured by a brick which is thrown by a citizen of the State in which 
the insurrection is occurring and who is a supporter of the revolution. 
88 YBILC 1975 Vol. 1169. 
89 See Bianchi, "Immunity versus Human Rights: The Pinochet Case" (1999) 10(2) EJIL 1. 
90 Rv Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (no. 3) (1999) 2 WLR 
827. 
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In the Case of United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, which arose out 
of the seizure of the American Embassy in Tehran during the Revolution, questions of 
imputability regarding supporters of a insurrectional movement were raised. The Court 
clearly recalled the principle that the acts of supporters of a revolution (as opposed to its 
agents) could be attributed to the State. 91 In that case the United States submitted that 
statements of the Ayatollah had incited supporters to take anti-American action and that 
the State was therefore responsible. However, in that case the Court was not persuaded 
on the facts and stated that the statements in question were not sufficiently directly 
linked to the action and were too general in nature to impute responsibility. 
This question was also considered in the Iran-US Claims Tribunal. In Short v Iran the 
Tribunal held that the acts of supporters of a revolution cannot be attributed to the 
government after the revolution is over and the new government takes power. 92 Partly 
due to problems finding sufficient evidence to attribute actions of insurgent's supporters 
to the State93 and partly because of the application of the principle in Short, the Tribunal 
attributed very few instances of such action to the government. 94 
The Tribunal did however note that if an insurgent group is sufficiently vociferous and 
influences the population, perhaps through statements or calls to arms, then wrongful 
acts may be reasonably foreseeable. If so, the chain of causation may be proven 
sufficiently to incur at least some degree of responsibility; 
"Even if the act of pulling the trigger is not attributable to the State because the actor is a private citizen 
and not an "agent" of the movement, an insurgency movement nonetheless, through its own acts, such as 
statements, may be said to have encouraged and thereby caused, at least in part, the pulling of the 
trigger. "95 
It is hard to state categorically therefore exactly when the link between statements and 
actions of supporters would be strong enough to impute responsibility. However this is 
clearly a question of fact and would therefore be assessed on a case by case basis. 
Overall however, as with states, once effective control is assumed by the non-state 
91 Case of United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (1980) 3 ICJRep. 29. 
92 Short v Iran (1987 - 111) 16 Iran - US CTR 76, at para. 34. 
" Arthur Young and Co. and Iran (1987 - IV)17 Iran-US CTR 245. 
" See for example, William Pereira and Iran (1984 - I) 5 Iran-US CTR 198 and Computer Sciences and 
Iran (1986 - I) 10 Iran-US CTR 
269. 
95 Lillich and Magraw (Eds. ), The American Society of International Law: The Iran-United States Claims 
Tribunal, at 126. 
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entity, as a matter of policy the same principles of attribution could be applied as in 
cases of claims against states. 
iv) In the fourth scenario the situation is the same as in the first. To re-cap, a UK citizen 
is in the territory of a State where a struggle is being waged between a non-state 
insurrectional movement and an existing State. The UK citizen is then caught up in the 
struggle and is injured by a bullet from the rifle of a member of the insurrectional 
movement itself who has been ordered by the movement command to storm a 
governmental building. The additional issue in this scenario is that the non-state 
insurrectional movement, which effectively controls the territory in which the 
insurrection is occurring, fails to provide adequate means of redress for injured aliens. 
International law is clear on the issue of being able to seek redress for breaches of 
responsibility. Draft Article 22 provides that, 
"When the conduct of a State has created a situation not in conformity with the result required of it by an 
international obligation concerning the treatment to be accorded to aliens, whether natural or juridical 
persons, but the obligation allows that this or an equivalent result may nevertheless be achieved by 
subsequent conduct of the State, there is a breach of the obligation only if the aliens concerned have 
exhausted the effective local remedies available to them without obtaining the treatment called for by the 
obligation or, where that is not possible, an equivalent treatment. " 
This is a more problematic question for insurrectional movements which are in effective 
control, since the test of effective control does not necessarily include the provision that 
full and good relationships with the existing judiciary have been established. 
Furthermore, if a new state is being set up it may take a while for the necessary 
mechanisms to be put in place before those seeking redress could achieve it. However, 
it is argued that this issue, whilst potentially problematic for insurrection movements 
which are in effective control of territory is no worse than the current situation in 
international law where those injured must wait until a movement is successful if they 
have any chance of bringing a successful claim. Therefore, there is no reason why 
similar principle cannot be applied to an entity with variable yet significant status. 
Overall, it is interesting to note that the jurisprudence in this area tends to adopt a 
factual approach to dealing with imputability. This is complimentary to the variable 
personality theory which also deals primarily with the realities of recognition and status. 
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Together they assist each other by using similar tools of analysis which in the long term 
will help to provide a more cohesive, logical and therefore simpler way of dealing with 
international legal issues. 
It appears that as long as the principles which have in general been used to establish 
State responsibility could also be used to determine whether non-state entities are 
responsible, in most circumstances no particular difficulties arise. Obviously, there are 
potential issues which could arise relating to the obtaining of evidence, or of clarity 
regarding exactly who or what carries out which functions in a movement which has 
recently gained effective control, as their systems are unlikely to be as established as the 
existing State's. However, since a de facto approach is taken there is no reason why 
these problems could not be overcome. 
An approach, such as the one described above, which would allow for the incurring of 
responsibility by an insurrectional movement in effective control, certainly goes a long 
way towards filling the gap which is currently left in international law by the failing of 
correct interpretation of the link between personality and responsibility. Allowing 
insurrectional movements in effective control of territory to incur responsibility for their 
wrongful actions is better for those who have been subjected to an internationally 
wrongful act as they are able to seek redress and offered better protection. It is also 
better for international law in general as it provides a more cohesive and effective body 
of rules. 
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2.3: Conclusions thus far 
It is submitted that the discussion so far has produced four main conclusions which in 
the following section can be applied to the Palestinian situation in order to examine the 
responsibility of non-state groups with variable personality in practice. 
1) The importance of the link between variable personality and responsibility has been 
underdeveloped in studies of the both areas. 
2) As a result, the responsibility of insurrectional movements has been largely ignored 
until a group becomes successful and takes on the governance of a state. 
3) As a result of the combination of points 1 and 2 above, there is a gap in the law of 
responsibility. This is particularly the case if a group has a variable level of 
personality for an extended period of time due to the power struggle they are 
involved in remaining unresolved. 
4) The de facto tests of control and imputability which are already applied in relation 
to states would appear in theory to be possible to also apply to non-state insurrection 
groups. 
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3: RESPONSIBILITY IN THE PALESTINIAN CONTEXT 
In Part I of this thesis it was established that Palestine and its representatives have a 
variable personality but have not yet achieved statehood. Therefore, under the ILC's 
rules it cannot yet be attributed with responsibility for unlawful acts. However, as 
pointed out above, this means that in practice there is potentially a vacuum of 
responsibility created. The following two sections aim to consider how the ideas 
expressed in the chapter so far can be applied to the Palestinian situation in order to 
think about how responsibility and variable personality work, or could work in practice. 
First, section 3.1 will give a few examples of different types of events which are the 
kind of issues where the question of responsibility arises in relation to the Palestinian 
situation. The examples provided are by no means intended to be a comprehensive list 
of instances where international responsibility could be raised as an issue, (for this task 
would be huge). Neither are they to be used to establish exactly who is responsible and 
for what in those individual circumstances, as without a detailed enquiry into the 
evidence surrounding each incident this would be inappropriate. However it is hoped 
that these brief examples will assist in contextualising the chapter and provide a picture 
to frame the discussion. 
Second, section 3.2 will consider whether, in the light of the personality of Palestine and 
the representatives of the Palestinian people, Israel can be held to have some degree of 
responsibility for acts which occur inside the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
Third, section 3.3 will then move on to look at the potential for responsibility of the 
PLO and the PA. This involves examining their responsibility under the law as it 
stands. However this section will also investigate what it would mean for the PLO and 
the PA if the tests, which were suggested in section 2 to incur responsibility of non-state 
groups, were applied. This last section should help to explain why the proposed 
amendments to the law of responsibility of non-state actors are more appropriate when a 
situation of variable personality is encountered. 
214 
3.1: Examples of the kind of situations where questions of responsibility could be 
raised in the Palestinian context. 
The examples given in this section are all real or reported occurrences which have been 
found in the press or books. Given the violent and difficult history of the area there are 
of course many instances which could have been chosen. Those which were picked 
however, are not all intended to be pure examples of when responsibility would 
definitely be incurred or, most importantly, a full catalogue of events. Their aim is to 
provide examples of the kind of situations which occur in Palestine and Israel and some 
would be unlikely to incur responsibility at a state or non-state entity level. 
After these examples have been given, in order to place the discussion which takes 
place in section 3 in context, the study will move directly on to the question of Israeli 
and Palestinian responsibility so that the questions of responsibility which these 
examples illustrate can be borne in mind. 
i) On 10 August 1999 a 23 year old Palestinian from a refugee camp near 
Bethlehem sped his car into a group of Israeli soldiers who were waiting to be 
picked up and returned to their base. 8 soldiers were injured before the young 
Palestinian male was shot dead. No organisation took responsibility for his 
conduct. However, some organisations within Palestine had been championing 
the notion of individual's carrying out "martyrdom operations" rather than group 
organised suicide bombings because they are more difficult for the PA and Israel 
to control. 96 
ii) The shooting of two Israeli settlers who were wounded in Hebron's old city in 
early August 1999. Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack. 97 
iii) On ist January 1997 a lone Israeli gunman, who was an off-duty soldier, fired 
for over 10 seconds into a crowded Hebron street, wounding a number of 
Palestinian citizens. 8 
96 For report see Amayreh, "New Harnas Offensive? " 606 MEI20 August 1999 6. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Reuters, "Ten seconds that shook the Middle East" The Independent 2 January 1997 10. 
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iv) On 250' September 1996 Israeli soldiers killed 5 Palestinians and wounded more 
than 300 during Palestinian protests in Ramallah in the West Bank. 
v) In November 1998 Ayman Amasi was acquitted by an Israeli court of a theft and 
rape in the Arab village of Tira in Israel. Six months later on 15 May 1999 he 
was arrested for a second time by the Palestinian police force. He was beaten 
and tortured by them and suffered a brain haemorrhage during questioning. It is 
reported that, despite having been already tried for the same offence, following a 
telephone call to Yasser Arafat, authority was given for him to be "punished for 
his crime". 99 
vi) On 315` July 1997 two suicide bombers killed 15 and injured over 150 in attacks 
on an open air Israeli market in Jerusalem. It is not clear who carried out the 
attacks although there were suspicions that they may have been linked to 
Hamas. 10° 
vii) In summer 1976 two Arabs and two West Germans hijacked a plane and 
separated the Jewish passengers from the other passengers (who were released). 
The plane was landed in Entebbe airport in Uganda. There were questions 
surrounding Palestinian involvement in the raid, however there were also issues 
regarding the use of force which Israel employed in order to rescue the 
remaining hostages when it stormed the plane. The hijackers and some Israeli 
and Ugandan soldiers were killed in the raid. '°' 
viii) During late 2000 and early 2001 there were a number of attacks on Jewish 
settlers in the West Bank and also others inside Israeli territory. Palestinian 
sources acknowledge that Osama Jawabri had taken part in them and that he was 
a member of the Fateh organisation which is headed by Yasser Arafat. Jawabri 
was assassinated in a revenge attack through a bomb in a telephone box he was 
using, reportedly by the Israeli army. 102 
99 Amayreh, "Shambolic Justice" 601 ME14 June 1999 10. 
'°° Nolen, "Tell me - am I dead or alive? " The Independent 31 July 1997 1. 
101 See the Security Council debates on the incident which are reprinted in (1976) 15 ILM 1224. 
102 Silver, "Palestinian killed by an Israeli booby trap" The Independent 25 June 2001 11 
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3.2: Israeli Resnonsibility? 
It should be made clear at the outset of this section that the international responsibility 
of Israel for its own unlawful acts is not in question here. The issue is whether it is 
possible to impute to Israel internationally unlawful acts which occur within the 
territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, possibly including the actions of the PLO, 
PA and their organs or agents. 
The responsibility of Israel is considered here because it could be suggested that in a 
situation like that in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Israel, rather than Palestinian bodies 
are responsible for internationally wrongful acts committed there. Such an approach 
would be based on the principle that as Israel is the administrative power it must take 
responsibility for the territories under its control. The test to establish responsibility is 
whether the administrative authority has `effective control' over the entity which 
committed the internationally wrongful act. Such a test was used in the Nicaragua Case 
by the International Court of Justice. 103 Here the Court did not find that the unlawful 
acts of the contra forces could be attributable to the United States government because: 
"For this conduct to give rise to legal responsibility of the United States, it would in principle have to be 
proved that that State had effective control of the military or paramilitary operations in the course of 
which the alleged violations were committed. i104 
Under this test it would be possible to argue that Israel is responsible for the actions of 
those it still has control over since the creation of the DOP (e. g.: the remaining Israeli 
soldiers carrying out tasks relating to security of Israelis within the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip). It would also be possible to impute responsibility to Israel for actions which are 
taken by those who work in areas of responsibility which have not been handed over to 
the PA through the DOP. I05 
It is suggested that such arguments would hold true whether the tests given the 
Nicaragua case or the modifications to it by the ICTY and ICTR were used. 106 This is 
because the question considered here is whether Israel or Palestine is responsible in 
'°3Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, Merits (1986) ICJ Rep. 
14. 
10` Ibid., at 65, cited in Jennings and Watts (Eds. ), Oppenheim's International Law, at 541. 
ios See Chapters Two and Three where these powers are discussed. See also further on this section for 
discussion regarding the power which Israel still holds in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
106 As discussed above in section 2.1. 
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general for potential acts committed inside the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The question 
is not whether a specific example of individual action can be imputed to either entity. 
For the purposes of this section, the tests are sufficiently similar to not affect decisions 
about whether Israel or Palestine is responsible for acts committed inside the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip, as both tests deal with the realities of a situation. Indeed, it has 
already been suggested in section 2.1 that the differences between the two tests in 
situations of state responsibility are academic as the thrust of all the case law is the de 
facto approach to attributing responsibility. In the context of the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip it is known which powers are still exercised by Israel and which powers have been 
handed over to the PA (as it is laid down in the Agreements). Therefore the difference 
between the types of tests suggested in the Nicaragua case and the Musema case would 
not affect the outcome of the question raised here. 107 Any differences in tests would 
only be argued in relation to a specific case once it had been decided which was the 
entity generally in control of that function of government. The tests would then be 
examined in relation to whether the entity which controlled the relevant function (i. e.: 
Israel or Palestine) had a sufficiently formed principal/agency relationship to the action 
in question. 
However, it is important to remember that one of the reasons why a de facto test was 
used in relation to responsibility is because if a State has no control over the actions of 
another entity, yet is held responsible for them, the State would be acting as insurer for 
all internationally unlawful circumstances. In the Palestinian situation it could be 
argued that potential Israeli responsibility is simply a consequence of her choosing not 
to recognise Palestine as a State and thereby admitting that the PLO and the PA are in 
effective control of all areas of government. 
In the areas where Israel could be deemed to still be the effective administrative power 
it is possible that internationally unlawful actions of the PLO and the PA and its organs 
and agents could be attributable to Israel. Therefore the de facto test of effective control 
is a good one since it is flexible depending on the facts of the case being considered. 
107 In other situations where the delineation of which powers are exercised by which entity (including the 
entity with variable personality) are not clearly laid down, the situation would be much more complicated 
and the slight differences in the Nicaragua and Musema tests might need to be examined. In general, 
given that the Palestinian situation is an unusual example of power sharing and that situations where an 
entity with variable personality exists are more likely to be less formally arranged, it is quite possible that 
such an investigation would be required. 
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The following part of the discussion moves on to consider the extent of the Israeli 
influence in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It is therefore important, and very relevant 
for the application of the test of effective control in relation to both Israeli and 
Palestinian responsibility, however it is placed in this section simply because Israeli 
responsibility is the first to be considered. 
Israel does appear to consider itself to still have a degree of influence during the interim 
period within the whole of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This can be assumed from 
the text of the DOP itself which provides that the West Bank and Gaza Strip are "a 
single territorial unif"08 even if authority for public life in some areas is passed to the 
PA. Furthermore one of the Israeli drafters of the DOP and Legal Adviser to the Israeli 
Foreign Affairs Ministry has stated that the DOP does not alter the status of the 
occupied territories: 
"During the interim period, the status of the Gaza Strip and Jericho area will be identical to that of the 
West Bank... [Their status] will continue to be that of areas subject to military government, with Israel 
remaining the source of authority therein. "`o' 
The Cairo Agreement which established the first phase of the implementation of the 
interim agreements laid down in the DOP also reinforce this Israeli position. 110 Article 
V3 (b) asserts that, 
"Israel shall exercise its authority through its military government, which, for that end, shall continue to 
have the necessary legislative, judicial and executive powers and responsibilities, in accordance with 
international law. " 
The reference to international law must in this situation relate to the law of occupation 
governed by the Geneva Conventions. 
"" Therefore, under the international law of 
occupation it can be inferred that Israel would be considered to have effective power 
within the territories. If Israel were held to have effective powers within the territories 
it may be assumed that she would be internationally responsible for all internationally 
wrongful acts within the territories during the time of occupation. Therefore, it is 
108 Article IV, DOP. 
109 Singer, "The Declaration of Principles on Interim Self Government Arrangements" (1994) 1 Justice 
(Published by the International Association of Jewish Lawyers and Jurists) 4, at 12 - 13, also cited 
in 
Benvenisti, "The Status of the Palestinian Authority" Chapter 3 from Cotran and Mallat (Eds. ), The Arab- 
Israeli Accords, at 50. 
110 Cairo Agreement was signed in Cairo on 4 May 1994, for text see (1994) 33 ILM 622. 
111 See Chapter Five for discussion regarding the Geneva Conventions. 
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possible to submit that however much power is handed over to the PA, the Israeli 
government arguably still has ultimate responsibility under the traditional international 
law of occupation, whilst occupation at any level continues. 112 
This however, is a technical description of the law and does not necessarily paint a full 
picture of the realities of the situation in terms of the control which both Israel and the 
Palestinian Representatives have. 113 As has already been pointed out, the test of 
effective control is a de facto test, therefore the realities of the situation are what is 
important in terms of state responsibility. 
Overall, the Cairo Agreement presents a difficult technical situation in terms of 
responsibility. It states that Israel maintains her responsibility in relation to settlements, 
military locations, Israelis and external security. 114 However, overall it still depicts 
Israel as the occupying power. As was discussed in Chapters Two and Three however, 
there are many areas of public life which have been handed over to the PA to control. 
In practical terms this means that in the areas handed back to the PA the effective 
controlling power is that of the PA rather than Israel. Although Israel still has a varying 
degree of influence in those areas, as a result of Israeli troop withdrawals it can also not 
really be said to occupy them in the traditional sense. ' 15 This is a novelty in the 
international laws of occupation, indeed the Geneva Conventions are not framed in a 
way to deal at all well with questions of responsibility in such a situation. 116 
112 See Benvenisti, "The Status of the Palestinian Authority", at 50 where he notes in footnote 11 that, 
"The law of occupation does not relieve an occupant from the duty to cater for the interests of the 
occupying population by the mere fact of signing an agreement to transfer power to local groups. Article 
47 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 states: 'Inviolability of Rights: Protected persons who are in 
occupied territory shall not be deprived, in any case or in any manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the 
present Convention by any change introduced, as a result of the occupation of a territory, into the 
institutions or government of the said territory, nor by any agreement concluded between the authorities 
of the occupied territories and the Occupying power, nor by any annexation by the latter of the whole or 
part of the occupied territory'. " 
Having noted this it could be argued in the context of the Palestinian question that the DOP and the 
creation of the PA would in fact benefit the "protected persons" referred to in Article 47 since it is 
working towards the achievement of their right of self determination for if Article 47 is taken too literally 
it would not assist in the resolution of a situation of occupation. 
113 Looking at the realities of a situation is an important tool in international legal analysis, however it 
should also be noted that Benvenisti also adopts this approach in his article cited above. 
114 Article V 3. 
115 As discussed in section 2.1 above in relation to effective control. 
116 Benvenisti, `"The Status of the Palestinian Authority" in footnote 50 notes that Article 6(3) of Geneva 
Convention IV states that an occupant is only relieved of its duties under the Convention one year after 
the close of military operations "to the extent that such Power exercises the functions of government in 
such territory". This cannot be said to apply directly to the current situation in Palestine for as is 
discussed above and as Benvenisti points out, Israel no longer occupies all of the disputed territories. 
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In the geographical areas where authority has been handed over to the PA it would seem 
to be unlikely that Israel would be willing to accept responsibility for actions which 
could be imputed to the PA or PLO, particularly if they are actions which come within 
the PA's competence. However, if Israel did try to assume responsibility as a political 
act of ultimate authority and reinforce the lack of Palestinian statehood it would be 
extremely unlikely to be accepted by the PA, since the PA's aims are to increase its 
international competence rather than diminish it. 
The whole aim of the DOP and the Cairo agreement was to create an autonomous 
Palestinian institution which was beyond Israeli control. By suggesting that Israel can 
(or would want to) assume responsibility for its actions surely defeats its purpose. 
The lack of effective control which Israel has regarding the civil life of the areas handed 
over to the PA is also reinforced when the international law relating to occupation is 
considered. "7 
17he test for effective control is not the military strength of the foreign army which is situated outside the 
borders that surround the foreign area. What matters is the extent of that power's effective control of 
civilian life within the occupied area; their ability, in the words of Article 43 of the Hague Regulations, to 
`restore and ensure public order and civil life...... 8 
Given that authority for civil life has now been handed over to the PA within the Gaza 
Strip and parts of the West Bank, it is unlikely that Israel can be classed as an occupant 
in the usual sense under international law. ' 19 Therefore, applying the de facto test of 
effective control, Israel cannot be held responsible for actions of the PA within PA 
controlled areas for its status is a purely formal and somewhat contrived one. However, 
as discussed above, it could still be held responsible for actions which come within the 
functions it still has under the DOP. 
117 The Law of occupation alongside variable personality and the status of the PA will be considered in 
Chapter Five. 
"8 Benvenisti, "The Status of the Palestinian Authority", at 56 - 57. 
119 For example, under Article 43 of the Hague Regulations an occupant would be capable of "Restoring 
and ensuring public life" - however, Israel has clearly handed competence for many areas of public life 
over to the PA. 
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3.3: Palestinian Responsibility? 
At the outset of this section it should be noted that the ILC did recognise that the PLO 
possessed international legal personality, despite the fact that it did not support the idea 
that non-state entities should incur responsibility prior to achieving statehood: 
"... in the case of national liberation movements such as the PLO and SWAPO which had been 
recognised by the United Nations and consequently had separate international personality... 99120 
However, as was demonstrated in Chapter Three the personality of the PLO has moved 
on significantly since the mid 1970s. Indeed, as has just been discussed, Israel does 
not have full effective control over the West Bank and Gaza Strip and therefore her 
responsibility for unlawful acts within those areas is limited. In the light of this, unless 
responsibility may be incurred by the PA and the PLO, a vacuum of responsibility 
exists, thereby demonstrating that unless such a gap is deemed acceptable, the 
international law of responsibility needs to be re-appraised to ensure its compatibility 
with variable personality. 
In section 2 above, it was submitted that the test for responsibility of non-state entities 
should also be the test of effective control since this is a practical way of dealing with 
responsibility issues and personality. It was also suggested that despite the fact that 
imputability is a complex topic when applied to insurrectional movements, that the 
same rules should apply as would in cases of States. 
This section therefore aims to demonstrate how these proposed amendments to the law 
of responsibility could be applied to the PA and the PLO, in order to fill the vacuum in 
responsibility which is created as a result of their variable, yet significant level of 
international legal personality. 
In considering whether Palestine can incur responsibility (as a state would) under the 
proposed amendments the first question to pose is whether Palestine fulfils the test of 
effective control. As was discussed in Chapters Two and Three and above in the 
previous section there are many areas of public life within the parts of the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip which have been handed over to the PA to control. 
120 YBILC 1975 Vol. I 55. Other members of the ILC also acknowledge that the PLO has a "separate 
international personality" - see Mr. Elias, YBILC 1975 Vol. I 50. 
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Article VI paragraph 2 of the DOP provides that: 
"... with the view to promoting economic development in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.. " authority for 
"... education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism" are handed over to the PA 
as well as the authority to "commence in building the Palestinian police force ". 121 
Article VIII of the DOP further provides that the Police Force must be set in place - "In 
order to guarantee public order and internal security for the Palestinians of the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip... ". This wording demonstrates that issues of public order 
would be deemed to be within the control of the PA. 
However, as has been mentioned above, Israel remains in control of the external 
relations of the territories. Article VIII of the DOP emphasises these limits in the 
competence of the PA and reaffirms its lack of statehood by stating that some of the 
rights which are generally attached to statehood (such as the use of force in certain 
situations) are to remain within Israeli competence: 
"... Israel will continue to carry the responsibility for defending against external threats, as well as the 
responsibility for overall security of Israelis for the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and 
public order. " 
This does raise issues relating to the test of effective control since it seems that the PA 
and the PLO could not be deemed to have control over the life of those Israelis in 
settlements within the West Bank and Gaza Strip. However, it is submitted that this 
does not affect the PA's ability to control the areas which have been handed over to it, 
since settlement areas are generally not in PA controlled areas. 
Overall, the PA was given powers in the three generally accepted main branches of 
government; legislative, executive and judicial. 122 Even though the PA does not possess 
all the powers which a full government of a state would have, the existence of these 
three elements means that it is likely to fulfil a test of effective control in relations to the 
municipal functions it has been accorded, since the necessary systems are in place to 
help to achieve control. 
121 Article VI, para. 2, DOP. 
122 Article VII(2), DOP. 
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The international relations of the PLO and the PA have already been considered in 
previous chapters. 123 However, the fact that Israel still officially conducts the external 
international relations of the PA should be remembered. 124 It is submitted that this 
does not mean that the PA and the PLO should fail the test of effective control. The 
effective control test refers to the internal control an entity has over the territory and 
people within it. 
However, there are some areas of Palestinian international relations which it could be 
said have been fully handed over from Israeli control. For example, the Cairo 
Agreement provides that, 
"The PLO may conduct negotiations and sign agreements with states or international organisations for the 
benefit of the Palestinian Authority.. "125 
A vacuum of responsibility is not likely to be left in situations where there is such an 
agreement because the parties to the agreement (i. e. the PLO and the other 
signatory(ies)) would be in effect recognising the competence of the PA in the relevant 
area and also therefore its responsibility. Furthermore, only states or organisations 
which recognise the Palestinian Representation as a significant actor in the international 
community would be likely to enter into such agreements, therefore the question of at 
what point on the scale of personality an entity can incur responsibility is already 
answered in terms of its bilateral relationships. This practice demonstrates that a non- 
state actor, such as the Palestinian Representation may be internationally responsible in 
some situations such as in relation to agreements it enters into with third parties, despite 
its formal lack of full capacity under the DOP to enter into relations with the rest of the 
international community. As far as Israel is concerned, she is therefore absolved of any 
responsibility in relation to agreements entered into by the Palestinian Representation 
which come within Article VIb. 
126 
123 Notably Chapter Three 
124 Annex II, Article 3 (b), DOP. It is possible that this is an attempt by Israel to stop the Palestine from 
achieving all of the requirements for statehood under the Montevideo Convention . For discussion of the 
Montevideo Convention see section 1.2 in Chapter One and section 1.1 in Chapter Three. 
125 Article VIb- related particularly to international agreements on economic matters within the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip. 
126 It could be said that the procedural issue arises as to how a party to an agreement concluded on the 
authority of the Cairo Agreement would respond to a breach of the agreement. Since Palestine is not a 
State and therefore has no access to the International Court of Justice (Article 34(1) of the Court's Statute 
provides that only States may be party to cases decided by the Court), then surely breaches could only be 
dealt with through diplomatic channels or ad hoc arrangements. However, it could also be submitted that 
since the authority for the PLO to conclude agreements for the benefit of the PA derives from the Cairo 
Agreement rather than from its personality that these treaties are not "international" agreements since 
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This evidence leads to the assumption that in the shape of the PA there exists a non- 
state actor which has a great deal of `effective control' over much of Palestinian public 
life with which the administering authority is rightly not able to interfere. 
The variable personality of the Palestinian Representatives can be said to lengthen the 
period of time before statehood is achieved because States can take different stances on 
the status of an entity. Therefore as a result of variable personality, in practice and 
because the Palestinian Representation has an unsurpassed level of personality for a 
national liberation movement, 127 surely they are an ideal candidate for incurring 
responsibility as a result of passing the effective control test prior to attaining full 
statehood. 
As was discussed in section 2 above, even if an entity does fulfil the test of effective 
control, the issue of imputability is a complex one in relation to non-state entities. 
Therefore let us consider imputability in the Palestinian context by looking at similar 
scenarios to the four scenarios considered in section 2 in order to decide for whose 
actions the PA and the PLO could be held internationally legally responsible. 
i) In section 2 the first scenario involved an official of the non-state entity shooting 
a UK citizen whilst carrying out official orders. In the Palestinian context the 
example could be the same, but the official could be a member of the Palestinian 
Police Force, for example. 
It is submitted that the PA would be internationally legally responsible for injuries in 
such circumstances. International law clearly supports this proposition in relation to a 
State. 128 Therefore, since the PLO and the PA are in effective control of the actions of 
their police officers and other such agents of their organisations, they should be 
considered to be ultimately responsible for all actions which are carried out in an 
official capacity. 
they are not between States. On a similar point see Quigley, "The Israel-PLO Agreements: Are they 
Treaties? " (1997) 30 Cornell JL1717. 
"' See conclusion to Part I of thesis. 
128 As was discussed in section 2, the ILC was clear on the point that the State must take responsibility for 
the actions of its agents or organs when acting in an official capacity - See Draft Articles 5,6 and 7. 
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It would seem unthinkable to attempt to attribute responsibility for the kind of actions 
described in the scenario above to Israel since she clearly has no control over the policy 
or personnel of the PLO and the PA. 
ii) The second scenario described in 2 above concerned an official of the state who 
shot a UK citizen but in doing so was acting beyond the powers accorded to him 
by the non-state entity. In the Palestinian context this might be likened to a 
policeman shooting a UK citizen when he was sent to protect him from other 
Palestinian insurgents, as a result of his joining in with the uprising. 
It is submitted that this is a harder situation to deal with since the action of the 
policeman is ultra vires. In section 2 it was demonstrated that the test to impute 
responsibility is a de facto test. Therefore, despite his actions being ultra vires the 
specifics of his orders, it is a fact that the gunman is a policeman, who perhaps owns the 
weapon as a result of his post and has also been called to the scene because of his post. 
The fact that he then acts beyond his powers does not negate the fact that there is an 
element of authority under which he has acted. Unless he held such a post it is unlikely 
that the event would have occurred. Therefore, it is possible to argue effectively that 
the principal-agency relationship would be fulfilled. 
As in the previous example, this kind of scenario would be imputable to a state, 
therefore there seems to be no reason for it not to be imputable to the PA and the PLO 
simply because statehood has not yet been achieved. If the test of effective control is 
satisfied, then responsibility can only rightly be incurred by them. Indeed it must be 
incurred by them if the vacuum in responsibility is to be filled. 
iii) The third scenario in section 2 can be likened to that of a UK citizen being 
injured by a brick thrown by a Palestinian who is a supporter of the PLO and is 
demonstrating against a curfew placed by Israel on a town in an area of the West 
Bank handed over to the PA. 
In this situation, the test should once more be the same test as that applied to States. 
The case law of the Iran-US Claims Tribunalt29 proved to be most instructive in such 
129 See section 2 above. 
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situations. Therefore, unless there was a very strong direct link between the action of 
throwing the brick and incitement to do so by the PLO or the PA, it would be unlikely 
for international legal responsibility to be attributed. 
iv) The fourth scenario from section 2 relates to the lack of means of redress for the 
wronged individual. 
For non-state entities it is possible that providing a means of redress for aliens who are 
victims of unlawful acts may be problematic as the mechanisms in which redress might 
be sought may well not be set up until the movement is successful and achieves 
statehood. However, in the Palestinian situation judicial functions were given to the 
Palestinian Authorities through the DOP, therefore it is submitted that the PA would be 
internationally responsible for a failure to provide adequate systems for redress. 130 
This chapter puts forward the proposals that non-state entities in general should have the 
same tests for responsibility as States if they satisfy the test of effective control. 
Therefore, in the Palestinian situation, as a result of its extremely high level of 
international status and its relatively well-developed internal organs and agencies, the 
argument for the incurring of responsibility is even stronger. 131 
Benvenisti also argues that the PA should incur responsibility for wrongful acts within 
its competence on the basis that state sovereignty is not a prerequisite for international 
responsibility. 132 He relies on the changing nature of the sovereign state and the 
outdated Westphalian approach which is being slowly eroded by the increased number 
of actors on the international stage. 133 
The changing nature of the State-centric international society does mean that traditional 
notions of responsibility must also change if there is to be a comprehensive framework 
of law relating to international responsibility. Using the test of effective control, plus 
the usual tests regarding imputability, would then allow the reality of a situation and the 
130 Article VII (2), DOP. 
131 A high level of status as demonstrated in Chapter Three. 
132 Benvenisti, "The Status of the Palestinian Authority", at 62 - 63. 
133 Benvenisti considers the responsibility of international organisations like the UN and the EU. 
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functions of those exercising authority to become the defining issue regarding 
responsibility. 
This realistic approach would be much more in keeping with the theory of variable 
personality. It means that entities other than full sovereign states could be held liable 
for their actions or those of their agents. There would be no vacuum of responsibility 
and States could continue to exercise some discretion in awarding personality to an 
entity without fear that their own or their citizens rights are being swept under the 
carpet. 
It is true to say that a State which wanted to enforce Palestinian responsibility, but did 
not choose to recognise it as a legal person, may find difficulties under this approach as 
it could be argued that bringing a claim amounts to de facto recognition. However, if 
it was widely accepted that non-sovereign entities can be held internationally 
responsible for their wrongful actions then the practical effect of any claims of de facto 
recognition would be minimised. 
There is no doubt that the issue as to which forum such a claim could be brought is a 
significant hurdle to overcome. It is not impossible for a non-state actor to be party to a 
case in a national court. 134 Nonetheless, the lack of statehood makes the traditional 
mechanisms for dispute settlement (such as the International Court of Justice) 
unsuitable. It is not beyond the realms of possibility that a specific tribunal could be set 
up in which claims could be brought against a non-state entity, however there would 
have to be a sufficient number of claims to make this financially viable. Furthermore, 
such a step would be a very unusual one to make where one of the actors was a non- 
state actor with variable levels of personality. 
The conclusion that the PA should be responsible for actions within the areas handed 
back to it rather than Israel is very important in relation to the theory that personality 
may be variable. However, whether any state would want to bring a claim, and indeed 
whether they would easily be able to before statehood was achieved is, to a degree, 
doubtful. 135 However, this does not change the fact that variable personality and the 
"` For example, United States v PLO and Others 82 ILR 282 and Democratic Republic of East Timor, 
FRETILIN and Others v State of the Netherlands 87 ILR 73. 
135 For example, see the comments above and also in section 2 above regarding a few of the potential 
practical problems regarding the bringing of a claim. 
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existence of entities such as the PA leaves a discrepancy in the international law of state 
responsibility. Without a more inclusive approach to the responsibility of non-state 
actors, states are left to make decisions on when the level of an entity's personality is 
sufficiently high to incur responsibility by according statehood. Moreover this would 
also run the risk of further politicising recognition decisions. 
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CONCLUSION 
This chapter has three main conclusions which are re-emphasised here in order to 
highlight the importance of the debate this thesis is raising and to demonstrate in clear 
point form the consequences which arise in relation to question of responsibility as a 
result of the existence of non-state entities with variable personality on the international 
stage. 
First, overall it seems that the rules relating to state responsibility are not sufficiently up 
to date to take into account the changing types of actors on the international stage. 
Therefore the current international law governing international responsibility does not 
work compatibly with the theory of variable personality. When entities exist which 
have personalities governed by complex webs of many different bilateral relationships, 
rather than by the formation of international consensus regarding status, then surely the 
rules relating to responsibility need to be more flexible to incorporate these different 
types of actors with potentially variable personalities. This is important in situations 
like those in Palestine where there may be conflict and therefore personality may be 
most variable as these are also the situations where potentially many internationally 
wrongfully acts maybe committed. 
This first point leads on to the second main conclusion which has been a running theme 
throughout this thesis; international law is currently not a fully cohesive body of rules. 
By its very nature international law has been built up on an ad hoc basis. Therefore if 
attempts are made to codify it and place those rules in some order (as in the case of the 
ILC), it is surely better to do so by considering all relevant issues, including personality. 
For even if this does make consolidation a (even more) lengthy process, it should make 
the results far more useful and workable. 
Third, in this chapter it has been shown by using the Palestinian example that without a 
re-think in the law of responsibility vacuums can appear where responsibility for 
internationally wrongful actions can be shirked. 
However, this chapter has also shown that it is possible to construct a better framework 
for laws of responsibility which takes into account both variable personality and the rise 
in the number of non-state entities with international legal personality. The proposals to 
allow non-state entities to be subject to similar rules as states in the area of 
230 
responsibility are sensible and workable because they take a de facto approach to an 
entity's personality and also use well-known tests and principles. The proposals 
provide that an entity's functions and activities dictate the level of responsibility which 
it must incur. A functionalist approach is better because it allows the personality of 
actors on the international stage to be taken into account. 
This results primarily in a more effective system of international law because it admits 
that personality can be variable and attempts to reconcile such variability with other 
areas of international law. In addition however, it deals with the reality of the increased 
number of non-state actors on the international stage and provides a workable set of 
tests aimed at ensuring responsibility for unlawful action is taken, rather than dismissed. 
"Rather than grope for the seat of sovereignty, we should adjust our intellectual framework to a multi- 
layered reality consisting of a variety of authoritative structures. Under this functionalist approach what 
matters is not the formal status of a participant... but its actual or preferable exercise of functions. i136 
136 Schreuer, "The Waning of the Sovereign State: Towards a New Paradigm for International Law? " 




VARIABLE PERSONALITY AND THE RIGHTS OF THOSE 
SUBJECT TO ITS JURISDICTION 
INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter has looked at the link between variable personality and 
responsibility. This chapter continues with the theme of examining whether variable 
personality is reflected in other areas of international law. However, on this occasion 
this is in relation to responsibility in the specific context of the protection of human 
rights. Chapter Four was concerned with the responsibility of an entity with variable 
personality towards others on the international plane. In contrast, this chapter deals 
with the rights of those subject to the jurisdiction of such an entity within the areas it 
purports to control. 
Once again the case study of Palestine will be used, for it is not a state but does have 
some form of personality on the international stage. Therefore, the issues here are the 
rights of Palestinians within the territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It will be 
instructive in considering who is responsible for the implementation of international 
human rights norms and who is responsible for their breach in situations where an entity 
with variable personality exists. Palestine is a good example not only because it 
provides an classic example of variable personality in practice, but it is also a situation 
where human rights have been at the forefront of much international concern. ' 
1 As evidence of this international concern the UN set up a Special Committee to Investigate Israeli 
Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Populations of the Occupied Territories (although it should 
be noted that there has been much controversy affecting the work of this committee - see Dinstein, "The 
Israeli Supreme Court and the Law of Belligerent Occupation: The Reunification of Families" (1988) 18 
Is. YHR 173, at 172). See also Falk & Weston, "The Relevance of International Law to Israeli and 
Palestinian Rights in the West Bank and Gaza Strip" and Dugard, "Enforcement of Human Rights in the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip" both from Playfair, International Law and the Administration of the Occupied 
Territories (Oxford: Clarendon Press) (1992), at 125 and 461 respectively, both of which detail much of 
the international concern regarding the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
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The protection of human rights is a classic example of an area of law to which the main 
responses which result in improvement of the situation must occur via the state. 2 This is 
logical given that a state is generally considered to be the body which is thought of as 
being capable of violating an individual's human rights. However, with the emergence 
of non-state entities with variable personality which also have significant powers at a 
domestic level, such as in Palestine, the time has come for a reappraisal of the 
protection afforded by international law. As stated in the previous chapter regarding 
international responsibility, the theory that personality is variable is not acknowledged 
by international law therefore it of course has not taken it into account. In the light of 
this the time for a re-assessment of the law has surely come. 
In order to tackle this reappraisal, this chapter is split into five main sections. 
The first section begins by considering the fact that in situations of upheaval or conflict, 
like that in Palestine, there is often abuse of human rights. In this kind of situation 
where there are two entities claiming conflicting rights against each other it would not 
be unusual for one of them to be a non-state entity with a variable level of personality. 
Examples of abuse of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip by Israeli and 
Palestinian Authorities are provided. 3 Overall, this section aims to introduce the main 
issues and looks at the ways in which the human rights of a population may be protected 
in such situations. This involves an examination of whether the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip can be classed as occupied territories since the time of the DOP. It is important to 
discuss this question at this stage as the answer will assist in deciding what kind of 
human rights regime could be used to protect the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip and also whether the Israeli or Palestinian Authorities should implement it. 
Section 2 aims to look at the realities of the situation in Palestine and begins to consider 
in practice how human rights are protected there since the time of the creation of the PA 
and whether this is compatible with the existence of an entity with personality. This 
involves examining whether international human rights law or international 
Z See for example, Dean, "Beyond Helsinki: The Soviet View of Human Rights in International Law" 
(1980) 21 Virg. JIL 55; Emerson, "The Fate of Human Rights in the Third World" (1975) 27 World 
Politics 210; McDougal, Lasswell and Chen, Human Rights and World Public Order (New Haven: Yale 
University Press) (1980); Tunkin, Theory of International Law (London: Allen & Unwin) (1974), at 81. 
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humanitarian law is the more appropriate system to use in order to achieve 
responsibility for human rights in situations where there is variable personality. 
Section 3 will then consider what kind of human rights regimes a situation like that in 
Palestine could be subject to in order to ensure compatability between variable 
personality and human rights protection. 
Following on from this section 4 examines whether there are any other possibilities 
apart from human rights law or international humanitarian law which may be suitable 
for improving the human rights of those affected by an entity with variable personality. 
The final section forms the conclusions to this chapter and considers what the overall 
consequences for the protection of human rights may be if an entity with variable 
personality exists and can have an impact on the lives of a population. 
Before the main discussion begins it should be noted at the outset that this chapter deals 
primarily with the concept of variable personality in relation to general human rights 
protection. In order for the implications of variable personality to be the focus, this 
means that on occasions the descriptions of human rights mechanisms or the full picture 
of human rights as protected through international law are only dealt with in brief. This 
is regrettable yet intentional due to the time and space constraints of a thesis compared 
with the vast array of international human rights law which could be examined. 
It should be noted that this chapter deals only with abuse within the areas of the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip. The issue of the abuse of Palestinians who live in Israel by Israeli Authorities is a separate question 
which is not examined here. 
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1: THE PROBLEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE IN SITUATIONS 
WHERE THERE IS ALSO AN ENTITY WITH VARIABLE 
PERSONALITY. 
Without intending to over-generalise, it tends to be the case that in situations where 
there is an entity with variable personality - for example, an emerging state (as in the 
case of Palestine) - there is often a degree of conflict 
4 This is often caused by the 
conflicting claims to territory or governance of a people, which are often made by a 
non-state entity such as a liberation group, which then clashes with the existing state 
and government. 
As a result of conflict it is an unfortunate fact that there are often wide scale abuses of 
human rights. These may be because one side carries out abuses against the other side 
in order to further their cause, as for example occurred in some of the power upheavals 
in South America where there were many disappearances, cases of torture or extra- 
judicial killings. 5 Human rights abuses could also occur in a conflict situation because 
of a heightened state of emergency caused by the conflict which results in existing 
human rights protection being lessened. 6 
It is therefore a foreseeable problem that human rights abuse and the existence of 
entities with variable personality are not unusual partners. As mentioned above, 
Palestine is a classic example of this link. The following section gives a few brief 
examples of human rights abuse in Palestine in order to place this chapter in context. 
4 See also the example of the situation in Somali described in the Elmi v Australia Communication no. 
120/1998: Australia. 25 May 1999, CAT/C122/D/120/1998 which was discussed in the introduction to 
Part II of this thesis. In Somalia there was conflict between an entity with variable personality - the 
Hawiye clan which was in effective control of some parts of the territory - and the State. 
s See Ensalaco, "Truth Commissions for Chile and El Salvador: A Report and Assessment" (1994) 16 
JIRQ 656; Crahan, `"The Salvadoran Truth Commission in Comparative Perspective" and Roniger and 
Sznajder, `"The Legacy of Human Rights Violations and the Collective Identity of Redemocratized 
Uruguay" (1997) 19 HRQ 55. 
6 For example, parties to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms 1950, UKTS 71 (1953); 213 UNTS 22, can choose to derogate from some of the articles under 
Article 15 when there is a state of emergency. There are similar provisions in the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights 1966, UKTS 6 (1977): 999 UNTS 171, in Article 4 (1). 
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1.1: The Human Rights Problem in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
Human rights have long been discussed in relation to the population of the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip because of the difficult and traumatic history of the area. Like the entire 
chapter, this section considers only the abuse suffered by Palestinians within the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip at the hands of both Israeli and Palestinian Authorities. Many 
different kinds of abuse have occurred, ranging from abuses of the right to life (notably 
during the intifadah) to violations of property rights (notably during the struggles for 
territory between 1948 and 19678). Since the Israeli occupation of those areas in 1967 
the situation in relation to some human rights has been accentuated because of the 
increased number of terrorist attacks against Israel. Aside from the issues surrounding 
the abhorrence of terrorism in general and the human rights abuses such attacks create 
in themselves, the potential for abuse of the rights of detainees is particularly apparent. 9 
However, allegations of human rights abuses since the DOP have not only been made 
against Israel. The PA has had its share of allegations and investigations into activities 
alleged to be in breach of the human rights of the population of the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip. The following two sections aim to give a pen-portrait of the situation and outline 
some of the main types of abuse which have been reported on both the Israeli and 
Palestinian sides in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in order to place the chapter in 
context. Since it is intended that this chapter should deal primarily with human rights 
in the context of the variable personality theory, the descriptions below are inevitably 
superficial, for human rights in the West Bank and Gaza Strip are worthy of being a 
major area for study in themselves. 
7 See for example the Human Rights Committee's concerns about "the number of Palestinians who have 
been killed by the Security Forces ... The Committee express concern over the use of rubber coated metal 
bullets by the security forces in the occupied territories in dispersing demonstrations ... This type of 
bullet 
is reported to have killed many Palestinians, including children. " - Concluding Observations of the 
Human Rights Committee: Israel (18 August 1998) CCPR/c/79/Add. 93. Para. 17. 
8 See for examples of violations - Benvenisti and Zamir, "Private Claims to Property Rights in the Future 
Israeli-Palestinian Settlement" (1995) 89(2) AJIL 295. 
9 Regarding the issues surrounding the conflict between terrorism and respect for human rights and 
possible approaches to resolve such conflict, for an Israeli approach see, Cotler, "Israel, Terrorism and 
Human Rights: The Dilemma of Democracies" from Kellerman, Siehr and Einhorn (Eds. ), Israel Among 
the Nations 111. 
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1.1.1: Human Rights Abuse by Israel in the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
The Israeli abuse of human rights within the West Bank and Gaza Strip has been 
extremely well documented by inter alia many different types of non-governmental 
organisations, academics and international organisations. 1° The UN in particular set up 
a Special Committee to examine and respond to Israeli Practices in the Occupied 
Territories which reports periodically and annually to the General Assembly. " The 
General Assembly, with the human rights of the Palestinian people in mind, also 
established the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian 
People. 12 This committee was created in order to recommend to the Assembly a 
programme of implementation (for the exercise of the inalienable rights of the 
Palestinian people), on the part of the UN and its principle organs. 
The fact that Israel has carried out human rights abuses does not in general appear to be 
disputed13 and abuses have spanned a wide range of rights; 
"... deportation, collective punishment, detention without trial, house (and town) arrest, torture, arbitrary 
lethal shootings, and the restrictions imposed on the freedoms of speech, press, association, and assembly 
in the Occupied Territories. Probably the most telling of these reports is that of International Center for 
Peace in the Middle East which, according to its preface, `was written by Jews who grew up in Israel, and 
whose beliefs were shattered before their eyes by their findings in the Occupied Territories. , 44 
10 A small sample of such reports by way of example are, Amnesty International, Report and 
Recommendation of an Amnesty International Mission to the Government of the State of Israel, 3-7 June 
1979; See Dugard, "Enforcement of Human Rights in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip", at 461 for 
substantial noting of reports; Dinstein, "The International Law of Belligerent Occupation and Human 
Rights" (1978) 8 Is. YHR 104; Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian 
People, established by General Assembly Resolution 3376 (XXX), 10 November 1975; the West Bank 
Data Base Project, which is a privately funded organisation based in Jerusalem, which was founded in 
1982 with the aim of cataloguing data relating to Israeli policy in the West Bank; and The International 
Committee of Jurists. 
'1 Set up by virtue of General Assembly Resolution 2546 (XXIV), 11 December 1969. For lists of the 
relevant UN resolutions to the Special Committee and the reports of the Committee itself, see 
http: //www. un. org/Depts/dpa/gpaYsp_rpts. htm 
12 General Assembly Resolution 3376 (XXX), 10 November 1975. The Committee was a supporting unit 
of the Secretariat and became the Division for Palestinian Rights in the 1978. 
13 `The settlement of more than 55,000 of Israel's Jewish citizens in the West Bank and Gaza (plus nearly 
100,000 in East Jerusalem) and the establishment of approximately 120 settlements there; the refusal to 
repatriate thousands of Palestinians displaced during the 1967 fighting; the summary deportation of 
prominent Palestinian citizens from many walks of life (including lawyers); systematic arbitrary arrests 
and detentions and the denial of procedural rights in respect of alleged security violations; the imposition 
of collective punishment, especially in the form of the destruction of family residences; and the 
mistreatment (including torture) of detainees - all these and other abusive policies and practices directed 
at the Palestinian population as a whole are a matter of record. " - Falk & Weston, "The Relevance of 
International Law to Israeli and Palestinian Rights in the West Bank and Gaza", at 127 - 128. 14 Dugard, "Enforcement of Human Rights in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip", at 462. 
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It appears clear that abuse is perpetrated by Israel towards Palestinians and therefore as 
a fact this is not in question. It then remains, later in the chapter in section 2, to 
examine what international mechanisms exist to attempt to deal with these abuses and 
how these are applied in relation to the West Bank and Gaza Strip both by Israel and 
towards Israel by the rest of the international community. 
1.1.2: Human Rights Abuse by the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip 
Since soon after its inception, the PA have been heavily criticised by a broad range of 
bodies for their human rights abuses. 15 As mentioned above, much of this has centred 
around their treatment of detainees, illegal detentions and arrests and concerns regarding 
due process because of the intent of the PA to attempt to suppress terrorism and 
violence both within the West Bank and Gaza Strip and attacks directed against Israel. 16 
As was the case when Israeli abuses of human rights were considered above, there is no 
need to go into great depth regarding examples of abuse by the PA because the number 
of reports by well-respected human rights monitoring bodies speak for themselves. 
However, by way of example and to set the scene regarding the type and scale of abuse 
a few examples of specific human rights abuse are laid out below. One recent incident 
in particular demonstrates some common human rights abuses. It also shows the heavy 
handed way in which the PA sometimes deals with Palestinians. 
In February 2000 the French Prime Minister, Lionel Jospin visited the West Bank and 
made a number of speeches and public appearances. One of these was to Bir Zeit 
University which has traditionally been active in the Palestinian struggle for 
15 See for example inter alia, Human Rights Watch/Middle East, Palestinian Self-Rule Areas: Human 
Rights Under the Palestinian Authority 39 (September 1997); Human Rights Watch, Human Rights 
Watch World Report (1998); Fishman, "Palestinian Human Rights Suffer from Official Corruption, 
(1998) 351 Lancet 425, at 425 (also cited in Bisharat, "Peace and the Political Imperative of Legal 
Reform in Palestine", at 271, footnote 74); Robinson, "Authoritarianism with a Palestinian Face" (1998) 
January Current History 13; Human Rights under the Palestinian Authority: Hearing Before the 
Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights of the Committee on International 
Relations, 104's U. S. Congress (1996) 77 (also cited in, Bisharat, "Peace and the Political Imperative of 
Legal Reform in Palestine", at 275 footnote 90); Hunter, "Human Rights Violations by the Palestinian 
Authority" 579 ME16; Usher, "A Gathering Storm" 614 MEI4. 
16 It has been suggested that one of the main reasons behind PA abuse of human rights of detainees is as a 
result of United States and Israeli pressure to crack down on terrorism - see Bisharat, "Peace and the 
Political Imperative of Legal Reform in Palestine", at 274. 
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independence. In the previous few days there had been a number of clashes between 
students and Israeli soldiers. Then, on 22 February the students staged a demonstration 
in support of Hizbullah which had taken action against Israel in the then Israeli occupied 
area of Southern Lebanon. Two days later at a press conference Jospin referred to 
action taken by the Hizbullah in Southern Lebanon as a "terrorist attack". On the 
occasion of his visit to Bir Zeit on 26 February he gave a lecture on the rule of law and 
then refused to retract his statement about terrorism. On leaving the University he was 
pelted with stones by angry students. 17 During the following week it was reported that 
about 120 students were arrested without charge by the PA's security services. Human 
Rights groups also stated that some of them had been tortured using methods such as 
beatings, hoodings, and being kept in painful physical positions - similar methods that 
were last year outlawed by the Israeli Supreme Court. 18 
This kind of incident resulting in abuses of the right to freedom from torture and 
inhumane or degrading treatment and freedom from arbitrary arrest and imprisonment 
have not been uncommon in recent times in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 19 However, 
these are by no means the only rights which the PA has allegedly infringed. 
There have been a number of reports which accuse the PA of gagging freedom of 
expression amongst the Palestinian press in order to ensure that the PA is described in 
the most favourable light and so maintain its popularity. 
For example, one of the Islamic Jihad leaders, Shaykh `Abdallah al-Shami, was arrested 
in April 1999 because of remarks he made regarding the PA during a sermon and was 
detained for three days. In August he was rearrested and held for 41 days in solitary 
confinement without charge or trial as a result of a newspaper article he had written 
17 See Usher, "The Jospin Affair" 620 MEI 10 March 2000 8. 
la Supreme Court of Israel: Judgment Concerning the Legality of the General Security Services' 
Interrogation Methods, 6 September 1999 (1999) 38 ILM 1471. It has been suggested that many of the 
PA's security services may have learnt these techniques from time spent under Israeli detention. 
19 For other methods of torture and examples of abuse see, Amnesty International, Palestinian Authority: 
Prolonged Political Detention, Torture and Unfair Trials, 
hllp: //www amnesty. ore. uk/reports/nalestine/index. html, cited in Bisharat, "Peace and the Political 
Imperative of Legal Reform in Palestine", at 272 footnote 81. See also the Amnesty Report 1999 for the 
PA which states that at least 450 people were arrested on political grounds during 1999 which includes 
people accused of criticising the PA, people suspected of being supporters of Hamas and Islamic Jihad 
and people suspected of `collaborating' with Israel - 
http//www amnesly. org/aý rel2ortlar99/mde21. htm 
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which criticised a PA cabinet reshuffle. 20 This kind of action strikes at the heart of the 
individuals right to freedom of expression and also abuses the rights of detainees. 
The PA has also attempted to gag the press by taking action against newspapers which 
have flouted the strict PA line. For example, when al-Umma printed a caricature of 
Yasser Arafat in May 1995 it was warned by the Palestinian Preventive Security Service 
that it should not release that edition. Many copies were seized by the Security Service, 
but when the paper in a future edition criticised the Security Service there was an arson 
attack on the al-Umma offices and the owner was threatened. As a result the owner 
closed the offices and ceased publication. 21 
This kind of behaviour on the behalf of the PA clearly does not fall in line with 
internationally accepted human rights standards. The outcome has been a kind of self- 
censorship of the press: 
"... Newspapers are afraid to write anything that might annoy the PA. Instead, they count on WAFA, the 
official Palestinian News Agency, for what they know is OK to print "22 
These kind of incidences of human rights abuse on the part of the PA are made more 
problematic by the lack of the rule of law in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. There is 
also a lack of separation of powers between the Executive, Legislative and Judicial 
elements of government which leaves the Courts restricted in their capacity to challenge 
PA action. The courts' inability to uphold the rule of law then results in failure to 
remedy human rights abuses or to provide examples of acceptable and non-acceptable 
conduct on the part of the Palestinian Authorities. 
Most political decision making power within the PA rests in the hands of Yasser Arafat 
- as evidenced by his refusal to sign the new Palestinian Basic Law despite agreement 
upon it by the elected legislative council. 23 
20Amnesty 1999 Report, ibid. 
21 Bisharat, "Peace and the Political Imperative of Legal Reform in Palestine", at 279. 
u Words of Palestinian journalist, Ghassan al-Khatib, cited in Bisharat, ibid., at 280 - 281. 2' The Basic Law is the proposed Palestinian constitution which if enacted would give firm grounding to 
the rule of law in Palestinian political and legal life. Note also the reporting of Arafat appointing the 
judiciary on the basis of political belief rather than merit - Rishmawi, "Features of the Administration of 
Justice under Palestinian Rule" (1994) 53 Rev. Int. Comm. Jur. 25, at 31- 32. 
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There is no doubt that the lack of specifications regarding the rule of law or separation 
of powers within any of the primary documents which set up Palestinian self rule are 
partly to blame for this situation. 24 The DOP has no mention of the rule of law at all. 
This is surprising given that there is surely a need to set a firm foundation for the 
legitimacy of the PA and its activities. Article XIV of the Gaza Jericho Agreement 
does mention the rule of law but provides no information about how a culture which 
respects the rule of law can be created. 25 The lack of rule of law means that those in 
authority are able to perpetrate human rights abuses without being subject to the usual 
checks and balances which would operate in a democratic system where power is spread 
among parts of the structure of the state in order to prevent dictatorship. Article VIII of 
the agreement provides that: 
"Any person or organisation affected by any act or decision of the Ra'ees of the Executive Authority of 
the Council or of any member of the Executive Authority or the Council or of any member of the 
Executive Authority, who believes that such act or decision exceeds the authority of the Ra'ees or of such 
member, or is otherwise incorrect in law or procedure, may apply to the relevant Palestinian Court of 
Justice for a review of such activity or decision. " 
This is obviously a helpful provision in terms of implementing the rule of law in the 
territories, however unless the courts are independent and fair in their decision making 
(which has been questioned) the practical effect of any such provisions is limited. 26 
The PA has also established Security Courts in the autonomous areas of the West Bank 
and Gaza over which human rights organisations have raised concern because of the 
lack of knowledge surrounding their procedure and composition. 27 The public are not 
allowed to attend trials, many of which have been alleged to be unfair and too secretive 
to ensure the rights of the defendant. 28 Human Rights Watch have stated that, 
"Trials have usually been held at night, within hours of arrest, and have often lasted only minutes. 
Defendants have been systematically denied the right to be represented by independent counsel, bring 
witnesses, or appeal their verdicts. The judges have no judicial experience, having served in neither the 
ordinary criminal nor the military courts. "29 
"4 See ibid., at 33 - 34 for practical examples of ways to improve the internal administration of justice 
within the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
25 Cairo Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, 4 May 1994 (1994) 33 ILM 622, Article XIX: 
"Israel and the Palestinian Authority shall exercise their powers and responsibilities pursuant to this 
Agreement with due regard to internationally-accepted norms and principles of human rights and the rule 
of law. " (hereafter Gaza-Jericho Agreement) 
26 Rishmawi, "Features of the Administration of Justice under Palestinian Rule". 
27 Ibid., at 41. 
28 See httn"www amnesty. org/ailib/airevort/ar99/mde21. htm and ibid. 
29 Cited in Bisharat, "Peace and the Political Imperative of Legal Reform in Palestine", at 272. 
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Furthermore, the High Court for State Security30 convenes only at the request of the 
executive - which is headed by Arafat and is therefore a gross infringement of the 
traditional democratic principles of the separation of powers. 31 
There is also a military court system within the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Its main 
function is to try cases regarding the duties carried out by individual members of the 
Palestinian Security Services. Similar criticisms have been levelled at the procedure in 
the Military Courts as to the Security Courts since they both operate the same 
procedure. It is reported that there is a scant chance of effective appeal from either of 
these courts since the High Court, which is officially the highest legal authority within 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip has stated that it will not consider appeals from the 
Military Courts because it is not within its jurisdiction 32 
The lack of opportunity for appeal is reinforced by the speedy nature of punishment 
meted out by the Military Courts. For example, in August 1998 a death sentence 
imposed on two members of the Palestinian Security Services was carried out only four 
days after the crime. 33 
The rule of law is thus in serious danger of disappearing as an effective safeguard for 
the rights of individuals in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (if it ever really existed). It is 
unfortunately unlikely that until there is greater money pumped into areas such as 
training and development of lawyers, legislative drafters and Ministry of Justice staff 
there will be a change in the application of laws which can create a culture where the 
rule of law is observed. More money would obviously be a step in the right direction, 
however until wholesale change and unification of the legal system occurs, alongside a 
greater respect for the doctrine of the separation of powers, it is difficult to imagine how 
this will impact on the rights of individuals. 
Given the types of abuse described above on both the Palestinian and Israeli sides the 
questions then arise as to how the international community responds in order to attempt 
to stop the abuse and in some cases provide a remedy for those who have been wronged. 
30 Established by a decree by Arafat in February 1995. 
31 See Bisharat, "Peace and the Political Imperative of Legal Reform in Palestine", at 272. 
32 Ibid. 
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The following section aims to consider how this could be achieved in the Palestinian 
situation by looking at the possible responses of international law to situations of 
human rights abuse. However, this is done by keeping in mind the specific 
circumstances of the Palestinian situations and the status of the relevant parties. 
1.2 How can international law make a difference in situations where there is 
human rights abuse and a variable level of personality? 
International law attempts to provide a certain level of protection against human rights 
abuse and has been the subject of much international study regarding its success in 
terms of setting out basic standards of treatment for individuals. 4 However, beyond 
that which is noted in the footnotes, the basics and development of such protection will 
not be discussed here in detail as there is neither time nor space, for it is submitted that 
as it stands, all the usual mechanisms of human rights protection are not directly 
relevant to the situation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip because of its specific 
circumstances. 
This is because, as discussed in Chapter Three the Palestinian situation is one of 
variable personality. This variable personality means that a "normal" system of 
government does not operate in the areas of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In terms of 
the international protection of human rights this means that the usual mechanisms for 
protection do not apply as Palestine is not yet a state under international law, but has a 
variable level of personality depending on whom it is operating with at that time. 
In situations of major breakdown of the usual systems of government, international 
humanitarian law is often applied in order to provide some level of basic protection for 
human rights and those involved in the situation of conflict. 35 Once again, the details of 
" Trounson, "Palestinian Brothers Executed Four Days After Crime" Los Angeles Times August 31 1998 
A6 cited in Bisharat, ibid., at 278 - 9. 
-1 An understanding of possible ways in which human rights can be protected at an international level is 
required in order to question whether they can be applied in a situation of variable personality. Basic 
knowledge is assumed as it seems that such a long excursus is unsuitable in this chapter because of time 
and space. However at relevant points in the Chapter some basic information is provided. 
's As in relation to international human rights law international humanitarian law is not discussed in detail 
in this Chapter and a basic level of knowledge is assumed. However, it should be noted here that perhaps 
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international humanitarian law will not be entered into here beyond that which is 
mentioned in the footnotes for they are a topic worthy of study entirely on their own. 
However, the fact that Palestine has a variable personality and therefore some level of 
independence means that the application of international humanitarian law also raises 
some problems 36 
Some have tried to reconcile the applicability of human rights instruments to situations 
of occupation. 37 Indeed General Comment 26 of the Human Rights Committee suggests 
that human rights protection once afforded to a people cannot be taken away even if 
there is a change in the administration of a state. 38 This will be discussed later in this 
chapter in section 2.1.1.1. However it should be mentioned here that General Comment 
26 is possible to distinguish in the Palestinian situation because of the fact that the 
people of the West Bank and Gaza Strip have never truly been part of a State and 
therefore never been subject to the Protection referred to by the Committee through 
their own government and a signing of human rights treaties on their behalf. The 
international legal position is not clear as it appears that no one area of law attempts to 
deal with situations where an entity with variable personality exists and has power over 
the lives of those subject to its jurisdiction. This means that this topic is ready for 
reappraisal. Therefore, the question which this part of the chapter aims to address is 
whether international human rights law or international humanitarian law is the more 
suitable or more intended mechanism for protecting the human rights of the people of 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
the most important function in the law of occupation which should be borne in mind is the temporary 
nature of occupation and the lack of transfer of sovereignty to the occupant. In order to achieve this the 
Conventions have a large number of provisions which require the occupant to protect the territories 
existing social, legal and political institutions. The administration of the occupied territory must "ensure 
as far as possible public order and safety while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force 
in the country" (Article 20, Hague Regulations). Note also Article 46 of the Hague Convention (Hague 
Regulations annexed to 1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land 9 
UKTS (1910)) and Article 27 of the Geneva Convention IV (Convention Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War (Geneva Convention IV) August 12 1949,75 UNTS 287) These Articles 
deal with the preservation of existing private relations between citizens of the territory. Also articles 50 
and 24 of the Geneva Convention IV deal with the provision of education. Changes can only be made for 
military necessity, to restore public order or as provided for in Article 43 as mentioned above. On this 
issue see also, Goodman, "The Need for Fundamental Change in the Law of Belligerent Occupation" 
(1985) 37 Stanford LR 1573, at 1583 - 1591. Regarding Geneva Convention IV see Pictet (Ed. ), 
Commentary on IV Geneva Convention Relative tot the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 
(Geneva: ICRC) (1958). 
36 See section 2.2. 
37 See Quigley, "The relation between human rights law and the law of belligerent occupation: Does an 
occupied population have a right to freedom of assembly and expression? (1989) 12 Boston College 
International and Comparative Law Review I and Roberts, "What is a Military Occupation? " (1985) 55 
BYBIL 249. 
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The answer to this question depends on various issues, however it is firstly important to 
establish whether the West Bank and Gaza Strip are areas to which international 
humanitarian law is applicable as this has been a disputed point. Humanitarian Law is 
dealt with here before human rights law simply because the tests which are used to 
establish whether or not the West Bank and Gaza Strip are occupied territories are 
useful in terms of understanding whether it is the PA or Israel towards whom 
international human rights law should be aimed. 
1.3 : Are the West Bank and Gaza Strip in a situation of belligerent occupation? 
It should first be noted that within the scope of international humanitarian law, it is the 
law of occupation which is of concern to the issue at hand. The laws of neutrality or the 
laws relating to the treatment of prisoners of war may also be interesting areas of study 
when linked to variable personality. However for the sake of time, space and particular 
relevance to the Palestinian situation, the law of occupation is examined here. The law 
of occupation attempts to balance the military needs of the occupier, the humanitarian 
needs and interests of the occupied and the needs of the displaced government. 39 
The question arises as to when a territory is considered to be occupied, however the 
answer has changed and developed over time. 40 Prior to the 1907 Hague Convention 
which led to the Hague Regulations there was an assumption that belligerent occupation 
occurs in the context of armed conflict and consists of direct control over the local 
38 Committee on Human Rights, Continuity of Obligations 8 December 1997, General Comment No. 26 
61" Session. 
39 See Kuttner, "Israel and the West Bank: Aspects of the Law of Belligerent Occupation" (1977) 7 Is 
YHR 166, at 169 and also Goodman's discussion of the two main functions of occupation, known as the 
"Rousseau-Portales doctrine" in Goodman, "The Need for Fundamental Change in the Law of Belligerent 
Occupation", at 1579 - 1580. McDougal and Feliciano use the principles of military necessity and 
humanitarianism as the complementary yardsticks by which to judge actions of the occupant: McDougal 
& Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order (New Haven: Yale University Press) (1962), at 739. 
For more basic information regarding the law of occupation in general see Kalshoven, Constraints on the 
Waging of War (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross) (2°d Ed.: 1991); Cassese, The New 
Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict (Napoli: Editoriale Scientifica) (1979); von Glahn, "The 
Occupation of Enemy Territory" (1963) I Whiteman Digest of International Law 946 - 98 and (1968) X 
Whiteman Digest of International Law 540 - 98 and Morgenstern, "Validity of Acts of the Belligerent 
Occupant" (1951) 28 BYBIL 291. 
40 For a brief, yet comprehensive overview of the history of the law of occupation and also the current law 
of occupation, see Goodman, ibid. 
245 
population through having control over the government and its agencies. However 
Article 42 of the Hague Regulations clarifies the position: 
" Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The 
occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised. " 
Article 43 (1) goes on to refer to "... authority of the legitimate power having passed into the 
hands of the occupant... 41 
Both these articles suggest that the important issue regarding the commencement of 
occupation is the obtaining of practical control of the territory (in part or whole). This 
is reaffirmed in Common Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions42 which provides 
that, 
"In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peace time, the present Convention shall 
apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of 
the High Contracting parties, even if a state of war is not recognised by one of them. The Convention 
shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even 
if the said occupation meets with no armed assistance... "a' 
The above tests both clearly take a practical and de facto approach to decisions 
regarding occupation. As was discussed in the previous chapter the situation regarding 
"effective control" is more complicated since the establishment of the PA and the 
handing over of power within some areas of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
The question of whether Israel or the PA has effective control over the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip has already been discussed-44 However, it is worth recalling the Cairo 
41 Emphasis added. 
42 Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick in Armed Forces in the Field 
(Geneva Convention I) August 12 1949,75 UNIS 31; Convention for Amelioration of the Condition of 
the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (Geneva Convention II) August 
12 1949,75 UNIS 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Geneva 
Convention III) August 12 1949,75 UNIS 135; Geneva Convention IV. There are also two Additional 
Protocols to the Geneva Conventions: Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Additional Protocol I), opened for 
signature December 12 1977, (1977) 16 ILM 1391 and Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 
12 August 1949 Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Additional 
Protocol II), opened for signature December 12 1977, (1977) 16 ILM 1442. 
43 See also, Article 1 (3) of Additional Protocol I which provides that "This Protocol, which supplements 
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the protection of war victims, shall apply in the situations 
referred to in Article 2 common to those Conventions. " 
µ See Chapter Four, sections 2.1 and 2.2 on the test of effective control and imputability (which also 
considers effective control) and also sections 3.2 and 3.3 which apply the tests of effective control to the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
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Agreement which established the first phase of the implementation of the interim 
agreements. It states the position that, 
"Israel shall exercise its authority through its military government, which, for that end, shall continue to 
have the necessary legislative, judicial and executive powers and responsibilities, in accordance with 
international law. "4s 
The reference to international law could in this situation be considered to relate to the 
law of occupation governed by the Geneva Conventions. Therefore, under the 
international law of occupation it could be inferred that Israel would be considered to 
have effective power within the territories. 
However, as was discussed in Chapters Two and Three, there are many areas of public 
life which have been handed over to the PA to control. In practical terms this means 
that in the areas handed back to the PA the effective controlling power is that of the PA 
rather than Israel. Although Israel still has a varying degree of influence in those areas 
as a result of Israeli troop withdrawals it can also not really be said to occupy them in 
the traditional sense. 46 This is a novelty in the international laws of occupation, indeed 
the Geneva Conventions are not framed in a way to deal at all well with questions of 
responsibility in such a situation. 47 
The law of occupation's inability to deal with a situation where effective control is held 
by two entities, Palestine and Israel, is evidenced once again: 
"The test for effective control is not the military strength of the foreign army which is situated outside the 
borders that surround the foreign area. What matters is the extent of that power's effective control of 
civilian life within the occupied area; their abilit', in the words of Article 43 of the Hague Regulations, to 
`restore and ensure public order and civil life. "" 
It seems that unless the power is held by one entity international humanitarian law is 
unable to cope effectively with a situation. The tests do not allow for some power 
relating to certain issues to be in the hands of one party while other remnants of 
authority rest in the hands of another. 
's Article V3 (b), Gaza-Jericho Agreement. Signed in Cairo on 4 May 1994. 
46 As discussed in section 2.1 above. 
47 Benvenisti, `The Status of the Palestinian Authority", at footnote 50 notes that Article 6(3) of Geneva 
Convention IV states that an occupant is only relieved of its duties under the Convention one year after 
the close of military operations "to the extent that such Power exercises the functions of government in 
such territory". This cannot be said to apply directly to the current situation in Palestine for as is 
discussed above and as Benvenisti points out, Israel no longer occupies all of the disputed territories. 
48 Ibid., at 56 - 57. 
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Given that authority for civil life has now been handed over to the PA within the Gaza 
Strip and parts of the West Bank, it is unlikely that Israel can be classed as an occupant 
in the usual sense under international law, however it must be noted that it still has a 
degree of control in some aspects of Palestinian life, such as foreign affairs. 49 
Since the establishment of the above conventions, however, it has also emerged that the 
Conventions apply to most situations of occupation even though occupation may take 
on different forms and varying arguments may be put by either party as to the status of 
territory and the reason for occupation. 50 Furthermore, the rules laid down in both the 
Geneva Conventions5' and the Hague Regulations52 are generally considered to be 
declaratory of customary law in the area. In which case the stance of either party is 
irrelevant to the legal status of the rules and therefore their objective applicability to the 
issue at hand. 
An alternative way to approach the current style of occupation of the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip is to look at the different level of Israeli occupation within different parts of 
the territories depending on the state of Israeli troop withdrawal. 53 Whilst both the PLO 
and the Israeli government view the West Bank and Gaza Strip as a single territorial 
unit, after the DOP the territory was marked into three uneven areas, (termed areas `A', 
`B' and `C' by the interim agreement) which each related to three different stages of 
sa Israeli withdrawal and PA competence. 
49 For example, under Article 43 of the Hague Regulations an occupant would be capable of "Restoring 
and ensuring public life" - however, Israel has clearly handed competence for many areas of public life 
over to the PA. 
so See Roberts, "What is a Military Occupation? ". 
51 The Geneva Conventions have almost achieved universality having been ratified by 188 states. 
Additional Protocol I has been ratified by 153 states (notably excluding the USA and Israel). However, it 
is noted that compliance with the Conventions coupled with opiniojuris is a better indicator of customary 
international law, on this point see, Meron, "The Geneva Conventions As Customary Law" (1987) 81 
AJIL 348. 
52 Roberts and Guelff note that, "The International Military Tribunal at Nuremburg in 1946 expressly 
recognised 1907 Hague Convention IV as declaratory of customary international law. ": Roberts and 
Guelff (Eds. ), Documents on the Laws of Mar (Oxford: Clarendon Press) (3rd Ed.: 2000), at 44. 
53 See the discussion on this way of approaching the situation in Watson, The Oslo Accords: International 
Law and the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process (Oxford: Oxford University Press) (2000), at 175 - 176. S` Paragraph 1 of Article XI of the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip, 28 September 1995 (1995) 36 ILM 551 provides that, "The Two sides view the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit the integrity and status of which will preserved during the interim 
period. ". Article XI then goes on to portion the West Bank and Gaza Strip into three categories, A, B and 
C, from which Israel will withdraw at different points during the peace process (the deadlines laid down 
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Since, as discussed above, the test for establishing occupation is a factual one of actual 
control, it could be said that whether Israel occupies Palestine changes, depending on 
which part of Palestine is under consideration at any one time. In area A for example, 
the PA has the full complement of authority which it is capable of achieving and there 
has been Israeli withdrawal. Therefore it could be argued that Israel is no longer an 
occupant in Area A. In Area C there has not been Israeli withdrawal thus it is possible 
to argue that Israel must continue to be classed as an occupant in that part of the 
territory. However, Area B is more complicated. The PA exercises some power there 
and is responsible for "public order", but Israel continues to have a degree of military 
presence there and has a overarching responsibility for protecting Israelis living within 
the area and "confronting the threat of terrorism". 55 
This approach means that the degree of occupation could change within a territory and 
that therefore parts may be considered still to be occupied while other areas are under 
independent control. Whilst it is submitted that the Palestinian peace process has 
resulted in a unique entity in the shape of the PA, it is also submitted that often 
struggles against occupiers result in situations where the occupied territory's army is in 
control of parts of the territory whilst the belligerent occupant still holds other parts 
itself. It is questionable whether the law of occupation should encourage this division 
of territory as it could mean that the occupant is more liable to give over some degree of 
control to the occupied if it results in lessening the degree of their own responsibility. 
Theorising aside, however, this approach still makes Israel the clear occupant in Area C 
and possibly Area B. 
Overall, the main point which can be gleaned from either approach to the determination 
of whether Israel occupies some or all of the Palestinian territory is that in its current 
form the law of occupation does not really provide a useful framework of rules for 
situations such as the Palestinian one where there is a varying degree of control on the 
part of both the occupant and the emerging government. The test given to establish 
occupation in the Hague Regulations is a step in the right direction as it makes the 
question one of fact. With such a test the realities of a situation become the defining 
factor in questions of status. However, what the law of occupation then fails to do is 
respond to situations which do not fit neatly into the "occupied" or "not occupied" 
have rarely been adhered to). Areas A and B are generally more populated areas and as such the PA has 
more power and there have been greater withdrawal of troops from these areas. 
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categories. Situations of variable personality where there is a long transitional stage 
between full occupation and full independence are particularly likely to fall between 
these two stages and thus international regulation of such semi-occupation is not 
established. 
However the debate over whether the West Bank and Gaza Strip are occupied territories 
has been much questioned beyond the factual tests discussed above. Israel and the 
international community have both expressed a position on the issue. Therefore, there 
follow two separate sections. Firstly Israel's stance regarding the determination of the 
territories as belligerently occupied will be examined and then the response of the 
international community will be considered. After this it will be possible to reach a 
conclusion regarding their status as occupied territories. 
1.3.1: Israel's stance 
Israel has consistently denied the applicability of the Geneva Conventions and the 
Hague Regulations to the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Israel is not a party to the Hague 
Convention to which the relevant regulations are annexed, however she is a party to 
Geneva Convention N. 56 Nonetheless, Israel contends that the Geneva Convention 
does not apply to her occupation of the West Bank or Gaza Strip. 
This is based upon Article 2 of Geneva Convention IV which provides, 
"In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peacetime, the present Convention shall 
apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of 
the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognised by one of them. 
The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High 
Contracting Power, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance. " 
It is Israel's submission that the West Bank was not part of the territory of Jordan and 
the Gaza Strip was not part of the territory of Egypt at the time of the 1967 war. 57 
ss Article XIII (2) (a), Interim Agreement. 
sb Israel signed the Geneva Conventions on 8 December 1949 and ratified them on 6 July 1951. 
s' The Israeli spokesman to the United Nations, Moshe Dayan stated that position to the General 
Assembly on 10" October 1977 - A/32/pv 27 October 1977. In 1979 Professor Yehuda Blum restated 
before the Security Council that Israel has taken and continues to take this stance in relation to Geneva 
Convention IV - Security Council Official Records (XXXIV) 21318` meeting 19 March 1979. Israel has 
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Therefore, if neither piece of land was part of the territory of a "High Contracting 
Power" (as provided for in Article 2 (2) above) then Geneva Convention IV is not 
applicable to the situation. Indeed, Israeli supporters have argued that were Israel to 58 
accept the applicability of Geneva Convention N to the territories it would amount to a 
de facto recognition of Jordanian and Egyptian sovereignty over the lands. 59 
The situation is thus slightly different depending on whether the West Bank or Gaza 
Strip is being considered. The basis of the Israeli denial of the applicability of Geneva 
Convention IV in relation to the West Bank stems from the claim that the West Bank 
was never part of the territory of Jordan. If this is correct it means that the original 
Jordanian claim to be the ousted legitimate sovereign in the West Bank by virtue of its 
succession to the rights of Palestinian Arabs living in the West Bank cannot be valid. 60 
However, the Jordanian view has been rejected on legal grounds. 61 This discussion is 
somewhat academic nonetheless because since that time Jordan has renounced its claim 
to sovereignty over the West Bank. 62 
Chaim Herzog (former Israeli President) has stated in a speech to the General Assembly 
that as Jordan was never a "legitimate sovereign" in the West Bank the Conventions do 
not apply because Israel is not an occupying power since that term is intended for use in 
relation to short term occupation and is not relevant in this situation. 63 
The Gaza Strip, is also contended by Israel not to come within the scope of the 
application of Geneva Convention N because it was not part of the territory of one the 
also officially stated this position to the International Committee of the Red Cross: cited in Bar-Yaacov, 
"The Applicability of the Laws of War to Judea and Samaria and to the Gaza Strip" (1990) Is. LR 485. 
See also O'Brien, Law and Morality in Israel's War with the PLO (1991) (New York: Routledge), at 228. 
The best description of the Israeli view is still found in Shamgar, "The Observance of International Law 
in the Israeli Administered Territories" (1971) 1 Is. YHR 262. 
sa This approach is also adopted by some Israeli writers. See, Blum, "The Missing Reversioner: 
Reflections on the Status of Judea and Samaria" (1968) 3 Is. LR 279. 
59 See Meir Shamgar's viewpoint as described in O'Brien, Law and Morality in Israel's War with the 
PLO, at 228. 
60 See Gerson, "Trustee-Occupant: The Legal Status of Israel's Presence in the West Bank" (1973) 14 
HIIJ 1, at 22 - 38 
61 Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation (Princeton: Princeton University Press) (1993), at 108 
regarding the Arab League's censuring of Jordan. See also, Blum, "The Missing Reversioner: Reflections 
on the Status of Judea and Samaria", at 289 - 293. 
62 On July 31 1988 King Hussein of Jordan made a declaration that Jordan accepted the wishes of the 
Palestinian people to secede - (1988) 28 ILM 1637. 
63 A/32/pv 47,26 October 1977. See also Gerson, "Trustee-Occupant: The Legal Status of Israel's 
Presence in the West Bank", at 9. See section 2.2.1 below on situations of prolonged occupation. 
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High Contracting Parties to the Convention. M However, the Gazan situation is slightly 
different from that of the West Bank since Egypt has only ever acted as a de facto 
administrator in the Strip, rather than as a sovereign power, (Egypt administered the 
Gaza Strip between 1948 - 1956 and then after the 1956 war again between 1957 - 
1967). Since the March 1979 Egyptian/Israeli peace agreement the belligerency 
between Israel and Egypt has formally ceased. 
Whilst the technical logic to this argument is clear and despite the Israeli agreement 
with Egypt and the Jordanian renunciation in sovereignty it is possible for those 
opposed to the Israeli stance to rebutt them. This is because it can be submitted that a 
state of belligerency still exists, even if in slightly different circumstances. The 
belligerency could be argued as being between the Palestinian people living in the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip and the Israelis, rather than between states. 65 Proponents of 
this theory would say that until the peace process is completed the argument exists that 
the laws of belligerent occupation should apply as a matter of course to both territories. 
Israel does agree however, to apply de facto the humanitarian provisions of Geneva 
Convention IV to both the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 66 Nonetheless, as Roberts points 
out, this is a dubious alternative, since it is not clear which provisions Israel defines as 
humanitarian and furthermore this interpretation of the situation potentially allows 
Israel the possibility of abrogating or unilaterally interpreting parts of the Convention. 67 
60 see Labes, "The Law of Belligerent Occupation and the Legal Status of the Gaza Strip" (1988) 9 Mich. 
JIL 385. 
65 The fact that although this situation is not a state of belligerency as between states is important because 
it also affects the question of whether the Palestinian situation is an internal or international armed 
conflict. It is submitted that without doubt the Palestinian situation is an international armed conflict. 
Therefore potentially Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions applies as the Palestinians in the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip, as discussed in Chapter Two, can be considered to be in an "... armed 
conflict[s] in which people area fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against 
racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self determination... " (Article 1 (4)). However Israel has 
not signed Additional Protocol I and its status as customary international law is shaky, partly because of 
the lack of significant practice by non-parties (Meron, "The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law" at 
350). Therefore, these issues will not be further discussed here since there is dubious support for their 
applicability. 
Roberts, "Prolonged Military Occupation" (1990) 84 AJIL 46, at 65. Shamgar notes that "de facto 
observance of rules does not necessarily mean their applicability by force of law" - Shamgar, "The 
Observance of international law in the Administered Territories", at 262. For discussion of how Israel 
applied the Convention de facto to the West Bank and Gaza Strip see, Benvenisti, The International Law 
ffOccupation, at 114 - 123. 
Roberts, "Prolonged Military Occupation", at 65 - 66. Gasser also supports the theory that the Geneva 
Conventions are applicable to the West Bank and Gaza Strip, see Gasser, "The Geneva Conventions and 
the Autonomous Territories in the Middle East" chapter 10 from Bowen (Ed. ) Human Rights, Self 
Determination and Political Change in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (The Hague/Boston/London: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers) (1997) 291. 
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The Israeli contention has also been criticised both by the international community 
(which will be considered below) and academics, including Israeli writers. 68 
Israel also takes a similar stance on the applicability of the Hague Regulations in the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip. 69 The Hague Regulations are generally thought of as 
declaratory of customary international law. Indeed the Israel Supreme Court has 
accepted that their status is reflective of customary international law on the issue. 70 The 
Israeli Supreme Court, sitting as High Court with jurisdiction over the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip has held however, that the Hague Regulations are applicable de jure to the 
territories, which contradicts traditional Israeli governmental thinking. 7' 
The closest the Israeli Supreme Court in its own capacity has got to declaring the 
applicability of the Geneva Conventions to the West Bank and Gaza Strip was in 
1988.2 The customary law test of effective control was used to decide whether the laws 
of occupation applied to the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It was held that the laws of 
occupation did apply because Israel was still in control of the territories. Benvenisti 
notes that this, 
"... questioned the Government's claim.. . for if in customary law what matters is effective control, and the 
legal status of the territory is never relevant, why did it become so important in the eyes of the drafters of 
68 For example, Dinstein, "Me International Law Of Belligerent Occupation and Human Rights", at 106 - 
108 and Roberts, "Prolonged Military Occupation", at 65 - 66 and footnote 72. Alternative options for 
the classification of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, rather than as belligerent 
occupancy have been attempted. Gerson suggests that Israel's status in the West Bank is that of trustee- 
occupant, see Gerson, "Trustee-Occupant: The Legal Status of Israel's Presence in the West Bank". 
Roberts rebuts this however, on the grounds that 1) the classification of the situation as a belligerent 
occupancy and therefore it coming within the scope of the Geneva Conventions does not necessarily have 
to be too narrow to incorporate Israeli occupation of the West Bank, 2) the idea of "trusteeship" is 
automatically implicit in all forms of occupation and 3) whether the State of Israel is an appropriate 
trustee for Palestinian interests - see Roberts "Prolonged Military Occupation', at 68 - 69. 
69 See Bar-Yaacov, "The Applicability of the Laws of War to Judea and Samaria and to the Gaza Strip", 
at 486. See also Shamgar, "The Observance of International Law in the Administered Territories". 
70 A Teachers' Housing Co-operative Society v the Military Commander of the Judea and Samaria 
Region et aL HC 393/82 (see (1984) 14 Is. YHR 301). Under Israeli law customary international law is 
automatically incorporated into national law, whereas treaty law is not unless it is incorporated by an Act 
of the Knesset - see Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation, at 118 - 119. 
71 For example see Arnon et al v Attorney-General et al HC 507/72 (see (1979) 9 Is. YHR 334, at 336) 
and The Elon Moreh Case et al HC 507/72 (see (1979) 9 Is. YHR 345, at 348) - both cited in Scobbie, 
"Natural Resources and Belligerent Occupation: Mutation Through Permanent Sovereignty" chapter 9 
from Bowen (Ed. ) Human Rights, Self Determination and Political Change in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories 221. For a discussion of High Court cases relevant to international law in general see Qupty, 
"The Application of International Law in the Occupied Territories as Reflected in the Judgments of the 
High Court of Justice in Israel" Chapter 2 from Playfair, International Law and the Administration of 
Occupied Territories 87. 
72 Affu v Commander of the IDF Forces in the West Bank (1988) 42 (2) Piskei Din (Judgments of the 
Israeli Supreme Court) 4, at 49, translated in (1990) 29 ILM 139 and cited in Benvenisti, The 
International Law of Occupation, at 111. 
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the Fourth Geneva Convention, who decided, per the Israeli government's argument, to qualify its 
applicability? "73 
All of the above show that Israel is technically in a "little-noted logical muddle on the 
applicability of the Hague and Geneva Conventions". 74 There has been an emphasis 
placed upon the importance of the status of belligerency, but since this has formally 
ended as between Israel and both Egypt and Jordan no such situation officially exists. 
Roberts notes that, 
"... Israel itself, when it chooses, is prepared to depart from its own strict legal logic about the 
circumstances in which the relevant rules and conventions are applicable. s975 
It seems that despite the Israeli position, if the Geneva Conventions are considered to be 
customary international law as well as the Hague Regulations, then Israel is nonetheless 
bound at an international level, if not a national level, to apply the Geneva Convention 
de jure. 76 
Following the DOP the question could arise as to whether Israel can still be considered 
to occupy the West Bank and Gaza Strip due to the powers taken on by the PA. 
However, since there has been no formal agreement of statehood and therefore no 
transfer of sovereignty to Palestine, it seems that there must also still be a state of 
occupation, albeit a unique and unusual one. 77 The belligerency exists between the 
Palestinian people and the state of Israel. The creation of the PA is a temporary regime 
which awaits the outcome of final status negotiations. It is submitted therefore, that it is 
still possible to classify the West Bank and Gaza Strip as occupied territories sui 
generis. Furthermore, as will be seen below, the international community is still of the 
opinion that the Geneva Conventions should apply post DOP, hence the United Nations 
Conference on Measures to Enforce the Fourth Geneva Convention in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, which took place on 15 July 1999. 
73 Benvenisti, ibid. 
74 Roberts, "Prolonged Military Occupation" (1990), at 65. 
75 Ibid. 76 Roberts states that the high number of state parties to the Geneva Convention is one of the reasons that 
it may be considered to be declaratory of customary international law - see ibid., at 53. 
n See Scobbie, "Natural Resources and Belligerent Occupation: Mutation Through Permanent 
Sovereignty". Other writers have suggested however, that post DOP the West Bank and Gaza Strip are 
difficult to fit into existing categories of international law such as belligerent occupation because of their 
sui generis nature. This then raises the question of by what international yardstick we should judge 
Israeli activities in the territories - see for example, Gasser, "The Geneva Conventions and the 
Autonomous Territories in the Middle East". 
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1.3.2: International Community's stance 
The international community has repeatedly rejected Israel's claims that Geneva 
78 Convention IV does not apply to the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The Israeli argument, 
as explained above, regarding Geneva Convention IV, has been wholly rejected by the 
International Committee of the Red Cross and state parties to the Geneva 
Conventions. 79 
The UN General Assembly has regularly maintained that the Geneva Conventions apply 
to the West Bank and Gaza Strip from the beginning of their occupation after the 1967 
war. 80 As has the Security Council. 81 Even the United States of America, which has 
often been a political ally of Israel, has stated that Geneva Convention IV is applicable 
to the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 2 
Indeed, at the United Nations International Meeting on the Convening of the 
Conference on Measures to Enforce the Fourth Geneva Convention in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, it was stated in the Final Document that, 
"The participants reaffirmed the existing international consensus on the de jure applicability of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, in accordance with 
relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. They also called upon Israel, the occupying 
Power, to comply fully with the provisions of the Convention. Furthermore, the participants recalled that 
?$ See for example General Assembly Resolution 58 Part B (XLIII), 6 September 1988 and the 
International Committee of the Red Cross Annual Report 1987, at 83. 
79 See Boyd, "The Applicability of International Law to the Occupied Territories" (1971) 1 Is. YHR 258. 
The EU has also dismissed the Israeli arguments as being "without merit" - UKMIL (1988) 59 BYBIL 
574. 
80 The first resolution to attempt to urge respect for the Conventions in the territory was General 
Assembly Resolution 2232 (XXII), July 4 1967 (Voting: 116: 0: 2). Then in 1968 came the first 
Resolution to request Israel's explicit compliance with both the Geneva Conventions and the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights - General Assembly Resolution 2443 (XXIII), December 19 
1968 (Voting: 60.22.37). The Security Council has also been critical of the Israeli stance on the Geneva 
Conventions - see for example Security Council Resolution 607, January 5 1988, in which the 
applicability of the Conventions to the territories was unanimously reaffirmed. See the discussion of the 
altern of voting at the UN on this issue in Roberts, "Prolonged Military Occupation", at 69 - 70. 
See for example Security Council Resolution 904,18 March 1994 which states that affirms "... the 
applicability of the 4th Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949... to the territories occupied by Israel in 
June 1967, including Jerusalem, and the Israeli responsibilities thereunder... ". Adopted as a whole 
without a vote at the 3351# meeting. 
82 See statement by Ambassador Scranton - Digest of United States Practice (1976) 710. See also U. S. 
Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1987,100th Congress, 2°d Session 
(1988) 1189: `The United States recognises Israel as an occupying power in all of these territories and 
therefore considers Israeli administration to be subject to the Hague Regulations of 1907 and the 1949 
Fourth Geneva Convention concerning the protection of civilian populations under military occupation. ", 
also cited in Roberts, "Prolonged Military Occupation", at 69. 
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the Fourth Geneva Convention, as an instrument of international humanitarian law, was applicable, 
regardless of the national legislation of Israel, which is a High Contracting Party to the Convention. , 83 
It is clear that whatever the stance taken regarding the occupation of the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip, and the applicability of the Geneva and Hague law, the Palestinian situation 
is an extremely difficult and detailed to analyse: 
"There is no doubt that this military occupation, qua military occupation, has been exceptional and 
unique, and in its relation to international law confusingly complex. "" 
1.4: Conclusions for this section 
In the first part of this chapter a number of issues have been raised which are important 
in terms of the protection of human rights, both for the people of the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip and for international law. 
First, we have been reminded that human rights abuses are continuing to be perpetrated 
against the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza Strip by both Israel and the PA. 
Second, given the setting of variable personality against which these abuses are 
occurring, the question as to how these abuses can be addressed - through the 
international legal mechanisms of human rights law or international humanitarian law - 
has also been raised. This question has meant that the issue of whether international 
humanitarian law applies to the territories has been examined which leads to the third 
conclusion. Third, it has been concluded that the situation of occupation in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip is a situation sui generis. 
As a result of the situation sui generis in Palestine the traditional debate as to the 
protection of human rights in situations of occupation where an entity with variable 
personality exists therefore needs rethinking. It is not surprising that international law 
fails to take account of variable personality as it does not recognise the existence of the 
theory of variable personality. However, by attempting to raise such questions in the 
light of variable personality it is possible that the problems could be solved. 
83 Final Document paragraph 5. Cairo, 14 and 15 June 1999.98 Governments took part in the meeting. "Best, War and Law Since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press) (1984), at 315. 
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It is submitted that this third point makes the question as to whether human rights law or 
international humanitarian law should be used to protect human rights in that context all 
the more complicated. The following section aims to examine these complications and 
looks at how human rights protection is currently implemented in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip, given its situation of occupancy sui generis and the variable nature of status 
of the PA. By examining what happens now in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 
relation to human rights -a system of protection that given the facts above is clearly 
operating badly - it will be possible to consider how it could be changed for the better. 
This discussion should assist in questioning how international law can protect human 
rights in situations of variable personality, by attempting to address the human rights 
issue in the light of the changing international scene. 
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2: WHAT DOES HAVING A SITUATION OF BELLIGERENT 
OCCUPATION SUI GENERIS WHERE VARIABLE 
PERSONALITY EXISTS MEAN FOR THE PROTECTION OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS? 
So, now it has been decided that the West Bank and Gaza Strip are in a situation of 
occupancy, albeit a unique example, it should be examined how human rights are 
currently protected there. This will lay the groundwork for a discussion to take place 
about how these systems can be improved. 
2.1: How are human rights currently protected by international human rights law 
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip? 
This issue will be split into three sections. The first will examine how international 
human rights law is applied by Israel and to Israel and the second will examine the same 
issue as applied by the Palestinian Authorities and to the Palestinian Authorities. The 
third will consider how the United Nations Commission and Sub-Commission on 
Human Rights have approached the issue of the protection of human rights in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip. 
2.1.1: Israel 
Israel is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). 85 
The question to be considered here is whether the rights laid down in the Covenant are 
$s Israel signed the ICCPR on 19 December 1966: UKTS 6 (1977); 999 UNTS 171. Receipt of the 
instrument of ratification was on 3 October 1991 and it entered into force on 3 January 1992. However 
since Israel has not ratified Protocol I, individual victims of human rights abuse are unable to petition the 
Human Rights Committee. Israel is also a party to the International Covenant on Economic Social and 
Cultural Rights 1966, UKTS 6 (1977); 993 UNTS 3, (ICESCR) which came into force in 1976. She 
signed the ICESCR on 19 December 1966, receipt of the instrument of ratification was on 3 October 1991 
and it entered into force for Israel on 3 January 1992. There are conventions regarding human rights that 
Israel has not signed. For example, Israel is not a party to The International Convention on the Protection 
of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (1990). As Palestine is not as yet a 
sovereign state it is party to none of these. 
The ICCPR came into force in 1976. For a general discussion see Joseph, Schultz and Castan, The 
ICCPR: Cases, Materials and Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press) (2000); Alston, The 
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applicable to the population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. However, the Israeli 
government has generally not been keen to suggest that they are applicable to the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip, thereby denying international legal responsibility for breaches of 
human rights they perpetrate within those areas. For example, Roberts cites the 
occasion when in a memo from the Office of the Legal Adviser in the Israeli Foreign 
Ministry in 1984, the government states in relation to the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UNDHR)86, the ICCPR and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 
'Ile unique political circumstances, as well as the emotional realities present in the areas concerned, 
which came under Israeli administration during the armed conflict in 1967, render the situation sui 
generis, and as such, clearly not a classical situation in which the normal components of 'human rights 
law' may be applied, as are applied in any standard, democratic system in the relationship between the 
'citizen' and his government. Hence the criteria applied in the areas administered by Israel, in view of the 
sui generis situation, are those of `humanitarian law', which balances the needs of humanity with the 
requirements of international law to administer the area whilst maintaining public order, safety and 
security. "87 
As to whether this position is legally tenable, it is instructive to turn to Article 2(1) of 
the 1966 Covenant, which provides that: 
"Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its 
territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognised in the present Covenant, without distinction of 
any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status" 
The relevant phrase from Article 2(1) of the ICCPR which can assist in answering the 
question posed above, is clearly, "within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction". 
The questions which then follows on is what exactly this phrase means. Buergenthal 
clearly states that: 
United Nations and Human Rights: A Critical Appraisal (Oxford; Clarendon Press) (1992); Nowak, UN 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (Kehl am Rhein/Strasbourg/Arlington: 
Engel) (1993); Henkin (Ed. ), The International Bill of Rights (New York: Columbia University Press) 
(1981); McGoldrick, The Human Rights Committee: Its Role in the Development of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press) (1990) and Alston and Crawford, 
Future of UNHuman Rights Treaty Monitoring (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) (2000). 
86 General Assembly Resolution 217A (III), (1948), UN Doc. A/810 (1948). Byelorussian Soviet 
Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Yugoslavia and Saudi 
Arabia abstained. See also Kunz, "The United Nations Declaration on Human Rights" (1949) 43 AJIL 
316 and Schwelb, "The Influence of the UNDHR on International and National Law" (1959) Proc. ASIL 
217. Reisman states that the UNDHR is declaratory of customary international law - Reisman, 
"Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law" (1990) 84 AJIL 866, at 867 - 868. 87 Office of the Legal Adviser, memorandum (September 12 1984), written for and contained in, Roberts, 
Joergensen and Newman, Academic Freedom Under Israeli Military Occupation (World University 
Service, London/International Commission of Jurists, Geneva, 1984) 80,81 cited in Roberts, "Prolonged 
Military Occupation", at 72 and footnote 98. 
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"A State party to the Covenant which maintains actual civil or military control over a given territory is 
under an obligation to ensure in that territory the rights the covenant guarantees, irrespective of whether it 
has formally annexed the territory or has a legal right to occupy or control it. "88 
This interpretation means that certainly up until the DOP and the hand over of some 
areas within the West Bank and Gaza Strip to the PA that Palestinians living within the 
occupied territories were afforded the human rights protection of the ICCPR as a result 
of the Israeli occupation. 
The next issue which naturally emerges in the Palestinian context is the extent to which 
Israel can currently be said to "maintain actual civil or military control" over the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip? It has been generally accepted that this equates to the test of 
effective control. 89 
As was discussed in the previous chapter and section 1 of this chapter, there are parts of 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip which Israel no longer occupies in the traditional sense - 
in that it no longer has effective control over civil life in areas which have been taken 
over the Palestinian Authority. 90 It is possible to submit the argument that in the areas 
which have not yet been handed over to the PA and are still effectively under Israeli 
administration that the ICCPR is applicable. However, this does not answer the main 
question regarding those areas which have been handed over to the PA since they cover 
the majority of the large densely populated areas of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
It is instructive to turn to the proceedings and comments of the Human Rights 
Committee in order to see what their practice regarding continuity of protection is in 
areas where the administering power has changed or boundaries have been altered. 
88 Buergenthal, "To respect and to ensure; State Obligations and Permissible Derogations" chapter 3 from 
Henkin (Ed. ), The International Bill of Rights 72, at 77. See also Nowak, U. N. Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, at 41- 42 and Benvenisti, "The Applicability of Human Rights Conventions to Israel and 
to the Occupied Territories" (1992) 26 Is. LR 24, at 27 - 28. See also the European Convention on 
Human Rights Practice on this issue- Lozidou v Turkey (1995) Series A No. 310. 
89 Benvenisti, "Responsibility for the Protection of Human Rights Under the Interim Israeli-Palestinian 
Agreements" (1994) 28 Is. LR 297, at 309. However, it should also be briefly noted that in some recent 
State practice it seems that new states have stated that they consider themselves to be legally responsible 
for areas of territory on which they have factual and effective control as well as other areas within their 
territory over which they do not exercise that degree of control - for example see the statement regarding 
Bosnia-Herzegovina in para. 329 of the Report of the Human Rights Committee, 7 October 1993 UN 
Doc., A148/40. However this stance was likely to have been taken for political reasons as Bosnia - 
Herzegovina clearly wanted to establish full effective control throughout the territory to which it 
purported to have title, whether or not it fulfilled the effective control test at the time. Note also the 
impact of the General Comment of the Human Rights Committee No. 26,8 December 1997, which is 
discussed below. 
90 See Chapter Four regarding state responsibility. 
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2.1.1.1: Human Rights Committee Practice 
The Committee has consistently maintained that Israel must apply the Covenant in the 
areas it occupies, despite Israel's denial of this. 91 However, the Committee has also 
clearly noted the issue with regard to the lack of protection afforded to those 
Palestinians in areas controlled by the PA, since it notes that "... the Covenant must be 
9992 held applicable to the occupied territories... where Israel exercises effective control. 
This therefore leaves a gap in protection as far as those Palestinians are concerned. 
Problematically, for the rights of the Palestinians under PA control and in the light of 
previous statements regarding continuity of rights by the Committee, which are 
examined below, the Committee does not appear to consider how the issue of the gap in 
protection can be addressed. 
On previous occasions the Committee has stated that rights once given cannot be taken 
away and it has applied a doctrine of continuity of rights even if the government or 
administration of a territory are changed. 
In 1997 the Committee issued a general comment which dealt specifically with this 
issue. 93 Paragraph 4 states that: 
"The rights enshrined in the Covenant belong to the people living in the territory of the State party. The 
Human Rights Committee has consistently taken the view, as evidenced by its long-standing practice, that 
once the people are accorded the protection of the rights under the Covenant, such protection devolves 
with territory and continues to belong to them, notwithstanding change in government of the State party, 
including dismemberment in more than one State or State succession or any subsequent action of the 
State party designed to divest them of the rights guaranteed by the Covenant. " 
This attitude has also been demonstrated in the recent practice of the Committee with 
regard to the way in which it has responded to the situations in the Former Yugoslavia 
and Hong Kong. 94 
91 Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Israel. 18 August 1998 CCPR/C/79/Add. 
93 para. 10. For discussion re: the applicability of multilateral conventions to occupied territories see, 
Meron, "Applicability of Multilateral Conventions to Occupied Territories" (1978) 72 AJIL 542. 
92 Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Israel, ibid. 
93 Continuity of Obligations, General Comment No. 26,61$` Session 8 December 1997. 
94 The Human Rights Committee has also adopted this approach in cases of state succession. See, for 
example Kamminga, "State Succession in Respect of Human Rights Treaties" (1996) 7(4) EJIL 1. The 
descriptions of the Committee's response to the situations in Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
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When considering the Former Yugoslavia the Committee emphasised the entitlement of 
the peoples within the territory of the former Yugoslavia to the guarantees of the 
Covenant in relation to the succession of each new State. 95 
Regarding the handing back of Hong Kong to the State of China by the United 
Kingdom the Committee recalled that, 
"... In dealing with cases of dismemberment of States parties to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, it had taken the view that human rights treaties devolve with territory and that States 
continue to be bound by the obligations under the Covenant entered into by the predecessor State. Once 
the people living in a territory enjoy the protection of the rights under the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, such protection cannot be denied to them merely by virtue of dismemberment of that 
territory or its coming under the sovereignty of another State or of more than one State. 6 s9 
China has now signed97 (but not yet ratified) the ICCPR and now reports for the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region. 98 Although China is not therefore a full state 
party to the Convention it was willing to accept that the rights of the population of Hong 
Kong must be reflected in its practice. This practice supporting the statements of the 
Committee must surely add to their strength. 
In the Palestinian context it appears that this practice is not adhered to given Israel's 
unwillingness to apply the ICCPR and the fact that as Palestine is not a state it is unable 
to become a party to the covenants. 
Although the main treaty being considered here is the ICCPR it is also instructive to 
consider the practice of other treaty bodies in relation to Israel in order to see if they are 
consistent with the approach adopted by this committee. To this end the other main 
bodies will be considered in turn. 
Tajikistan, Macedonia, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, which it stated were bound by the obligations of 
the Covenant from the dates when they became independent. 
95 See for example para. 333 re: Croatia, and para. 363 re: Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro), Report of the Human Rights Committee 7 October 1993, UN Doc. A/48/40. 
96 Report of the Human Rights Committee Vol. 121 September 1997, UN Doc. A/52/40, para. 81. 
97 China signed on 5 October 1998. It should be noted that sovereignty over Hong Kong was given to 
China by the United Kingdom on 1 July 1997. 
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2.1.1.2: The Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 
The Committee was established by ECOSOC resolution 1985/17 and Israel ratified the 
Convention on Economic Social and Cultural Rights on 3 October 1991. The last 
Israeli report was considered at its 26th Session from 13 - 31St August 2001. In its 
concluding observations the Committee stated in paragraph 11 that it deplored 
"... the State party's refusal to report on the occupied territories... "99 
This shows that Committee considered Israel to be the occupying power and that as a 
result it should report for all areas within its jurisdiction. The Committee therefore 
ignored the issue of effective control and the question of those areas where the PA could 
be said to exercise some degree of power. 
In the Committee's concluding observations to the previous Israel report in 1998 the 
Committee did take the view that, 
"... the State's obligation under the Covenant apply to all territories and populations under its effective 
control. The Committee therefore regrets that the State party was not prepared to provide adequate 
information in relation to the occupied territories. " 100 
This Committee's approach is therefore similar to that of the Human Rights Committee. 
It noted that effective control was an issue at play, however it failed to consider that the 
PA may have control in some Palestinian areas. It resolved therefore that Israel, as 
occupying power, was the entity under whose jurisdiction the rights of Palestinians in 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip should be considered to be. 
2.1.1.3: Committee Against Torture 
The Committee Against Torture was established pursuant to Article 17 of the 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment 1984 and Israel ratified the Convention on 3 October 1991. The 
98 See CCPR/CIHKSAR/99/1,16 June 1999. 
E/C. 12/1/Add. 69,31 August 2001. 
11 C/C. 12/1/Add. 27,4 December 1998, para. 8. 
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Committee is due to consider the latest Israeli report at its 27th Session on November 
2001. 
It last considered an Israeli report in 1998 at its 20th Session. In its concluding 
observations the Committee did not address the issue of effective control or the question 
of whether Israel should report for the occupied territories. The conclusions did express 
concern regarding the Israeli interrogation methods used towards arrested Palestinians 
and requested such action to be ceased. '°' However, its lack of comment suggests that it 
shut its eyes to the question of who should be reporting on behalf of the Palestinians in 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
2.1.1.4: Committee on Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
The Committee was established pursuant to Article 8 of the International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 1965 and Israel ratified the 
Convention on 3 January 1979. 
The Committee last considered an Israel report in 1998. In its concluding observations 
the Committee generally refers to "Israel and the occupied Palestinian territory". In 
paragraph 6 it did refer to the PA, however it failed to consider the implications of its 
creation for the protection of human rights: 
"It takes note of the establishment of the Palestinian Authority which has certain responsibilities in parts 
of the occupied Palestinian territories. " 102 
The Committee then goes on to state in paragraph 12 that it, 
"... reiterates its opinion of 1991 that the report of Israel should encompass the entire population under the 
jurisdiction of the government of Israel... Israel is accountable for the implementation of the Convention, 
including reporting obligations, in all areas over which it exercises effective control. 9103 
Therefore, like the other Committees, the lack of examination of the implications of the 
creation of the PA mean that PA human rights abuses are not properly addressed and the 
101 A/53144, para. 240 (a). 
102 CERD/C/304/Add. 45,30 March 1998, para. 6. 
103 Ibid., at para. 12. 
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question of Israel's ability to protect human rights in areas under PA effective control 
are not sufficiently well considered. 
2.1.1.5: Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 
The Committee was established pursuant to Article 17 of the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 1979 and Israel ratified it 
on 3 October 1991. 
The Committee last considered an Israeli report in its 17th Session in July 1997. There 
was very little reference to the position of Israel and its reporting obligation since the 
creation of the PA. However, in its concluding observations the Committee 
recommended that, 
"... the Government of Israel should ensure that the Convention was implemented throughout the territory 
under its jurisdiction. "'04 
The Committee thereby side-stepped the question of effective control and the potential 
gap created for the protection of Palestinian's human rights in the areas controlled by 
the PA. 
2.1.1.6: Committee on the Rights of Child 
The Committee for the Rights of the Child was established pursuant to Article 43 of the 
Convention on the Rights of Child 1989 which Israel ratified on 3 October 1991. 
The Committee has not considered a report from Israel since the creation of the PA 
since its second periodic report is overdue and she submitted her first report late. The 
report was due in 1993 and was not submitted until February 2001. The Committee will 
consider the report at its session next year. It will be surprising however if the 
Committee take a different stance to that of the other Committees considered above. 
As discussed above in relation to the other Committees, the approach of the treaty 
bodies fails to take into account the reality of the question of effective control of 
104 A/52/381rev. 1/part 11 , para. 170. 
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territory. Whilst this means that Israel must continue to report for all within the 
occupied territories, it does not take account of the practicalities of doing so, or the issue 
of abuse on the part of the PA. 
Now that the situation has been considered in relation to Israel, this study turns to 
examine how, if at all, international human rights provisions are applied to and by 
Palestine. 
2.1.2: Palestine. 
The issue in terms of the international protection of human rights of the Palestinian 
population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip is particularly difficult due to the fact that 
as yet Palestine is not a full State in international law. This is despite the fact that as 
was discussed in Chapter Three Palestine is sometimes treated as a state in some 
circumstances by some other entities. As a result of this lack of official statehood it is 
unable to become a high contracting party to any international human rights treaty - 
such as the ICCPR. '°5 
Traditionally Israel, as the occupying power, would usually be the State which would 
apply the human rights treaty within the occupied areas. However, in the areas 
controlled by the PA it is unclear who should be applying which standards and how they 
should do this, since arguably Israel is not in effective control of public life within those 
regions. These are all important issues in terms of this overall thesis since the 
conclusions reached are necessary to help determine whether the theory of variable 
personality is compatible with the current systems of international human rights 
protection. 
There is, sadly very little information to note within this section because of the 
unbalanced way in which international human rights structures approach the issue of 
rights protection. It is true to say that in the majority of situations the entity against 
ios Article 48(1) of the ICCPR provides that, "The present Convention is open for signature by any State 
member of the United Nations or member of any of its specialised agencies, by any State Party to the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice, and by any other State which has been invited by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations to become a party to the present Covenant. See also article 3 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, UN Doc. A/Conf. 39/28, UKTS 58 (1980), which draws a 
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which a citizen's human rights need to be protected is the state, and indeed international 
human rights law acknowledges and attempts to cover such situations, albeit with lack 
of enforcement mechanisms. However, it does not deal at all well with the scenario 
where the entity infringing the human rights of a people is not a state and has a variable 
level of personality depending upon the context it is operating within at any one time. 
This is particularly unacceptable given that at the moment when rights are infringed (for 
example, freedom of speech or unfair treatment of detainees - examples which were 
given of PA action against Palestinian human rights in section 1.1 above) the entity with 
variable personality is taking on the role of state and acting in an official capacity. 
Therefore other than through the media, NGOs, or academic writing, there is almost no 
attempt to place pressure on the PA to comply with human rights standards. 
International law itself does not provide any remedy or lay down regulations which 
should be adhered to by the Palestinian Authorities in the period before full statehood is 
achieved. 
This is interesting and important given that as was discussed in Chapter One there is 
sometimes importance placed on human rights standards in recognition decisions. 
Since human rights records can be important in terms of achieving recognition, 
recognition for Palestine could be said to be trapped in a vicious circle. If Palestine was 
seen to be more "human rights friendly" then it might be more likely to be recognised. 
However until it is a state, unless international law makes changes to incorporate non- 
state entities into its human rights mechanisms, Palestinian authorities are not in the 
position to positively demonstrate an improvement in human rights under the same 
schemes under which those who are able to chose to recognise it are governed. 106 
Overall it can be said with certainty that in the Palestinian context international human 
rights structures are not being complied with by either Palestine or Israel. The 
Palestinian population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip do not have protection which 
they are entitled to due to the effective control the PA has without any international 
safeguards to place a check on its actions. 
distinction between those treaties concluded between States and those concluded between States and other 
subjects of international law. 
106 This is an extremely important issue and will be returned to later in this chapter in section 3. 
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The international community through its recognition and encouragement of the PA has 
helped to create a non-state entity with significant powers which are hard to pin-down 
due to the variable and the non-static nature of its personality. However this 
development has occurred without sufficient thought as to the creature which has 
emerged. The international law which governs the protection of human rights clearly 
does not reflect the reality that an entity with a variable personality exists, for 
international human rights law weights responsibility for human rights protection 
significantly towards states. 
International law is sufficiently flexible in its application in that it allows such an entity 
to emerge, which is good as it means that the right to self determination is slowly 
fulfilled. However, other areas of international law, such as the protection of human 
rights do not envisage a situation, such as the Palestinian one, where the sovereignty is 
slowly passing and a state-like entity emerges which has no powers to sign and ratify 
the human rights treaties, due to its lack of full statehood. 
The international community has permitted this variable personality to emerge due to its 
failure to reach consensus about the status of Palestine and the Palestinian 
representatives. Since human rights protection aims to uphold the human rights of all 
peoples it appears that as a result of the variable personality of the PLO and the PA, 
Palestinians within the West Bank and Gaza Strip are missing out on the international 
systems of protection which if they were still controlled fully by Israel, or if Palestinian 
statehood had already been achieved they would be protected by. 
It seems therefore that the human rights law mechanisms which are considered above do 
not adequately deal with a situation of variable personality when occurring in a situation 
of occupancy like that which exists in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It is interesting to 
consider whether the political organs of the United Nations which deal with human 
rights have faired any better in considering protection for those in the territories. The 
study now turns therefore to examine the practice of the Commission and Sub- 
Commission for Human Rights. 
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2.1.3: The practice of the United Nations Human Rights Commission and Sub- 
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Ri2hts107 
The Commission has 53 member states which are drawn from the different political 
blocs within the organisation. 108 The Commission's work has three main prongs - 
enforcement, promotional activities and standard setting. 109 The enforcement work of 
the Commission has occurred mostly through the establishment of procedures through 
which it can investigate allegations of human rights violations by individual states. 
Ito 
Usually a working group or a special rapporteur is appointed to consider the allegations 
against the state and make a public report which is then discussed at public Commission 
meetings. 
The Commission has recently had a special session relating the Grave and Massive 
Violations of the Human Rights of the Palestinian people from 17 - 19 October 2001.111 
The session can no doubt be considered to be a good thing in terms of the awareness of 
human rights violations in the area it created and the attention which was drawn to the 
issues raised. However, as its title suggests, it related primarily to Israeli rather than 
PA human rights abuses. In its resolution at the session the Commission referred to 
Israel as the "occupying power" and called upon Israel to "... abide scrupulously by its 
legal obligations and responsibilities under Geneva Convention N". 112 Like the human 
rights treaty bodies discussed above the Commission did not fully consider the 
implications of the creation of the PA or the intricacies of the question of effective 
control. 
At the Special Session discussed above the Commission also heard from the Special 
Rapporteur, Mr. G. Giacomelli. His contribution was entitled "Mission Report on 
Israel's violations of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967". 
1' The name of the sub-commission was changed from `Sub-commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities' on 27 July 1999 by a decision of ECOSOC. 
'° Established by ECOSOC under Article 68 of the UN Charter. ECOSOC was set up by Chapter X of 
the UN Charter and has 54 members. (Article 61(1) aims to implement the human rights standards laid 
down in Article 1 and 55 of the Charter). 
109 See Humphrey, Human Rights and the United Nations (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Transnational 
Publishers) (1984); Meron, Human Rights Lawmaking in the United Nations (Oxford; Clarendon Press) 
(1986); McDougal and Bebr, "Human Rights in the United Nations" (1964) 58(3) AJIL 603 and Alston, 
The United Nations and Human Rights: A Critical Appraisal. 
110 ECOSOC Resolution 1235 gave the Commission this power when it authorised the examination of 
information relevant to "gross violations of human rights" and to study situations where there had been a 
"consistent pattern" of human rights violations. 
II I E/CN. 4/S - 515 and E2000/112. 
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In the report Mr. Giacomelli refers to Israel as the occupying power and he reaffirms the 
obligation upon Israel to apply international humanitarian law de jure within the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip. Since the Report and indeed the whole special session related 
particularly to Israeli human rights abuses this is perhaps not surprising, however it does 
mean that there is a failure to consider the human rights abuse perpetrated by the PA. 
The Commission has also considered human rights violations at its regular session and 
last did so earlier this year at its 57`h Session. The Commission adopted a Resolution 
entitled, "Question of the violation of human rights in the occupied Arab territories, 
including Palestine". 113 The resolution referred to Palestinian territory and Palestinian 
people but placed all the emphasis regarding protection of human rights at Israel's door. 
It also resolved to consider the same issue again at its 58h Session next year " as a 
matter of high priority". However, in itself this is nothing unusual as the Commission 
regularly considers this issue and uses the same phrases and terms to describe the areas 
of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. "4 Should it ever change its terminology then this 
would be fairly provocative, however until this occurs the significance of such 
resolutions should not be over-estimated. 
During the 57th Session Mr. Giacomelli also gave an update on his report from the 5th 
Special Session. In Paragraph 6 he did draw, 
".. the Commission's attention... to the determinations of the treaty bodies reaffirming 
that Israel has maintained "effective control" in all of the occupied territories and, 
therefore, holds treaty obligations to implement human rights there. "' is 
This shows that, like the treaty bodies discussed in sections 2.1.1.1 to 2.1.1.6 above, the 
Commission is failing to understand fully the implications that the creation of the PA 
and the transfer of authority may have for the application of the test of effective control 
and Israeli responsibility. 
At the 57th Session the Commission also heard the Report of the Inquiry Commission 
which during the 5`h Special Session (examined above) it had requested investigate the 
112 E/CN. 4/RES/S - 5/127 October 2000. 
1 13 E/CN. 4/RES/2001/7. 
114 See for example, E'CN. 4/RES/2000/6 17 April 2000: Resolution on the "Question of the violation of 
human rights in the occupied Arab territories, including Palestine". 
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violation of human rights in the occupied Arab territories including Palestine. 116 The 
Inquiry Commission did seem to take a more realistic approach to the protection of 
human rights than had been seen by the Commission before. The Commission met with 
both PA and Israeli officials which is an important symbolic gesture in terms of 
considering abuse on all sides. 
Whilst the Inquiry Commission still considered that overall Israel was the occupying 
power, "? it did also criticise the PA for the abuses it has perpetrated' 18 and it began to 
draw distinctions between the different areas within the West Bank and Gaza Strip and 
the areas controlled by the PA. 119 This is certainly a step-forward in terms of 
considering the full realities of the situation and the fact that abuses are being 
committed by both sides. In paragraph 114 the suggestion is made that an international 
presence in the area could assist in the monitoring of human rights abuse by all parties. 
The approach taken is therefore the most realistic and forward thinking of the bodies 
considered so far in this Chapter. 120 However, it remains to be seen whether any of the 
recommendations of the Inquiry Commission are implemented. 
The Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights has been 
surprisingly quiet on the issue of human rights abuse in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
The Sub-Commission was established by the Commission on Human Rights and meets 
annually and reports to the Commission. 121 At its 46th session it, 
"Express[ed] its full support for... the Declaration of Principles signed by the State of Israel and the PLO 
which constitutes a positive contribution to the protection of human rights in the Middle East" 22 
However, the Sub-Commission has not returned to the issue of Palestinian human rights 
in recent years. 
Overall, although some parts of the Commission's consideration of the Palestinian 
situation seem to take account of the realities of human rights abuse in the area (such as 
"s E/CN. 4/2001/30 21 March 2001. 
116 E/CN. 4/2001/121 16 March 2001. 
117 Para. 41. 
118 Para. 26 and para. 12. 
"9 Para. 22. 
120 It should also be mentioned that a Report to the Commission by the High Commissioner on Human 
Rights did consider abuses by the PA as well as those by Israel. However, it failed to consider the issue 
of effective control and how this may impact on protection of rights. (see E/CN. 4/2001/114). 
121 Under the authority of ECOSOC Resolution 9 (II) of 21 June 1946. 
122 Resolution 1994/13 25 August 1994. 
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the Commission for Inquiry) it appears that, like the human rights treaty bodies there 
has overall been a failure to consider the full implications of the creation of the PA for 
the proper protection of human rights. Therefore the existence of an entity with variable 
personality and the effect this has on Israeli occupation demonstrate that existing United 
Nations human rights legal and political mechanisms are not adequately able to deal 
with a situation such as that in Palestine. This leads to the question of how else human 
rights can be protected in the Palestinian situation? 
The first point of call is therefore the law of occupation in order to see how this could 
possibly work in a situation of occupation sui generis. 
2.2: How can human rights be protected by the law of occupation in a situation sui 
eneris with variable personality? 
As it has been concluded that the West Bank and Gaza Strip are in an occupancy 
situation, albeit a special example of one, this has important implications in terms of the 
protection of human rights. Even before the question of how the law of occupation can 
work alongside variable personality, the issue arises as to whether there can be any 
human rights in a situation of occupancy as the upholding of civil and political rights is 
the antithesis of the notion of occupation. Indeed, any protection by a belligerent power 
against human rights abuse by that same power is a contradiction in teens. 
Furthermore, by giving a belligerent occupant human rights obligations to uphold, there 
is the danger that the legal order they impose could be unwittingly validated through 
other international legal mechanisms. 
Variable personality bears upon the law of occupation because the situation in the 
Palestinian occupied territories is qualitatively different from other types of occupation, 
particularly since the DOP and the creation of the PA. Therefore as discussed above, 
Israel has become a different kind of occupant and the Palestinians living in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip a different kind of occupied people. 
It was shown in Chapter Three that variable personality has allowed Palestine to exist in 
the international community as a non-state but with a reasonable degree of international 
personality. The fact that it has been able to function on the international stage has 
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meant that it is having a very long transitory stage between occupation and statehood. 
Such a situation has been possible because the international community has been able to 
take individual action regarding recognition and accord Palestine varying degrees of 
status in different contexts. Therefore there has been less international pressure exerted 
to attempt to force an end to the troubles in the area through the creation of a fully 
fledged Palestinian state. 
The overarching problem in relation to variable personality and the law of occupation is 
that there is a general assumption in the relevant Conventions that the occupied territory 
was, prior to occupation, part or all of an independent State in international law. 123 This 
was not so in the case of the West Bank and Gaza Strip as the land of the West Bank 
was administered by other Arab States. This problem reaffirms the need for a 
discussion of the law of occupation in the light of the Palestinian question. 
Leading on from this there is one issue which is particularly problematic when 
examined in relation to the existence of variable personality; that of prolonged 
occupation. The very long transitory stage between occupation and statehood in the 
Palestinian situation has occurred partly due to the variable nature of Palestinian 
personality. The laws of occupation are designed to meet the needs of those involved in 
temporary occupations. Therefore, it is necessary to ask whether the current laws of 
occupation are appropriate in situations of variable personality. 
Within the question of variable personality and prolonged occupation it will also be 
necessary to consider whether there is a cut off point when belligerent occupation could 
be considered to have ended. As can be seen in the Palestinian situation, the end of 
occupation may not be as simple as a full handing over of control from one side to 
another at one agreed moment in time. This may lead on to considerations regarding 
the customary test of effective control which is often used to determine whether a 
belligerent can be considered to occupy an area. 
123 For example, Article 53 of Geneva Convention IV provides, "Any destruction by the occupying power 
of real or personal property belonging individually or collectively to private persons or to the State... ". 
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2.2.1: Variable Personality and Prolonged Occupations 
The question of prolonged occupations within the law of belligerent occupation is not a 
new problem for international lawyers. 124 Although there is no precise legal definition 
of when an occupation can be considered to be "prolonged", Roberts describes a 
prolonged occupation as, 
"An occupation that lasts for more than 5 years and extends into a period when hostilities are sharply 
reduced. " 25 
He also suggests that the situation of prolonged occupation which has brought this 
international legal issue to the fore is that of the Israeli occupied territories. 126 
None of the international documents relating to occupations set a prescribed limit for 
the period of time occupation may last. However, Geneva Convention IV does provide 
for a transitional period during which some of the provisions of the Convention should 
no longer continue to be applicable: 
"In the case of occupied territory, the application of the present Convention shall cease one year after the 
general close of military operations; however, the Occupying Power shall be bound, for the duration of 
the occupation, to the extent that such Power exercises the functions of government in such territory, by 
the provisions of the following Articles of the Present Convention: 1 to 12,27,29 to 34,47,49,51,52, 127 53,59,61 to 77,143. » 
Since Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, it can be said that the above 
provision is technically abrogated. 128 Article 3 (b) of Protocol I provides, "The 
application of the Conventions and of this Protocol shall cease. . on the termination of 
the occupation. " 
As Israel is not a party to Additional Protocol I it would be difficult to apply Article 3 
(b) to the Palestinian situation. 129 More to the point, however, is the fact that when the 
124 See for example, Roberts, "Prolonged Military Occupation". 
125 Ibid., at 47. Roberts then goes on to list a few examples of prolonged occupations such as, the allied 
occupations of Germany and Japan, the South African occupation of Namibia, the Turkish presence in 
Northern Cyprus, the Moroccan forces in Western Sahara and the Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea. 
126 See for example, ibid., at 44. 
127 Article 6 (3). This means that an occupying power is only bound to observe 43 articles of the 
Convention one a year after the close of military operations. See ibid., at 55 - 56 for a discussion of the 
articles which would still require observance. 
12$ The Additional Protocol deals with the protection of victims of international armed conflicts and 
supplements the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 
12 As noted above in note 65 the Protocol's status as customary international law is far from certain. 
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actualities of the development of the Palestinian situation regarding occupation are 
taken into account, the one year rule laid down in Article 6 (3) would be very difficult to 
apply. It would be hard to state exactly when "general military operations" ceased, or 
even if they did at all. This is particularly a problem in the Palestinian context because 
of the variable personality of the PA and the phased approach which was laid down in 
the Declaration of Principles and the steps taken towards peace. Furthermore, since the 
violent outbursts of 2000/2001 within the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the level of Israeli 
military activity has increased in order to attempt to resist Palestinian uprising. This, 
whilst not surprising, means that it is difficult to assess when occupation can be 
considered to have ended or in this case, lessened in intensity. 
As discussed above, when Articles 42 and 43 of the Hague Regulations were considered 
the test for occupation is a factual one similar to that of the effective control test which 
has arisen many times in this thesis. 130 To recap, Article 42 provides that territory is 
occupied when "it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army... " and 
Article 43 describes the occupying power as the entity into whose hands the authority of 
the legitimate power "... has in fact passed... ". 
In the light of this, the question to be asked in relation to variable personality, and in 
establishing its relationship with the law of occupation, is a factual one, which can be 
answered by an examination of the extent to which Israel is capable of controlling the 
life of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. As was discussed above in section 1.3 when it 
was being considered whether the West Bank and Gaza Strip were occupied territories, 
it was decided that they are a unique example of occupation which is unlike others 
which have gone before because of the existence of an entity with high, yet variable 
degree of status. 
Some academics have suggested that a doctrine of historical consolidation exists in 
cases of prolonged occupation: 
"There comes a time when realities, however illegal or inequitable they may have been initially appear to 
have become irreversible and the world community's interest in orderliness and stability might justify 
cloaking it with the mantel of legality. ""' 
"o See section 1.3 regarding the legal tests for occupancy. 
"' This was raised in the context of Indonesian occupation of East Timor by Fontein, in (1991) 45 
Australian Journal of International Affairs 170. 
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In the context of variable personality such a suggestion is particularly abhorrent and 
completely destroys the notion of self determination of peoples. It reeks of the 
legalising of acquisition of territory through the use of force. Given the increased 
possibility of prolonged occupation where a situation of variable personality exists it 
would be highly dangerous to give credence to such a theory for it would destroy the 
chance of a gradual emergence of a peaceful settlement through the less than ideal, yet 
preferable creation of a new entity (such as the PA). 
Once an occupation has continued for a prolonged period of time there is an argument 
to support the idea that there should be a distinct set of rules applied to the occupant. It 
is debatable whether the powers of the occupant should decrease (in order to allow the 
civilian population more input into public life, or whether they should increase in order 
to prevent the occupant from leaving the territory in an underdeveloped state. 132 it 
would be possible to undertake a study examining how far this is happening in Palestine 
and whether Israel is taking a sufficiently responsible attitude to the development of the 
territory. 133 It is submitted that whilst this issue is most certainly relevant to the 
Palestinian situation it is not of direct use to the question under consideration here - that 
of the relationship between variable personality and the law of occupation. 
Overall it seems that the combination of a prolonged occupation and variable 
personality raises particular questions which are not fully answered by the current law 
of occupation. This means that because of the extended time which occupation has 
continued for, albeit in a sui generis style situation, that the law of occupation is not 
very effective at protecting the human rights of the Palestinian population. 
Therefore the conclusions so far do not bode well for the protection of human rights 
outside of regular situations, whether attempts at protection are made through 
international human rights law or the law of occupation. 
However, this leads on to a very interesting question which is perhaps the crux of this 
chapter. That is, whether in a situation which does not fall into the traditional 
132 See Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation, at 144 - 149; Roberts, "Prolonged Military 
Occupation" and Cassese, "Powers and Duties of an Occupant in Relation to Land and Natural 
Resources" chapter 14 from, Playfair, International Law and Administration of the Occupied Territories 
419. 
133 Such a study is not undertaken here due to time and space, as this is an area more than worthy of at 
least an entire thesis. 
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mechanisms for human rights protection, there is an alternative way to attempt to shield 
the population from abuse. '34 
2.3: Is the situation different if one of the parties is an entity with variable 
personality, for example a non-state or emergin! state entity? 
Given the conclusions reached so far in this chapter, that the current systems of human 
rights protection are inadequate, whether they are through human rights law or the law 
of occupation, the logical approach to take is a new one. International law is clearly 
lagging behind the realities of international life, since it does not provide laws which are 
possible to apply effectively to situations such as the Palestinian problem. 
Although the West Bank and Gaza Strip are in a situation of occupation sui generis it is 
likely that Palestine, as an emerging state with variable personality is not the only entity 
which may suffer as a result of having these characteristics. 
It does not seem to be beyond the realm of possibility that a non-state entity should be 
encouraged to abide by human rights norms. This is particularly so if the entity is an 
emerging state and will in the future have to be accountable for its human rights records 
Therefore, the following section aims to examine how entities which have a variable, 
yet significant level of personality on the international stage can be dealt with in order 
to ensure that their populations are not denied their human rights simply through lack of 
international legal protection. 
134 For the purposes of this thesis alternative methods examined will be considered only in relation to the 
example of an emerging state entity with variable personality through applying them to the Palestinian 
situation. 
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3: TO WHAT KIND OF HUMAN RIGHTS REGIME COULD AN 
ENTITY WITH VARIABLE PERSONALITY BE SUBJECT? 
Since the previous sections have demonstrated the difficulties which variable 
personality poses for international human rights protection it is instructive to consider 
ways in which the two could be reconciled if international recognition practice 
continues to result in the emergence of entities with a variable personality. 
There are two main ways to reconcile them in through international legal mechanisms 
which are discussed in detail below. The first is to allow non-state entities with 
effective control of a particular territory to become parties to multilateral protection 
treaties, like the ICCPR, or at least to give them a certain level of participation and 
obligation. The second is to take a functionalist interpretation of customary 
international law in which non-state entities are bound by the customary elements of 
international human rights law. 
3.1: Non-State entities as parties to multilateral human rights conventions? 
International law does not generally allow non-state entities to become party to 
multilateral conventions. 135 The variable nature of personality of an entity such as 
Palestine obviously means that agreement regarding its status has not been reached and 
therefore different state parties would perhaps not be happy with Palestine as a party, 
albeit a non-state party. 
In the case of a non-state entity signing and ratifying a convention such as the ICCPR 
there would need to be some test of when becoming a party was necessary and practical. 
However, it would be possible for tests such as the effective control test to be used. 
Once an entity is in effective control it can have a drastic effect on the human rights of 
the population and therefore should be subject to some level of scrutiny. 
"3s For example, Article 48(1) of the ICCPR provides that, "The present Convention is open for signature 
by any State member of the United Nations or member of any of its specialised agencies, by any State 
Party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice, and by any other State which has been invited by 
the General Assembly of the United Nations to become a party to the present Covenant. " See also 
Article 3 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties UN Doc. A/Conf 39/28; UKTS 58 (1980), 
which draws a distinction between those treaties concluded between states and those concluded between 
states and other subjects of international law. 
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The situation as to whether a non-state entity with variable personality should be able to 
become a party to a multilateral human rights convention would not always be clear cut 
as it may not be certain whether or for how long it may stay in effective control of the 
territory. However, in situations such as the Palestinian one, where the achievement of 
statehood appears to be simply a matter of time and it would be extremely unlikely that 
current powers would be taken away from those in effective control, there does not 
appear to be reason to deny the population the protection these instruments may afford 
them. 
Within this section it is also necessary to consider the possibility that in some situations 
opponent states may be too great in number or power to enable a non-state entity to 
become a party to a multilateral convention. However, given the potential benefit to the 
population under its control, some level of non-state participation may be possible in 
order to keep a check on its power without making it a full party. 
Before China signed the ICCPR136 the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region was 
in a similar position. The population had rights as a result of UK sovereignty and when 
sovereignty was passed over to China, the rights remained. Therefore Hong Kong had a 
degree of participation and would have been due to report under Article 40 of the 
Covenant, had China not signed and taken on reporting obligations. 137 However, it is 
true to say that the situation in Hong Kong was slightly different to that of Palestine, 
since Hong Kong passed between states, rather than emerging as a new state. 
Nonetheless, there is no good reason why an emerging state, which is likely to achieve 
full statehood in time could not become a party to a treaty. Particularly if signing would 
result in the upholding of the aims and purposes of the treaty - which in a situation of 
human rights abuse would surely be the case. 
Naturally, this would involve agreement between the existing parties to the treaty that 
its terms could be altered to include emerging state entities. However, since the terms 
of a treaty can vary from treaty to treaty, in theory at least, this is a possible solution. In 
controversial cases, like that of Palestine, where world opinion is divided, agreement 
136 China signed on 5 October 1998. 
137 Arguably there was less pressure for Hong Kong to be allowed to accede to the Convention because 
the likelihood of statehood was not great. However in the Palestinian context, as pointed out above, the 
situation is somewhat different. 
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would be more difficult to reach. Agreement might be reached however, if it was clear 
that a non-state entity becoming party to a treaty did not constitute recognition of 
statehood by another party to the treaty. 
It seems therefore that limited participation could be possible if the international 
community were unwilling to be sufficiently flexible to allow an entity to become a 
party. However, if statehood is extremely likely then not allowing full participation 
seems less justifiable. 
With the practice of the Human Rights Committee in mind, it should be noted that the 
focus of protection of human rights is becoming less state-centric and more emphasis is 
being placed on rights as they attach to individuals/peoples. 138 In terms of securing 
greater protection for peoples whose rights are affected by non-state entities this is 
surely a step in the rights direction. However, the existence of variable personality 
means that further steps must be taken to place peoples' human rights within the scope 
of international legal protection. 
It is submitted here that this kind of approach is needed because of the unbalanced 
international response to the question of human rights protection where a state and a 
non-state entity both affect a people's human rights. Whilst it is clear that the activities 
of the non-state entity are in desperate need of regulation by the international 
community, it is not suggested that the response to the state in question is necessarily 
ideal. 139 The point to remember however, is that in comparison the responses to the two 
different entities are unbalanced given the extent to which the non-state entity is able to 
abuse the human rights of its people. 
As far as non-state entities are concerned the important advantage which this method of 
achieving human rights protection provides is that it gives them a yardstick to be judged 
by in terms of their human rights records. This is important because it would be the 
138 See above in section 2.1.1.1 the Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 26. 
139 Dugard notes that the response of the international community towards Israeli abuse of Palestinian 
human rights is far from effective. He points out numerous possible ways to encourage Israeli 
compliance with human rights standards including, enforcement action under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter; application of the Geneva Conventions and Hague Regulations; an advisory opinion on the 
matter from the International Court of Justice; non-recognition of the annexation of East Jerusalem; 
economic Coercion; exclusion from International Organisations; investigative Committees; the 
applicability of International Labour Organisation Conventions and the advancement of human rights 
through domestic courts - Dugard, "Enforcement of Human Rights in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip". 
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same mechanisms used to judge states and would surely only improve their status in the 
international community. Indeed, given the importance placed on human rights by 
states in recognition decisions, it would seem sensible from the point of view of non- 
state entities, for them to be encouraged to seek human rights monitoring through 
becoming parties to human rights treaties. If aiming to achieve statehood, they should 
look to have more emphasis placed on their ability to protect human rights through 
international legal mechanisms in order to further their cause. Such monitoring would 
therefore not only be simply a burden to them in terms of responsibility but also an 
advantage in seeking greater recognition. 
3.2: Non-State Entities could be bound by customary international human rights 
law 
It is submitted that based on a functionalist approach to the capacity of non-state 
entities, it is permissible to consider them bound by relevant customary law. In the 
Reparations case the Court was of the opinion that the UN was an international 
organisation which is endowed with international legal personality and that it had the 
capacity to bring international claims which were "necessitated by the discharge of its 
functions. " 140 
The Court also stated that, 
"... the organisation was intended to exercise and enjoy, and is in fact exercising and enjoying, functions 
and rights which can only be explained on the basis of the possession of a large measure of international 
personality and the capacity to operate upon an international plane. " 
The functionalist approach to personality of a non-state entity was coupled by the Court 
with an approach which affirms an entity's obligations, responsibilities and duties rising 
from the exercise of its functions, as well as rights. However such an approach is not 
only advocated by the Court. Academics have also been keen to point out the merits of 
a functionalist approach due to the range of actors which have a meaningful role to play 
in the international community. "' 
140 Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations Case, Advisory Opinion, (1949) 
ICJRep. 174. 
141 Schreuer, "The Waning of the Sovereign State: Towards a New Paradigm for International Law? " 
cited in Benvenisti, "Responsibility for the Protection of Human Rights Under the Interim Israeli- 
Palestinian Agreements", at 310. Relevant parts of Schreuer's article are also used at the end of Chapter 
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When this functional based responsibility notion is applied to a non-state entity which is 
the government of an emerging state it can be argued that it is bound to follow 
customary human rights law. The safeguarding of the population under its effective 
control and the observance of their basic human rights would surely be considered to 
fall within its functions. To effectively discharge those functions within the framework 
of its obligations as a result of its international legal personality it must be bound by 
relevant customary law. 
On the assumption that a functional responsibility argument is permissible it would then 
follow that in the Palestinian context the PA would be bound by the UNDHR142 and 
those parts of the ICCPR and other human rights instruments which are part of 
customary international law. 143 
This kind of customary protection is obviously not as effective as protection though the 
international human rights covenants due to lack of scrutiny or enforcement procedures. 
However, particularly in conjunction with treaty based protection regimes the 
guarantees under customary law provide a basic standard of human rights for those 
effectively governed by non-state entities. 
The advantages of encouraging a non-state entity to be subject to international law 
human rights standards are great. A functionalist approach to responsibility also 
ensures that as an entity's domestic powers increase so does its accountability in 
Four. Both uses rely on the functionalist approach to the responsibility of a non-state entity. The fact that 
both approaches are the same whether concerning general international responsibility or responsibility for 
human rights is important as it would create a more cohesive system of international law if similar tests 
were used in similar areas. 
142 According to Reisman's interpretation - Reisman, "Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary 
International Law" (1990) 84 AJIL 866, at 867 - 868. See also Filartiga v Pena-Irla which suggests that 
the UNDHR is an authoritative statement from the international community which creates expectations 
that it will be adhered to: (1980) 19 ILM 966. The Proclamation of Tehran at the conclusion of the 
International Conference on Human Rights also stressed that the UNDHR was an "obligation for 
members of the international community": 23 GAOR, A/Conf. 32/41. 
"' It is not possible here to provide a list of all customary human rights, however it has previously been 
attempted to clarify what may fall within this category. See, Restatement of the Law: Third Restatement 
of the US Foreign Relations Law Vol. 2 (1987) 165. The restatement does not necessarily represent the 
views of the US government but was prepared by American international lawyers. They stated that "A 
state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, encourages, or condones, a) 
genocide, b) slavery or slave trade, c) the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals, d) the 
torture or other cruel, inhuman , or 
degrading treatment or punishment, e) prolonged arbitrary detention, 
f) systematic racial discrimination, or g) a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally 
recognised human rights. " See also, Harris, Cases and Materials (51h Ed), at 725 - 738 regarding 
customary international human rights law and Meron, "The Geneva Conventions As Customary Law". 
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relation to its population's human rights. It is underpinned by the theory that with rights 
come duties - an approach which is common when looking at the responsibilities of 
states. Furthermore as mentioned above at the end of section 3.1, by seeking to be part 
of an international human rights regime, an entity with emerging statehood would 
strengthen the legitimacy of their claims to be overseers of the rights of the population. 
This study now moves on to consider some alternative ways in which greater human 
rights protection could be afforded to those subject to the jurisdiction of an entity with 
variable personality. 
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4: ARE THERE ANY OTHER WAYS OF PROTECTING HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN SUCH A SITUATION? 
The suggestions discussed above are obviously only one way to approach human rights 
protection in a situation of variable personality and both involve subjecting the entity 
with variable personality to an existing international legal regime which would 
generally be reserved for states. The benefits of an approach which is based upon the 
actual functions of an entity being taken in account when determining the point at which 
it becomes responsible are great. It is submitted that this is perhaps the most effective 
way of positively protecting the rights of a population and taking preventative action in 
situations of variable personality. 
However, there are alternative ways to both protect human rights and to encourage 
responsibility for human rights once they have occurred. This section aims to look at 
some of those possibilities. These are through the promotion and creation of internal 
human rights safeguards, the establishment of truth and reconciliation commissions and 
through the greater use of the political organs of the UN. 
4.1: Greater promotion of the creation of internal human rights safeguards 
The international community could also seek to protect human rights of those 
"governed" by an entity with variable personality through the promotion of internal 
safeguards for human rights. 
There could perhaps be a conscious effort to do this at a policy level if there are 
negotiations which help give the entity power and control within the state. For 
example, in the Palestinian context, human rights could have had a higher profile and 
provisions regarding human rights inserted in the DOP or other interim agreements. 
Whilst negotiations may not take place in every situation before a non-state entity 
realises effective control (for example in a coup), on the occasions where it does, human 
rights should be at the forefront of such plans. 
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In those situations where no agreements are reached regarding the power set-up in a 
state it is then the obligation of the international community to put pressure upon those 
in effective control to observe the human rights of the population. This could for 
example be done through refusing to recognise the new regime. This was done in 
Southern Rhodesia regarding the rebel white minority government of Ian Smith in 
1965.144 
To refer to the Palestinian situation, there has been a lack of international pressure upon 
the PA and its Chairman to implement human rights norms within the areas under their 
control. For example, despite the Legislative Council endorsing the Palestinian Basic 
Law, which as discussed above sets a reasonable level of rights protection and aims to 
uphold more strictly the rule of law, there has been a significant failure by the 
international community to bring Palestinian human rights infringements to the fore 
which has enabled Arafat to continue to refuse to sign the Basic Law. '45 
The action suggested in this sub-section is not intended to be an alternative to the two 
suggestions above regarding treaties and customary international law. Indeed if human 
rights are to be taken extremely seriously by all members of the international 
community, then the ideas suggested here could be implemented regardless. However, 
if the other suggestions are not implemented in practice, this third suggestion becomes 
all the more vital. 
4.2: Truth and Reconciliation Commissions 
In many South American States'46 and some African States147 truth and reconciliation 
commissions were established following periods of human rights abuse. 148 It is right to 
'" The General Assembly called upon "all states not to recognise any form of independence in Southern 
Rhodesia without the prior establishment of a government based on minority rule in accordance with 
General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XX)" - General Assembly Resolution 2379 (XXVI), (1968) 
(Voting: 92: 2: 17. ) The resolution text can also be found at (1968) 7 ILM 1401. 
"S See above section 1.1.2. 
146 For example, Bolivia (no report has yet been published); Argentina, (Nunca Mas: The Report of the 
Argentine National Commission on the Disappeared 1986); Uruguay, (Uruguay: Nunca Mas: Informe 
Sobre La Violacion A Los Derechos Humanos (1972 - 1985)); Chile, (Report of the Chilean National 
Commission on Truth and Reconciliation); El Salvador (From Madness to Hope; The 12 Year War In El 
Salvador: Report of the Commission on the Truth For El Salvador). 
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point out that truth commissions do not protect against possible human rights abuse 
through standard setting. A truth commission may have the effect of lessening future 
abuses by attempting to heal old divisions in the country or by educating a population 
and bringing human rights to the fore, however this is a by-product rather than a definite 
product of a commission. 
There is no reason why an entity that has variable personality would not be able to set 
up a truth and reconciliation commission in order to investigate past and current human 
rights abuse on its own part. Indeed, in this sense a truth commission is ideal as there 
are no issues which relate to variable personality which would bar such action. It is true 
to say that it would be unusual, though not impossible for an entity which was not the 
full government of a state to take such action. It might be difficult to ensure the 
legitimacy of a truth commission set up by an entity with variable personality or 
difficult to establish if funding was difficult to obtain. However, at a theoretical level at 
least it is not beyond the realms of possibility. 
However there are a number of international legal issues in relation to truth 
commissions which have been dealt with differently by different states. There have 
been questions as to whether situations where peace settlements which involve 
amnesties for those who come and give evidence to the commission, (yet have 
committed gross violations of human rights), are compatible with state responsibility 
and human rights regimes. '49 
147 Uganda (1974 and 1986) (Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Disappearance of People in 
Uganda Since the 25`" of January 1971, cited in Carver, "Called to Account: How African Governments 
Investigate Human Rights Violations" (1990) 89 African Affairs 536 - the second Ugandan Report has not 
yet been published); Zimbabwe (there has reluctance to publish the report from the government due to 
tensions between the two main ethnic groups in the State); Chad, (Report of the Commission of Inquiry 
into the Crimes and Misappropriations Committed By Ex-President Habre, his Accomplices and/or 
Accessories. May 1992); South Africa, (African National Congress: Report of the Commission of Enquiry 
into Complaints By Former African National Congress Prisoners and Detainees (1992) and Reports of 
the Commission of Enquiry into Certain Allegations of Cruelty and Human Rights Abuse Against ANC 
Prisoners and Detainees by ANC Members II (20 August 1993); Rwanda, (Report of the International 
Commission of investigation on Human Rights Violations in Rwanda Since 1 October 1990 (7 - 21 
January 1993) Final Report (1993)); Ethiopia. 
148 Notable Commissions have also been established in Germany following reunification to investigate 
human rights violations following communist rule in East Germany (Enquet Kommission Aufarbeitung 
von Geschichte und Folgen der SED-Diktator in Deutschland) and in The Philippines in 1986 after the 
victory of Corazon Aquino's democratic government ending martial law in the country (the commission's 
work was cut short and no report was produced). For a comparative study of the different commissions 
See, Hayner, "Fifteen Truth Commissions -1974 - 1994: A Comparative Study" (1994) 16 HRQ 597. 
149 There is a view that international law does not allow indemnity or amnesty in such situations. See, 
Sarkin, "The Trials and Tribulations of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission" (1996) 12 
SAID 617, at 627; Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Judgment of July 
29 1988, (1988) 9 HRIJ 212; Pasqualucci, "The Whole Truth and Nothing But the Truth: Truth 
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There is also the issue as to who is held responsible and for what. This links in with 
some of the questions surrounding the giving of orders and superior responsibility 
which was touched upon in Chapter Four. 150 Until 1992 no truth commission had 
named individuals, however even a decision not to name names can be breached 
because of the complex and bitter situation which led to the decision to set up a 
Commission in the first place. 151 
It is interesting to note however that a truth commission has been willing to find a NLM 
responsible for human rights abuses. 152 The El Salvadoran Truth Commission found 
that the Farabundo Marti Liberation Front approved the assassination of civilian mayors 
and that the People's Revolutionary Army was responsible for a number of 
executions. 153 Therefore truth commissions can have a role to play in cases where non- 
state entities have committed human rights abuses. 
However the interesting legal problems with truth commissions which were noted above 
exist separately from the question of variable personality and human rights which are 
being dealt with here. Nonetheless, they needed to be raised, if not discussed in detail. 
The main point to make is that truth commissions could be useful in situations such as 
Palestine, although their role until the peace process is over is limited. 
4.3: Making Greater Use of the Political Organs of the United Nations 
There is no doubt that one of the most important ways to encourage a regime to observe 
human rights standards is to bring the situation to the forefront of international debate. 
This is true whether an entity is a State or a non-state entity with variable personality. 
Commissions, Impunity and the Inter-American Human Rights System" (1994) 12 BUILT 321; 
Orentlicher, "Settling Accounts: The Duty To Prosecute Human Rights Violations of Prior Regime" 
(1991) Yale IJ 2537; Roniger and Sznajder, "The Legacy of Human Rights Violations and the Collective 
Identity of Redemocratized Uruguay". 
uo See section 2.1 of Chapter Four. 
151 The Chadian report gave names and photographs, the El Salvador Truth Commission named over forty 
officials, the second African National Congress Truth Commission in South Africa was conducted 
similarly to a trial of individuals and the Rwandan Commission named many officials including the 
President. In Argentina, the commission chose not to name individuals however a government leak gave 
the report to the Press and it became public knowledge - (see Hayner, "Fifteen Truth Commissions - 
1974 - 1994: A Comparative 
Study", at 648. ) 
152 As was mentioned briefly in section 2 of Chapter Four. 
153 Crahan, "The Salvadoran Truth Commission in Comparative Perspective", at 473. 
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Indeed, an entity seeking recognition as a State, such as Palestine, is likely to want to 
better its "image" in the international community, for this may affect the decisions of 
recognising states. 
By using the weight of the General Assembly to issue resolutions which are explicit in 
relation to abuses which have occurred and directive as to exactly what action could be 
taken by the PA to reduce those abuses or behaviour, then increased international 
pressure could be brought to bear upon the situation. 
The other political organ of the UN which could possibly be used effectively in a 
situation of variable personality in order to try to uphold human rights is the 
Commission on Human Rights. '54 Given the existing Commission involvement which 
was discussed in section 2.1.3 above, it would surely not be beyond the realm of 
possibility for its consideration of the issue to be expanded and for greater account of 
PA conduct in the same area to be examined. 
As with action taken by any political body the embarrassment to the State when an 
adverse report is publicly discussed is significant, particularly as States are called on to 
defend themselves at the Commission's public meetings. So although there are no 
legally binding sanctions, the powers of the Commission can work well to bring the 
world's attention to a situation and to shame and persuade the State into hopefully 
taking some action to rectify their behaviour. 
There appears to be no reason as to why the Commission's procedures could not be 
used to investigate the human rights record of an entity with variable personality. Since 
reports are generally on an ad hoc basis there would not necessarily be any problems 
regarding precedent setting in relation to non-state entities. Furthermore, as long as the 
report made it clear that the entity being investigated was not a state, there would not 
need to be any concern regarding implied recognition or political messaging regarding 
status. 
In this respect the use of the Commission on Human Rights could potentially be an ideal 
method by which to encourage the respect for human rights by emerging actors on the 
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international stage which have sufficient status to exercise jurisdiction over the people 
they purport to represent. The only disadvantage the Commission has is the lack of 
teeth with which to enforce its reports' conclusions. However, a non-state entity is 
likely to be seeking to build a good relationship with other actors on the international 
stage and may want to demonstrate that it has a good human rights record. It is 
reasonable to suggest therefore, that the potential embarrassment and likely hurdles on 
the way to recognition which a bad report may produce, could be enough to encourage 
respect for human rights. 
So far the last two main sections, 3 and 4, have looked at ways of achieving greater 
levels of human rights protection in variable personality situations. The following 
section then returns to consider the overall consequences for the protection of human 
rights in a situation of occupation sui generis due to variable personality. 
154 Established by ECOSOC under Article 68 of the UN Charter. ECOSOC was set up by Chapter X of 
the UN Charter and has 54 members. (Article 61(1) aims to implement the human rights standards laid 
down in Article 1 and 55 of the Charter). 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Section 3 examined the ways in which an established human rights regime could be 
implemented in a situation of occupation sui generis where there is an entity with 
variable personality. However it is interesting to return to the issue of whether human 
rights law or occupation law is used to protect a population, as the consequences of 
which is used can be quite drastic. They are significant simply because apart from the 
different style of protection (or lack of it) that they both offer, the decision may help 
with the question of what level of status an entity possesses. The extent to which an 
entity with variable personality is encouraged to abide by the international law of 
human rights (which a state would be required to adhere to) may be a good indicator of 
where on the scale of possibilities of status it may lie. 
In terms of the Palestinian situation, this means that the PA should be seeking to have 
its role in human rights protection recognised and validated by the international 
community precisely because it strengthens the legitimacy of their claims as overseers 
of the rights of the population. Any attempts by an entity with variable personality to 
try to exclude the applicability of human rights should have the opposite effect and 
therefore reduce its level of status on the scale of possibilities. 
Therefore the logical corollary of this in the Palestinian situation is that if Israel wants 
to oppose Palestinian claims to statehood or increased personality it should attempt to 
discourage the international community from accepting Palestinian responsibility for 
human rights. However, this naturally means that Israel would be considered still to be 
responsible overall for the human rights of Palestinians living within the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip. This would mean at the very least that international humanitarian law 
would have to be applied. 
Overall, a situation where an entity has variable personality and exercises a degree of 
control over a population can have a huge affect on the human rights of the population. 
They have the power to abuse human rights but international law lacks the means by 
which to regulate the activity of that entity. This shows that the reality of variable 
personality is not reflected in other important areas of international law. However, there 
is no need for this to sound the death knell for the theory of variable personality, indeed 
it cannot since in practice variable personality exists and recent international practice 
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shows no signs of decreasing, as exemplified through the Palestinian situation. In 
section 3 and 4 it has been shown that there are ways these gaps in protection could be 
filled that could work effectively and achieve a number of results. 
First, they could provide a more comprehensive system of international law which takes 
into account the realities of the number of different types of actors which exist on the 
international stage. This requires international law to be flexible and allow a functional 
approach to rights and obligations in which the traditional notions about sovereignty 
may be challenged. When placed alongside a system which at a policy level places 
human rights at the forefront of its goals, then variable personality and human rights are 
extremely compatible. 
Second, by assessing each non-state situation individually and dealing with the factual 
level of control an entity has within the relevant territory, it is possible to react to 
provide a more adequate system for the protection of human rights. If this were to be 
implemented it would mean much more protection could be afforded to all peoples and 
the plan of attaining universal human rights is more achievable. Human rights 
standards can after all only be truly upheld once all actors on the international stage in 
practice are subject to the same level of scrutiny regardless of their official status. 
Third, they can assist in the evolution of a new responsible state as its personality 
evolves and its status is increased. This is vital if the international community aims to 
create a culture of responsibility where human rights protection is placed at the forefront 
of international life. 
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CONCLUSION TO PART II 
The second part of this thesis has focussed on the question of whether variable 
personality is reflected in other areas of international law. It appears that there are three 
main conclusions which can be drawn from the last two chapters. The first relates to the 
broader implications of variable personality, the second to the nature of international 
law and the third to the ways in which some of the problems could begin to be dealt 
with. 
(A): BROADER IMPLICATIONS OF VARIABLE PERSONALITY 
International law does not cope adequately with the regulation of non-state entities with 
variable personality in the field of responsibility for wrongful actions on the 
international plane. It also does not provide suitable mechanisms to regulate the activity 
of such entities towards those subject to their jurisdiction. This is because the theory of 
variability in personality is not reflected in the make-up of the regulation in those 
specific areas of international life. 
However, such a conclusion is not surprising given that the notion that personality may 
be variable is not in keeping with traditional international legal theory and that the range 
of actors found on the international stage is ever increasing and changing. 
: THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
This leads to the second conclusion which relates to the nature of international law in 
general. It appears that given that gaps have formed in some areas of international law 
where there is insufficient regulation for some actors on the international stage, that 
international law is not yet fully formed into a cohesive body of law. This is also not 
surprising because of the ad hoc manner in which international law has been created and 
because of the constantly changing international scene. However, these gaps also 
suggest that when there are attempts at codification (such as through the International 
292 
Law Commission) more steps could be taken to help ensure that these gaps do not 
appear by taking into account the realities of international life. 
(C): THE POSSIBILITY FOR REFORM 
The third conclusion is a positive note on which finish this part of the thesis. In order to 
create a better regulated and more comprehensive system of international law there does 
not necessarily have to be wholesale change. As discussed in both Chapters Four and 
Five there are ways of using the international systems already in operation in both the 
field of responsibility and human rights in order to attempt to plug the gaps which have 
appeared. This would mean taking a functionalist and de facto approach towards new 
style entities and their relationship with international law in the light of the theory of 
variable personality. This approach would help to ensure that responsibility is taken for 
international wrongful actions, even when the wrong-doer is a non-state entity with a 
variable level of personality and would also assist in protecting the human rights of 
those under the jurisdiction of such an entity. Although these are only two areas of 
international law which have been specifically examined in the light of variable 
personality, there is no reason why other areas could not studied in the same manner. 
By seeking to make emerging entities with variable personality take more responsibility 
for their actions and by encouraging them to accept the regulation of the international 
community in fields like human rights it is more likely that a co-operative and 
responsible state will emerge, which is aware of the effects of its actions on both its 




The main conclusions to each part of this thesis have already been laid out in the 
conclusions to Part I and Part II of this thesis and therefore will not be reiterated here in 
great depth. Those conclusions should be referred back to in order to refresh the mind 
as to the important ideas which were drawn from the discussion in each part however. 
Nonetheless, to draw this study to a close it is important to compare those conclusions 
with the aims which were laid down at the beginning of this study. The thesis aimed 
firstly to gather together recent state practice and reassess the nature of personality. 
Secondly, to examine the status of the Palestinian situation in order to further the 
understanding of the nature of personality. Lastly, it aimed to consider the implications 
which this reappraisal of the nature of personality may have for other areas of 
international law. It is submitted that the conclusions drawn in at the end of each part to 
this thesis have made headway in tackling these challenges. The first and second of 
these aims have been undertaken through the theory that personality is variable which 
was asserted in Chapter One and the discussion which followed in Chapter Three 
regarding the variable nature of personality of Palestine and the Palestinian 
Representatives of those in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It can be remembered that 
the additional conclusion which grew out of Chapter Three as to the "Super" status of 
the PLO as a national liberation movement is an interesting extra point could perhaps 
developed in future study. The third aim of this thesis was tackled in Part II of this 
thesis through the examination of the broader implications of variable personality. The 
conclusions drawn in Part II are important as they provided not only discussion as to the 
broader implications of variable personality but also enabled reflection back as to the 
nature of the theory itself and the possibility for reconciliation of the current practice 
with other areas. 
In general this thesis has taken not taken a formalist approach to the study of 
international law. It is hoped that through dealing with the realities of international life 
this study has resulted in an appraisal of state practice which encourages international 
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legal thinking to be forward-thinking and orientated towards process-led solutions to 
international legal problems. It is submitted that such approaches enable international 
law to develop and deal effectively with the challenges which are posed by the 
questions raised in this thesis. 
Overall however there are also a couple of points which should be noted when Part I 
and Part II are considered in tandem. The first relates to the theory of variable 
personality and the second to international law in general. 
(M: VARIABLE PERSONALITY 
The theory that personality may at many different levels be variable was posited in Part 
I of this thesis. It seems true to say that the broader implications of variable personality 
as discussed in Part II do not necessarily support the existence of the theory which was 
promoted in Part I. This is because there was not found to be evidence of the potential 
for an entity's personality to be variable in the existing law examined in either Chapter 
Four or Five. However, it is suggested that this does not mean that the theory of 
variable personality must be incorrect, because as an emerging theory, notably about 
non-state entities, it is to be expected that international law would be unaware of its 
existence. 
Indeed, the problems encountered for entities with variable personality in Chapters Four 
and Five seem to be mostly as a result of the incompatibility of the changing 
international scene with existing international legal frameworks. It is clear that in 
modem times non-state entities can have a meaningful role to play on the international 
stage but that the rest of international law has not always kept abreast of these 
developments. It is not strange to suggest therefore that it is the variable nature of an 
entity's personality which causes those problems and that as a result current 
international law is unable to effectively regulate its activities. Given that the theory of 
variability personality has emerged from a reappraisal of the nature of personality it is 
not surprising that it is not reflected in existing international law. Therefore in a upside 
down way it is almost the lack of international law's ability to cope with the notion of 
variable personality which suggests that it is a real phenomenon. 
(B): GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW 
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It is of importance to continue to remember the significance that the international norms 
and customs relating to personality and recognition can have upon other areas of 
international law. As examined in Part II, if personality is not taken into sufficient 
account when considering other areas of international regulation, gaps can begin to 
appear where entities with a significant amount of power on the international stage can 
act comparatively unregulated. 
Whilst it is true that international law is not a fully formed comprehensive body of 
rules, it is no doubt preferable that when international law is created or states take action 
which may eventually form custom, that the international community is aware of the 
most current thinking in all areas which may impact on the rest of the system. In this 
respect the assertion made in this thesis that personality is variable in nature has 
considerable influence in relation to general international law. Personality is of primary 
importance to ascertaining which entities act on the international stage and to what 
extent they operate. Without a solid understanding of practice regarding personality the 
rest of international law is to a degree operating in the dark, not clear about which and 
how entities operate in the international community. Whilst the assertion that 
personality is variable does to a certain extent make that understanding more difficult, it 
at the very least means that the reality and the complexities of international life are 
faced head on rather than blissfully ignored. Such understanding can only assist in 
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States which recognised the State of Palestine after the 15 November1988 Palestinian 
Declaration of Statehood. ' 
State Date of Recognition 
1) Afghanistan 16/11/1988 
2) Albania 17/11/1988 
3) Algeria 15/11/1988 
4) Angola 06/12/1988 
5) Austria 14/12/1988 
6) Bahrain 15/11/1988 
7) Bangladesh 16/11/1988 
8) Benin 
9) Bhutan 25/12/1988 
10) Botswana 19/12/1988 
11) Brunei 17/11/1988 
12) Bulgaria 25/11/1988 
13) Burkina Faso 21/11/1988 
14) Burundi 22/12/1988 
15) Byelorussian SSR 19/11/1988 
16) Cape Verde 24/11/1988 
17) Central African Republic 23/12/1988 
18) Chad 01/12/1988 
19) China 20/11/1988 
20) Comoros 21/11/1988 
21) Congo 05/12/1988 
22) Cuba 16/11/1988 
23) Cyprus 18/11/1988 
24) Czechoslovakia 18/11/1988 
25) Democratic Kampuchea 18/11/1988 
26) Democratic People's Republic of Korea 24/11/1988 
27) Democratic Yemen 15/11/1988 
28) Djibouti 17/11/1988 
29) Egypt 18/11/1988 
30) Equatorial Guinea 
31) Ethiopia 04/02/1989 
32) Gabon 12/12/1988 
33) Gambia 
34) German Democratic Republic 18/11/1988 
35) Ghana 29/11/1988 
36) Guinea 19/11/1988 
37) Guinea-Bissau 21/11/1988 
38) Hungary 23/11/1988 
39) India 18/11/1988 
1 Listed in "For the Record: The State of Palestine", (1989) V Pal. YBIL 290, at 291- 293. Where there 
are gaps in the date column no official date was recorded. 
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40) Indonesia 15/11/1988 
41) Iran 04/02/1989 
42) Iraq 15/11/1988 
43) Jordan 16/11/1988 
44) Kenya 
45) Korea, North 
46) Kuwait 15/11/1988 
47) Laos People's Democratic Republic 02/11/1988 
48) Lebanon 
49) Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 15/11/1988 
50) Madagascar 16/11/1988 
51) Malaysia 15/11/1988 
52) Maldives 28/11/1988 
53) Mali 26/11/1988 
54) Malta 16/11/1988 
55) Mauritania 15/11/1988 
56) Mauritius 17/11/1988 
57) Mongolia 22/11/1988 
58) Morocco 15/11/1988 
59) Mozambique 08/12/1988 
60) Namibia (SWAPO) 19/11/1988 
61) Nepal 19/12/1988 
62) Nicaragua 16/11/1988 
63) Niger 24/11/1988 
64) Nigeria 18/11/1988 
65) Oman 13/12/1988 
66) Pakistan 16/11/1988 
67) People's Republic of Kampuchea 26/11/1988 
68) Poland 14/12/1988 
69) Philippines 
70) Qatar 16/11/1988 
71) Romania 02/01/1988 
72) Rwanda 02/01/1989 
73) Sao Tome and Principe 10/12/1988 
74) Saudi Arabia 16/11/1988 
75) Senegal 22/11/1988 
76) Seychelles 18/11/1988 
77) Sierra Leone 03/12/1988 
78) Somalia 15/11/1988 
79) Tanzania 24/11/1988 
80) SriLanka 18/11/1988 
81) Sudan 17/11/1988 
82) Togo 29/11/1988 
83) Tunisia 15/11/1988 
84) Turkey 15/11/1988 
85) Uganda 13/12/1988 
86) Ukrainian SSR 19/11/1988 
87) USSR 19/11/1988 
88) United Arab Emirates 16/11/1988 
89) United Republic of Tanzania 24/11/1988 
90) Vietnam 19/11/1988 
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91) Yemen 15/11/1988 
92) Yugoslavia 16/11/1988 
93) Zaire 10/12/1988 
94) Zambia 16/11/1988 
95) Zimbabwe 29/11/1988 
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APPENDIX III ` `1 ," 
Research Letters Written regarding the Status of the Palestinian Representation to 
Individual States 
In May 1998 1 wrote to all the States which had diplomatic offices in either London or 
Paris in order to gain an insight into the status which they consider the PLO to have. I 
asked each State to answer three specific questions. ' 
1) Whether their government had recognised the PLO and the date of recognition? 
2) What their government had recognised the PLO as? 
3) Whether their government regards the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of 
the Palestinian people. If their government does not then are there any alternative 
bodies which are recognised as such? 
Overall I wrote to 190 different High Commissions and Embassies. 59 States replied 
directly to at least some of the specific questions I had posed. 2 21 others were not able 
to answer the questions themselves and passed the information on to the equivalent of 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in their State. However the vast majority of 
these I never received a reply from. 
Whilst 59 replies does not provide a solid basis for making global conclusions about the 
status of the Palestinian Representation it is interesting to examine the replies received. 
They obviously demonstrate the relationship between the responding State and the PLO, 
but interestingly also show that on the whole the responding States did not traditionally 
tend to be more pro-Palestinian than those which did not respond at all. 
This can be shown by breaking down the States which responded into the same political 
and continental groupings which were used in chapter three when the States which 
A copy of the letter I wrote is attached to this appendix as Document A. All the replies are also copied 
and attached to this Appendix. 
2 Including the Holy See. 
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recognised the State of Palestine in 1988 are examined. Of the 59,16 of the States were 
from Asia, 3 14 were from Western Europe, 4 11 were from the Americas, 5 8 were from 
Africa, 6 8 were from Eastern Europe? and 2 were from the Middle East. 8 
The results from the specific questions I posed are as follows: 
Question 1: 
39 State stated that they had recognised the PLO in some form9 and a further 6 stated 
that they had not officially recognised it but did have a de facto relationship with it. 10 
Not all States that responded were able to give a date for recognition. However of those 
that did, some States wrote that they recognised the PLO first at around the time of its 
inception" (even if they then went on to recognise it again as a different style entity), 
others during the 1970s12, others after the 1988 Declaration13 and others after the 1993'4 
Oslo Accords. '5 
3 Asian States (including Australasia): Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei Darusalaam, Cambodia, China, 
Indonesia, Korea, Maldives, Nepal, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, 
Turkmenistan, Tuvalu. 
4 Western European States: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, 
Liechtenstein, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, 
s States from the Americas: Antigua & Barbuda, Belize, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Dominica, Equador, 
Marshall Islands, Mexico, Uruguay, Venezuela, 
6 African States: Algeria, Burundi, Madagascar, Mauritius, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, 
7 Eastern European States: Estonia, Hungary, Macedonia, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Ukraine, 
Yugoslavia. 
' Middle Eastern States: Lebanon, Israel. 
9 Algeria, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Belize, Brazil, Brunei, Burundi, Cambodia, Chile, 
China, Columbia, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Israel, Korea, Lebanon, Madagascar, 
Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Netherlands, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Poland, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, Sudan, Sweden, Tanzania, Thailand, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zimbabwe. 
10 Dominica, Finland, Nepal, Turkmenistan, Uruguay, Ukraine. 
11 Algeria, China, Hungary, Iceland, Tanzania, Yugoslavia. 
12 Brazil (although also upgraded diplomatic status in 1988 and 1993), Burundi, Malta, Mexico, 
Netherlands (de facto recognition), Thailand. 
13 Bangladesh, Czechoslovakia (Czech Republic continued contact when it became independent in 1993). 
" Australia, Belgium (upgraded to a General Delegation after Oslo), Cambodia, Chile, Netherlands 
(formal recognition since Oslo), Philippines, Poland, Sudan. 
Is Other dates for recognition were, "26.9.79 - 11.3.80" (Austria), "1.1.84" (Brunei), "1996" (Columbia), 
"1992" (Estonia - after creation of State), "1995" (Korea), "4.4.82" (Maldives), "September 1992" 
(Papua New Guinea), "1992" (Slovenia - after creation of State), " From the time of Ukrainian 
independence" (Ukraine), "1980" (Zimbabwe). 
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Question 2: 
Some States recognise the PLO as a government, 16 others as the government of an 
emerging State, '? others as a national liberation movement, 
18 and some as the legitimate 
representative 19 or sole legitimate representative20 of the Palestinians. 
1 
Question 3: 
Just over half of the States which replied considered the PLO to be the sole legitimate 
representative of the Palestinians. 
22 Of those which did not, quite a few either did not 
specify any answer with regard to this issue23 and some stated that the PLO was the 
"legitimate representative" of the Palestinian people. 24 
With regard to the second limb of Question 3, as to whether any alternative bodies were 
considered to be representatives of the Palestinian people there were only a few 
responses. Australia stated that it recognised no other bodies as such. Denmark stated 
that she did not consider the PLO to be the sole legitimate representative, suggesting by 
implication that there must be other possible bodies as well. In a similar vein, Finland 
called the PLO "a significant representative" and Hungary, without being specific, stated 
that her Government "has had relations with several other Palestinian organisations as 
16 Cambodia, China, Mauritius, Poland, (Some of these States merely wrote that they recognised the State 
of Palestine from which it is assumed that they must therefore recognise the PLO (or the PA) as the 
government. - see attached copies of letters for individual responses). 
Algeria, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Tuvalu. 
1s Burundi, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Mexico, Slovakia, Tanzania, Thailand. 
19 Australia, Chile, Maldives, Netherlands, Slovenia. 
20 Bangladesh, Belize, Brunei, Columbia, Korea, Madagascar, Malta, Sudan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, 
Venezuela, Yugoslavia. 
21 Other responses included: "Subject of international law" (Austria), "the Representative of the PA" 
(Belgium), "Special Palestinian Delegation" (Brazil), "Agreeing with EU policy" (Cyprus), " As having 
an internationally recognised mandate to represent the Palestinians" (Estonia), "de facto political entity" 
(New Zealand), "Leading political component of Palestine" (South Africa), " Most authoritative and 
representative body of the Palestinians" (Sweden), "Government in Exile" (Zimbabwe). 
u 32 States: Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Belize, Brunei, Burundi, 
Cambodia, China, Columbia, Estonia, Indonesia, Israel, Korea, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malta, 
Mauritius, Mexico, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Poland, Slovak Republic, Sudan, Thailand, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zimbabwe, 
23 For example, Cambodia, Columbia, Cyprus, Dominica, Estonia, Ireland, Lebanon. 
24 For example, Australia, Brazil, Chile, Zimbabwe. 
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well. ". Slovenia stated that she considered the PLO to be the "legitimate but not only 
representative" of the Palestinian people, despite not having recognised any other group 
as such, whilst South Africa stated that the PLO was a "leading Palestinian political 
component". New Zealand was by far the most specific, replying that other bodies 
which can be considered to represent and speak for the Palestinian people are "the 
Palestinian National Authority, the Palestinian National Council, the Palestinian 
Legislative Council and Hamas". 
This range of responses perhaps is partially representative of the lack of formalised 
objective status of the PLO or particularly any of its competitors for status in the 
international community. However, it is interesting to note that those States which 
responded to the second limb of question 3 are from a fairly wide cross section of 
different parts of the international community. Therefore it is difficult to draw any 
conclusions (other than with regard to the position of individual states) from the 
responses to this particular part of the question. 
Although the States which responded were not necessarily only those which have 
traditionally been supportive towards the Palestinian Representation, it is not surprising 
to see that the States which recognised the PLO as having the greatest levels of status 
were ZS Indeed this trend continues when it considered that the States which extended 
recognition to the PLO before the Oslo Accords were all politically pro-Palestinian. 
26 
Therefore, although the number of replies received were not overwhelming, even from 
this limited examination it is easy to conclude that the world political groupings in 
terms of Palestinian support and recognition discussed in chapter 3 are firmly reiterated 
in the letters from States themselves. 
25 For example, Cambodia, China, Mauritius, Poland recognised the PLO as the government of Palestine 
and Algeria, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Tuvalu recognised the PLO as the government of an 
emerging State. 




- ''"ter UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL 
Caroline M. Jackson 
Department of Law 
University of Bristol 




The Director of Legal Affairs 
State of Afghanistan 
31 Prince's Gate 
London 
SW7 1QQ 
Dear Sir or Madam 
Th 
'` 1 
DocvMEN c ý4 
Tel: 0117 9288991 
Re: The Status Accorded to the Palestine Liberation Organisation by the Government of 
Afehanistan 
I am a researcher in the field of public international law at the University of Bristol and am 
currently conducting a study establishing what the status of the Palestine Liberation 
Organisation is in international law. 
In order to do this effectively I need to gather information directly from governments as to their 
position regarding the Palestinian Liberation Organisation. It would therefore assist me greatly 
if you would be kind enough to reply to me and supply me with the following information 
regarding the position of your government. 
1) Whether your government has recognised the Palestinian Liberation Organisation and the 
date of recognition. 
2) What your government has recognised the Palestine Liberation Organisation as. (i. e.: as a 
liberation movement, a government in exile, a government of an emerging state. ) 
3) Whether your government regards the Palestinian Liberation Organisation as the sole 
legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. If your government does not then I would 
be grateful if could please tell me if there is an alternative body which is recognised as such 
I would like to take this opportunity to thank you in advance for your co-operation in this 
matter. I look forward to hearing from you. 
Yours faithfully 
Caroline Jackson, LLB. (lions), LL. M. 
of --14 
i 
(27 1 om" 07C4e%tcz 
Z"u4n 
Caroline M. Jackson 
Department of Law 
University of Bristol 
Wills Memorial Building 
Queens Road 
Bristol BS8 1 RJ 
Dear Ms. Jackson, 
May 26th, 1998 
Further to your recent letter, I should like to inform you that : 
,; I} I oýlý.,,, 
ýý 
1. The Algerian authorities recognised the Palestinian Liberation Organisation not 
long after its creation. 
2. The Algerian government has recognised the Palestinian Liberation Organisation 
as the government of an emerging state. 
3. The Algerian government regards the PLO as the sole legitimate representative 




hope that the above answers your questions on the position of the Algerian 
government vis-A-vis the PLO. 
Yours sincerely, 




ö4 dZv4 -rvnl a' 
Wit -fg& 5re/ 0171-2217800 5ram. 0/71-2210448 
='1 
1 
HIGH COMMISSION FOR ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA 
15 THAYER STREET, LONDON W1M 51D 
TEL 0171-386 7073/5 FAX: 0171486 9970 
His Excellency Mr Ronald M Sanders CMG 
High Commissioner 
22nd June 1998 
Ms Caroline M Jackson 
Department of Law 
University of Bristol 
{® Willis Memorial Building 
Queen Road 
Bristol BS8 1RJ 
Dear Ms Jackson, 
Thank you for your letter of 21n May and 19th Jinie 1998. I am sorry that it 
required a second letter from you before this response. 
The answers to the questions you asked are as follows: 
1. My Government has not recognised the PLO 
2. Were we to recognise them as this time, it would be as the Government of 
-ý an emerging State 
3. -My Government does regard the PLO as the sole legitimate representative 
of the Palestinian people. 
Please note that the reason we have not recognised the PLO is that the issue of 
such recognition has not arisen. If the PLO approached us for recognition we 
would do so in accordance with the answers to 2 and 3 above. 
Yours sincerely, _ 
RONALD IS CMG 
High Cö ssioner 
j 
AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION 
11 June 1998 
Ms Caroline Jackson 
Department of Law 
University of Bristol 
Wills Memorial Building 
Queens Road 
BRISTOL BS 1RJ 
AUSTRALIA HOUSE 
STRAND 
LONDON WC2B 4LA 
0171379-0334 
Dear Ms Jackson 
Thank you for your letter of 21 May 1998 enquiring about the status accorded to the Palestinian 
Liberation Organisation by the Government of Australia. In answer to your question, the Australian 
Government recognised the PLO as the "legitimate representative" of the Palestinian people at about the 






ÖSTERREICHISCHE BOTSCHAFT -- 
AUSTRIAN EMBASSY 
Mrs. Caroline 1%!. Jackson 
Department of Law 
Wills Memorial Building 
University of Bristol 
Queens Road 
Bristol BS8 1RJ 
GZ. 8.60/6/98 
Dear Mrs. Jackson, 
London, 1. July 1998 
Re: The Status accorded to the PLO by Austria 
After consultation with our authorities in Vienna as well as on the basis of academic 
research I am pleased to answer your questions concerning above matter as follows: 
1. Austria recognised the PLO by various statements of Foreign Minister Pahr and 
Chancellor Kreisky between 26 September 1979 and 11 March 1980 
(Neuhold/Hummer/Schreuer, Österreichisches Handbuch des Völkerrechts, Vienna 1991). 
2. Austria recognised the PLO as a subject of international law sui generis. 
3. Austria regards the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. 





Austrian Embassy, I8 Betgrave Mews West, London SWI X8HU 
Tel: ++44 171 2353731/F=++44 171 344 0292 
e-mail: austria©embassy. org. uk 
HIGH COMMISSION FOR THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BANG1ADESu 
d ' on, SW7 51A 28 Queen s Gate, Lon 
Phones 0171584 0081 
Telex 918016 
Fax 0171 225 2130 
NO. POL-SPL-3/96 Dated: 10 July 1998 
-Dear Ms. Jackson, 
Please 'refer to your letter dated 21-May 1998 addressed 
töýDirector of Legal Affairs, Bangladesh). Higb Commission. Your. 4, 
letter was forwarded to,. tbe Ministry -of Foreign Affairs, 
Bangladesh and we have received the following statement with. 
--i 1, regärd. to Palestine and 
PLO: 
Quote .. 
"Bangladesh has consistently maintained that the 
'Palestinian people have the. inalienable right to self-determination 
including their right to=bave a. state of., their own in their 
homeland with Al-Quds as its capital, under the leadership of 
PLO, their sole and legitimate! -representative: It -was -in_- 
persuant to her. principled position that Bangläde5b: -becamoý asne C 
the first countries to accord recognition to the State of 
Palestine when it was proclaimed on 15 November 1988. " 
r- - Unquote 
' Yours Sincerely 
Ms. Caroline M. Jackson (K 1 
jAb 
) am s Department of Law 
University of Bristol Counse' 
emorial. Building ' Wills M 
Queens Road 
Bristol BS8 1R4 
. ýO 
EMBASSY OF BELGIUM 103 Eaton Square 
London SW1 W 9AB 
Tel 0171 470 37 68 




Re: The Status Accorded to the Palestine Liberation Organisation by the 
Government of Belgium. 
My letter of 29/05/98. 
Dear Ms Jackson, 
I am pleased to be able to communicate to you the answer to the 
questions asked in your letter of 21 May 98. 
1) Belgium has recognised the PLO at the end of the eighties as a "Bureau 
d'information de I'OLP'. 
2) As a result of the Oslo Agreements the 'Bureau d'information de I'OLP' 
= has been upgraded to a 'Delegation generale palestinienne' in 1993, with Mr C. 
ARMALI as its representative. 
3) Belgium entertains official contacts with the PLO as representative of the. 





Ms Caroline M. Jackson 
Department of Law - 
University of Bristol \\ 
Wills Memorial Building 
Queens Road 
Bristol BS81 RJ 
Ministry. of Foreign Affairs 
BELIZE, CENTRAL AMERICA 
Reference: FA/D/87198(35) 18th June, 1998 
1 
1 
Caroline M. Jackson, Esq. 
Department of Law 
University of Bristol 





Reference is made to your correspondence of 21 May, 1998, regarding the status 
of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). 
Please be advised that Belize regards the PLO as the sole legitimate representative 
of the Palestinian people. 
Highest regards, 
1 !A ") 
ýIVED. DEL CID 
F Permanent Secretary 
ODDC/bcs 
-w Adailnistmdve Building, Belmopan. Belize, 
C. A, -- Phones: (501)-8-22322/22167 - Telex 102 Foreign Bz., - Fax: (501)4 
S. -- 
BRAZILIAN EMBASSY 
"' -". 32 Green Street 
f 
London WIY 4AT 
f 
1 




June 25`h, 1998. 
Caroline Jackson, LL. B. (lions), LLM. 
UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL . 
Department of Law 
Wills Memorial Building 
Queens Road 
Bristol BS8 1RJ 
Dear Miss 
ýZ- 
Thank you for you two letters enquiring about the Brazilian position regarding the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization. Further to the telephone call you received from 
Mr Nelson Lafraia, I am sending you the notes enclosed which I believe answer your 
three questions. 









BRAZIL and PLO 
Brazil recognizes the Palestine Authority as a legitimate 
entity resulting from the peace accords between Israel and the PLO 
(specially the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho of May 1994) and 
as the legitimate representative of the Palestine People. Brazil does not 
recognize, however, the existence of a Palestine State because it considers 
that some basic conditions established by International Law for a state-to 
exist are still lacking (territorial delimitation, for example). 
Formal relations between the Federative Republic of Brazil 
and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) date from 1975, when 
Brazil authorized PLO to -assign a representative to the Office of the 
League of Arab States in Brasilia. 
r, 
In 1993, after tin exchange of notes between the 
Government of Brazil and the PLO, this representation was upgraded to a 
"Special Palestine Delegation", with diplomatic status similar to that 
granted to international organizations in Brazil. 
On 291h April 1998, ' the following modifications were 
introduced to the List of Diplomatic Missions accredited to Brazil: 
a) the name of the Special Palestine Delegation, which was -previously 
included in the section "International Organizations", was included in the 
section reserved for "Countries and Delegations", immediately after 
"Zambia" and before the "European Union".; 
b) within the order of precedence of Heads of Missions, the name of the 
Head of the Special Palestine Delegation was included in the position 
corresponding to the date of presentation of his credentials. 
The above mentioned modifications should not be 
construed as altering the nature of the status of the Palestine Delegation 
vis a vis the Brazilian Government. Their purpose is rather to reflect 
more adequately the political and geographical reality of-the Middle 
East after the Oslo agreements. 
fý 
10 oý 14 
i f" I"N 
N ýJý TELEGRAMS: BRULONGOV ->>`ýJ 
~N" 
Jý'" 
TELEX: SUM HIGH COMMISSION OF BRUNEI DARUSSALAM TEL : 0171-S81 0521 
FAX: 0171.2359717 19 Betgrave Square 




BHCL 339: 1V2 7th July 1998 
Yow Nd: 
Ms Caroline Jackson 
Department of Law 
University of Bristol 
Wills Memorial Building 
Queens Road 
Bristol BS8 IRJ 
Dear Ms Jackson, 
Re: The Status Accorded to the Palestine Liberation Organisation by 
the Government of Brunei Darussalam 
With reference to your letter dated 21 May 1998 regarding the above, I 
am pleased to inform you that since Brunei Darussalam resumed full 
independence on 1 January 1984, the country recognised the PLO as the 
sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. It has supported 
the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people including their rights to 








or t he missioner 
\ 
., 
REPUBLIQUE DU BURUNDI 
V, 
MINISTERS DES RELATIONS EXTERIEURES 
ET DE L4 COOPERATION 
B! jumbrrrq le. 1 : J- /S 
NO 204.09/ iY 7. ` /RE/98. 
Mademoiselle Caroline M. Jackson 
Department of Law 
Wills Memorial Building 
Y1 Queens Road 




J'ai 1'honneur d'accuser reception de vos coirespondances des 29 mai et lerjuin 1998 
par lesquelles vous me demandez des informations sur la position de mon pays en cc qui 
concerne rorganisation de liberation de la Palestine. 
Je vous remercie d'avoir bien voulu consulter mon Gouvernement dann le cadre de vos 
rcchcrchcs en droit international et porte ä votre connaissance cc qui suit : 
10 Le Gouvernement du Burundi a reconnu F'Organisation de Liberation de la Palestine 
(O. L. P. ) apres la guerre de 1973. 
2° Le Gouvernement du Burundi a reconnu I'O. LP. en tant que Mouvement de 
Liberation nationale. 
3° Lc Burundi a reconnu 1'O. -P. comme le seul et unique Repr6sentant Legitime du 
peuple palestinien. 
Tout en esperant que nous awns satisfait ä votre'questionnaire et en vous souhaitant 
plein succes dam votre recherche, je vows prie d'agreer Mademoiselle, rassurance de ma 
consideration distinguee. 
LE DIRECTEUR GENERAL DE L'AD 
DES AFFAIRES JURIDIQUES 
Renovat ND 
, 
_. -- _.,.. -ý 
- ti 
AMBASSADE ROYALE DU CAMBODGE 
N' 221-98 ARGAG 
Paris, le 2 juillet 1998 
Mademoiselle, 
Faisant suite ä votre lettre du 29 juin 1998, j'ai 1'honneur de porter ä 
votre connaissance que le Gquvernement Royal du Cambodge. a reconnu 10 
I'Organisation de Liberation de la Palestine, qui est actuellement un Etat souverain 
en conformitC avec la Constitution du Royaume du Cambodge du 24 septembre 
1993. 
L'article 53 de la Constitution stipule que "Le Royaume du Cambodge 
pratiquera toujours une politique permanente de'neutralite et de non-alignement. Le 
Royaume du Cambodge entend vivre en co-existence pacifique avec les pays voisins 
et les autres pays du monde". 
Actuellement, le Royaume du Cambodge entretient des relations 
diplomatiques avec la Palestine et Israel. 




Mademoiselle Caroline M. JACKSON 
Department of Law - University of Bristol 





EMBASSY OF CHILE 
12 DEVONSHIRE STREET 
If 
LONDON W IN 2DS 
TEL 0171-580 639217 
FAX: 0171-436 5204 
TELEX: 25970 EMBACNIL 
Miss Caroline Jackson, LL. B. (Hons), LL-M. 
Department of Law 
University of Bristol 
Wills Memorial Building 
Queens Road 
Bristol 





Dear Miss Jackson 
23 June 1998 
Further your letter dated 19 June 1998, I have the pleasure to inform you that by Decree 
No. 1414, dated 12 November 1993, Chile recognized the Palestine Liberation Organisation as 
representative of the Palestinian people, and' gave to the "Oficina de Informaciön Palestina" 
(Palestinian Information Office) in Santiago a diplomatic status with the diplomatic immunities 
and privileges established in the Vienna Convention. 
Later, by Decree No. 57 dated 18 January 1994, the name of the "Oficina de Informaciön 
Palestina" (Palestinian Information Office) was replaced by "Representaciön Palestirta" 
(Palestinian Representation) 
Yours sincerely, 
Jorge A Tagle 
Second Secretary 
\ 
Embassy of the People's Republic of China 
49-51 Portland Place, London WIN 4JL 
Caroline M. Jackson 
Department of Law 
University of Bristol 




Dear Ms. Jackson, 
As requested, I am introducing you the position of Chinese Government on 
Palestinian Autonomous Government. 
China has all along supported the justified course of the Palestinian people 
struggling for their national rights. In May 1965, the Palestine Liberation- 
Organisation set up an office in Beijing which enjoys the privilage of 
diplomatic mission. On 20, November 1988, China and the State of Palastine 
founded the diplomatic relationship. 




Prdocol: Td: 0171-636 937k From Tal: 0171-6360380 Adninis ratioxTd: 0171-636 8843 Coam(ar, Tel: 0171-636 3637. Pua: Tel: 0891-880 808 or 
F. r 0171.636 2981. Fas 0171-636 3378 Fas 0171-636 2981 F=0171-636 9756 0171-631 1430 
ý, F=0171-6369756. 
--.. -- -ý: 
EMBAJADA DE COLOMBIA 
3 HANS CRESCENT, LONDON SWIX OLN 011 
" 
_'ý'ý 
TEL 0171-589 0177 FAX: 0171-581 1829 
London, June 24 1998 
Mrs 
CAROLINE JACKSON 
Department of Law 
Wills Memorial Building 
University of Bristol 
Queens Road 
Bristol 
.,. _; ý. l 
Dear Mrs Jackson: 
Further to your letter dated June 19th, in which you asked some information 
regarding the status conferred by Colombia to the Palestinian Liberation 
Organisation, I am pleased to provide you with the following information that the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs has send to us. 
1. Colombia has sustained a firm position of support to the Palestinian right of 
having an own State. This position goes back to 1947 when the General 
Assembly of the United Nations settled Resolution Number 181, in which the 
partition of Palestine was approved. From then, in the United Nations Colombia 
has supported Palestinian speakers and has voted in favour of Palestine for the 
approval of Resolutions on the conflict. 
2. The premises of Colombian Foreign policy regarding the Palestinian issue have 
been: 
a. The acknowledge of the right of the Palestinian people to have their own 
homeland and to live in peace; 
b. The recognition of the right of the State of Israel to exist and to have 
guarantees for its security; 
C, The impossibility of reaching the peace in the Middle East without giving an 
adequate solution to the Palestinian issue; 
d. The reject to all kind of actions against civil population; 
e. The support to the Peace Conference for the Middle East in the framework of 
the UN; 
f. The support to the Peace Process as result of the Madrid Agreement in 
December 1991. 
\ 
EMBAJADA DE COLOMBIA 
3 MAN$ CRESCENT. LONDON SWIX OLN 
- bý TEL: 0171-588 9177 FAX. 0171-581 1829 
- ,%3. 
In the XI Summit of the Non - Aligned Movement held in Cartagena in October 
' 1996, Presidents Samper and Arafat agreed to exchange Ambassadors. In 
April 1996, it was authorised the opening of a Palestinian Special Mission in 
Colombia, with Ambassador Sabri Ateyeh as Head of Mission.. On the other 
- hand, Colombia 
has designated Jaime Girbn Duarte, currently the Colombian 
Ambassador in Egypt, as Ambassador Non Resident to the National 
Palestinian Authority. 
I hope you will find this information useful. If you have further questions do not 











Our Ref.: INTA80 
Ms Carolina M. Jackson 
Department of Law 
University of Bristol 
Wits Memorial Building 
Queens Road 
Bristol. BS8 I RJ 
CYPRUS HIGH COMMISSION 
93, PARK STREET, 
LONDON W 1Y 4ET 
Tel: 0171-499 8272 
Fu: 0171-4910691/ 0171-491 29SS 
23 July, 1998 
Dear Ms Jackson, 
.; 
i `' j 
Further to our letter dated 13 July 1998, I am writing now to confirm that Cyprus 
conforms in general with the policy of the. European Union, as far as the 
international representation of the Palestine Liberation Organization is concerned. 
Cyprus also conforms with the same policy concerning the role of the P. I. O. in its 
efforts to gradually reconstruct the territories handed back within the peace process, 
also the ones that it Is hoped will be handed back in the near future, into a modem 
state. 
The Republic of Cyprus supported and continues to' support the alienable right of 
the Palestinian people to self-determination and it is hoped that the implementation 
of this right will allow the Palestinian people to create a modem, independent and 
sovereign Palestinian State. 
Needless to say, the Republic of Cyprus supported and continues to support the 
right of Israel to exist within internationally recognised borders. It is a well known fact 
that Cyprus has full diplomatic relations with the State of Israel since its creation and 
retains friendly relations on both the bilateral and international level. 
Yours sincerely, 
ý/V'eputy Nigh Comissioner 
a Kasoulides (/Dputy Nigh Cor isjkk fier 
-. ý -; .. 
_. ý :r 
KONGELIG DANSK AMBASSADE 
London 
University of Bristol 
55 Sloane Street 
L6ndon SWIX 9SR 
tttj 
Att. Caroline Jackson TIE +44 171 333 0200 
Department of Law Fax +44 171 333 0270 
Wills Memorial Building Telegr. Adr. Ambadane, London Direkte nr. +44 171 333 02 QQ Queens Road, 
Bristol BS8 1RJ 
EncL Re&rmce Date 
5. C. 10 23 June 1998 
Dear Ms Jackson, 
With reference to your letter of 21 May 1998 concerning information on 
the status accorded to the Palestine Liberation Organisation by the 
Government of Denmark I can inform you that The Palestine Liberation 
Organisation has W been recognized by the Danish Government. Nor 
does the Danish Government regard the PLO as the sole legitimate 
representative of the Palestinian people. 
Official contacts to the Palestinian authorities are conducted through an 
office entitled "The Palestinian General Delegation to Denmark". The 
office does not rank as an Embassy but enjoys certain privileges such as 
VAT and tax exemption, flying the Palestinian flag, and is included in the 
Danish Diplomatic List under "Other Missions". 
I trust this clarifies the Danish position with regard to the PLO and remain, 
Yours sincerely, 
(:: ýA 4, (Pe 
1st Secretary 
i 
- .... . -- . ý,, -ý--r, 
1, 
OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR 
FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF DOMINICA 
I COLLINGHAM GARDENS 
TELEPHONE 
0371-370 8194.5 
LONDON SW5 OHW FAX 0171-373 8743 
14 September, 1998 
Ms. Caroline M. Jackson 
Department of Law 
1 Wills memorial Building 
University of Bristol 
Queens Road 
BRISTOL BS81RJ 
Dear Ms. Jackson, 
Re: The Status Accorded to the Palestine Liberation Organisation by the 
Government of the Commonwealth of Dominica 
I am now able to reply to your earlier correspondence on this matter, and to confirm 
that the Government of the Commonwealth of Dominica has not as yet expressed a 
formal position regarding the Palestinian Liberation Organisation. 
However, in a message dated 22 November, 1994, from the Minister of External 
Affairs of Dominica, addressed to the PLO, the Minister wrote as follows: 
"We emphasise our continuing support for progress in the peace negotiations 
and in the progressive realisation and development of the legitimate 
aspirations of the Palestinian People towards full nationhood". 
I hope you find this information useful. 
Yours sincerely, _ 
EORGE E. WILL IS' 
HIGH COMAIISSIO R 
GEwrc 
20 orr - 
EMBAJADA DEL ECUADOR 
LONDRES 
Ms Caroline Jackson 
Department of Law 
Wills Memorial Building 
University of Bristol 
Queens Road 
Bristol, BS8 IRJ 
22 July 1998 
Dear Madam, 
Regarding your letter dated 19th June 1998, please find enclosed a copy of 
the information received from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in reference 
with the status accorded to the Palestine Liberation Organization by the 
Ecuadorian Government. 






Flat 3b, 3 1iANS CRESCENT. London SW IX OLS Tc! 01715841367 Fax : 0171823 9701 
FECHIA: QUITO, 1 DE JULIO DE 1998 
REF. SU CE 161/98 
I ASUNTO. RECONOCIRMIENTO OTORGADO. A LA OLP. 
CON EL PROPOSITO DE QUE PUEDA ATENDER LA CONSULTA FORMULADA POR 
LA DOCTORA CAROLINE JACKSON, INVESTIGADORA DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE BRISTOL, 
INFORMO A USTED LO SIGUIENI'E: 
'CON OCASION DE LA SUSCRIPCION FOR EL ESTADO DE ISRAEL Y LA 
ORGANIZACION PARA LA LIBERACION DE PALESTINA, EN WASHINGTON, EL 13 DE 
SEPTIEMBRE DE 1993, DE INSTRUMENTOS MEDIANTE LOS CUALES SE RECONOCIERON 
MU DAMENTE Y CONVINIERON EN ESTABLECER UN REGIMEN DE AUTONOMIA 
PALESTINA EN 
LA FRANJA DE GAZA YEN JERICO, EL GOBIERNO DEL ECUADOR EXPRESO SU 





E LA SUPERACION DEL CONFLICTO QUE POR TANTOS ANOS HA ENSANGRENTADO A 
PALESTINOS E ISRAELITAS, SINO LA APARICION DE UNA NUEVA ERA EN LAS 
RELACIONES DE LOS PUEBLOS DEL MEDIO ORIENTE, Y FORMULO VOTOS POR LA FELIZ 
CULMINACION DE ESTE PROCESO HISTORICO QUE REDUNDARA EN EL 
FORTALECIMIENTO 
DE LA AMISTAD Y COOPERACION NECESARIOS PARA LOGRAR EL DESARROLLO 
INTEGRAL 
DE LOS PAISES DE ESA REGION Y EL AFIANZAMIENTO DE LA PAZ EN EL MUNDO. 
EL ECUADOR HA MANTENIDO UNA POUTICA DE RESPALDO A LA LEGALIDAD 
DE LA RESOLUCION ADOPTADA POR LA ASAMBLEA GENERAL DE LAS NACIONES 
UNI DAS EL 
28 DE NOVIEMBRE DE 1947, REFERENTE A LA PARTICION DEL TERRITORIO PALESTINO 
BAJO MANDATO BRITANICO EN FAVOR DE ESTA DECISION QUE EN LA PRACTICA DIO 
ORIGEN AL ESTABLECIMMIENTO DEL ESTADO DE ISRAEL, EL 14 DE MAYO DE 1948. 
NUESTRO PAIS NA DESARROLLADO CON EL ESTADO JUDIO LAS MAS 
ESTRECUAS Y MUTUAMENTE BENEFICIOSAS RELACIONES DE AMISTAD Y 
COOPERACION, 
NMS ESTAS VINCULACIONES NO HAN OBSTADO PARA QUE APOYE TRADICIONALMENTE 
TODOS LOS FOROS INTERNACIONALES EL DERECHO DE AUTODETERMINACION DEL 
PUEBLO 
PALESTINO DE CONStITUIR UN ESTADO ARABE EN' PARTE DEL TERRITORIO DEL 
ANTIGUO MANDATO BRITANICO EN LA PALESTINA, DE SER ESA SU VOLUNTAD. 
DENTRO DE ESTE MARCO JURIDICO, EL GOBIERNO ECUATORIANO 
TRADICIONALMENTE HA RESPALDADO TODAS LAS GESTIONES ENCAMINADAS A LA 
SOLUCION GLOBAL Y DEFINITIVA DEL CONFLICTO ENTRE ISRAEL Y PALESTINA 
NEOTANTE LOS METODOS PACIFICOS CONSIGNADOS EN LA CARTA DE LAS NACIONES 
UNIDAS Y CON SUJECION A LAS RESOLUCIONES DEL CONSEJO DE SEGURIDAD 
REFERENTES A LA CUESTION PALESTINA, NUMEROS 242 DE 22 DE NOVIEMBRE DE 1967 
Y 338 DE 22 DE OCTUBRE DE 1973. 
1 
EL RECONOCI IIENTO RECIPROCO ENTRE EL ESTADO DE ISRAEL Y LA 
ORGANIZACION PARA LA LIBERACIOND DE PALESTINA Y EL ACUERDO ALCANZADO 
PARA 
ESTABLECER UN REGIMEN PROVISIONAL DE AUTONOMIA EN LA FRANJA DE GAZA Y EN 
JERICO, EL 13 DE SEPTIEMBRE DE 1993, SENALAN LA VOLUNTAD DE AMBAS PARTES DE 
INICIAR UN NUEVO PROCESO IUSTORICO DE NEGOCIACIONES DIRECTAS QUE LAS 
PODRIA 
CONDUCIR NO SOLAMENTE A LA SOLUCION DE LA CUESTION PALESTINA SINO A UN . 
ARREGLO GLOBAL DEL CONFLICTO ARABE-ISRAELI YA LA INSTAURACION DE UNA PAZ 
JUSTA EN EL MEDIO ORIENTE. " 
MUY ATENTAMENTE, 
DGAO. CAN. CE 
PINE 3.95q MESSAGE TEXT Folder: INBOX Message 25 of 31 79% 
)ate: Thu, 28 May 1998 18: 08: 20 +0300 
'rom: "(iso-8859-1) Kört Juhasoo" <kart@estonia. gov. uk> 
'0: "1c. m. jackson@bristol. ac. uk"" <c. m. jackson@bristol. ac. uk> 
Subject: PLO 
[The following text is in the "iso-8859-4" character set] 
[Your display is set for the "US-ASCII" character set] 
[Some characters may be displayed incorrectly] 
)ear Ms Jackson, 
C hope that those few lines would be more or less an answer to your 
Bestions. You are always welcome to'contact us again. 
vEstonia recognises states that respond to the most common criteria of 
statehood, PLO is not recognised as such. 
t PLO is regarded by Estonia as an organisation that has internationally 
recognised mandate to represent Palestinians. There is no visible 
alternative at present to the PLO. 
t We communicate with PIA through their legal representations at the UN 
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MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF FINLAND/ 




Caroline M. Jackson 
Department of Law 
University of Bristol 




Dear Ms. Jackson 
With reference to your letter of May 21,1998 requesting the information about the status accorded to 
the Palestine Liberation Oraganisation by the Government of Finland I wish to inform you about the 
following: 
The PLO established a representation in Finland called The PLO Information Office in 1984. In 1993 it 
was closed down, but was reopened in 15.8.1995 . with the name 
The Palestinian General Delegation to 
represent in Finland the interests of the Palestinian people. It does not have a diplomatic status, but in 
1997 it was added in the Helsinki Diplomatic Corps and Consular list under the title: "other entities". 
The Head of the Delegation is also included on the quest list for the Independence Day Seremonies 
hosted by the President of the Republik for the Diplomatic Corps. 
} 
Finland regards PLO as a significant representative of the Palestinian people. Finland does not formally 
recognise organisations or governments but only states. With the other EU-states, Finland has lined up 
with the EPC declaration of Venice (1980) and the conclusions of Amsterdam European Council 
(1997) , where 
it is stated that the Palestinian people must be placed in a position to exercise fully their 
right to self-determination. The conclusions of Luxembourg (1997) state, that EU is ready to contribute 
to Permanent Status negotiations including possible Palestinian statehood. These conclusions have their 
basis on UN resolution 242. 
i 
Yours Faithfully 
Eevamaija Pa jakka 
.I Botschaft 
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland London, 7 July 1998 
Embassy 
of the Federal Republic of Germany Direct Line: 0171-82413 17 
Gz.: Pol 320.00 PSE Min 
fn"w vgl 
Mrs. Caroline M. Jackson 
Department of Law - 
Wills Memorial Building 
University of Bristol 
Queens Road 
Bristol BS8 lRJ 
L-I 
.- 
Dear Mrs Jackson, 
with regard to the questions in your letters of 21 May 1998 and 19 June 1998, I can give you the 
following answers: 
1. The Federal Republic of Germany has not recognised the PLO, as, in principle, only states are " 
recognised. However, there have been contacts at working level. A "Palestine Information 
Centre" registered as a private-law society in Bonn, which on 16 December 1993 was 
converted into the "Palestinian General Delegation" (head: Abdallah Frangi). The General 
Delegation is listed in the list of foreign missions present in Germany under the heading 
"other missions", but (like its head) it does not possess diplomatic status, although itcan hoist 
the Palestinian flag. . 
2. - As the PLO has not been recognised, the type of recognition does not apply. - 
3. The Federal Republic of Germany acts according to the principle that peoples"determine -0 
themselves who their legitimate representatives are. The Federal Republic of Germany bases 
its relations to the Palestinian territories on the Washington Interim Agreement of 28 .. 
September 1995. This includes the provisions that .::. 
Israel shall conclude agreements with the-PLO. as "the- representative of the Palestinian :. 
people":. :... . 
- the PLO "may conduct negotiations and' sign 
agreements with states and international 
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Thus the EC concluded, among others, an interim agreement on trade matters "with the PLO for 
the benefit of the Palestinian authority for the West Jordan territory and the Gaza Strip" in 1997. 
Germany too concludes its intergovernmental agreements with the Palestinian side (e. g. on 
technical and financial cooperation) under this formulation. 
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APOSTOLIC NUNCIATURE 
Prot No 983/98 
Dear Miss Jackson, 
54 PARKSIDE 
LONDON. SW 19 5NE 
TEL.: 0181-946 1410 
FAX.: 0181-947 2494 
London 8thSeptember 1988 
Your letter- dated the 8th-July was received together with 
the copy of the letter dated the 8th June in which you ask for information about 
the status that may have been given to the Palestinian Liberation Organisation by 
the Holy See. The questiop was referred to the appropriate department in the 
Vatican and they have sent an unofficial comment (enclosed). 
Miss Caroline Jackson 
Department of Law 
University c? ristol 
Wills Memorial Building 
Queens Road 
Bristol BS8 1RJ 
enclosure 
With every good wish 
Yours faithfully 




Commento non ufficiale alle tre questioni poste con. lettera 
dell'8 giugno 1998 
1. La Santa Sede ha riconosciuto e riconosce l'OLP, nella sua 
quality di rappresentante del Popolo Palestinese. 
Pii the di un preciso atto giuridico si 6 trattato di un 
percorso, durante il quale la Santa Sede, come la maggior 
parte dei Paesi del morido, ha preso atto di una dtiplice 
realty: lo sviluppo, nello stesso Popolo Palestinese, di una 
coscienza di popolo e l'emergere di una organizzazione e dei 
relativi leaders, particolarmente rappresentativi. 
Un primo gesto significativo si puö registrare il 15 
settembre 1982, quando il Papa Giovanni Paolo II concesse la 
prima udienza al Sig. Yasser Arafat. 
La prima dichiarazione. ufficiale della Santa Sede circa 
1'OLP, in quanto rappresentante del Popolo Palestinese, e 
datata 25 ottobre 1994, quando, con una dichia'razione 
congiunta, la stessa OLP e la Santa Sede hanno concordato 
1'apertura di un Ufficio dell'OLP presso la Santa Sede, con un 
suo proprio Direttore. 
Tale Ufficio risulta nella Lista Diplomatica della Santa 
Sede, tra le Missioni a carattere speciale. 
2. La Santa Siede, come. gran parte della Comunitä 
internazionale e lo stesso Stato di Israele, ritiene the l'OLP 
abbia ricevuto dalla comunitä internazionale e dagli Accords 
firmati con Israele dopo la Conferenza di Madrid e 
controfirmati dagli USA, Russia ecc..., una sorta- di 
personality giuridica internazionale con capacitä di operare 
internazionalmente in quanto rappresentante del Popolo 
Palestinese ea beneficio della costituita Autoritä 
Palestinese. 
I1 riconoscimento e all'OLP in quanto organizzazione. 
3. Quanto sopra affermato significa the all'OLP 6 riconosciuta 
la rappresentativiti del Popolo Palestinese e la capacity di 
esercitarla legittimamente. 
\ 







Caroline M. Jackson 
Department of Law 
University of Bristol 
Wills Memorial Building 
Queens Road 
Bristol BS8 IRJ 
Dear Dr. Jackson, 
London May 29,1998 
With reference to your letter dated May 21,1998 enquiring about the status accorded to the 
PLO by the Government of the Republic of Hungary I should like to inform you as follows. 
The Government of Hungary / then the Hungarian People's Republic / recognized the PLO as 
a liberation movement throughout the 1960s, 70s and 80s . The Government however had 
relations with several other Palestinian organizations as well. 
In 1988 the Government of Hungary / still the Hungarian People's Republic / established 
diplomatic relations with the PLO at ambassadorial level after having acknowledged the 
statement of the Palestinian National Council on the Declaration of the State of Palestine on 
November 15,1988. The representation of the PLO in Budapest is officially called "The 
Embassy of the State of Palestine". This does not however equal to the recognition of the State 
of Palestine. 
At present the Hungarian authorities keep contact with the Palestinian National Authority 
through the Hungarian Embassy in Tel Aviv. 





Embassy of the Republic of Hungary 
35 Eaton Place 
London SW1X 8BY 
I 
i 
Tel: 0171-235-52 18 
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EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA 
LONDON 
048NI/07/Lon/98 
Ms. Caroline M. Jackson 17 July'1998 
Department of Law 
Wills Memorial Building 
University of Bristol 
Queens Road 
Bristol BS 1RJ 
Dear Ms. - Jackson, 
With reference to your letter of May 21 and June 19, I would like to submit 
answers to your questions on Indonesia's position regarding the PLO as follows : 
1) Indonesia recognised PLO as a liberation movement. We do not have the 
date of recognition for PLO as a liberation movement, however, the 
Indonesian Government has recognised the Palestinian State on 16 
November 1988, a day after the establishment of a Palestinian. State was 
proclaimed by the PLO on 15 November 1988. 
2) Indonesia also recognised PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the 
Palestinian people. 
I hope that this information would be of assistance to your study. 
Sincerely urs, 
-. 
Sunten Z. Manurung 
Head of Political Department 
Indonesian Embassy 
38 Grosvenor Square, London W1X 9AD United Kingdom 
Phone 0171499 7661 Faz 01714914993 Telex 28284 
i 
OIFIG AN AIRE GNÖTHAI EACHTRACHA 
OFFICE OF THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
BAILE ATHA CLIATH 2 
DUBLIN 2 
Tel: 35314082178 
(helen. callanan@iveagh. irlgov. ie) 
Ms Caroline M Jackson 
Department of Law 
University of BristonVills Memorial Building 
Queens Road 
Bristol BS8 1RJ 
United Kingdom 24 July 1998 
Dear Ms Jackson, 
Further to your enquiry regarding the diplomatic representation of the Palestinian Liberation 
Organisation, the PLO representative to Ireland is resident in London. The status of the 
Palestinian representative tq Ireland, Dr Yousef Allan, is Delegate-General of Palestine. Dr 
Allan's status was determined by Government decision S26358 of 14 December 1993. This 
decision approved the establishment of a resident Israeli Embassy in Dublin and said that the 
PLO should be invited to establish a Palestinian delegation in Dublin. 
It was decided to afford the Palestinian delegation official status in the following manner: 
- The title of office would be Delegate-General of Palestine 
- No diplomatic immunities would be offered to the office as there was no legislative. 
basis to govern such a case. 
Certain limited privileges would be granted to the office, such as duty free import of 
vehicles. 
- As the PLO was not as state the presentation of credentials was not thought 
appropriate. Therefore, upon nomination by the PLO, and following approval by the 
Minister, the PLO would submit to the Minister a formal letter confirming the agreed 
nominee as Delegate-General of Palestine. 
- The Palestinian office, and its accredited official, would appear in the final section of 
-, the Diplomatic List. \ 
Dr Allan is resident in London and the PLO have not yet taken up the invitation to establish a 
Delegation Office in Ireland due to insufficient financial resources. There was previously, 
from 1985-1991, a Palestine Information Office in Dublin which was closed for financial 
reasons. It had not been afforded any form of official status. 
If you have any further queries please contact us. 
Yours sincerely - 
Helen Callanan 
Middle East Section - Department of Foreign Affairs 
EMBASSY OF ISRAEL 
. G. 2 PALACE GREEN rrý' 
LONDON, W8 4QB 
Telephone: 0171-957 9500 
Fa, c 0171-957 9555 
e-mail: isr-info@(rircon. co. uk 
Internet bnpJhvww. isrsel-embassyorg. uklondon( 
5kýmý mrýým 
pýýý5 
June 9th 1998 
R 
Ms Caroline Jackson 
Department of Law 
University of Bristol 
Wills Memorial Building 
Queens Road 
Bristol BS8 1 RJ 
Dear Ms Jackson, 
Thank you very much for your letter of May 21st, enquiring about 
the legal status of the PLO. 
I enclose a copy of the Peace Accords that are the legal basis 
for the Peace Process, and I hope that you will find the information 
that you need in those documents. 





Public Affairs Officer 
r 
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EMI3ASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 
60 D UCE INOHAM GATE 
LONDON SW1E 6AJ 
Ms Caroline Jackson, LL. B., LL. M. 
Department of Law, 
University of Bristol, 
Wills Memorial Building, 
Queens Road, 
Bristol, 
BS8 1RJ. 26th May, 1998 
Dear Ms Jackson, 
Re: The Status Accorded to the PLO by the Government 
of the Republic of Korea 
The Government of the Republic of Korea recognised. 
that the PLO solely represents the Palestinian people in 
1995. 
Please note that the above recognition is not equivalent 
to recognition as a state or government. 
Yours sincerely, 
Lee Ufo g- g 
FirVt/Secretary 
i 




Mrs. Caroline Jackson 
Department of Law 
University of Bristol 







London, 16 June 1998 
Dear Mrs. Jackson, 
v L.: ýJ b, Lä. _...,, 
c: y ýý ;S 
t. 
11 -) C; a *-': 1, - -Z- 
With reference to your letter dated 21 May concerning the status accorded to 
the Palestine Liberation Organization by the Government of Lebanon, kindly 
take note that your letter has been forwarded to the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs. Their reply letter reference no.. 3301/4 dated 13th June, is that you 
may consult other political and legal publications concerning that matter and 
that the Office of the Palestine Liberation Organization in London may better 
qualified than the Lebanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs to answer some of 




Embassy of Lebanon 
21 Kensington Palace Gardens 





Foreign A airs 
Caroline M. Jackson 
Department of Law 
University of Bristol 
Wills Memorial Building 
Queens Road 






Vaduz, 16 July 1998 
92023 
Re: The Status Accorded to the Palestine Liberation Organization 
Dear Ms. Jackson, 
With reference to your letter dated 18 'June 1998 concerning the position of the 
Liechtenstein Government regarding the Palestine Liberation Organization I can give 
you the following information: 
Liechtenstein has never officially recognised the Palestine Liberation Organization. 
However, within the framework of its membership of the United Nations, Liechtenstein 
has voted on resolutions of the General Assembly referring to the Palestine Liberation 
Organization, most recently on resolution A/52/l. 53/Rev. 2 entitled Questions . of 
'Palestine". Furthermore, Liechtenstein has signed the Declaration by the EFTA States 
and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) for the Benefit of the Palestinian 
Interim Self-Government Authority of the West Bank and Gaza Strip" of 16 December 
1996 by which the willingness to establish an interim free trade agreement taking into 
account the provisions of the WTO is expressed. 
Hoping that this information will be of use, I remain 
yo "since ly, 
Dv el spelt Vice-Director 
HeTgkreuz i4 FL-9490 Vaduz Telephone. 075 236 60 58 Telefax 075 236 60 59 
0 me fe /uff 
Ref. No. 459/P/98 
I 
Ms Caroline M. Jackson 
Department of Law 
University of Bristol 
10 Harcourt House 
19a Cavendish Square 
London WlM 9AD 
Tel: 0171-499 5152 
Fax: 0171-499 2864 
August 20,1998 
Dear Ms Jackson, 
Thank you very much for your letter of June 8,1998. 
Concerning your interest about the status accorded to the 
PLO by the Government of the Republic of Macedonia we 
would like to inform you the following: 
1) The Republic of Macedonia has never recognised the 
PLO. 
2) None 
3) The Republic of Macedonia'. regards the PLO as the sole 
legitimate representative and 'Mr. Jaser Arafat as a 
Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO. 
Yours sincerely, 








DE LA REPUBLIQUE DE MADAGASCAR 
EN FRANCE 
4, Avenue Raphael - 75016 PARIS 





Paris, le 25 AQUT 1998 
Mademoiselle Caroline M. JACKSON 
Departement of Law 
Wills Memorial Building 
Queens Road 
The University of Bristol 
B 58 1RJ - ROYAUME UNI 
OBJET : Position de Madagascar via-ä-vie de 1'OLP. 
Mademoiselle, 
Falsant suite ä votre lettre en date du 1er Juin 1998 
relative ä l'objet libelld en rubrique, j'ai l'honneur de vous faire 
connaitre que MADAGASCAR reconnalt l'OLP en tant que Mouvement de 
Liberation et le considbre comme le Beul representant du Peuple 
Paleatinien. 
Restant toujours ä votre entiere disposition, je vous prie 
d'agreer, Mademoiselle, l'assurance de mes salutations distinguees. 
\ 
; e. Premier Conseilter 
Elot A. Maxime DOVO 
*5 
- 






HIGH COMMISSION OF MALDIVES 
TEL: (0171) 224 2135 22 NOTTINGHAM PLACE 
TELEX: 921494 MALDI G LONDON WIM 3FB 
FAX: (0171) 224 2157 
Ref. No. 139/MIS/98/46 
Ms. Caroline M. Jackson 
Department of Law 
Wills Memorial Building 




Dear Ms. Jackson, 
12 August 1998 
The Status Accorded to the Palestine Liberation Organization by the 
Government of the Maldives 
Thank you for your letter of 8 June 1998 and 8 July 1998 regarding the above 
subject. 
I wish to inform you that the Government of Maldives recognised that the 
I PLO is the legitimate representative of the Palestine People and established 
diplomatic relations with the PLO. on 4" April 1982. The Maldives 
recognised the State of Palestine shortly after it was proclaimed. 
Having maintained diplomatic relations, the Government of Maldives enjoys 




Abdulla Maseeh Mohamed 
Second Secretary 
MINISTERU 
TA' L-AFFARIJIET BARRANIN 
U L-AMBJENT 
Our Ref: MFA/UN/689 
22 July 1998 
Ms Caroline M. Jackson 
Department of Law 
University of Bristol 
Wills Memorial Building 
Queens Road 
Bristol BS8 IRJ 
United Kingdom 
Dear Ms Jackson, 
MINI 
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
MALTA 
I wish to refer to your letter dated 21 May 1998, concerning the status accorded to the 
Palestine Liberation Organisation by the Government of Malta, which letter was 
brought to my attention through the Malta High Commission in London. 
With a view to assist you in your study and research on what is the status"of the PLO in 
international law, I wish to submit the following information. 
The Government of Malta on 16 November 1988, had issued a declaration by which it 
reaffirmed its recognition of the right of the Palestinian People to a State of their own. 
Malta also welcomed the Declaration of Independence made in Algiers on 15 November 
1988, and acknowledged this Declaration as a true and genuine expression of the right 
of the Palestinian People to a State of their own. 
With respect to youi first and third questions regarding the recognition of the PLO, the 
Maltese Government had since the 1970s recognised the PLO as the sole and legitimate 
representative of the Palestinian People. 
Regarding your second question, the Government of Malta has not declared itself on the 
matter. 
Yours sincerely, 
Saviour F. Borg 
Director Multilateral Affairs 
PALAZZO PARISIO, MERCHANTS STREET, VALLETTA 
TELEPHONE: 242505; 242853 FAX 237822 
ýp Qý JL 
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Caroline M. Jackson, Dept. of Law 
University of Bristol = 
Wills Memorial Building 
Queens Road, Bristol BS8 1RJ 
United Kingdom 
June 16,1998 
Dear Ms. Jackson, -. 
Thank you for your letter of June 8,1998 regarding the position of the 
Republic of the Marshall Islands vis-ä-vis the Palestine Liberation 
Organization. In response to your questions I can inform you of the 
following: 
1. The Republic of, the Marshall Islands has not formally recognized the 
PLO, nor have diplomatic relations been established. However, the 
Government of the Republic of the Marshall Islands issued a declaration on 
the day of the Washington Ceremony welcoming these developments. This 
was reiterated by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade in his speech that 
year to the United Nations General Assembly. 
2. The Republic of the Marshall Islands has not given any particular 
designation of a formal nature to the PLO. However, Government Officials 
have referred to it as an Authority in official statements. 
3. The Republic of the Marshall Islands does not accord any other 
Palestinian representative the status of legitimacy, and although there has 
been no official formal recognition, there has neither been an official 






KUG (nr BIS YOi(i Qrt 
MAURITIUS HIGH COMMISSION 
0171-581 029415 32/33 ELVASTON PLACE 
LONDON SW7 5NW1 
Your Ref.: Telex No: 917772" 
Our Ref.: ICL 726Il/02 Fax No: 0171-823 8437 
25 June 1998 
Ms C. Jackson 
University of Bristol 
Y ., 
Department of Law. 
Wills Memorial Building 
Queens Road 
Bristol BS8 1RJ 
Dear Ms Jackson, 
The Status Accorded to the Palestine Liberation Organisation by the 
Government of Mauritius 
Thank you for your letter of 19 June, 1998. 
I would like to inform you that we do recognise the Palestine Liberation Organisation, 
having an Embassy based in Tanzania which is accredited to Mauritius. I enclose copy 
of the entry in the Mauritius Directory of the Diplomatic Corps of October 1997. 
There is no other. Palestinian Organisations, except the PLO, which appears in the 
Directory. 
I would, however, advise you to contact the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and } International Trade, New Government Centre, Port-Louis, Mauritius 
(Fax No: 00 230 208 8087) for further information. 
Yours sincerely, 
' (S. Chuckowree) 





.. -- .. -; -tom 
EMBAJADA DE MEXICO 
Caroline M. Jackson, LL. B. (Hons. ), LL. M. 
Department of Law 
University of Bristol 
Wills Memorial Building 
Queens Road 
Bristol, BS8 IRJ 
1101436 
London, September 1,1998 
Dear Ms. Jackson: 
In attention to your kind letter in which you requested information on the 
Mexican Government's position regarding the Palestinian Liberation Organisation 
(PLO), I am pleased to inform you that, according to information recently provided by 
the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs, our Government extended its recognition to 
the PLO on August 5,1975, as a National Liberation movement and as the only and 
legitimate representative of the people of Palestine. Furthermore, the PLO maintains 
an information office in Mexico since 1990 and is, consequently, granted with 
privileges and immunities. 
This Embassy hopes that the information provided would be of assistance to 








YOUR REF : 
OUR REF : 
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S`h August, 98 
EMBASSY 
of the 
FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA 
P. O. BOX 15493. SUVA. FIJI. 
Caroline M. Jackson 
Department of Law 
Wills Memorial Building 




Dear Madam Jackson: 
TELEPHONE : (679)304566 
TELEXFAX : (679)304081 
Reference is made to your inquiry concerning the status accorded to the Palestine. 
Liberation Organization (PLO) by our Government. Please be advised that the 
Government of the Federated States of Micronesia has not made any determination 
regarding the status of the PLO. 
Sincerely, . 
A 
Osaia M. Santos 





/ICE DES RELATIONS EXTERIEURES 
bIRECTION 
N° 98-1486 
PRINCIPAUTE DE MONACO 
Le 
13 JUIL 1998 
Mademoiselle, 
Suite ä: votre lettre en date du 18 juin 1998, relative au statut 
accord& par Monaco ä 1'Organisatiort de Liberation de la Palestine, j'ai 
1'honheur de vous faire savoir que la Principaut@, conform@ment ä ses usages 
diplomatiques, n'a jamais expressement reconnu cette Organisation. 
Je vous prie d'agreer, Mademoiselle, mes salutations distinguees. 
P. le Ministre d'Etat, 
Le Chef de Cabinet, 
Denis RAVERA 
Mademoi lle Caroline JACKSON - 
pepartmei t of Law 
pniversity of Bristol 
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Ms Caroline M. Jackson 
Department of Law 
Wills Memorial Building 
i--ý University of Bristol 
Queens Road 
Bristol BS8 1RJ 
Dear Ms Jackson, 
ROYAL NEPALESE EMBASSY. 
12A. KENSINGTON PALACE GARDENS, 
LONDON. W8 4QU 
28 July 1998 
With reference to your letter dated 19th June, 1998, I am sending 
herewith Nepal's position on Palestine Liberation Organisation. 
"Nepal has not officially recognised Palestine Liberation Organisation. 
However, Nepal's' policy on Palestine is that Palestine must have their 
right of self determination to their homeland. Nepal considers PLO as 









.i Mevrouw Caroline M. Jackson 
Department of Law 
University of Bristol 
Wills Memorial Building 
Queens Road 
Bristol 
BS8 IRJ ENGLAND 
AlinisteTie van 
Buitenlandse Zaken 
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
North Africa and Middle East Department 
Bezuidenhoutseweg 67 
Postbus 20061 
2500 EB Den Haag 
The Netherlands 
Date 9 July 1998 Contact drs. G. de Jong 
Our Ref M0-467/98 Tel. +31 70 3485189 
Page 1/1 Fax +31 70 3486639 
End * E-mail dam-mo@dam. minbuza. nl 
Re your letter of 21 May 1998 requesting information 
Dear Ms Jackson, 
Your request for information on the Dutch govemment's position regarding the 
status of the PLO has been passed to me. 
Since the late seventies, the Netherlands has recognised the PLO de facto as a 
negotiating partner. In the 1980 Venice Declaration, the European Community 
called for the Palestinian people and the PLO to be involved in peace talks. In 1983 
the PLO was given permission to open an office - without diplomatic status - in the 
Netherlands. 
Since the signing of the Declaration of Principles in 1993, the Netherlands has 
recognised the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people. 
I hope to have been of service. 
Yours sincerely, 
G. S de 
Head, Middle East Division 






NEW ZEALAND HIGH COINIMISSION 
TE AKA AORERE 
LONDON 
4 June 1998 156/1/1 
Caroline Jackson 
Department of Law 
University of Bristol 
Wills Memorial Building 
Queens Road 
BRISTOL BS8 1RJ 
Dear Ms Jackson 
Thank you for your letter of 21 May requesting information about the status accorded to 
the Palestine Liberation Organisation by the New Zealand Government. 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade in Wellington advise that there are 
differences between how international law portrays the Palestine Liberation 
Organisation (PLO) and the body's status in a political context. Specific responses to 
your questions are as follows: 
1) The PLO is a political entity, not *a state. It is not recognised by the New 
Zealand Government. 
2) The PLO is seen as a representative of the Palestinian people and as such the 
New Zealand Government has had dealings with the organisation. 
3) As noted in 2) above, the New Zealand Government does not see the PLO's role , 
as the exclusive representative of the Palestinian people. Other entities identified as 
representing and speaking on behalf of certain sections of the Palestinian people, but on 
which the Government passes no judgement, include the Palestine National Authority, 
the Palestine National Council, the Palestine Legislative Council and Hamas. 
Yours sincerely 
Gabrielle Rush 
for High Commissioner 
NEW ZEALAND HOUSE 80 HAYMARKET ' LONDON SWIY 4TQ 
USia 




Telephone: 01 910 0922/6 
Telex: 25827 KUNDU 
Out Ref: UICIPOL/INFO. 12 
Ms Caroline Jackson 
Department of Law 
Wills Memorial Building 
University of Bristol 
Queens Road 
BRISTOL BSS 1RJ 




PAPUA NEW GUINEA 
HIGH COMMISSION 
14 Waterloo Place, 
London SW 1R 4AFý 
17 July 1998 
The Status of Accorded to the Palestine Liberation Organisation 
by the Government of Papua New Guinea 
I refer to your letter of 21" May and 19'h June 1998 respectively, and apologise most sincerely for 
the long delay. The reason being that we had to refer your request to the appropriate authorities 
in Port Moresby for their advice due to very limited information available to us here. 
Nevertheless, I have now received a response this week and am able to response to your request. 
Papua New Guinea's official position to conducting formal relations with the Palestinian 
Liberation Organisation are as follows: 
a) Papua New Guinea formally commenced recognition of the PLO in September 
1992; 
b) Formal diplomatic ties between PNG and PLO were established on 13`h January - 1995; 
c) Papua New Guinea recognises the PLO as an emerging state; 
d) Papua New Guinea Government regards the PLO as the sole legitimate 
representative of the Palestinian people and finally, 
e) Papua New Guinea Government's current official position is that the recognition 
of the state of Palestine would only be accorded on the condition that the current 
and on-going peace negotiations between Palestinian Authorities and the Israelis 
is successfully concluded to the mutual satisfaction of all parties cgncemed. 
I trust the veatisfactorily meet your purposes. 
sincerely 
Sir Kina Bona KEE 
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Dear Ms. Jackson. 
With reference to your letters dated 21 May 1998 and 19 June 1998, below are replies to your 
queries: 
1. The Philippines first formally recognized the PLO on 18 November 1973, when it supported 
UN Security Council Resolution No. 242, dated 22 November 1967, calling for withdrawal of 
Israeli forces from all occupied Arab territories, and the restoration of the legitimate rights of 
the Palestinian people. 
In 1988, Mr. Farouk Khadoumi, Foreign Affairs Minister of the State of Palestine visited the 
Philippines. It was during this visit that the Philippine government allowed the PLO to open 
its resident mission in Manila with Hassan Hamdouna as the first Palestinian resident envoy. 
2. The Philippines recognizes the PLO as a government of an emerging state. It supports the 
rights of the Palestinian people for self determination and the establishment of a Palestinian 
state, in the context of the right of all states in the Middle East to exist peacefully along 
guaranteed borders and to have security and economic stability. 
3. The Philippines regards the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian 
people. 
It is my understanding that the above information will be used as part of your study at the 
University of Bristol establishing the status of the Palestine Liberation Organisation in 
international law. 
Very truly yours, 
Ma. Zenei aA Collinson 
Minister-Counsellor 
Ms. Caroline Jackson, LL. B. (lions), LL. M 


















OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND 
Mrs Caroline M Jackson 
Department of Law 
Wills Memorial Building 
University of Bristol 
Queens Road 
Bristol BS81RJ 
Dear Mrs Jackson, 
47 Portland Place 
London W1 N 4JH 
tel: 0171 580 4324 
fax: 0171 323 4018 
London, 25.06.1998 r. 
Thank you for your letter dated 19.06.1998. 
In accordance with your request I am sending some information from the Polish 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 
Yours sincerely, 
Kate Brujewicz 
Press & Information Office 
\ 
L ... .... 
Polish - Palestinian relations 
1. Official contacts between Poland and the political representation of the Palestinian 
nation - Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) - can be traced from the 1970s'. A PLO 
delegation, without a status of a diplomatic mission, has been established at the Committee for 
Solidarity with the Nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Since the very beginning of its 
existence, PLO has been regarded as the only representative body of the Palestinian nation. 
Diplomatic relations between Poland and PLO were instituted on the basis of the government 
decision of 22 October 1982 (after the Israeli aggression on Lebanon). The PLO delegation 
received a status of an official diplomatic mission, and its Head, the Ambassador, was granted 
the privilege of accreditation to the head of government. This state has been maintained. 
Poland recognised the act of proclamation of the State of Palestine passed on 19th 
session of the Palestinian National Council (parliament) in Algiers on 15 November 1988 and, 
º in the release by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesman, expressed its willingness to 
undertake co-operation with the Palestinian government when it has been formed". The 
change of the name of the PLO delegatiön in Warsaw into , 
The Embassy of the, State of 
Palestine" took place during Y. Arafat' s visit to Poland as a result of a one-sided Palestinian 
decision, acknowledged by the Polish authorities. 
Y. Arafat has paid three official visits to Poland. In 1989 he was received with the 
honours due to a Head of State. His first contact with Poland took place in 1955 when he 
participated in the International Youth Festival. 
In Poland, the Association for Polish - Palestinian Friendship was created, it has its 
Palestinian counterpart. 
In the 1970s', Polish attitude towards the Palestinian issue took into account all 
X" ideological and political aspects, but simultaneously it resulted from the conviction that lasting 
peace and stabilisation in the Near East, in the existing realia, was impossible to be attained 
without granting the national aspirations of Palestinians. Poland has never questioned the 
Israel's right to exist securely as a state. 
2. In the time between the initiation of the Near East peace process (Madrid, October 
1991) and the normalisation of the PLO - Israel relations (Oslo, August 1993), our contacts 
with the population on th' occupied territory consisted mainly in the participation of the 
Ambassadors of the Republic of Poland in Tel Aviv in occasional meetings organised in the 
Orient House for the representatives of the foreign diplomatic missions accredited to Israel. 






Affairs - visit to Israel (November, 1992) where he met a group of Palestinian activists who 
were taking part in the Arab - Israeli negotiations in Washington. Our mission in Tel Aviv 
suspended its contacts with the Orient House after the Cairo agreements had been conducted 
between Israel and PLO (May 1994) as a result of which Palestinian autonomy began to exist. 
These agreements limited political activity of the autonomous. authorities only to the territories 
under its administration. Consequently, the Israeli authorities began discouraging 
representatives of foreign countries from the meetings organised in the Orient House. They 
approved, however, of maintaining contacts with the delegations of the autonomous 'authorities 
on the territories under their administration. 
3. In 1995 we began a direct political dialogue with the Palestinian autonomous 
authorities through the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Cairo. On 6-12 August 1995 a 
special envoy was delegated by the Embassy to the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. He was 
r received by Y. Arafat and he also contacted representatives of the Palestinian autonomous 
authorities. Irrespective of this, since December 1994 diplomats from the Polish Embassy in 
Tel Aviv, at least once a month, and sometimes more often, have paid visits to Palestinian 
offices in Gaza and took part in the events organised there. Our mission maintains regular 
contacts with the departments of Information, International Co-operation and Planning, 
Education and Construction, Youth and Sport Tourism and Cultural Heritage and Labour and 
Social Affairs. 
4. In April 1997 the Minister for Foreign Affairs appointed a contact person (a 
counsellor at the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Tel -Aviv) between the Polish 
authorities and the Palestinian Autonomy which was an official starting point for 
communication with the Palestinian autonomous authority. We treat these contacts mainly as 
an expression of our support for the Near East peace process. 
By, Piotr Opalirtski 
Department for Africa, Asia, 
Australia and Oceania 




OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC 
CONSULAR DEPARTMENT 
25 Kensington Palace Gardens 
LONDON W8 4QY 
$ 0171-243 0803,0171-243 8935 
Fax 0171-727 5824 
London, May 25,1998 
Ms 
Caroline M. Jackson 
" -- . 'ý Department of 
Law 
_ 
"ý University of Bristol 
Wills Memorial Building 
Queens Road 
BRISTOL BS8 1RJ 
Dear Ms Jackson, 
refering to your letter of May 21,1998 on the position of 
the Government of the Slovak Republic in the status of the 
Palestine Liberation Organisation we have the following answers: 
1. The Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic 
established the diplomatic relations and recognized P. L. O. on 
November 18,1988. From January 1,1993 the two independent 
states- the Slovak Republic and also the Czech Republic were 
established. From the same day, the Slovak Republic continue with 
contacts to the Palestine National Council, as a representative 
of P. L. O. The Embassy of the Slovak Republic in Tel Aviv covers 
., the contacts to the Palestine National Council. 
2. The Government of the Slovak Republic has recognised the 
P. L. Ö. as a liberation movement. 
3. The Government of the Slovak regards the P. L. O. as the sole 
legitimate representative of the Palestine people. 
For the information on the Czech side you can contact: 
The Embassy of the Czech Republic, 26-30 Kensington Palace 
Gardens, London W8 4QY. 
Sincerely yours 
Dr M. KLItNO 
COUNSELLOR 
(Consular and Legal) 
- \ý 
VELEPOSLANISTVO REPUBLIKE SLOVENIJE 
EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA 
Suite One. Ca, - tndish Coua I -IS Wi¢mcre Street. LONDON WIN 
9LA 
Tel: 01114?: ms 
Fay: 011149: m6 
London, July 7 1998 
Ms. Caroline Jackson, 
Department of Law 
University of Bristol 
Wills Memorial Building 
Queens Road 
Bristol BS8 1RJ 
Dear Ms., Jackson, 
Re: The status of the Palestine Liberation Organisation 
Thank you for your letters of May 21 and June 19 1998. 
The Republic of Slovenia had recognised the PLO in 1992 as 
the legitimate representative of the Palestine people. 
The Republic of Slovenia recognises the PLO as the 
legitimate but not as the onl y representative. Nevertheless, 
the Republic of Slovenia has not so far recognised any other 
-Palestinian organisation. 
Yours sincerely, 
A. Br kovic (Mr) 
Minister Plenipotentiary 
ý: ý : ý: ý 
Telephone : 0171-23S 8315 SINGAPORE HIGH COMMISSION 
Facsimile : 0171-2456583 
Telex : 51-262 564 
9 Wilton Crescent 
.! 
Out Ref London SW IX 8SA 
Your Rd: 12 August 1998 
Ms Caroline Jackson 
Department of Law 
University of Bristol 




Dear Ms Jackson 
Please refer to your letter dated 21 May 98. At the outset, I would 
like to apologise for this late reply. 
Enclosed ere some speeches and statements that would give you 
an idea of our position on the recognition of the PLO. 
Yours sincerely 






SOUTH AFRICAN HIGH COMMISSION 
TRAFALGAR SQUARE LONDON WC2N 5DP 
TEL 0171 451 7299 FAX: 0171 451 7284 
Direct Line : 0171-451-7165 
Ref : 
16 June 1998 
Ms Caroline Jackson LLB (Hons), LL. M. 
Department of Law 
University of Bristol. 




Dear Ms Jackson, 
i 
1 
We have referred-your enquiry of 21 May to the relevant desk at our 
Head Office and received the following reply: 
"The South African Government recognises the State of 
Palestine as an affirmative act of diplomatic recognition, and the 
jurisdiction authority of the-Palestinian National Authority as 
defined in the Oslo Accords. Additionally, the South African 
Government is supportive of the quest of the Palestinian people to 
the right of self-determination as embodied in the leading 
Palestinian political component, the PLO". 








25th June, 1998 
Al 
6tv5gIAf Ia Jjgg. ý:. qýLIAM 
Caroline M. Jackson 
Department of Law, 
University of Bristol, 
Wills Memorial Building. 
Queens Road, 
Bristol BS 8 1RJ 
,. ý 
Dear Ms Caroline, 
Thank you very much for your letter dated May 21st and 
your reminder of 19th June, regarding the status 
Accorded to Palestine Liberation: Organisation by the 
Government of Sudan. 
I would like to confirm that the Sudan as well as other. 
Arab countries has recognized the PLO. As sole and 
Legitimate representative of. the Palestinian people. 
This happened in 1974 according-to a solution adapted by 
Arab Leaders in Arab League summit in Morocco. 
This was prior of Oslo accord which led to the 
establishment of the Palestinian National Authority under 
the leadership of PLO. 
{I hope the above mentioned information will be of any 
" help in your research. 
Thank you. 
Yours Sincerely , 
Fadl Idris Fad]. 
For/Ambassador. 
3 CLEVELAND ROW. ST. JAMESS. LONDON SW1A 1DD TEL: 0171.839 8080 FAX-0171-8397560 
! 9ý EMBASSY OF SWEDEN 
LONDON 
1998-07-06 
Caroline M Jackson 
Department of Law 
University of Bristol 
Wills Memorial Building 
Queens Road 
Bristol BS8 1RJ 
Dear Ms Jackson 
Thank you very much for your letter of May 21 and June 
19. We apologise for our late reply but hope that the 
information below can be of help in your research. 
1. The Palestine Liberation Organisation has a 
representation in Stockholm. It does not have 
diplomatic status and holds no privileges that are 
recognised by the Vienna Convention. It is since 
January 1995 referred to as The Palestinian General 
Delegation. 
2 and 3. The Swedish Government stated already in. 
1976, in connection to a debate in the UN Security 
Council, that the Palestine Liberation Organisation' 
was the most authoritative. and representative body of 
the Palestinians. This is still the case. and has not 
changed with the emergence of the Palestinian 
Authority which could be said to function more or less 
as a normal government for Palestinians in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip, but which does not necessarily 
represent the larger Palestinian community (including 
the Diaspora). This: is a role still played by the PLO. 
However, the Palestinian question is changing through 
a process of negotiation, and could develop into 
independence and finally a Palestinian state on the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
Adress Telefonen Ax Telex E-mail 
11. Montagu Place +44 171 9176400 +44 171 7244174 51 28249 embassy(swednet. org. uk 
LONDON WIH 2AL www. swedish-embassy. otg. uk 
- , --ý 
z 
Due to this process of change Sweden can not consider 
the Palestine Liberation Organisation to be the sole 
legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. 
Neither does the Swedish Government acknowledge the 
Palestine Liberation Organisation as a government of 













FÜR AUSWÄRTIGE ANGELEGENHEITEN 
DEPARTEMENT FEDERAL DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES 
DIPARTIMENTO FEDERALE DEGLI AFFARI ESTERI 
P. 279.61-2-VMA 3003 Bern, July 1st, 1998 
Bitte dieses Zeichen in der Antwod niederholen 
Pni re de rappeler cette reference Bans la rkponse 
Pregasi rarnmentare questo riferimento nella risposta 
Mrs. Caroline M. Jackson 
Department of Law 
University of Bristol 
Wills Memorial Building 
Queens Road 
GB - Bristol BS8 IRJ 
ýi 
`ý' 
Palestine Liberation Organization 
Dear Madam, 
We refer to your request of May 21st, 1998, made to our Embassy in London and forwarded to us 
for reasons of competence, and we would like to answer to your questions as follows: 
The Swiss Government has n recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). 
However, we would like to inform you that Switzerland is in a special situation regarding to the 
PLO. 
As you certainly know, our country holds the headquarters of the United Nations Organization 
(UNO) in Geneva. Therefore, as the General Assembly had recognized to the PLO the right to 
follow the sessions as Observer, the Secretary General of the UNO asked the Swiss Government 
to allow the PLO to open an office in Geneva and to grant to it privileges and immunities, which 
were necessary to accomplish its mission in conformity with the Resolution 3237 (XXIX). In order 
to answer to our engagement 'of 1946 to facilitate the activities of the UNO in Switzerland, the 
Federal Council (Swiss Government) granted, on June 25th, 1975, to the office of the PLO and its 
non-Swiss members privileges and immunities, but only on a functional basis in order to allow the 
PLO to execute properly its functions in Geneva. 
The title given in Geneva was at that time «Bureau d'observation de 1'OLP» (Office 6f 
Observation of the PLO). Later, in December 1988, the General Assembly decided that the 
designation «Palestine» should be used in place of the -designation «Palestine Liberation 
Organization. This is why the denomination in Geneva is now <Mssion permanente 
d'observation de la Palestine aupres de 1'Office des Nations Unies ä Geneve)) (Permanent 
Observer Mission of Palestine to the United Nations in Geneva). 
On a bilateral basis, on December 4th, 1992, the Director of the Permanent Observer Mission of 
Palestine to the UNO in Geneva, Mr. Nabil Ramlawi, has been appointed «Interlocuteur officiel du 
Departement federal des affaires etrangeres» (Official Interlocutor of the Federal Department of 
Foreign Affairs). Once the Palestinian Authority was established, he presented, on September 21st, 
1994, to the Head of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, the Federal Counsellor Mr. 
Flavio Cotti, his «lettres de cabinet» as «Delegue general de Palestine» (General Delegate of 
Palestine) in Switzerland. The privileges and immunities accorded to this Delegation and its 
members remained the same, that is to say only functional ones, and no office has been opened in 
Bern. 
We can also add that in the protocol order the «General Delegation of Palestine» is placed at the 
end. 
In conclusion, it is true that Switzerland considered at that time the PLO as the greatest Palestinian 
organization, however this did not give to it the lawfulness to be recognized as such, especially 
considering the fact that Switzerland only recognizes States. This statement remains for the 
Palestinian Authority which does not yet represent a State. 
Yours sincerely, 
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`U" UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL 
Caroline M. Jackson 
Department of Law 
University of Bristol 





The Director of Legal Affairs 
Tanzania High Commission 
43 Hertford Street 
London 
1 W1Y TTF 
Tel: 0117 9288991 
Dear Sir or Madam 
Re: The Status Accorded to the Palestine Liberation Organisation by the Government of 
Tanzania 
I am a researcher in the field of public international law at the University of Bristol and am 
currently conducting a study establishing what the status of the Palestine Liberation 
Organisation is in international law. 
In order to do this effectively I need to gather information directly from governments is to their 
position regarding the Palestinian Liberation Organisation. It would therefore assist me greatly 
if you would be kind enough to reply to me and supply me with the following information 
regarding the position of your government. 
1) Whether your government has recognised the Palestinian Liberation Organisation and the 
date of recognition. ; n&$0, R 
2) What your government has recognised the Palestine Liberation Organisation as. (i. e.: as a 
liberation movement, a government in exile, a government of an emerging state. ) 
3) Whether your government regards the Palestinian Liberation Organisation as the sole 
legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. If your government does not then I would 
be grateful cou please tell me if ere is an alternative body which is recognised as such 
I would like to take this opportunity to thank you in advance for your co-operation in this 
matter. I look forward to hearing from you. 
Yours faithfully 
CaroUg. Jacksort, LL. B. (Hoes), LL. M. 
- .; -_;.. (_; :.;. 
t. -.. 
TANZANIA HIGH COMMISSION 
0171-499 8951 43 Hertford Street, 
Fax 0171-491-9321 London W1Y 8D& 
Telex: 262504 TANLDN G 
E-c: tanzarcp@demon. co. uk 
ALL mw*mamcv writ be adke wI to 
I Ii. E. Tbr High ONLY. 
Please quote Ref No. TZII. 50/2 
Ms Caroline M. Jackson 
Department of Law 
Wills Memorial Building 
University of Bristol 
Queens Road 
BRISTOL BS8 1RJ 
Dear Caroline, 
6`h July 1998 
Thank you for your letter dated 19 June 1998 on the status of the Palestine 
Liberation Organisation. This is to 'inform you that The Government of the 
United Republic of Tanzania accords PLO the status an organisation/party in 
power. The PLO offices in Tanzania are accorded full diplomatic status. 
I hope this brief outline answers your question. Should you need further 
clarification, please get in touch with the undersigned. 
-t. qpLk-, ý 
Simba A. Mbenna 
for HIGH COMMISSIONER. 
I 
THE ROYAL THAI EMBASSY, 
30, QUEEN'S GATE, 
LONDON, SW7 5JB. 
No. 02/ : ýý 
+Q98 
Dear Ms Caroline Jackson, 
\Vith reference to your letters dated 21 May and 19 June 
1998 enquiring about the relations between the C Tovernment of 
Thailand and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation, I wish to state the 
following : 
1. The Government of Thailand has recognised the PLO as 
a liberation movement and as the sole legitimate representative of the 
Palestinian people since 1974 but has yet to recognise Palestine as a 
sovereign state ; 
2. Since 1974, the Government of Thailand has supported 
the right of self determination of the Palestinian people and the 
acquisition of their motherland ; 
3. In 1996 when Mr Arafat was elected the President of 
Palestinian National Authority (PNA), His Excellency Mr Banharn 
Silpa-archa, the then Prime Minister of Thailand conveyed his 
congratulatory message to him through the Thai Permanent Mission in 
New York which is our official contact channel with PNA. 
I very much. hope 
. 'that 
the above-mentioned information 




Ms Caroline Jackson, 
Department of Law, 
Wills Memorial Building, 
University of Bristol, 
Queens Road, 
Bristol BS8 IRJ 
. -.... -. -: 
. N't, 
TORKMENISTAN ILI; IHANASY EMBASSY OF TURKMENISTAN 
Caroline M. Jackson 
Department of Law 
University of Bristol 
Queens Road 
Bristol BSS 1RJ 
14 July 1998 
Dear Ms Jackson 
I refer to your letter of 8 July 1998. Please find the information requested. 
Turlanenistan and Palestine established diplomatic relations on 17 April 
1992. 
Taking into consideration the fact that on 14 November 1974 the UN General 
Assembly recognized the Palestine Liberation Organisation as the sole 
legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, the Government of 
Turkmenistan considers the PLO and the Palestine National Autonomy 
formed by it as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. 
With best regards, 
Serdar Byashimov 
Deputy Head of Mission 
TORKMENISTAN ILc t"MAY EMBASSY OF TURKMENISTAN 
14117 WELLS KOcESI. LONDON WIP VP 14117 WELLS STREET. LONDON WI? 3FP -r 
Tel *M 171256 1971 Fu +44 171 323 9184 Tel +44 171 256 1071 Fax +N 171321n 411$4 
EmaiL" mturlaneit clara. net EmaiL" mhulmieW-2lc1aramet 





230 Worple Road, 
London SW20 8RH 
9`ý 7ä1y 1998 





Caroline M. Jackson 
Department of Law 
Wills Memorial Building 




Dear Caroline Jackson, 
Thank you for your letter of 8`h July 1998, and my apologies for a delay in replying to 
your earlier communication of 8a' June. 
I am pleased to inform you that: 
1. The government of Tuvalu does not recognise the Palestinian Liberation 
Organisation. 
2. The government, however, recognises the emerging State of Palestine and the PLO 
as a government of that State. 
3. The Government of Tuvalu does not recognise PLO as the sole legitimate 
representative of the Palestinian people. It does, however, recognise PLO as the 
legitimate representative of the present Government of the Palestinian State. 
Yours sincerely, 
I. A. Ayaz, OBE 
Consul of Tuvalu 
`ýý 
Embassy of Ukraine 
in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
78 Kensington Park Road, London WVI 12PL. 
Tel: 0171-727 6312 Fax: 0171-792 1708 
i .. 
Mrs Caroline M. Jackson 
Department of Law 
Wills Memorial Building 
University of Bristol 
Queens Road 
Bristol, BS8 IRJ 
KB%98-222 






Dear Kirs Jackson, 
Re: The Status of the Palestine Liberation Organisation 
I refer to your letter of 8t' July 1998. 
Please be advised that Ukraine considers that the Palestinian people due to historical 
circumstances has its specific political, economic and cultural interests. Ukraine from 
the first day of its Independence recognises PLO de facto as the sole representative of 
the Palestinian people irrespective of the place of resitlence. 
The recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organisation as such does not demand 
according. to the Ukrainian -legislation the adoption of the special legal act of its 
confirmation. 





Embassy of the 
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 
London 
Caroline M. Jackson 
Department of Law 
Wills Memorial Building 











Dear Ms. Jackson, 
Thank you for your letter of 19th June. I am enclosing the following items: 
1. UAE yearbook, which is quite a good document, it contains a separate chapter on 
foreign policy and Middle East policy. 
2. Speech of the Foreign Affairs Minister at the Islamic summit which has certain 
views on the Middle East Policy. 
Should you need specific answers to certain question, please contact the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, P. O. Box 1, Abu-Dhabi, UAE. Tel: 9712 652200, Fax: 9712 663926. 
With kind regards. 
Sincerely yours 
I-? -- Itf j --- F. Sultan 




Embassy of the United Arab Emirates, 30 Princes Gate, London SW7 1PT Teh 0171 581 1281, Fax: 0171581 9616 
Consular & Commercial Section, Tel: 0171 589 3434, Telex: 918 459, Cables: Emarat, London SW7. 
[MBASSY OF URUGUAY 
Landon, 8 June 1993 
No. 045/98 
Ms. Caroline M. Jackson 
Department of Law 
University of Bristol 
Wills Memorial Building 
Queens Road 
Bristol BS8 I RJ 
Dear Ms. Jackson, 
Thank you for your letter dated 21 May 1998 requesting Information on the status accorded to 
the Palestine Liberation Organisation by the Government of Uruguay. 
Following consultations with the Uruguayan Foreign Ministry, I can -confirm that the Uruguayan 
Government have not formally recognised the above-mentioned organisation or the so-called 
Natiönal Palestine Administration. 
Notwithstanding, on the occasion of the inauguration of the new Palestine National Authority 
the then Uruguayan Foreign Minister sent Mr Yasser Arafat a note of congratulations. The 
Foreign Minister highlighted the 'firm support' of our Government towards the Palestine 
authorities' efforts In order to secure the peace process in the Middle East. The expression 
, legitimate Palestine authorities' was also mentioned by him. 
I sincerely hope that this information meets with your satisfaction. 
_, 
Yours faithfully. 
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20 August 1998 
Ms. Caroline M. Jackson, LL. B. (Hons). LL. M 
Department of Law 
University of Bristol 
Bristol. - . 
Dear Ms. Jackson 
Further to your letter dated 21s` May 1998 in relation to the position. of 
Venezuela regarding the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), please be advised 
that the government of Venezuela is : currently studying the formalisation of full 
diplomatic relations with the Organisation. 
At the United Nations, Venezuela has repeatedly supported General 
Assembly resolutions regarding the status of the PLO as the sole legitimate 
representative of the Palestinian people and at present, the Embassy of Venezuela 
in Israel exercises diplomatic duties before the Palestine National Authority. 
lt has therefore been suggested that a simple normalisation of a de facto 
situation take place, through a de jure recognition that would formalise the cordial 














EMBASSY OF THE FEDERAL 
REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA 
5 Le)dwn Gardens. LONDON W3 
35JJ 
ir 
Ms Caroline Jackson, LLB. (Hons), LL. M. 
Department of Law 
University of Bristol 
Wills Memorial Building 
Queens Road 
Bristol, BS8 1RJ 
Dear Ms Caroline Jackson, 
11 August 1998 
Further to your letter requesting information on the status accorded to 
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) by the Government of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, I would like to advise you of the following: 
1. The Social Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia (SSRNJ), 
as the most numerous political organization in the former SFR of Yugoslavia, 
established de facto relations with the PLO in 1964 when it was established. At that 
time PLO did not have an emphasized political character and it was focused in 
particular on the problem of Palestinian refugees. At the 'time when Yasser Arafat 
became its leader and assumed the post of its executive secretary in-1969, the PLO 
became more a political organization. As it is known, the PLO comprised at that 
time a number of Palestinian organizations and movements. Since then, political 
and State authorities of the SFR of Yugoslavia has recognized the PLO as the sole 
legitimate representative of the Palestinian people: However, that did not exclude 
relations of political organizations of that time , i. e. parties, of the SFR of 
Yugoslavia 
(SSRNJ and Yugoslav Communist Party) with other members or non-members of 
the PLO, aimed at ensuring full protection of interests of the Palestinian people. 
\1 
. .. _-_. 
Z. -- 
2. 
The first representative office of the PLO in Europe was opened in 
Belgrade in 1971. 
On 15 November 1988 the Palestinian State was proclaimed by the 
Palestinian National Council at its 19th special meeting in Algeria from 12-15 
November 1988. The SFR of Yugoslavia was the fifth country which recognized the 
Palestinian State. The next year, on 5 April 1989 diplomatic relations were 
established between the SFR of Yugoslavia and the Palestinian State. The 
representative office of the PLO in Belgrade got the status of the 'Embassy of the 
1 Palestinian State. 
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Telephone: 0171 836 7755 
Facsimile: 0171 379 1167 
Telexes: 262014/262115 
Our Ref: ZLO/INF/8 
5 June, 1998 
HIGH COMMISSION OF THE 
REPUBLIC OF ZIMBABWE 
ZIMBABWE HOUSE 
429 STRAND 
LONDON WC2R OSA 
Ms Caroline Jackson 
University of Bristol 
Department of Law 




Dear Ms Jackson, 
RE: IU V STATUS ACCORDED TO THE PLO BY THE 
GOVERNMENT OF ZIMBABWE 
Thank you for your letter dated 21 May, 1998. 
The Government of Zimbabwe recognised the PLO in 1980. The PLO was 
recognised as a government in exile and was/and is represented in 
Zimbabwe at Ambassadorial level. Zimbabwe also regards the PLO as a 
legitimate representative of the Palestian people. 
We apologise for the late response. 
Yours faithfully 
e oorgina Kwesha 
For. High Commissioner 
--y- 
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